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Which member of the Soviet General Staff was a spy for the Nazi Abwehr. German spies in the Red Army during World War II Spies surrounded by Stalin during WWII


In the Caucasus, German military intelligence, called the Abwehr, after the start of the war launched a stormy activity to create anti-Soviet national movements, in this sense Chechnya was ideal. There, even before the war, Muslim separatists campaigned and openly opposed the Soviet regime, their goal was to unite the Muslims of the Caucasus into a single state under the leadership of Turkey. In Checheno-Ingushetia, there was mass desertion, unwillingness to serve in the Red Army, disobedience to Soviet laws. The number of deserters who united in illegal armed groups amounted to 15,000 people by 1942, and this happened in the immediate rear of the Soviet Army. Abwehr actively threw sabotage groups, weapons and equipment there, the Chechen rebels had experienced military specialists, masters of intelligence and sabotage. Uprisings and sabotage began, but they were suppressed, although, as it turned out in our time, not completely. There was no longer and no longer exists in Russia a general like the late Yermolov, only he knew and did so that later no one wanted to fight with him!


A TROUBLED REPUBLIC

An increase in the activity of religious and bandit authorities was observed in the ChI ASSR even before the start of the Great Patriotic War, thereby exerting a serious negative impact on the situation in the republic. Focusing on Muslim Turkey, they advocated the unification of the Muslims of the Caucasus into a single state under the protectorate of Turkey.

To achieve their goal, the separatists called on the population of the republic to resist the measures of the government and local authorities, and initiated open armed uprisings. Particular emphasis was placed on indoctrinating Chechen youth against serving in the Red Army and studying in the schools of the FZO. At the expense of deserters who went underground, bandit formations were replenished, which were pursued by units of the NKVD troops.

So, in 1940, the rebel organization of Sheikh Mohammed-Khadzhi Kurbanov was identified and neutralized. In January 1941, a major armed uprising was localized in the Itum-Kalinsky region under the leadership of Idris Magomadov. In total, in 1940, the administrative bodies of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR arrested 1055 bandits and their accomplices, from whom 839 rifles and revolvers with ammunition were confiscated. 846 deserters who evaded service in the Red Army were put on trial. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War led to a new series of bandit attacks in the Shatoi, Galanchozh and Cheberloevsky regions. According to the NKVD, in August - November 1941, up to 800 people took part in armed demonstrations.

A DIVISION THAT DID NOT REACH THE FRONT

Being in an illegal position, the leaders of the Chechen-Ingush separatists counted on the imminent defeat of the USSR in the war and led a widespread defeatist agitation for desertion from the Red Army, disruption of mobilization, and forging together armed formations to fight in favor of Germany. During the first mobilization from August 29 to September 2, 1941, 8,000 people were to be drafted into construction battalions. However, only 2,500 arrived at their destination, in the city of Rostov-on-Don, the remaining 5,500 either simply avoided appearing at recruiting stations or deserted along the way.

During the additional mobilization in October 1941, persons born in 1922 out of 4733 conscripts evaded 362 people from appearing at the recruiting stations.

By decision of the State Defense Committee, in the period from December 1941 to January 1942, the 114th National Division was formed from the indigenous population in the CHI ASSR. As of the end of March 1942, 850 people managed to desert from it.

The second mass mobilization in Checheno-Ingushetia began on March 17, 1942, and was supposed to end on the 25th. The number of persons subject to mobilization was 14577 people. However, only 4,887 were mobilized by the appointed time, of which only 4,395 were sent to military units, that is, 30% of the order. In this regard, the mobilization period was extended until April 5, but the number of mobilized increased only to 5543 people. The reason for the failure of mobilization was the massive evasion of conscripts from conscription and desertion along the way to assembly points.

At the same time, members and candidate members of the CPSU (b), Komsomol members, senior officials of district and rural Soviets (chairmen of executive committees, chairmen and party organizers of collective farms, etc.) evaded the draft.

On March 23, 1942, Daga Dadaev, a deputy of the Supreme Council of the Chi ASSR, mobilized by the Nadterechny RVC, fled from the Mozdok station. Under the influence of his agitation, 22 more people fled with him. Among the deserters were also several instructors of the Komsomol Committee, a people's judge and a district prosecutor.

By the end of March 1942, the total number of deserters and those who evaded mobilization in the republic reached 13,500 people. Thus, the active Red Army did not receive a full-fledged rifle division. In the conditions of mass desertion and the intensification of the rebel movement on the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ingushetia, in April 1942, the People's Commissar for Defense of the USSR signed an order to cancel the conscription of Chechens and Ingush into the army.

In January 1943, the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the ChI ASSR addressed the NPO of the USSR with a proposal to announce an additional recruitment of volunteer military personnel from among the inhabitants of the republic. The proposal was accepted and the local authorities received permission to call for 3,000 volunteers. According to the order of the NPO, the conscription was ordered to be carried out in the period from January 26 to February 14, 1943. However, the approved plan for the next conscription this time was miserably failed both in terms of execution time and in terms of the number of volunteers sent to the troops.

So, as of March 7, 1943, 2986 “volunteers” were sent to the Red Army from those recognized as fit for military service. Of these, only 1806 people arrived in the unit. Only along the way, 1075 people managed to desert. In addition, another 797 "volunteers" fled from the district mobilization points and on their way to Grozny. In total, from January 26 to March 7, 1943, 1,872 conscripts deserted from the so-called last "voluntary" conscription to the CHI ASSR.

Among the fugitives again appeared representatives of the district and regional party and Soviet assets: Arsanukaev, secretary of the Gudermes Republican Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Magomaev, head of the department of the Vedensky Republican Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Martazaliev, secretary of the Komsomol regional committee for military work, Taimaskhanov, second secretary of the Gudermes Komsomol Republican Committee, chairman of the Galanchozh regional executive committee Khayauri.

IN THE REAR OF THE RED ARMY

The leading role in disrupting the mobilization was played by Chechen political organizations operating underground - the National Socialist Party of Caucasian Brothers and the Chechen-Gorsk National Socialist Underground Organization. The first was led by its organizer and ideologist Khasan Israilov, who became one of the central figures of the rebel movement in Chechnya during the Great Patriotic War. With the outbreak of war, Israilov went underground and until 1944 led a number of large bandit formations, while maintaining close contact with German intelligence agencies.

Another organization was headed by the brother of the well-known revolutionary in Chechnya A. Sheripov - Mairbek Sheripov. In October 1941, he also went underground and gathered around him several bandit detachments, which consisted mainly of deserters. In August 1942, M. Sheripov raised an armed uprising in Chechnya, during which the administrative center of the Sharoevsky district, the village of Khimoy, was defeated, and an attempt was made to capture the neighboring regional center, the village of Itum-Kale. However, the rebels lost the battle with the local garrison and were forced to retreat.

