Fire Safety Encyclopedia

Who won the Finnish war 1939 1940. Soviet-Finnish war. Losses. Other loss estimates

(see the beginning in the previous 3 publications)

73 years ago, one of the most unreported wars, in which our state took part, ended. The Soviet-Finnish war of 1940, also called the "Winter" war, cost our state dearly. According to the lists of names drawn up by the personnel apparatus of the Red Army in 1949-1951, the total number of irrecoverable losses amounted to 126,875 people. The Finnish side in this conflict lost 26,662 people. Thus, the ratio of losses is 1 to 5, which clearly shows the poor quality of command, weapons and skills of the Red Army. Nevertheless, despite such a high level of losses, the Red Army completed all its tasks, albeit with a certain adjustment.

So at the initial stage of this war, the Soviet government was confident of an early victory and complete capture of Finland. It was from these perspectives that the Soviet authorities formed the "government of the Finnish Democratic Republic" headed by Otto Kuusinen, a former deputy of the Finnish Sejm, delegate of the II International. However, as the hostilities developed, appetites had to be reduced, and instead of the premiership of Finland, Kuusinen received the post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the newly formed Karelo-Finnish SSR, which existed until 1956, and remained the head of the Supreme Council of the Karelian ASSR.

Despite the fact that the entire territory of Finland was never conquered by Soviet troops, the USSR received significant territorial acquisitions. The sixteenth republic within the USSR, the Karelo-Finnish SSR, was formed from the new territories and the already existing Karelian Autonomous Republic.

The stumbling block and the reason for the start of the war - the Soviet-Finnish border in the Leningrad region was pushed back 150 kilometers. The entire northern coast of Lake Ladoga became part of the Soviet Union, and this reservoir became internal for the USSR. In addition, a part of Lapland and an island in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland went to the USSR. The Hanko Peninsula, which was a kind of key to the Gulf of Finland, was leased to the USSR for 30 years. The Soviet naval base on this peninsula existed at the beginning of December 1941. On June 25, 1941, three days after the attack of Nazi Germany, Finland declared war on the USSR and on the same day Finnish troops began military operations against the Soviet garrison of Hanko. The defense of this territory continued until December 2, 1941. Currently, the Hanko Peninsula belongs to Finland. During the Winter War, Soviet troops occupied the Pechenga region, which was part of the Arkhangelsk Territory before the 1917 revolution. After the transfer of this area to Finland in 1920, large reserves of nickel were discovered there. The fields were developed by French, Canadian and British companies. Largely due to the fact that the nickel mines were controlled by Western capital, in order to maintain good relations with France and Great Britain, following the results of the Finnish War, this section was transferred back to Finland. In 1944, after the completion of the Petsamo-Kirkineskoy operation, Pechenga was occupied by Soviet troops and subsequently became part of the Murmansk region.

The Finns fought selflessly and the result of their resistance was not only great losses of the Red Army personnel, but also significant losses of military equipment. The Red Army lost 640 aircraft, the Finns knocked out 1800 tanks - and all this with the complete domination of Soviet aviation in the air and the Finns practically lacking anti-tank artillery. However, no matter what exotic methods of fighting Soviet tanks the Finnish troops came up with, luck was on the side of the "big battalions".

All the hope of the Finnish leadership was in the formula "The West will help us." However, even the closest neighbors provided Finland with rather symbolic assistance. 8 thousand untrained volunteers arrived from Sweden, but at the same time Sweden refused to let 20 thousand interned Polish soldiers through its territory, ready to fight on the side of Finland. Norway was represented by 725 volunteers, and 800 Danes also intended to fight against the USSR. Hitler and Mannerheim set up another bandwagon: the Nazi leader banned the transit of equipment and people through the territory of the Reich. A couple of thousand volunteers (albeit elderly) arrived from the UK. A total of 11.5 thousand volunteers arrived in Finland, which could not seriously affect the balance of power.

In addition, the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations should have brought moral satisfaction to the Finnish side. However, this international organization was only a pathetic forerunner of the modern United Nations. In total, it included 58 states, and in different years, countries such as Argentina (withdrew in the period 1921-1933), Brazil (withdrew from 1926), Romania (exited in 1940) left it for various reasons, Czechoslovakia (membership terminated on March 15, 1939), and so on. In general, one gets the impression that the countries participating in the League of Nations did nothing but enter or leave it. Countries close to Europe such as Argentina, Uruguay and Colombia especially actively advocated the exclusion of the Soviet Union as an aggressor, while Finland's closest neighbors Denmark, Sweden and Norway, on the contrary, declared that they would not support any sanctions against the USSR. Not being any serious international institution, the League of Nations was dissolved in 1946 and, ironically, the chairman of the Swedish story (parliament) Hambro, the one who had to read out the decision to expel the USSR, at the final assembly of the League of Nations read out his greetings to the founding countries of the UN , among which were the Soviet Union, still headed by Joseph Stalin.

The deliveries of weapons and ammunition to Filandia from European countries were paid for with hard currency, and at inflated prices, which Mannerheim himself admitted. In the Soviet-Finnish war, the concerns of France (which at the same time managed to sell weapons to the promising Nazi ally of Romania), Great Britain, which sold the Finns frankly outdated weapons, received profits. An obvious enemy of the Anglo-French allies - Italy sold 30 aircraft and anti-aircraft guns to Finland. Hungary, which then fought on the Axis side, sold anti-aircraft guns, mortars and grenades, and Belgium, after a short time fell under a German attack, sold ammunition. The closest neighbor - Sweden - sold to Finland 85 anti-tank guns, half a million cartridges, gasoline, 104 anti-aircraft weapons. Finnish soldiers fought in greatcoats made from cloth bought in Sweden. Some of these purchases were paid for with a $ 30 million loan from the United States. What is most interesting is that most of the equipment arrived "at the end" and did not have time to take part in hostilities during the Winter War, but, apparently, was successfully used by Finland already during the Great Patriotic War in alliance with Nazi Germany.

In general, one gets the impression that at that time (winter 1939-1940) the leading European powers: neither France nor Great Britain had yet decided who they would have to fight with in the next few years. In any case, the head of the British Department of the North, Laurencollier, believed that the goals of Germany and Great Britain in this war could be common, and according to eyewitnesses, judging by the French newspapers of that winter, it seemed that France was at war with the Soviet Union, and not with Germany. The Joint British-French War Council on February 5, 1940, decided to ask the governments of Norway and Sweden to provide Norwegian territory for the landing of the British Expeditionary Force. But even the British were surprised by the statement of the French Prime Minister Daladier, who unilaterally announced that his country was ready to send 50 thousand soldiers and a hundred bombers to help Finland. By the way, plans to wage war against the USSR, which at that time was assessed by the British and French as a significant supplier of strategic raw materials to Germany, developed after the signing of peace between Finland and the USSR. As early as March 8, 1940, a few days before the end of the Soviet-Finnish war, the British Chiefs of Staff developed a memorandum describing the future military actions of the British-French allies against the USSR. Combat operations were planned on a wide scale: in the north, in the Pechenga-Petsamo region, in the Murmansk direction, in the Arkhangelsk region, in the Far East and in the southern direction - in the Baku, Grozny and Batumi regions. In these plans, the USSR was viewed as a strategic ally of Hitler, supplying him with strategic raw materials - oil. According to the French General Weygand, the blow should have been delivered in June-July 1940. But by the end of April 1940, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain admitted that the Soviet Union adheres to strict neutrality and there was no reason for an attack. In addition, already in June 1940, German tanks entered Paris, and it was then that the joint French-British plans were seized by the Nazis. troops.

Nevertheless, all these plans remained only on paper, and for more than a hundred days of the Soviet-Finnish won, no significant assistance was provided by the Western powers. In fact, Finland was put in a stalemate during the war by its closest neighbors, Sweden and Norway. On the one hand, the Swedes and Norwegians verbally expressed all kinds of support for the Finns, allowed their volunteers to participate in hostilities on the side of the Finnish troops, and on the other hand, these countries blocked a decision that could actually change the course of the war. The Swedish and Norwegian governments refused the request of the Western powers to provide their territory for the transit of military personnel and military cargo, and otherwise the Western Expeditionary Force could not arrive at the theater of operations.

By the way, the military expenditures of Finland in the pre-war period were calculated precisely on the basis of possible Western military assistance. Fortifications on the Mannerheim Line in the period 1932-1939 were not at all the main item of Finnish military spending. The overwhelming majority of them were completed by 1932, and in the subsequent period, a gigantic (in relative terms, it amounted to 25 percent of Finland's entire budget), the Finnish military budget was allocated, for example, for such things as the massive construction of military bases, warehouses and airfields. So the military airfields of Finland could accommodate ten times more aircraft than were at that time in service with the Finnish Air Force. Obviously, the entire Finnish military infrastructure was being prepared for foreign expeditionary troops. Tellingly, the massive filling of Finnish warehouses with British and French military equipment began after the end of the Winter War, and all this mass of goods almost in full fell subsequently into the hands of Nazi Germany.

Actually, the Soviet troops began military operations only after the Soviet leadership received guarantees from Great Britain that it would not interfere in the future Soviet-Finnish conflict. Thus, the fate of Finland in the Winter War was predetermined by precisely this position of the Western allies. The United States has adopted a similar double-faced position. Despite the fact that the American Ambassador to the USSR Steinhardt literally went into hysterics, demanding to impose sanctions against the Soviet Union, expel Soviet citizens from the United States and close the Panama Canal for the passage of our ships, US President Franklin Roosevelt limited himself to imposing a "moral embargo".

The English historian E. Hughes generally described the support of France and Great Britain to Finland at a time when these countries were already at war with Germany as a “product of a madhouse”. One gets the impression that the Western countries were even ready to enter into an alliance with Hitler only for the Wehrmacht to lead the West's crusade against the USSR. French Prime Minister Daladier, speaking in parliament after the end of the Soviet-Finnish war, said that the results of the Winter War are a disgrace for France and a "great victory" for Russia.

The events and military conflicts of the late 1930s, in which the Soviet Union participated, became episodes in history in which the USSR first began to act as a subject of international politics. Before that, our country was viewed as a "terrible child", an unviable monster, a temporary misunderstanding. Nor should we overestimate the economic potential of Soviet Russia. In 1931, at a conference of industrial workers, Stalin said that the USSR lagged behind the developed countries by 50-100 years and this distance should be covered by our country in ten years: "Either we do it, or they will crush us." The Soviet Union did not succeed in completely eliminating the technological backwardness even by 1941, but it was no longer possible to crush us. With the industrialization of the USSR, it gradually began to show its teeth to the Western community, starting to defend its own interests, including by armed means. Throughout the end of the 1930s, the USSR carried out the restoration of territorial losses that resulted from the collapse of the Russian Empire. The Soviet government methodically pushed state borders further and further beyond the West. Many acquisitions were made almost bloodlessly, mainly by diplomatic methods, but the transfer of the border from Leningrad cost our army many thousands of soldiers' lives. Nevertheless, such a transfer largely predetermined the fact that during the Great Patriotic War, the German army got bogged down in the Russian expanses and in the end Nazi Germany was defeated.

After almost half a century of constant wars, as a result of the Second World War, relations between our countries have returned to normal. The Finnish people and their government have realized that their country is better off acting as a mediator between the world of capitalism and socialism, rather than being a bargaining chip in the geopolitical games of world leaders. And even more so, the Finnish society has ceased to feel itself as a vanguard of the Western world, called upon to contain the "communist hell". This position has led to the fact that Finland has become one of the most prosperous and fastest growing European countries.

A New Look

Triumphant defeat.

Why hide the victory of the Red Army
in the "winter war"?
The version of Viktor Suvorov.


The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, called the "winter war", is known as one of the most shameful pages of Soviet military history. The huge Red Army for three and a half months was unable to break through the defenses of the Finnish militias, and as a result, the Soviet leadership was forced to agree to a peace treaty with Finland.

Marshal Mannerheim, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Finland, Winner of the "Winter War"?


The defeat of the Soviet Union in the "winter war" is the most striking evidence of the weakness of the Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. It serves as one of the main arguments for those historians and publicists who argue that the USSR was not preparing for a war with Germany and that Stalin tried by any means to delay the entry of the Soviet Union into the world conflict.
Indeed, it is unlikely that Stalin could have planned an attack on a strong and well-armed Germany at a time when the Red Army suffered such a shameful defeat in battles with such a small and weak enemy. However, is the "shameful defeat" of the Red Army in the "winter war" an obvious and self-evident axiom? In order to understand this issue, first consider the facts.

Preparing for war: Stalin's plans

The Soviet-Finnish war began at the initiative of Moscow. On October 12, 1939, the Soviet government demanded that Finland cede the Karelian Isthmus and the Rybachiy Peninsula, transfer all the islands in the Gulf of Finland and lease the port of Hanko for a long-term lease as a naval base. In exchange, Moscow offered Finland a territory twice as large in size, but not suitable for economic activity and useless from a strategic point of view.

A Finnish government delegation arrived in Moscow to discuss territorial disputes ...


The Finnish government has not rejected the "great neighbor" claim. Even Marshal Mannerheim, who was considered a pro-German supporter, spoke in favor of a compromise with Moscow. In mid-October, Soviet-Finnish negotiations began, which lasted less than a month. On November 9, negotiations broke off, but the Finns were ready for a new bargaining. By mid-November, the tension in Soviet-Finnish relations seemed to be defused somewhat. The Finnish government even urged residents of border areas who moved inland during the conflict to return to their homes. However, at the end of the same month, on November 30, 1939, Soviet troops attacked the Finnish border.
Citing the reasons that prompted Stalin to start a war against Finland, Soviet (now Russian!) Researchers and a significant part of Western scientists indicate that the main goal of Soviet aggression was the desire to secure Leningrad. Like, when the Finns refused to exchange lands, Stalin wanted to seize part of the Finnish territory near Leningrad in order to better protect the city from attack.
This is a clear lie! The true purpose of the attack on Finland is obvious - the Soviet leadership intended to seize this country and include it in the "Unbreakable Union ..." Back in August 1939, during secret Soviet-German negotiations on the division of spheres of influence, Stalin and Molotov insisted on the inclusion of Finland (along with the three Baltic states) into the "Soviet sphere of influence." Finland was to become the first country in a series of states that Stalin planned to annex to his power.
The aggression was planned long before the attack. The Soviet and Finnish delegations were still discussing the possible conditions for territorial exchange, and in Moscow the future communist government of Finland was already being formed - the so-called "People's Government of the Finnish Democratic Republic". It was headed by one of the founders of the Communist Party of Finland, Otto Kuusinen, who permanently lived in Moscow and worked in the apparatus of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

Otto Kuusinen is a Stalinist candidate for the Finnish leader.


A group of leaders of the Comintern. Standing first on the left - O. Kuusinen


Later O. Kuusinen became a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), was appointed deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and in 1957-1964 he was the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Other "ministers" of the "people's government", which were to arrive in Helsinki in a train of Soviet troops and announce the "voluntary annexation" of Finland to the USSR, were similar to Kuusinen. At the same time, under the leadership of NKVD officers, units of the so-called "Red Army of Finland" were created, which was assigned the role of "extras" in the planned performance.