In November 1942 Mayrbek Sheripov was killed as a result of a conflict with accomplices. Some of the members of his bandit groups joined Kh. Israilov, some continued to act alone, and some surrendered to the authorities.

In total, the pro-fascist parties formed by Israilov and Sheripov consisted of over 4,000 members, and the total number of their rebel detachments reached 15,000 people. In any case, it was these figures that Israilov reported to the German command in March 1942. Thus, in the immediate rear of the Red Army, a whole division of ideological bandits was operating, ready at any moment to provide significant assistance to the advancing German troops.

However, the Germans themselves understood this. The aggressive plans of the German command included the active use of the "fifth column" - anti-Soviet individuals and groups in the rear of the Red Army. It certainly included the bandit underground in Checheno-Ingushetia as such.

ENTERPRISE "SHAMIL"

Having correctly assessed the potential of the insurgent movement for the advancing Wehrmacht, the German secret services set out to unite all gangs under a single command. To prepare a one-time uprising in mountainous Chechnya, special Abwehr emissaries were supposed to be sent as coordinators and instructors.

The 804th regiment of the Brandenburg-800 Special Purpose Division was sent to solve this problem, sent to the North Caucasian sector of the Soviet-German front. The subdivisions of this division, on the instructions of the Abwehr and the command of the Wehrmacht, carried out sabotage and terrorist acts and reconnaissance work in the rear of the Soviet troops, captured important strategic objects and held them until the main forces approached.

As part of the 804th regiment, there was a Sonderkommando of Ober-Lieutenant Gerhard Lange, conditionally called "Lange Enterprise" or "Shamil Enterprise". The team was staffed by agents from among former prisoners of war and emigrants of Caucasian nationalities and was intended for subversive activities in the rear of Soviet troops in the Caucasus. Before being sent to the rear of the Red Army, the saboteurs underwent a nine-month training at a special school located in Austria near the Moskham castle. Here they taught subversion, topography, taught how to handle small arms, self-defense techniques and the use of fictitious documents. The direct transfer of agents behind the front line was carried out by the Abwehrkommando-201.

On August 25, 1942, from Armavir, a group of Lieutenant Lange in the amount of 30 people, staffed mainly by Chechens, Ingush and Ossetians, was parachuted into the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe villages of Chishki, Dachu-Borzoy and Duba-Yurt, Ataginsky district of the CHI ASSR to commit sabotage and terrorist acts and the organization of the insurgent movement, timing the uprising to the beginning of the German offensive on Grozny.

On the same day, another group of six people landed near the village of Berezhki, Galashkinsky District, headed by a native of Dagestan, a former emigrant Osman Gube (Saidnurov), who, in order to give due weight among Caucasians, was called in the documents "colonel of the German army." Initially, the group was given the task of advancing to the village of Avtury, where, according to German intelligence, a large number of Chechens who had deserted from the Red Army were hiding in the forests. However, due to the error of the German pilot, the paratroopers were thrown out significantly to the west of the intended area. At the same time, Osman Guba was to become the coordinator of all armed gangs on the territory of Checheno-Ingushetia.

And in September 1942, another group of saboteurs in the amount of 12 people was thrown out on the territory of the CHI ASSR under the leadership of non-commissioned officer Gert Reckert. Arrested by the NKVD in Chechnya, the Abwehr agent Leonard Chetvergas from the Reckert group testified during interrogation about its goals: active struggle against the Soviet power at the entire stage of its existence, that the peoples of the Caucasus truly desire the victory of the German army and the establishment of German orders in the Caucasus. Therefore, upon landing in the Soviet rear, landing groups must immediately enter into contact with the active bandit formations and, using them, raise the peoples of the Caucasus to an armed uprising against Soviet power. By overthrowing Soviet power in the republics of the Caucasus and handing it over to the Germans, to ensure the successful advance of the advancing German army in Transcaucasia, which will follow in the coming days. The landing groups, preparing for landing in the rear of the Red Army, were also given the immediate task of preserving the oil industry of the city of Grozny at all costs from possible destruction by the retreating units of the Red Army.

EVERYBODY HELPED THE DIVERSEERS!

Once in the rear, paratroopers everywhere enjoyed the sympathy of the population, ready to provide assistance with food and accommodate for the night. The attitude of local residents towards saboteurs was so loyal that they could afford to walk in the Soviet rear in German military uniform.

A few months later, Osman Gube, who was arrested by the NKVD, described during interrogation his impressions of the first days of his stay in the Chechen-Ingush territory: “In the evening, a collective farmer named Ali-Mohammed came to our forest and with him another named Mohammed. At first they did not believe who we were, but when we took an oath on the Koran that we were indeed sent to the rear of the Red Army by the German command, they believed us. They told us that the area where we are is flat and it is dangerous for us to stay here. Therefore, they recommended leaving for the mountains of Ingushetia, since it would be easier to hide there. After spending 3-4 days in the forest near the village of Berezhki, we, accompanied by Ali-Mohammed, went to the mountains to the village of Khai, where Ali-Mohammed had good friends. One of his acquaintances turned out to be a certain Ilaev Kasum, who took us in, and we stayed overnight with him. Ilaev introduced us to his son-in-law Ichaev Soslanbek, who took us to the mountains ...

When we were in a hut near the village of Khai, various Chechens came to us quite often, passing along the nearby road, and usually expressed sympathy for us ... ".

However, Abwehr agents received sympathy and support not only from ordinary peasants. Both the chairmen of the collective farms and the leaders of the Party and Soviet apparatus willingly offered their cooperation. “The first person with whom I spoke directly about the deployment of anti-Soviet work on the instructions of the German command,” Osman Gube said during the investigation, “was the chairman of the Dattykh village council, a member of the CPSU (b) Ibragim Pshegurov. I told him that I was an emigrant, that we had been parachuted from a German plane, and that our goal was to assist the German army in liberating the Caucasus from the Bolsheviks and to continue the struggle for the independence of the Caucasus. Pshegurov said that he fully sympathized with me. He recommended establishing contacts with the right people now, but speaking openly only when the Germans take the city of Ordzhonikidze.

A little later, the chairman of the Akshinsky village council, Duda Ferzauli, came to the Abwehr envoy. According to O. Gube, “Ferzauli himself approached me and proved in every possible way that he was not a communist, that he was obliged to fulfill any of my tasks ... At the same time, he brought half a liter of vodka and tried his best to appease me, as a messenger from the Germans. He asked to take him under my protection after their area was occupied by the Germans.