Chronicle of the "winter war"

However, the performance did not work out. The Soviet military planned to quickly capture Finland, which did not have a strong army. People's Commissar of Defense "Stalin's Eagle" Voroshilov boasted that in six days the Red Army would be in Helsinki.
But already in the first days of the offensive, Soviet troops encountered stubborn resistance from the Finns.

Finnish huntsmen are the mainstay of Mannerheim's army.



Having advanced 25-60 km deep into the territory of Finland, the Red Army was stopped at the narrow Karelian Isthmus. Finnish defensive forces buried themselves on the Mannerheim Line and fought off all Soviet attacks. The 7th Army, commanded by General Meretskov, suffered heavy losses. Additional troops, sent by the Soviet command to Finland, were surrounded by mobile Finnish detachments of warriors-skiers, who made sudden raids from the forests, exhausting and bleeding the aggressors.
For a month and a half, the huge Soviet army trampled on the Karelian Isthmus. At the end of December, the Finns even tried to launch a counteroffensive, but they clearly lacked the strength.
The failures of the Soviet troops forced Stalin to take extraordinary measures. On his orders, several high-ranking commanders were publicly shot in the army in the field; General Semyon Timoshenko (the future People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR), who was close to the leader, became the new commander of the main North-Western Front. To break through the "Mannerheim Line", additional reinforcements were sent to Finland, as well as NKVD detachments.

Semyon Timoshenko - the head of the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim line"


On January 15, 1940, Soviet artillery began a massive shelling of the positions of the Finnish defense, which lasted 16 days. In early February, 140 thousand soldiers and more than a thousand tanks were thrown into the offensive in the Karelian sector. Fierce fighting took place on a narrow isthmus for two weeks. Only on February 17, Soviet troops managed to break through the Finnish defenses, and on February 22, Marshal Mannerheim ordered to withdraw the army to a new defensive line.
Although the Red Army managed to break through the "Mannerheim Line" and capture the city of Vyborg, the Finnish troops were not defeated. The Finns managed to once again strengthen themselves on new frontiers. In the rear of the occupation army, mobile detachments of Finnish partisans were operating, making daring attacks on enemy units. Soviet troops were worn out and battered; their losses were enormous. One of Stalin's generals bitterly admitted:
“We have conquered just as much Finnish territory as is needed to bury our dead.
Under these conditions, Stalin preferred to again propose to the Finnish government to settle the territorial issue through negotiations. The Secretary General chose not to recall the plans for Finland to join the Soviet Union. By that time, Kuusinen's puppet "people's government" and his "Red Army" had already been quietly disbanded. As compensation, the failed "leader of Soviet Finland" received the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the newly created Karelo-Finnish SSR. And some of his colleagues in the "cabinet of ministers" were simply shot - apparently, so as not to get underfoot ...
The Finnish government immediately agreed to negotiations. Although the Red Army suffered heavy losses, it was clear that the small Finnish defense would not be able to stop the Soviet offensive for long.
Negotiations began at the end of February. On the night of March 12, 1940, a peace treaty was concluded between the USSR and Finland.

The head of the Finnish delegation announces the signing of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union.


The Finnish delegation accepted all the Soviet demands: Helsinki ceded to Moscow the Karelian Isthmus with the city of Viipuri, the northeastern shore of Lake Ladoga, the port of Hanko and the Rybachiy Peninsula - only about 34 thousand square kilometers of the country's territory.

Results of the war: victory or defeat.

So these are the basic facts. Remembering them, now you can try to analyze the results of the "winter war".
Obviously, as a result of the war, Finland found itself in a worse position: in March 1940, the Finnish government was forced to make much larger territorial concessions than those demanded by Moscow in October 1939. Thus, at first glance, Finland was defeated.

Marshal Mannerheim managed to defend the independence of Finland.


However, the Finns managed to defend their independence. The Soviet Union, which unleashed the war, did not achieve its main goal - the annexation of Finland to the USSR. Moreover, the failure of the Red Army offensive in December 1939 - the first half of January 1940 caused enormous damage to the prestige of the Soviet Union and, first of all, its armed forces. The whole world made fun of the huge army, which for a month and a half trampled on a narrow isthmus, unable to break the resistance of the tiny Finnish army.
Politicians and the military were quick to conclude that the Red Army was weak. The developments on the Soviet-Finnish front in Berlin were especially closely followed. German propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary back in November 1939:
"The Russian army is worth little. It is poorly guided and even worse armed ..."
A few days later, Hitler repeated the same thought:
"The Fuehrer again defines the catastrophic state of the Russian army. It is barely capable of fighting ... It is possible that the average level of intelligence of the Russians does not allow them to produce modern weapons."
It seemed that the course of the Soviet-Finnish war fully confirmed the opinion of the Nazi leaders. On January 5, 1940, Goebbels wrote in his diary:
"In Finland, the Russians are not advancing at all. It looks like the Red Army is really not worth much."
The topic of the weakness of the Red Army was constantly discussed at the headquarters of the Fuhrer. Hitler himself said on January 13:
"You can't squeeze out more of the Russians ... It's very good for us. Better a weak partner in our neighbors than an arbitrarily good alliance."
On January 22, Hitler and his entourage again discussed the course of hostilities in Finland and came to the conclusion:
"Moscow is very weak militarily ..."

Adolf Hitler was convinced that the "winter war" revealed the weakness of the Red Army.


And in March, a representative of the Nazi press at the headquarters of the Fuhrer Heinz Lorenz openly mocked the Soviet army:
"... Russian soldiers are just fun. Not a trace of discipline ..."
Not only Nazi leaders, but also serious military analysts saw the Red Army's failures as evidence of its weakness. Analyzing the course of the Soviet-Finnish war, the German General Staff made the following conclusion in a report to Hitler:
"The Soviet masses cannot resist a professional army with a skillful command."
Thus, the "winter war" dealt a severe blow to the authority of the Red Army. And although the Soviet Union made very significant territorial concessions in this conflict, strategically it suffered a shameful defeat. In any case, this is the opinion of almost all historians who have studied the Soviet-Finnish war.
But Viktor Suvorov, not trusting the opinion of the most authoritative researchers, decided to check for himself: did the Red Army really show weakness and inability to fight during the "winter war"?
The results of his analysis were amazing.

The historian is at war with ... the computer

First of all, Viktor Suvorov decided to simulate the conditions in which the Red Army was fighting on a powerful analytical computer. He entered the necessary parameters into a special program:

Temperature - up to minus 40 degrees Celsius;
the depth of the snow cover is one and a half meters;
relief - rugged terrain, forests, swamps, lakes
etc.
And every time the smart computer answered:


IMPOSSIBLE

IMPOSSIBLE
at this temperature;
with such a depth of snow cover;
with such a relief
etc...

The computer refused to simulate the course of the Red Army offensive in the given parameters, recognizing them as unacceptable for conducting offensive operations.
Then Suvorov decided to abandon the modeling of natural conditions and suggested that the computer plan a breakthrough of the "Mannerheim line" without taking into account the climate and relief.
Here it is necessary to clarify what the Finnish "Mannerheim Line" was.

Marshal Mannerheim personally supervised the construction of fortifications on the Soviet-Finnish border.


The Mannerheim Line was the name given to a system of defensive fortifications on the Soviet-Finnish border 135 kilometers long and up to 90 kilometers deep. The first line of the line included: extensive minefields, anti-tank ditches and granite boulders, reinforced concrete tetrahedrons, wire barriers in 10-30 rows. Behind the first line was the second: reinforced concrete fortifications 3-5 floors underground - real underground fortresses made of fortification concrete, covered with armor plates and multi-ton granite boulders. In each fortress there is an ammunition and fuel depot, a water supply system, a power station, rest rooms, and operating rooms. And then again - forest rubble, new minefields, escarpments, barriers ...
After receiving detailed information about the fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line", the computer clearly replied:

Main attack direction: Lintura - Viipuri
before the offensive - fire training
first explosion: air, epicenter - Kannelyarvi, equivalent - 50 kilotons,
height - 300
second explosion: air, epicenter - Lounatjoki, equivalent ...
third explosion ...