Representatives of the local population not only sheltered and fed the Abwehr saboteurs, but sometimes they themselves took the initiative to carry out sabotage and terrorist acts. The testimony of Osman Gube describes an episode when a local resident Musa Keloev came to his group, who said “that he was ready to carry out any task, and he himself noticed that it was important to disrupt the railway traffic on the Ordzhonikidzevskaya-Muzhichi narrow-gauge road, because military cargo. I agreed with him that it was necessary to blow up the bridge on this road. To carry out the explosion, I sent Salman Aguev, a member of my parachute group, with him. When they returned, they reported that they had blown up an unguarded wooden railway bridge.”

History is written by the victors, and therefore it is not customary for Soviet chroniclers to mention German spies who worked behind the lines in the Red Army. And there were such scouts, and even in the General Staff of the Red Army, as well as the famous Max network. After the end of the war, the Americans transferred them to their place, to share their experience with the CIA.

Indeed, it is hard to believe that the USSR managed to create an agent network in Germany and the countries occupied by it (the most famous is the Red Chapel), but the Germans did not. And if German intelligence officers during the Second World War are not written in Soviet-Russian histories, then the point is not only that it is not customary for the winner to confess his own miscalculations.

In the case of German spies in the USSR, the situation is complicated by the fact that the head of the Foreign Armies - East department (in the German abbreviation FHO, it was he who was in charge of intelligence) Reinhard Galen prudently took care of preserving the most important documentation in order to surrender to the Americans at the very end of the war and offer them a "goods face".

His department dealt almost exclusively with the USSR, and in the conditions of the beginning of the Cold War, Gehlen's papers were of great value to the United States.

Later, the general headed the intelligence of the FRG, and his archive remained in the United States (some copies were left to Gehlen). Having already retired, the general published his memoirs “Service. 1942-1971", which were published in Germany and the USA in 1971-72. Almost simultaneously with Gehlen's book, his biography was published in America, as well as the book of British intelligence officer Edward Spiro "Ghelen - Spy of the Century" (Spiro wrote under the pseudonym Edward Cookridge, he was a Greek by nationality, a representative of British intelligence in the Czech resistance during the war).

Another book was written by the American journalist Charles Whiting, who was suspected of working for the CIA, and was called Gehlen - German Master Spy. All of these books are based on the Gehlen archives, used with the permission of the CIA and the German intelligence BND. They contain some information about German spies in the Soviet rear.

(Gelena's personal card)

General Ernst Kestring, a Russian German born near Tula, was engaged in "field work" in Gehlen's German intelligence. It was he who served as the prototype of the German major in Bulgakov's book Days of the Turbins, who saved Hetman Skoropadsky from reprisals by the Red Army (in fact, the Petliurites). Kestring was fluent in the Russian language and Russia, and it was he who personally selected agents and saboteurs from Soviet prisoners of war. It was he who found one of the most valuable, as it turned out later, German spies.

On October 13, 1941, 38-year-old Captain Minishkiy was taken prisoner. It turned out that before the war he worked in the secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and earlier in the Moscow City Party Committee. From the moment the war began, he served as a political instructor at the Western Front. He was captured along with the driver when he was driving around the advanced units during the battle of Vyazemsky.

Minishky immediately agreed to cooperate with the Germans, citing some old grievances against the Soviet regime. Seeing what a valuable shot they got, they promised, when the time came, to take him and his family to the west with the provision of German citizenship. But first, business.

Minishki spent 8 months studying in a special camp. And then the famous operation "Flamingo" began, which Gehlen carried out in cooperation with the intelligence officer Bown, who already had a network of agents in Moscow, among which the radio operator with the pseudonym Alexander was the most valuable.

Baun's men ferried Minishkiy across the front line, and he reported to the very first Soviet headquarters the story of his capture and daring escape, every detail of which was invented by Gelen's experts. He was taken to Moscow, where he was hailed as a hero. Almost immediately, mindful of his previous responsible work, he was appointed to work in the military-political secretariat of the GKO.


(Real German agents;
something like this could look like other German spies)

Not the only super spies

Through a chain through several German agents in Moscow, Minishki began to supply information. The first sensational message came from him on July 14, 1942. Gehlen and Gerre sat all night, drawing up a report based on it to the Chief of the General Staff, Halder. The report was made: “The military conference ended in Moscow on the evening of July 13th.

Shaposhnikov, Voroshilov, Molotov and the heads of the British, American and Chinese military missions were present. Shaposhnikov declared that their retreat would be as far as the Volga, in order to force the Germans to spend the winter in the area. During the retreat, comprehensive destruction should be carried out in the territory being abandoned; all industry must be evacuated to the Urals and Siberia.

The British representative asked for Soviet assistance in Egypt, but was told that the Soviet manpower resources were not as great as the Allies believed. In addition, they lack aircraft, tanks and guns, in part because part of the supply of weapons destined for Russia, which the British were supposed to deliver through the port of Basra in the Persian Gulf, was diverted to protect Egypt.

It was decided to conduct offensive operations in two sectors of the front: north of Orel and north of Voronezh, using large tank forces and air cover. A distraction attack must be carried out at Kalinin. It is necessary that Stalingrad, Novorossiysk and the Caucasus be kept.”

It all happened. Halder later noted in his diary: “The FCO has provided accurate information on the enemy forces newly deployed since June 28, and on the estimated strength of these formations. He also gave a correct assessment of the energetic actions of the enemy in the defense of Stalingrad.

The above authors made a number of inaccuracies, which is understandable: they received information through several hands and 30 years after the events described. For example, the English historian David Kahn gave a more correct version of the report: on July 14, the meeting was attended not by the heads of the American, British and Chinese missions, but by the military attaches of these countries.


(Secret intelligence school OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr)

There is no consensus about the real name of Minishkia. According to another version, his surname was Mishinsky. But perhaps it is not true either. For the Germans, it passed under the code numbers 438.

Coolridge and other authors report sparingly on the further fate of agent 438. The participants in Operation Flamingo definitely worked in Moscow until October 1942. In the same month, Gehlen recalled Minishkiy, arranging, with the help of Bown, a meeting with one of the leading reconnaissance detachments of the Wally, which ferried him across the front line.

In the future, Minishkia worked for Gehlen in the information analysis department, worked with German agents, who were then transferred across the front line.

Minishkia and Operation Flamingo are also named by other respected authors, such as the British military historian John Eriksson in his book The Road to Stalingrad, by the French historian Gabor Rittersporn. According to Rittersporn, Minishkiy actually received German citizenship, after the end of the Second World War he taught at an American intelligence school in southern Germany, then moved to the United States, having received American citizenship. The German Stirlitz died in the 1980s at his home in Virginia.