But the Red Army had no nuclear weapons in 1939!
Therefore, Suvorov introduced a new condition into the program: to attack the "Mannerheim Line" without using nuclear weapons.
And again the computer replied categorically:

Conducting offensive operations
IMPOSSIBLE

A powerful analytical computer recognized the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" in winter conditions without the use of nuclear weapons IMPOSSIBLE four times, five times, many times ...
But the Red Army made this breakthrough! Let after long battles, albeit at the cost of huge human sacrifices - but still, in February 1940, the "Russian soldiers", who were mockingly gossiped at the Fuehrer's headquarters, did the impossible - they broke through the "Mannerheim line".
It is another matter that this heroic feat did not make sense, that in general this whole war was an ill-considered adventure generated by the ambitions of Stalin and his parquet "eagles".
But militarily, the "winter war" demonstrated not weakness, but the might of the Red Army, its ability to carry out even an IMPOSSIBLE order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Hitler and company did not understand this, many military experts did not understand, and after them modern historians did not understand either.

Who Lost the Winter War?

However, not all contemporaries agreed with Hitler's assessment of the results of the "winter war". Thus, the Finns who fought with the Red Army did not laugh at the "Russian soldiers" and did not repeat about the "weakness" of the Soviet troops. When Stalin invited them to end the war, they very quickly agreed. And they not only agreed, but also without long disputes ceded strategically important territories to the Soviet Union - much larger than Moscow demanded before the war. And the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, spoke of the Red Army with great respect. He considered Soviet troops modern and effective and had a high opinion of their fighting qualities:
"Russian soldiers learn quickly, catch everything on the fly, act without delay, easily obey discipline, are distinguished by courage and sacrifice and are ready to fight to the last bullet, despite the hopelessness of the situation," the marshal said.

Mannerheim had the opportunity to be convinced of the bravery of the soldiers of the Red Army. Marshal on the front line.


And the neighbors of the Finns - the Swedes - also commented with respect and admiration on the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" by the Red Army. And in the Baltic countries, too, they did not make fun of the Soviet troops: in Tallinn, Kaunas and Riga they watched in horror the actions of the Red Army in Finland.
Viktor Suvorov noted:
"The hostilities in Finland ended on March 13, 1940, and in the summer the three Baltic states: Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia surrendered to Stalin without a fight and turned into" republics "of the Soviet Union.
Indeed, the Baltic countries made an absolutely clear conclusion from the results of the "winter war": the USSR possesses a powerful and modern army, ready to carry out any order, without stopping at any sacrifices. And in June 1940 Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia surrendered without resistance, and in early August "the family of Soviet republics was replenished with three new members."

Soon after the Winter War, the three Baltic states disappeared from the world map.


At the same time, Stalin demanded that the Romanian government "return" Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which were part of the Russian Empire before the revolution. Taking into account the experience of the "winter war", the Romanian government did not even begin to bargain: on June 26, 1940, a Stalin ultimatum was sent, and on June 28, units of the Red Army "in accordance with the agreement" crossed the Dniester and entered Bessarabia. On June 30, a new Soviet-Romanian border was established.
Consequently, it can be considered that as a result of the "winter war" the Soviet Union not only annexed the Finnish border lands, but also got the opportunity to seize three countries entirely without a fight and a large part of the fourth country. So, strategically, Stalin won this carnage.
So, Finland did not lose the war - the Finns managed to defend the independence of their state.
The Soviet Union did not lose the war either - as a result, the Baltics and Romania submitted to the dictates of Moscow.
Who, then, lost the "winter war"?
Viktor Suvorov answered this question, as always, paradoxically:
"Hitler lost the war in Finland."
Yes, the Nazi leader, who closely followed the course of the Soviet-Finnish war, made the biggest mistake a statesman can make: he underestimated the enemy. "Not understanding this war, not assessing its difficulties, Hitler drew catastrophically wrong conclusions. For some reason he suddenly decided that the Red Army was not ready for war, that the Red Army was not capable of anything."
Hitler miscalculated. And in April 1945 he paid with his life for this miscalculation ...

Soviet historiography
- in the footsteps of Hitler

However, Hitler very soon realized his mistake. Already on August 17, 1941, just a month and a half after the start of the war with the USSR, he told Goebbels:
- We seriously underestimated the Soviet combat readiness and, mainly, the armament of the Soviet army. We did not even have an approximate idea of ​​what the Bolsheviks had at their disposal. Therefore, an incorrect assessment was given ...
- Maybe it's very good that we did not have such an accurate idea of ​​the potential of the Bolsheviks. Otherwise, perhaps we would have been horrified by the urgent issue of the East and the proposed attack on the Bolsheviks ...
And on September 5, 1941, Goebbels admitted - but only to himself, in his diary:
"... We misjudged the Bolshevik resistance force, we had incorrect figures and we based our whole policy on them."

Hitler and Mannerheim in 1942. The Fuhrer has already realized his miscalculation.


True, Hitler and Goebbels did not admit that the cause of the disaster was their self-confidence and incompetence. They tried to shift all the blame onto the "treachery of Moscow." Speaking to his comrades-in-arms at the Wolfschanze headquarters on April 12, 1942, the Fuhrer said:
- The Russians ... have carefully concealed everything that is in any way connected with their military power. The whole war with Finland in 1940 ... is nothing more than a grandiose disinformation campaign, since Russia at one time had weapons that made it, along with Germany and Japan, a world power.
But, one way or another, Hitler and Goebbels admitted that, analyzing the results of the "winter war", they were mistaken in assessing the potential and strength of the Red Army.
However, until now, after 57 years after this confession, most historians and publicists continue to talk about the "shameful defeat" of the Red Army.
Why do communist and other "progressive" historians so persistently repeat the theses of Nazi propaganda about the "weakness" of the Soviet armed forces, about their "unpreparedness for war," why, after Hitler and Goebbels, do they describe the "inferiority" and "lack of training" of Russian soldiers and officers?
Viktor Suvorov believes that behind all these rantings lies the desire of semi-official Soviet (now Russian!) Historiography to conceal the truth about the pre-war state of the Red Army. Soviet falsifiers and their Western "progressive" allies, despite all the facts, are trying to convince the public that on the eve of Germany's attack on the USSR, Stalin did not even think about aggression (as if there was no capture of the Baltic countries and part of Romania), but was only concerned about "ensuring the security of the borders" ...
In fact (and the "winter war" confirms this!) The Soviet Union already at the end of the 30s had one of the most powerful armies, armed with modern military equipment and staffed with well-trained and disciplined soldiers. This powerful war machine was created by Stalin for the Great Victories of Communism in Europe, and perhaps all over the world.
On June 22, 1941, preparations for the World Revolution were interrupted by a surprise attack on the Soviet Union by Hitlerite Germany.

References.

  • Bullock A. Hitler and Stalin: Life and Power. Per. from English Smolensk, 1994
  • Mary V. Mannerheim - Marshal of Finland. Per. from the Swede. M., 1997
  • Picker G. Hitler's Table Conversations. Per. with him. Smolensk, 1993
  • Rzhevskaya E. Goebbels: Portrait on the background of the diary. M., 1994
  • Suvorov V. The Last Republic: Why the Soviet Union played the Second World War. M., 1998

Read the material in the following issues
ACADEMIC BURLING
on the controversy surrounding the research of Viktor Suvorov

Of all the wars that Russia has fought in its entire history, the Karelian-Finnish war of 1939 and 1940. remained the least advertised for a long time. This is due to both the unsatisfactory outcome of the war and significant losses.

It is still not known for certain how many participants in the hostilities on both sides died in the Finnish war.

Soviet-Finnish war, a march of soldiers to the front

When the Soviet-Finnish war, started by the country's leadership, broke out, the whole world took up arms against the USSR, which in fact turned out to be colossal foreign policy problems for the country. Next, let's try to explain why the war could not end quickly and turned out to be a failure on the whole.

Finland has almost never been an independent state. During the 12-19 centuries it was ruled by Sweden, and in 1809 it became part of the Russian Empire.

However, after the February Revolution, unrest began in Finland, the population first demanded wide autonomy, and then completely came to the idea of ​​independence. After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks confirmed Finland's right to independence.

The Bolsheviks confirmed Finland's right to independence.

However, the further path of development of the country was not unambiguous; a civil war broke out in the country between the whites and the reds. Even after the victory of the White Finns, there were still many communists and social democrats in the country's parliament, half of whom were eventually arrested, and half were forced to hide in Soviet Russia.

Finland supported a number of White Guard forces during the civil war in Russia. Between 1918 and 1921, there were several military conflicts between the countries - two Soviet-Finnish wars, after which the final border between the states was formed.


Political map of Europe during the interwar period and the Finnish border before 1939

In general, the conflict with Soviet Russia was settled and until 1939 the countries lived in peace. However, on the detailed map, the territory that belonged to Finland after the Second Soviet-Finnish War is highlighted in yellow. This territory was claimed by the USSR.

Finnish border before 1939 on the map

The main reasons for the Finnish War of 1939:

  • the border of the USSR with Finland until 1939 was located only 30 km away. from Leningrad. In case of war, the city could be located under shelling from the territory of another state;
  • the land in question has not always been part of Finland. These territories were part of the Novgorod principality, then they were captured by Sweden, re-conquered by Russia during the Northern War. Only in the 19th century, when Finland was part of the Russian Empire, these territories were transferred to them under control. That, in principle, was not of fundamental importance within the framework of a single state;
  • The USSR needed to strengthen its position in the Baltic Sea.

In addition, despite the absence of war, the countries had a number of claims against each other. Many communists were killed and arrested in Finland in 1918, and a number of Finnish communists found refuge in the USSR. On the other hand, many Finns suffered during the political terror in the Soviet Union.

a large number of communists in Finland were killed and arrested this year

In addition, local border conflicts between countries regularly took place. Just as the Soviet Union was not happy with such a border near the second largest city in the RSFSR, so not all Finns were happy with the territory of Finland.

In some circles, the idea of ​​creating a "Greater Finland" was considered, which would unite the majority of the Finno-Ugric peoples.


Thus, there were enough reasons for the Finnish war to start, when there were a lot of territorial disputes and mutual discontent. And after the signed Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Finland fell into the sphere of influence of the USSR.

Therefore, in October 1939, negotiations begin between the two parties - the USSR demands to cede the territory bordering on Leningrad - to move the border at least 70 km.

negotiations between the two countries begin in October this year

In addition, we are talking about the transfer of several islands in the Gulf of Finland, the lease of the Hanko Peninsula, the transfer of Fort Ino. Instead of Finland, a territory in Karelia that is twice as large in area is proposed.

But despite the idea of ​​a Greater Finland, the deal looks extremely unprofitable for the Finnish side:

  • firstly, the territories offered to the country are sparsely populated and practically devoid of infrastructure;
  • secondly, the rejected territories are already inhabited by the Finnish population;
  • finally, such concessions would both deprive the country of the line of defense on land and seriously weaken its position at sea.

Therefore, despite the length of the negotiations, the parties did not come to a mutually beneficial agreement and the USSR began preparations for an offensive operation. The Soviet-Finnish war, the start date of which was secretly discussed in the highest circles of the political leadership of the USSR, increasingly appeared in the headlines of Western news.

The reasons for the Soviet-Finnish war are summarized in archival publications of that era.

Briefly about the balance of forces and means in the winter war

As of the end of November 1939, the balance of forces on the Soviet-Finnish border is presented in the table.

As you can see, the superiority of the Soviet side was colossal: 1.4 to 1 in the number of troops, 2 to 1 in guns, 58 to 1 in tanks, 10 to 1 in aircraft, 13 to 1 in ships. Despite careful preparation, the start of the Finnish war (the date of the invasion had already been agreed with the country's political leadership) happened spontaneously, the command did not even create a front.

They wanted to conduct the war with the forces of the Leningrad Military District.

Formation of the Kuusinen government

First of all, the USSR creates a pretext for the Soviet-Finnish war - it arranges the border conflict at Mainil on 11/26/1939 (the first date of the Finnish war). There are many versions describing the reasons for the start of the Finnish war in 1939, but the official version of the Soviet side:

The Finns attacked a border outpost, killing 3 people.

The documents disclosed in our time, which describe the war between the USSR and Finland in 1939 - 1940, are contradictory, but do not contain clear evidence of an attack by the Finnish side.

Then the Soviet Union forms the so-called. the Kuusinen government, which is headed by the newly formed Democratic Republic of Finland.

It is this government that recognizes the USSR (no other country in the world recognized it) and responds to the request to send troops into the country and support the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeois government.

From that time until the peace negotiations, the USSR did not recognize the democratic government of Finland and did not conduct negotiations with it. Officially, even a war has not been declared - the USSR brought in troops with the aim of helping a friendly government in an internal civil war.

Otto V. Kuusinen, head of the Finnish government in 1939

Kuusinen himself was an old Bolshevik - he was one of the leaders of the Red Finns in the Civil War. He fled the country in time, headed the International for some time, even avoided reprisals during the Great Terror, although they primarily fell on the old guard of the Bolsheviks.

Kuusinen's coming to power in Finland would be comparable to the coming to power in the USSR in 1939 of one of the leaders of the white movement. It is doubtful that major arrests and executions could have been avoided.

However, the hostilities are not going as well as planned by the Soviet side.

Heavy War of 1939

The original plan (developed by Shaposhnikov) included a kind of "blitzkrieg" - the capture of Finland was to be carried out within a short time. According to the plans of the General Staff:

The war in 1939 was supposed to last 3 weeks.

It was supposed to break through the defenses on the Karelian Isthmus and tank forces to make a breakthrough to Helsinki.

Despite the significant superiority of the forces of the Soviet side, this basic plan of the offensive did not succeed. The most significant advantage (in terms of tanks) was leveled out by natural conditions - tanks simply could not make free maneuvers in forest and swampy conditions.

In addition, the Finns quickly learned to destroy the still insufficiently armored Soviet tanks (mainly T-28 were used).

It was when there was a Finnish war with Russia that an incendiary mixture in a bottle and with a wick - a Molotov cocktail - got its name on it. The original name is "Molotov Cocktail". Soviet tanks simply burned out on contact with a combustible mixture.

The reason for this was not only low-level armor, but also gasoline engines. This incendiary mixture was no less terrible for ordinary soldiers.


The Soviet army also turned out, surprisingly, not ready for war in winter conditions. Ordinary soldiers were equipped with ordinary budenovka and greatcoats, which did not save from the cold. On the other hand, if it was necessary to fight in the summer, the Red Army would face even greater problems, for example, impenetrable swamps.

The offensive that had begun on the Karelian Isthmus was not prepared for heavy fighting on the Mannerheim Line. In general, the military leadership did not have clear ideas about this line of fortifications.

Therefore, shelling at the first stage of the war was ineffective - the Finns simply waited for it in fortified bunkers. In addition, ammunition for the guns was transported for a long time - the weak infrastructure affected.