Minishkia was not the only super spy. The same British military historians mention that the Germans had many intercepted telegrams from Kuibyshev, where the Soviet authorities were based at that time. A German spy group worked in this city.

There were several "moles" surrounded by Rokossovsky, and several military historians mentioned that the Germans considered him as one of the main negotiators for a possible separate peace at the end of 1942, and then in 1944 - if the assassination attempt on Hitler would be successful. For reasons unknown today, Rokossovsky was seen as a possible ruler of the USSR after the overthrow of Stalin in a coup of the generals.


(This is how the unit of German saboteurs from Brandenburg looked like. One of its most famous operations was the capture of Maykop oil fields in the summer of 1942 and the city itself)

The British knew about German spies in the Red Army

The British knew well about these German spies (it is clear that they know now). This is also recognized by Soviet military historians. For example, the former military intelligence colonel Yuri Modin, in his book The Fates of the Intelligence Officers: My Cambridge Friends, claims that the British were afraid to supply the USSR with information obtained through the decoding of German reports, precisely because of the fear that there were agents in the Soviet headquarters.

But they personally mention another German superintelligence officer - Fritz Kauders, who created the famous Max intelligence network in the USSR. His biography is given by the aforementioned Englishman David Kahn.

Fritz Kauders was born in Vienna in 1903. His mother was Jewish and his father was German. In 1927 he moved to Zurich, where he began working as a sports journalist. Then he lived in Paris and Berlin, after Hitler came to power he left as a reporter in Budapest. There he found himself a profitable occupation - an intermediary in the sale of Hungarian entry visas to Jews fleeing Germany. He made acquaintances with high-ranking Hungarian officials, and at the same time met the head of the Abwehr station in Hungary, and began working for German intelligence.

He makes acquaintance with the Russian emigrant general A.V. Turkul, who had his own intelligence network in the USSR - later it served as the basis for the formation of a more extensive German spy network. Agents are thrown into the Union for a year and a half, starting in the autumn of 1939. The annexation of Romanian Bessarabia to the USSR helped a lot here, when at the same time they “attached” dozens of German spies, abandoned there in advance.


(General Turkul - in the center, with a mustache - with fellow White Guards in Sofia)

With the outbreak of war with the USSR, Kauders moved to Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, where he headed the Abwehr radio post, which received radiograms from agents in the USSR. But who these agents were has not been clarified so far. There are only fragments of information that there were at least 20-30 of them in various parts of the USSR. The Soviet super-saboteur Sudoplatov also mentions the Max intelligence network in his memoirs.

As mentioned above, not only the names of German spies, but also the minimum information about their actions in the USSR is still closed. Did the Americans and the British pass information about them to the USSR after the victory over fascism? Hardly - they needed the surviving agents themselves. The maximum that was then declassified was secondary agents from the Russian émigré organization NTS.

(quoted from the book by B. Sokolov "Hunting for Stalin, hunting for Hitler", publishing house "Veche", 2003, pp. 121-147)

Why did Stalin and Hitler fail to conclude a separate peace?


In 1941-43, Germany and the USSR repeatedly tried to negotiate peace, but they were frustrated due to Hitler's stubbornness. Germany and the Anglo-American allies came much closer to a truce in World War II, but they also failed due to Hitler's fault.

In July 1941, through the departing Ambassador Schulenburg, Stalin addressed Hitler with a letter about the possibility of concluding peace. After that, one of the leaders of Soviet intelligence, General Sudoplatov, with the knowledge of Molotov, tried to negotiate through the Bulgarian ambassador in Moscow I. Stamenov, who was told that, according to the Soviet side, it was not too late to resolve the conflict peacefully.

But Stamenov, for some reason, did not inform the Germans about the proposals made to him. Through Beria and his agents, Stalin sought contacts with the Germans and sounded out the conditions for concluding peace in October 1941. G. Zhukov testified to this in an interview with the staff of the Military Historical Journal, Stalin's translator Berezhkov tells about this in his memoirs, and at the trial of Beria in 1953, these negotiations were brought against him as one of the charges.

According to Berezhkov, Germany was offered a "Brest type" peace - the transfer of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Bessarabia, the Baltic states, the free transit of German troops through Soviet territory to the Middle East, to the Persian Gulf. But Hitler was in euphoria from his victories, and such conditions did not satisfy him.

Another attempt of this kind was made in September 1942 after Churchill's visit to Moscow and his refusal to open the Second Front in the near future. The former ambassador to Germany, V.G. Dekanozov, and his assistant, I.S. Chernyshev, met in Sweden with the adviser to the German Foreign Ministry, Schnurre, and again compromise options were offered with many concessions, and again the Germans were not interested in this.

In August 1942, Schellenberg and Himmler came up with plans for a separate peace in the West. They came to the conclusion that it is more profitable to conclude it while Germany is winning - soberly assessing the potentials of the Germans and the anti-Hitler coalition, both understood that the situation could soon change for the worse.

According to them, the first step for this was to discredit in the eyes of Hitler and remove the fanatic Ribbentrop, who was opposed to any kind of negotiations. Schellenberg, through his channels, established preliminary contacts with the Anglo-Americans and brought his proposals to them, assuring them of his unlimited possibilities and promising the imminent resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs - which supposedly was supposed to demonstrate to the West the change in the foreign policy of the Reich.

But all attempts to lay a mine under Ribbentrop failed. And Schellenberg's reputation with Western negotiating partners was undermined. They lost faith in his real capabilities and considered that they were either fooled by empty projects, or the proposals of the German special services were a provocation to spoil their relations with the USSR.

In December 1942, after the Allies landed in Africa, Mussolini put forward a proposal to make peace with the Russians and continue the war with the Anglo-Americans. And some contacts did take place. In 1942–43, negotiations with Soviet agents in Stockholm were conducted by Foreign Ministry official Peter Kleist, who acted on behalf of Ribbentrop.

But no data about them has been preserved, and, judging by subsequent events, no agreements could be reached. In 1942-43, Canaris also resumed negotiations with the Anglo-Americans, acting through their representatives in Switzerland and his colleague, the head of Italian intelligence, General Ame, who, together with the chief of the General Staff, Marshal Badoglio, was already looking for a way out of the war for Italy.

But one of the couriers, the businessman Schmidthuber, was caught smuggling currency abroad. The case was taken up by the Gestapo, and he spoke about attempts to establish contacts with the West. Persons directly involved in the negotiations were arrested.

The introduction of a provocateur

Then they introduced a provocateur into the so-called "Frau Solf's tea salon", which gathered people from high society who maintained ties with representatives of the Western powers. And in December 1943 they took everyone en masse, which was one of the reasons for the fall of Canaris and the defeat of the Abwehr.