Let's take a closer look at the Mannerheim Line.

1939 - War with Finland on the Mannerheim Line

Since the 1920s, the Finns have been actively building a series of defensive fortifications, named after the prominent military leader of 1918-1921. - Carl Gustav Mannerheim. Realizing that a possible military threat to the country does not come from the north and west, it was decided to build a powerful defensive line in the southeast, i.e. on the Karelian Isthmus.


Karl Mannerheim, military leader after whom the front line is named

We should pay tribute to the designers - the relief of the territory made it possible to actively use natural conditions - numerous dense forests, lakes, swamps. The key building was the Enckel Bunker, a typical concrete structure armed with machine gun cannons.


At the same time, despite the long construction time, the line was not at all as impregnable as it would later be called in numerous textbooks. Most of the pillboxes were created according to Enkel's design, i.e. early 1920s These were outdated pillboxes for several people at the time of the Second World War, with 1-3 machine guns, without underground barracks.

In the early 1930s, million-strong bunkers were designed and built in 1937. Their fortification was stronger, the number of embrasures reached six, there were underground barracks.

However, there were only 7 such pillboxes built. The entire Mannerheim line (135 km) could not be built up with pillboxes, therefore, before the war, some areas were mined and surrounded by barbed wire.

On sectors of the front, instead of pillboxes, there were simple trenches.

This line should not be neglected either, its depth ranged from 24 to 85 kilometers. It was not possible to break it through with a swoop - for some time the line saved the country. As a result, on December 27, the Red Army stops offensive operations and prepares for a new assault, bringing up artillery and retraining soldiers.

The further course of the war will show that with proper preparation, the outdated line of defense could not hold out for the proper time and save Finland from defeat.


The exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations

The period of the first stage of the war also saw the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations (12/14/1939). Yes, at that time this organization lost its meaning. The very exclusion was rather a consequence of the growing antipathy towards the USSR throughout the world.

England and France (at that time not yet occupied by Germany) provide Finland with various assistance - they do not enter into an open conflict, however, active supplies of weapons are going to the northern country.

England and France are developing two aid plans for Finland.

The first includes the transfer of military corps to Finland, and the second - the bombing of Soviet fields in Baku. However, the war with Germany forces them to abandon these plans.

Moreover, the expeditionary force would have to pass through Norway and Sweden, to which both countries responded with a categorical refusal, wishing to maintain their neutrality in World War II.

Second stage of the war

From the end of December 1939, a regrouping of Soviet troops took place. A separate Northwest Front is formed. The armed forces are being built up in all sectors of the front.

By the beginning of February 1940, the number of armed forces reached 1.3 million people, guns - 3.5 thousand. Aircraft - 1.5 thousand. Finland by that time was also able to strengthen the army, including through assistance from other countries and foreign volunteers, but the balance of forces becomes even more catastrophic for the defending side.

Mass artillery bombardment of the Mannerheim line begins on February 1. It turns out that most of the Finnish pillboxes cannot withstand an accurate and prolonged shelling. Bombed just in case for 10 days. As a result, on the offensive of February 10, the Red Army discovers instead of pillboxes only a lot of "Karelian monuments".

In the winter of February 11, the Mannerheim line was broken, the Finnish counter-offensives did not lead to anything. And on February 13, the second line of defense, hastily reinforced by the Finns, breaks through. And already on February 15, taking advantage of the weather conditions, Mannerheim gave the order for a general retreat.

Finnish aid from other countries

It should be noted that the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line meant the end of the war and even defeat in it. There was practically no hope for major military aid from the west.

Yes, during the war not only England and France provided Finland with various technical assistance. The Scandinavian countries, the USA, Hungary and a number of others sent many volunteers to the country.

soldiers were sent to the front from Sweden

At the same time, it was the threat of direct war with Britain and France, in the event of the complete capture of Finland, that forced I. Stalin to negotiate with the current Finnish government and conclude peace.

The request was forwarded through the USSR ambassador to Sweden to the Finnish ambassador.

The myth of war - Finnish "cuckoos"

Let us dwell separately on the well-known military myth about Finnish snipers - the so-called. cuckoos. During the Winter War (as it is called in Finland), many Soviet officers and soldiers fell victim to Finnish snipers. A bike began to walk among the troops that Finnish snipers were hiding in trees and firing from there.

However, sniper fire from trees is extremely ineffective, since the sniper in the tree itself is an excellent target, does not have the proper foothold and the ability to quickly retreat.


The answer to the same accuracy of snipers is quite simple. At the beginning of the war, the officer corps was outfitted with insulated dark-colored sheepskin coats, which were clearly visible on the snow-covered desert and stood out against the background of the soldier's greatcoats.

The fire was fired from insulated and camouflaged positions on the ground. Snipers could sit in makeshift shelters for hours, waiting for a suitable target.

The most famous Finnish sniper of the Winter War is Simo Häyhä, who shot down about 500 Red Army officers and soldiers. At the end of the war, he received a severe injury to his jaw (it had to be inserted from the thigh bone), but the soldier lived to be 96 years old.

The Soviet-Finnish border was moved 120 kilometers from Leningrad - Vyborg, the northwestern coast of Lake Ladoga, and a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland were annexed.

A 30-year lease on the Hanko Peninsula was agreed. In return, Finland received only the Petsamo region, which provided access to the Barents Sea and was rich in nickel ores.

The end of the Soviet-Finnish war brought bonuses to the winner in the form of:

  1. Acquisition of new territories by the USSR... The border from Leningrad was moved away.
  2. Gaining combat experience, awareness of the need to improve military technology.
  3. Colossal combat losses. The data vary, but the average casualties were over 150 thousand people (125 from the USSR and 25 thousand from Finland). Sanitary losses were even greater - 265 thousand from the USSR and over 40 thousand from Finland. These figures had a discrediting effect on the Red Army.
  4. Failure of the plan on the establishment of the Finnish Democratic Republic .
  5. Fall of international prestige... This also applies to the countries of future allies and the Axis countries. It is believed that it was after the Winter War that A. Hitler finally established himself in the opinion that the USSR is a colossus with feet of clay.
  6. Finland lost important territories for themselves. The area of ​​the given land was 10% of the entire territory of the country. The spirit of revanchism began to grow in her. From a neutral position, the country increasingly gravitates towards the support of the Axis countries and, as a result, participates in the Great Patriotic War on the side of Germany (in the period 1941-1944).

Summing up all of the above, we can conclude that the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 was a strategic failure of the Soviet leadership.

The Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, known in Finland as the Winter War, is an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940. According to some historians of the Western school - the offensive operation of the USSR against Finland during the Second World War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, this war is viewed as a separate bilateral local conflict that is not part of a world war, just like the undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol.

The war ended with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, which recorded the separation from Finland of a significant part of its territory, which it had seized during the Civil War in Russia.

War goals

Officially, the Soviet Union pursued the goal of achieving by military means what they could not do peacefully: to get the Karelian Isthmus, part of the coast of the Arctic Ocean, bases on the islands and the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland.

At the very beginning of the war, a puppet Terijoki government was created on the territory of the USSR, headed by the Finnish communist Otto Kuusinen. On December 2, the Soviet government signed an agreement of mutual assistance with the Kuusinen government and refused any contacts with the legitimate government of Finland, headed by R. Ryti.

There is an opinion that Stalin planned to include Finland in the USSR as a result of the victorious war.

The plan for the war with Finland provided for the deployment of hostilities in two main directions - on the Karelian Isthmus, where it was supposed to lead a direct breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line in the direction of Vyborg, and north of Lake Ladoga, in order to prevent counterstrikes and possible landing of landings of Finland's western allies from the Barents Sea. The plan was based on an incorrect, as it turned out, idea about the weakness of the Finnish army and its inability to long-term resistance. It was assumed that the war would be carried out on the model of the campaign in Poland in September 1939. The main hostilities were to be completed within two weeks.