In 1943-44, Schellenberg, on behalf of Ribbentrop, again tried to contact the Russians through Sweden and Switzerland with proposals for a compromise peace. But according to his testimony, Ribbentrop himself thwarted the meeting with Soviet representatives with excessive ambitions and a lack of understanding of the changed situation - he began to put forward preliminary demands, insist that there were no Jews among the participants in the negotiations, and everything went downhill. By the way, in circles close to Hitler, a very respectful attitude towards Stalin continued to be maintained during the war. Goebbels wrote in September 1943:

“I asked the Fuhrer if anything could be done with Stalin in the near future or in the long term. He replied that it was not possible at the moment. The Führer thinks it is easier to deal with the British than with the Soviets. At some point, the Fuhrer believes, the British will come to their senses. I am inclined to consider Stalin more accessible, since Stalin is a more practical politician than Churchill.

By the end of the war, the "peacekeeping initiatives" of the Nazis, of course, intensified. Schellenberg was still focused on the Western powers, in the summer of 1944 he met in Sweden with Roosevelt's representative Hewitt, who promised to organize real business negotiations. At the beginning of 1945, Schellenberg's collaborator Hoettl, the head of the SD in Vienna, established contacts in Switzerland with the head of American intelligence, General Donovan, and Himmler's representatives Langben and Kersten were sent there for negotiations.

The questions of a separate peace were discussed if the Anglo-Americans weakened the pressure on the Rhine army group and made it possible to transfer troops to the Eastern Front. But according to radio intercepts, Muller found out about the dialogue that had begun. Relying on Kaltenbrunner, he immediately began an investigation, and Himmler, as soon as he learned from their reports that the game was lit up, got scared and cut it off.

Wolf's talks with Dulles

As for Wolf's negotiations with Dulles, the most famous in our country thanks to "Seventeen Moments of Spring", Y. Semenov added a large share of fiction to this story.

Firstly, Himmler and Schellenberg had nothing to do with these negotiations. The initiative came from Wolf himself, the chief commissioner of the SS and police in Northern Italy, and the industrialists Marinetti and Olivetti, who did not want Italy to become a battlefield with all the ensuing consequences.

Secondly, they were of a private nature, only for a given theater of operations - and conditions were proposed for discussion that seemed to be beneficial to both sides: the Germans surrender Italy without resistance, but without surrender, and the Americans and the British allow them to freely leave for the Alps .

And Germany thus gets the opportunity to use these troops in the East. And thirdly, Wolf did not dare to take such a step until he agreed it with Hitler. On March 6, 1945, he made a report to the Führer in the presence of Kaltenbrunner, convincing him of the benefits of contacts. Hitler was skeptical about the idea, but allowed to act.

And only after that, in Zurich, meetings between Wolf and Dulles began. The Americans were throwing baits about the surrender of Army Group C, led by Kesselring, and Wolf, secretly from Hitler, played his game - he began to ventilate the possibility of a separate peace or an alliance with the Americans if he managed to get rid of the Fuhrer (he also sent Himmler overboard, as a figure too odious).

And the partners were so carried away in their fantasies that they even began to draw up lists of the future German government - Kesselring, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Neurath, was predicted to be the head, and Wolff staked out the post of Minister of the Interior for himself. But his trips to Switzerland were spotted by the Gestapo, the information reached Himmler, and he gave Wolf a scolding for getting into such a case without his sanction, and forbade further actions.

The Soviet Union was not informed about these negotiations by “Standartenführer Stirlitz” at all - they were laid by the British themselves with the Americans. They didn’t want to spoil relations with Moscow at the end of the war, and after Wolf’s first meeting with Dulles, they became worried – what if Stalin finds out something and gets angry? And they decided to notify the USSR. Already on March 11, the US ambassador in Moscow officially notified Molotov of contacts with Wolf.

And the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs said that he would not object to the negotiations, provided that a Soviet representative participated in them. Then the allies realized that the Soviet emissary would surely scare off Wolf and thereby thwart the opportunity to occupy Italy without loss.

They began to get out, on March 16 they answered that there were no negotiations yet, but "preparation of the ground" for negotiations, and Russia's participation was premature. But it wasn’t there, Molotov immediately took a pose - they say “unwillingness to admit a Soviet representative is unexpected and incomprehensible”, and if so, then the USSR cannot give consent to negotiations. On March 23 and April 4, two letters from Stalin to Roosevelt followed, and on April 13, General Donovan summoned Dulles to Paris and announced that the USSR knew about their negotiations, so behind-the-scenes games should be stopped.

In the meantime, clouds were gathering over Wolf. The Gestapo dug hard under him and proved to Kaltenbrunner that he was a traitor. He was again called to Berlin, and Muller was really going to arrest him right at the airport, but Himmler did not allow this - however, he did not send Schellenberg to meet him, but his personal doctor and assistant Gebhard. Before the Reichsführer SS, Wolf managed to justify himself, referring to Hitler's permission.

And on April 18, the Fuhrer resolved all disputes, giving permission to continue negotiations. With the condition that their main goal is to quarrel the West and the USSR. But he had already lost his sense of reality, on April 16 the Russians broke through the front on the Oder, and the situation was rapidly getting out of control of the Nazi leadership.

And the next stage of negotiations with Wolf already took place in the presence of the Soviet representative, General A.P. Kislenko, from the intrigues of the special services, they went to the level of the military command, and the bargaining for them was only about the conditions for the surrender of the Italian group.

Himmler was persuaded to take charge and start negotiations with the West through the Swedish Count Bernadotte only on April 19, when Germany was rapidly descending into chaos and it was too late to take any action.

It is curious that until the last moment Hitler retained the hope of reaching an agreement with the USSR. So, in the entry for March 4, 1945. Goebbels notes:


"The Führer is right when he says that it is easiest for Stalin to make a sharp turn, since he does not have to take public opinion into account."
He also notes that in recent days, Hitler "felt even greater closeness to Stalin", called him "a man of genius" and pointed out that Stalin's "greatness and steadfastness know in their essence neither the vacillation nor the pliability characteristic of Western politicians" .

And here is the entry dated March 5, 1945: “The Fuhrer is thinking of finding an opportunity to negotiate with the Soviet Union, and then with the most severe energy to continue the war with England. For England has always been a troublemaker in Europe. Soviet atrocities are, of course, horrendous and have a profound effect on the concept of the Fuhrer. But after all, the Mongols, like the Soviets today, were outrageous in their time in Europe, without having an impact on the political resolution of the then contradictions. Invasions from the East come and go, and Europe must deal with them.”

(Quotes - from the works of the historian Shambarov)

Trotsky could become the ruler of the USSR with the victory of Hitler



(Esteban Volkov in the house-museum of his grandfather)

Leon Trotsky was considered by the Germans in the late 1930s as the most realistic contender for the ruler of the defeated USSR. Trotsky's grandson Esteban Volkov spoke about this in the late 1980s.