Reason for war

The official reason for the war was the "Mainil incident": on November 26, 1939, the Soviet government addressed the government of Finland with an official note, which reported that as a result of artillery shelling, allegedly from the territory of Finland, four Soviet soldiers were killed and nine were wounded. Finnish border guards indeed recorded cannon shots from several observation points that day - as it should be in this case, the fact of the shots and the direction from which they were fired were recorded, a comparison of the records showed that the shots were fired from Soviet territory. The Finnish government has proposed the creation of an intergovernmental commission of inquiry to investigate the incident. The Soviet side refused, and soon announced that it no longer considered itself bound by the terms of the Soviet-Finnish mutual non-aggression agreement. On November 29, the USSR broke off diplomatic relations with Finland, and on the 30th at 8:00 am, Soviet troops were ordered to cross the Soviet-Finnish border and begin hostilities. War was never officially declared.


On February 11, 1940, after ten days of artillery preparation, a new offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Naval Flotilla, created in October 1939, operated together with the land units of the North-Western Front.

In the course of three-day intense battles, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first defense line of the Mannerheim Line, introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, since there was a threat of encirclement.

By February 21, 7th Army had reached the second line of defense, and 13th Army - towards the main line of defense north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with the coastal detachments of the Baltic Fleet sailors, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the North-Western Front launched an offensive in the strip from Lake Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops withdrew.

The Finns put up fierce resistance, but were forced to retreat. Trying to stop the attack on Vyborg, they opened the sluices of the Saimaa Canal, flooding the area northeast of the city, but this also did not help. On March 13, troops of the 7th Army entered Vyborg.

End of war and conclusion of peace

By March 1940, the Finnish government realized that, despite the demands for continued resistance, Finland would not receive any military assistance other than volunteers and weapons from the allies. After the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line, Finland was deliberately unable to contain the advance of the Red Army. There was a real threat of complete capture of the country, which would be followed by either annexation to the USSR, or a change of government to a pro-Soviet one.

Therefore, the Finnish government turned to the USSR with a proposal to start peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and on March 12, a peace treaty was signed, according to which hostilities ceased at 12 o'clock on March 13, 1940. Despite the fact that Vyborg, according to the agreement, retreated to the USSR, Soviet troops on the morning of March 13 stormed the city.

The terms of the peace treaty were as follows:

The Karelian Isthmus, Vyborg, Sortavala, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Finnish territory with the city of Kuolajärvi, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the USSR. Lake Ladoga was completely within the borders of the USSR.

The Petsamo (Pechenga) region was returned to Finland.

The USSR leased part of the Hanko (Gangut) Peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there.

The border, which was established under this treaty, basically repeated the border of 1791 (before Finland became part of the Russian Empire).

It should be noted that during this period the intelligence of the USSR worked extremely poorly: the Soviet command did not have information about the combat reserves (in particular, about the amount of ammunition) of the Finnish side. They were practically at zero, but without this information, the Soviet government signed a peace treaty.

Results of the war

Karelian Isthmus. Borders between the USSR and Finland before and after the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. "Mannerheim Line"

Acquisitions of the USSR

The border from Leningrad was pushed back from 32 to 150 km.

Karelian Isthmus, islands of the Gulf of Finland, part of the coast of the Arctic Ocean, rent of the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula.

Full control of Lake Ladoga.

Murmansk, which was located near the Finnish territory (Rybachy Peninsula), is safe.

The Soviet Union gained experience in waging war in the winter. If we take the officially declared goals of the war, the USSR has fulfilled all its tasks.

These territories were occupied by the USSR until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. In the first two months of the Great Patriotic War, Finland again occupied these territories; they were released in 1944.

The negative result for the USSR was the increased confidence in Germany that militarily the USSR is much weaker than it seemed before. This strengthened the position of supporters of the war against the USSR.

The results of the Soviet-Finnish war were one (although far from the only) of the factors that determined the subsequent rapprochement of Finland with Germany. For the Finns, it became a means of containing the growing pressure from the USSR. The Finns themselves call their participation in the Great Patriotic War on the side of the Axis countries "the Continuation War", meaning that they continued to wage the war of 1939-1940.

"WINTER WAR"

Having signed agreements on mutual assistance with the Baltic states, the USSR turned to Finland with a proposal to conclude a similar agreement. Finland refused. Foreign Minister of this country E. Erkko said that "Finland will never make a decision like the one adopted by the Baltic states. If this happens, it will only be in the worst case." The origins of the Soviet-Finnish confrontation are largely explained by the extremely hostile, aggressive position of the ruling circles of Finland towards the USSR. Former President of Finland P. Svinhufvud, under whom Soviet Russia voluntarily recognized the independence of its northern neighbor, said that "any enemy of Russia should always be a friend of Finland." In the mid-30s. M. M. Litvinov, in a conversation with the Finnish envoy, said that "in no neighboring country is there such open propaganda for an attack on the USSR and the seizure of its territory, as in Finland."

After the Munich Agreement of Western countries, the Soviet leadership began to show particular persistence in relation to Finland. During 1938-1939. During negotiations, Moscow sought to ensure the security of Leningrad by moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus. Instead, Finland was offered the territory of Karelia, and much larger in size than the land that was supposed to be transferred to the USSR. In addition, the Soviet government promised to allocate a certain amount for the resettlement of residents. However, the Finnish side stated that the territory ceded to the USSR was insufficient compensation. The Karelian Isthmus had a well-developed infrastructure: a network of railways and highways, buildings, warehouses and other structures. The territory transferred by the Soviet Union to Finland was an area covered with forests and swamps. In order to turn this territory into a region suitable for life and economic needs, it was necessary to invest considerable funds.

Moscow did not give up hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and offered various options for concluding an agreement. At the same time, he firmly declared: "Since we cannot move Leningrad, we will move the border in order to secure it." In doing so, he referred to Ribbentrop, who explained the German attack on Poland by the need to secure Berlin. On both sides of the border, large-scale military construction was launched. The Soviet Union was preparing for offensive operations, and Finland for defensive operations. Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko, expressing the mood of the government, confirmed: "Everything has its borders. Finland cannot accept the Soviet Union's proposal and will defend its territory, its inviolability and independence by any means."

The Soviet Union and Finland did not take the path of finding a compromise acceptable to them. Stalin's imperial ambitions made themselves felt this time too. In the second half of November 1939, diplomatic methods gave way to threats and saber rattling. The Red Army was hastily preparing for hostilities. On November 27, 1939, VM Molotov issued a statement in which he said that "yesterday, November 26, the Finnish White Guards undertook a new heinous provocation, firing artillery fire at a Red Army military unit located in the village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus." Disputes over the question of whose side these shots were fired are still ongoing. The Finns already in 1939 tried to prove that the shelling could not have been fired from their territory, and the whole story with the "mining incident" is nothing more than a provocation by Moscow.

On November 29, taking advantage of the shelling of its border positions, the USSR terminated the non-aggression pact with Finland. On November 30, hostilities began. On December 1, in the Finnish territory, in the city of Terijoki (Zelenogorsk), where Soviet troops entered, a new, "people's government" of Finland was formed at the initiative of Moscow, headed by the Finnish communist O. Kuusinen. The next day, an agreement of mutual assistance and friendship was concluded between the USSR and the government of Kuusinen, which is called the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic.