In 1989, the correspondent of the Russian Yearbook, V. Leskov, met with the grandson of Leon Trotsky in Mexico. Leskov published a report on this meeting in the above-mentioned publication in 1990 (No. 2). We republish this report (with some abbreviations) from the paper edition of PE (it is not available on the Internet).

Esteban Volkov (Vsevolod Bronstein) was born in 1926. He was the son of Trotsky's daughter who died early (who committed suicide in a state of depression). The boy was then adopted by Trotsky's son, Lev Sedov. Esteban moved to live with his grandfather in Mexico in 1939.

Volkov completely forgot the Russian language, and the correspondent Leskov communicated with him in Spanish. Esteban trained as a pharmaceutical chemist, but devoted his life to looking after his grandfather's house-museum. Fortunately, he had something to live on - the Mexican government still subsidizes the activities of the house-museum.


(One of Leon Trotsky's guards is American James Cooper, photo - spring 1940)

Volkov recalls his grandfather's conversations with loved ones. Here is what he remembered from the main:


- It is necessary to create an independent, free Ukraine. In the event of a war, the USSR will face national uprisings.
- All real revolutionaries, opponents of Stalin will oppose him in the upcoming war (with Germany - BT). The enemy will be 70 km from the Kremlin, and that's when Stalin will surrender.
- With Hitler and Japanese it is possible to agree. For support to the Germans, Ukraine can be given under the protectorate, Japan - the Far East.
- The anti-fascist struggle is a Stalinist deceit and fiction, a coalition of countries against Hitler is alien to the interests of the Russian revolution; let Hitler crush the Western powers - he will unleash a revolution in Europe.
- The way to Paris and London lies through Afghanistan, Punjab and Bengal. Also, the normal life of the USSR is unthinkable through a revolution in Germany or even the unification of two states into one.
Leon Trotsky was considered by the Germans as a possible ruler of the USSR in the event of the fall of the Stalinist regime. Esteban Volkov claims that the United States also saw him in this role. True, allegedly, the Americans considered Trotsky as the ruler of the USSR, in the event of the liberation of our country - but from Hitler. Shortly before his death, Leon Trotsky and his lawyers petitioned the US authorities for resettlement in this country.


(On the left is Trotsky's wife Natalya, in the center is the Mexican artist Frida Kahlo)

But even more surprising is that Trotsky was considered as the new ruler of the defeated USSR not only by Germany and the USA, but also by England, France and even Finland. Here are some secret intelligence reports from the above countries:

“In December 1939, the State Council of Finland discussed the formation of an alternative Russian government headed by Trotsky or A.F. Kerensky.

In connection with the information given in previous messages about the concentration of Anglo-French troops in Syria, the following reports and rumors, which were transmitted here by agents from France and Geneva, will probably also be of interest. According to them, England intends to deliver a surprise blow not only on the Russian oil regions, but will also try at the same time to deprive Germany of Romanian oil sources in the Balkans.

The agent in France reports that the British are planning, through Trotsky's group in France, to establish contact with Trotsky's people in Russia itself and try to organize a putsch against Stalin. These coup attempts must be seen as closely related to the British intention to seize Russian oil sources.

Crauel"

“British plans regarding the disruption of the oil supply to Germany and Russia from Geneva are secretly reported:

The British side wants to make an attempt to cut off the Russians from oil sources and at the same time intends to influence Romania in one form or another and, by causing a conflict in the Balkans, to deprive Germany of oil supplies. Having cut off the USSR and Germany from oil, the British hope to quickly and radically solve the problem; it is assumed that in a sharply deteriorating conditions these countries will go over to an open struggle against each other ...

Further, the British side will attempt to mobilize the Trotsky group, that is, the Fourth International, and in some way transfer it to Russia. Agents in Paris report that Trotsky, with the help of the British, will have to return to Russia to organize a putsch against Stalin. It is difficult to judge from here (from Geneva) to what extent these plans can be implemented.

(In Mexico, Lev Davydovich Trotsky started a farm with rabbits and chickens, he worked on the farm himself (at least 2-3 hours every day). Work on the land seems to be contrary to Trotsky's theory that the peasantry is a reactionary, petty-bourgeois class. But Trotsky believed that only townspeople should work on the land - people who had cleansed themselves of peasant conservatism)

By killing Trotsky, Stalin may have prevented the collapse of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. If Trotsky had remained alive then, by the winter of 1941/42 he could have headed the collaborationist Russian government. And there was a great chance that this faithful Leninist would be followed not only by the surrendered Red Army soldiers and residents of the occupied territories, but also by Soviet citizens who had rebelled in the rear.

And so Hitler had to use the services of a minor character - General Vlasov. We know very well the results of Vlasov's propaganda on the Soviet rear.

Corruption and "socially close" security forces in Stalin's MGB

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Ministry of State Security was hit by massive corruption. The security guards stole wagons, opened underground workshops, closed cases for bribes. The head of the MGB, Abakumov, was eventually arrested. This example clearly shows how important it is to have competition among law enforcement agencies.


(In the picture: Abakumov, Merkulov and Beria)

In Russian public opinion (and earlier in the Soviet one) there is a strong opinion that "there was order under Stalin." However, the archives show that even the "Order of the Sword" and the "cadre elite" - the state security - was struck by corruption, arbitrariness, drunkenness and debauchery.

The Ministry of State Security (MGB) in 1946 was headed by Viktor Abakumov, who during the war headed SMERSH and worked as Deputy Minister of Defense (de jure - Stalin's deputy). KGB cadres Viktor Stepakov (the book "The Apostle of SMERSH"), Anatoly Tereshchenko, Oleg Smyslov (the book "Victor Abakumov: Executioner or Victim") in their biographies of the head of the MGB Abakumov recall how he and his apparatus went to domestic and official decay.

Victor Abakumov came from a working-class family, with virtually no education (4th grade at school). He was a product of the decomposition of the NEP system and the transition to a totalitarian state, combining a passion for a beautiful life and at the same time a rigid system. In the late 1930s - early 1940s, Stalin, seeing how dangerous it was to delegate power powers only to state security (the NKVD of the times of Yagoda and Yezhov, which became in fact a state within a state), began to create a system of checks and balances. The NKVD was divided into two parts - in fact, the Commissariat of Internal Affairs itself and state security; a little later, SMERSH also appeared - formally the army counterintelligence, but in fact the Chekist control over the army. At the same time, the Party Control Committee was also strengthened.

The MGB, headed by Abakumov, mainly accepted army personnel, as well as "jackets" - civilians who graduated from humanitarian universities. A significant percentage of the new ministry was occupied by partisans and security officers engaged in sabotage during the war. Stalin, who gave the go-ahead for such a staffing of the MGB, was sure that the ministry, unlike the NKVD of the 1930s, with such personnel would be guaranteed from “rebirth”. However, reality taught the darkest lessons.

The new Stalinist system of checks and balances in the second half of the 1940s led to the fact that the security forces with tripled energy were looking for dirt on each other. The MGB of Abakumov was the first to fall, plunging into the mud of “rebirth”, for which, as a result, the minister himself was arrested in 1951, and in 1954 he was shot.

But at the same time, the new Stalinist system at that time clearly began to demonstrate both class degeneration and the introduction of class justice (as under the tsar). The vast majority of cases against Chekist criminals ended with symbolic punishments, and even if prison terms were applied to them, they could not be compared with how much people from other classes received for similar crimes.

The dry summaries from the archives cited by the aforementioned authors speak best.

Immediately after the Second World War, many cases of trophy atrocities arose against high officials of the MGB, but most of them were put on the brakes. So, the head of the counterintelligence department of the USSR Navy in 1943-1946, Lieutenant-General P.A. He also transferred three cars to the personal property of his deputies - Generals Karandashev, Lebedev and Duhovich, organized the purchase of property in commission stores and from private individuals for employees of the counterintelligence department of the Navy for 2 million 35 thousand rubles (with an average salary of 600 rubles in the country then ). In 1947, Gladkov got off with an administrative penalty.

In March 1947, the head of the UMGB in the Arkhangelsk region, A.I. Brezgin, was removed from his post by the decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and was soon expelled from the party because, until the summer of 1945, he was the head of the Smersh counterintelligence department of the 48th Army in East Prussia, first organized the delivery of trophies (mostly furniture) to his Moscow apartment by three trucks with two trailers.

Then Brezgin assembled a train of 28 wagons with furniture, pianos, cars, bicycles, radios, carpets, etc., which arrived from Germany in Kazan, where the Chekist received the post of head of the counterintelligence department of the Volga Military District. All this property was appropriated by Brezgin and his deputies - Pavlenko, Paliev and others. The Chekists openly sold the surplus. Paliev, years later, also had to answer for excesses: in May 1949, he lost his post.

"Trophy cases" were investigated for a long time, and the perpetrators were often repressed in connection with the struggle of the clans of the Minister of State Security Abakumov and Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs I.A. Serov. The arrest in December 1952 of Lieutenant General N.S. Vlasik, in 1946-1952. who worked as the head of the Main Directorate of Security of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, led to the subsequent conviction of the head of the Stalinist security (in January 1955) for official misconduct for 10 years of exile, after which an amnesty followed. In total, Vlasik was charged with stealing trophy property worth 2.2 million rubles. In 2000, he was fully rehabilitated (posthumously).

In the central apparatus of the MGB, not only the ministers and their deputies could count on receiving large illegal profits. It was not difficult for foreign intelligence officers to hide the expenditure of operational funds for their own needs.

The certificate of the Personnel Department of the MGB of the USSR dated January 30, 1947 indicated that the former deputy head of the 4th department of the MGB, Major General N.I. for the intended purpose of products and funds earmarked for operational purposes", about which the leadership of the MGB "with respect to Eitingon limited himself to analysis and suggestion." The accusatory certificate stated that Eitingon received only “gifts” for 705 thousand rubles.

The employees of the MGB abroad were also engaged in grabbing. The representative of the MGB task force on the Liaodong Peninsula, V.G. Sluchevsky, was expelled from the party in February 1949 for taking bribes from arrested Koreans from South Korea; The Chekist escaped with dismissal from the MGB. The adviser of the MGB in Czechoslovakia, Colonel V.A. Boyarsky, who had previously distinguished himself in robberies of the inhabitants of Manchuria, in February 1952 received a party reprimand for "excesses in the expenditure of funds for personal maintenance of himself and his apparatus" (about 500 thousand rubles). For Boyarsky, this episode did not have consequences - in 1951 he was transferred to the apparatus of the MGB-Ministry of Internal Affairs of Lithuania.


(Photo by Abakumov from the investigation file)

Some heads of local security agencies have been caught committing large speculative enterprises. K.O. Mikautadze, People's Commissar for State Security of the Adjara ASSR, was sentenced to 8 years in prison for malfeasance (released less than two years later due to amnesty and illness).

In 1944-1945, with the sanction of Mikautadze, his deputies Skhirtladze and Berulava, together with other NKGB officers, through the speculator Akopyan, carried out a number of frauds and speculative transactions.

Having provided Akopyan with a false certificate of a state security officer, the Chekists sent him to sell fruit, and he, under the guise of gifts for front-line soldiers and workers of the Leningrad car repair plant, took 10 tons of tangerines and other fruits to other regions (at the same time, Akopyan took five more speculators with him, from which he received for this trip 100 thousand rubles). Having sold fruits, Hakobyan bought cars, motorcycles, clothes and other goods, which were then dismantled by employees of the republican NKGB. Mikautadze's wife received 50 thousand rubles from the resale of various goods.

In 1946, the newly appointed head of the MGB department, V.I. Moskalenko, took hams, sausages and other products from the warehouse, illegally organized a sewing workshop in the internal prison of the MGB, sewed four suits for free in this workshop and allowed other employees of the UMGB to sew suits for free. Moskalenko pleaded guilty only to the fact that he used a prisoner tailor to sew costumes. In the allied MGB, they limited themselves to explaining Moskalenko, appointing him Minister of State Security of the Estonian SSR as a "punishment".

It turned out that during 1943-1947, family members of a number of senior officials of the UMGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including the families of Borshchev and the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Major General I.G. etc.), foodstuffs”.

A frequent occurrence was the appropriation of secret amounts intended to pay for the services of agents. The head of the KRO UMGB in the Chita region, Z.S. Protasenko, was expelled from the party by the regional committee in June 1951 for the illegal expenditure of state funds: the KRO employees drank and squandered 9,000 rubles intended to pay for agents. The head of the Transport Department of the Ashgabat MGB A.G. Kochetkov was expelled from the party in July 1946 for misappropriation of state funds: he made 10 false receipts on behalf of informants and received 2,900 rubles on them. The punishment was light - three years probation.

A clear example of the low morality of the communists of the MGB was the frequent facts of theft of party contributions by party organizers of Chekist institutions. Party organizer of the UMGB in the Kemerovo region I.P. Emelyanov, a former experienced SMERSH counterintelligence officer, embezzled and squandered 63 thousand rubles in 1947-1949 by forging documents. party contributions. The party organizer (in 1949-1951) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the same region, B.I. Kholodenin, was expelled from the CPSU (b) for embezzling and drinking 3.662 rubles of party fees, removed from his post and then sentenced to 8 years in labor camp (left a year and a half later under an amnesty of 1953 of the year).