Events, however, did not develop as well as the Kremlin had hoped. The first stage of the war (November 30, 1939 - February 10, 1940) was especially unfortunate for the Red Army. This was largely due to the underestimation of the combat capability of the Finnish troops. Break through the Mannerheim Line on the move - a complex of defensive fortifications built in 1927-1939. and stretching along the front for 135 km, and in depth up to 95 km - it was not possible. During the fighting, the Red Army suffered huge losses.

In December 1939, the command stopped unsuccessful attempts to attack deep into Finnish territory. Thorough preparations for a breakthrough began. The North-Western Front was formed, headed by S. K. Timoshenko and a member of the Military Council A. A. Zhdanov. The front consisted of two armies, which were led by K. A. Meretskov and V. D. Grendal (replaced in early March 1940 by F. A. Parusinov). The total number of Soviet troops was increased by 1.4 times and brought to 760 thousand people.

Finland also strengthened its army, receiving military equipment and equipment from abroad. 11.5 thousand volunteers arrived from Scandinavia, the USA and other countries to fight the Soviets. England and France developed their plans of military action, intending to enter the war on the side of Finland. London and Paris did not hide their hostile plans towards the USSR.

On February 11, 1940, the final stage of the war began. Soviet troops went on the offensive and broke through the Mannerheim Line. The main forces of the Karelian army of Finland were defeated. On March 12, a peace treaty was signed in the Kremlin after short negotiations. Military operations along the entire front ceased from 12 noon on March 13. In accordance with the signed agreement, the USSR included the Karelian Isthmus, the western and northern shores of Lake Ladoga, and a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland. The Soviet Union received a 30-year lease on the Hanko Peninsula to create a naval base "capable of defending the entrance to the Gulf of Finland from aggression."

The price of victory in the "winter war" was extremely high. In addition to the fact that the Soviet Union as an "aggressor state" was expelled from the League of Nations, during the 105 days of the war, the Red Army lost at least 127 thousand people killed, died of wounds and missing. About 250 thousand servicemen were injured, frostbitten, shell-shocked.

The "Winter War" demonstrated major miscalculations in the organization and training of the Red Army. Hitler, who closely followed the course of events in Finland, formulated the conclusion that the Red Army is a "colossus with feet of clay" that the Wehrmacht can easily cope with. Certain conclusions from the military campaign of 1939-1940. made in the Kremlin. So, K. Ye. Voroshilov was replaced by S. M. Timoshenko at the post of People's Commissar of Defense. The implementation of a set of measures aimed at strengthening the defense capability of the USSR began.

However, during the "winter war" and after its end, no significant strengthening of security in the northwest was achieved. Although the border was moved away from Leningrad and the Murmansk railway, this did not prevent Leningrad from being surrounded by a blockade during the Great Patriotic War. In addition, Finland did not become a friendly or at least neutral country for the USSR - revanchist elements prevailed in its leadership, which relied on the support of Nazi Germany.

I.S. Ratkovsky, M.V. Khodyakov. History of Soviet Russia

THE POET'S LOOK

From a shabby notebook

Two lines about the boy fighter

What was in the fortieth year

Killed in Finland on ice.

Lied somehow awkwardly

Childishly small body.

Frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,

The hat flew far away.

It seemed the boy was not lying,

And still running

Yes, he held the ice to the floor ...

In the midst of a great cruel war,

Why - I don’t know,

I feel sorry for that distant fate,

As if dead, lonely

As if it were me lying

Frozen, small, killed

In that unremarkable war,

Forgotten, little, I lie.

A.T. Tvardovsky. Two lines.

NO MOLOTOV!

Ivan goes to war with a cheerful song,

but, leaning against the Mannerheim line,

he starts to sing a sad song,

as we hear it now:

Finland, Finland,

Ivan is heading there again.

Once Molotov promised that everything will be fine

and tomorrow they will eat ice cream in Helsinki.

No, Molotov! No, Molotov!

Finland, Finland,

the Mannerheim line is a serious obstacle,

and when a terrible artillery fire began from Karelia

he silenced many Ivanov.

No, Molotov! No, Molotov!

You're lying even more than Bobrikov!

Finland, Finland,

the invincible Red Army fears.

Molotov already said to look after a dacha,

otherwise the Chukhonts threaten to capture us.

No, Molotov! No, Molotov!

You're lying even more than Bobrikov!

Follow the Ural, follow the Ural,

there is a lot of space for the Molotov dacha.

We will send the Stalins and their henchmen there,

political instructors, commissars and Petrozavodsk swindlers.

No, Molotov! No, Molotov!

You're lying even more than Bobrikov!

MANNERHEIM LINE: MYTH OR REALITY?

Good form for supporters of the theory of a strong Red Army that has broken into an impregnable line of defense has always been to quote General Badu, who was building the "Mannerheim Line." He wrote: “Nowhere in the world have natural conditions been so favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia. In this narrow place between two bodies of water - Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland - there are impenetrable forests and huge rocks. The famous "Mannerheim Line" was built from wood and granite, and where necessary - from concrete. The greatest fortress of the "Mannerheim Line" is given by anti-tank obstacles made in granite. Even twenty-five-ton tanks cannot overcome them. In granite, the Finns, with the help of explosions, equipped machine-gun and gun nests, which are not afraid of the most powerful bombs. Where there was a shortage of granite, the Finns did not spare concrete. "

In general, reading these lines, a person imagining a real "Mannerheim line" will be terribly surprised. In the description of Badu, some gloomy granite cliffs with firing points carved into them at dizzying heights rise before his eyes, over which vultures circle in anticipation of the mountains of the storming corpses. The description of Badu actually fits rather to the Czech fortifications on the border with Germany. The Karelian Isthmus is a relatively flat terrain, and there is no need to cut out the rocks simply due to the absence of the rocks themselves. But one way or another, the image of an impregnable castle was created in the mass consciousness and was firmly entrenched in it.

In reality, the "Mannerheim Line" was far from the best examples of European fortification. The overwhelming majority of the long-term structures of the Finns were one-story, reinforced concrete structures partially buried in the ground in the form of a bunker, divided into several rooms by internal partitions with armored doors. Three pillboxes of the “million” type had two levels, three more pillboxes - three levels. Let me emphasize, exactly the level. That is, their battle casemates and shelters were located at different levels relative to the surface, casemates with embrasures slightly recessed into the ground and completely recessed galleries with barracks connecting them. Structures with what could be called floors were negligible. One under the other - such an arrangement - there were only two pillboxes (Sk-10 and Sj-5) and a gun casemate in Patoniemi where there were small casemates directly above the rooms of the lower tier. This is, to put it mildly, not impressive. Even if you do not take into account the impressive structures of the "Maginot Line", you can find many examples of much more advanced bunkers ...

The survivability of the nadolb was designed for Renault tanks in service with Finland, and did not meet modern requirements. Contrary to Badu's assertions, the Finnish anti-tank warheads showed their low resistance to attacks from T-28 medium tanks during the war. But it was not even a matter of the quality of the Mannerheim Line structures. Any defensive line is characterized by the number of Permanent Firing Structures (DOS) per kilometer. In total, on the "Mannerheim Line" there were 214 permanent structures for 140 km, of which 134 were machine-gun or artillery DOS. Directly on the front line in the combat contact zone in the period from mid-December 1939 to mid-February 1940 there were 55 bunkers, 14 shelters and 3 infantry positions, of which about half were obsolete structures of the first construction period. For comparison, the "Maginot Line" had about 5,800 DOS at 300 defense centers and a length of 400 km (density 14 DOS / km), the Siegfried Line had 16,000 fortifications (weaker than the French ones) on a 500 km front (density - 32 structures per km) ... And the "Mannerheim Line" is 214 DOS (of which only 8 artillery) at a front of 140 km (average density 1.5 DOS / km, in some areas - up to 3-6 DOS / km).

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