The party organizer of the Biysk city department of the UMGB for the Altai Territory, A.K. Savelkaev, was expelled from the party in May 1948 for embezzling 2.069 rubles. party fees "for drinking" and fired from the "organs".

The party organizer and head of the investigative department of the ROC of the MGB of the East Siberian Military District V.I.

It came to very sophisticated methods of theft. Thus, in 1944-1951, the party functionary A.I. In June 1952, Pulyakh was expelled from the party because he illegally received 42,000 rubles in royalties from the editor of the regional newspaper Kuzbass, both for unpublished articles and for materials from other authors and TASS. The criminal case against Pulyakh was terminated due to the 1953 amnesty.

Several bribe takers and scammers

Several bribe-takers and swindlers from Abakumov's inner circle received significant terms. For example, Colonel A. M. Palkin, head of department "D" of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, received 15 years in the camps in October 1952 for theft (although he was released ahead of schedule in 1956). Colonel P.S. Ilyashenko, who worked as deputy head of one of the departments of the USSR Ministry of State Security, was sentenced to 10 years in prison in February 1953 for “theft of socialist property” (he was released in 1955).

Other corrupt officials got off much easier. The head of the counterintelligence department of the Central Group of Forces, Lieutenant-General M.I. Belkin, in the second half of the 40s, created a “black cash desk” and was engaged in speculation. In October 1951, he was arrested in connection with the defeat of Abakumov's entourage and was released in 1953. However, Belkin was then fired from the "bodies" "on the facts of discrediting."

Simultaneously with Belkin, Lieutenant-General P.V. Zelenin was arrested for embezzlement in Germany, in 1945-1947. worked as the head of the UKR "Smersh" - UKR MGB in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. In 1953, he was amnestied, but then stripped of his general rank. And the former Commissioner of the MGB in Germany, Lieutenant General N.K. Kovalchuk, who was promoted to the Minister of State Security of Ukraine, escaped repression, although in 1952 he was accused of “bringing two carloads of trophy items and valuables from the front”; however, in 1954 he was deprived of his title and awards.


(In the picture: Colonel-General S.A. Goglidze, Head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, officer and foreman of the security units of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR in transport. An officer in the form of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) is visible behind. 1947-52)

The head of the personnel department of special workshops No. 4 of the USSR Ministry of State Security, Kuznetsov, was engaged in the theft of materials from the workshop and took bribes. So, in 1948, he received two bribes from the workers of the special workshops Vykhodtsev and Shevchuk in the amount of 850 rubles for issuing documents on their dismissal from the workshops. In the same year, for a bribe of 12 thousand rubles, Kuznetsov left the convicted Grinberg to serve his sentence in the Moscow region instead of deporting him to Vorkuta.

In 1947, he received 4,800 rubles from a certain Bogomolova for the transfer of her convicted husband from prison to a camp, and then early release. Also, Kuznetsov, for 20 thousand rubles, contributed to the release from the camp to freedom "as disabled" of two convicts under Article 58 - some Gorenshtein and Rivkin.

The arrest of the minister of the MGB Abakumov in July 1951 led to a massive purge in the leadership of the "organs". The data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Party Control Committee showed that up to 40% of the MGB staff fell under various kinds of punishment. It was the largest purge of the security organs of the USSR during their entire existence (except for the “political” purges in the late 1930s and after the arrest of Beria; but in the case of Abakumov, these were punishments of the Chekists under non-political articles).

What lesson can be drawn from this story, besides the fact that it was at this time - in the late 1940s - early 1950s - that the establishment of class justice in the country (which is still in force now) was finally formalized? The system of checks and balances in law enforcement agencies contributes well to controlling them and preventing the final degeneration of the “organs”. "The war of all against all" - in the zero years, almost the same system was created by Putin.

Then each other was restrained by the prosecutor's office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Drug Control Service and the FSB, the army and later - the Investigative Committee. We witnessed large-scale purges in the "organs" that did not allow any department to take over. Today, there is only one link in the system that balances each other: the superdepartment of the Investigative Committee and the FSB. Outwardly, such a system looks monolithic, “stable”, but, as we know from the history of Russia, “stability” (stagnation) is the first step towards “perestroika”.

Russia again has a rural-KPSS State Duma

The new State Duma still continues to be part of the Soviet system. As before, it is dominated by people from villages and towns, released workers of the Komsomol and the CPSU. Only one thing distinguishes it from previous compositions - sports wrestlers and people who were associated with Germany in the past were introduced to this State Duma.

Despite the quantitative changes in the new State Duma (a decrease in the representation of United Russia and, accordingly, an increase in the presence of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the SR and the Liberal Democratic Party), it remained the same - a village-KPSS. Just as nothing has changed in the country in recent decades, so within the walls of Okhotny Ryad everything remains the same.

The Interpreter's Blog has already analyzed the biographical characteristics of the deputies of the former State Duma, V convocation. Then we divided the entire composition of the parliament into several groups. By the same principle, we analyzed the new composition of the State Duma.

1-2) In the former State Duma, there were 124 and 33 people from villages and towns, respectively. The new one has 109 and the same 33 people. Rural - a decrease of 15 people. But still, their share - 24.2% of the total composition - is still even slightly higher than the total number of rural residents in the country (23%). And again there are deputies whose place of birth is difficult to classify, but we put them in the group born in the village. For example, Nikolai Makarov: he was born at stud farm No. 137 in the Saratov region. Well, then a standard Soviet-sovereign-democratic career: he worked in the prosecutor's office, as an instructor in the department of administrative bodies of the Saratov regional committee of the CPSU, and as a prosecutor in his native region.

As a rule, the deputies who come from the villages have a very rich professional experience, they have mastered several professions. Here is Ramazan Abdulatipov: he graduated from the medical and obstetric school, was in charge of the rural medical center, worked as a fireman, taught philosophy. And Alevtina Oparina was a laborer at the state farm, a cashier, an accountant, a pig farmer, a poultry keeper, a pioneer leader, and a teacher of the Russian language. From 1968 - secretary of the district committee of the Komsomol, from 1973 - head of the organizational department of the district committee of the CPSU, from 1976 - instructor of the Volgograd regional committee of the CPSU (well, further up the party line). Dmitry Vyatkin - worked as a turner, asphalt concrete worker, court clerk, teacher.

3) But the released workers of the Komsomol and the CPSU in the new State Duma even turned out to be more than in the previous one. It seems that the USSR is farther and farther away from us, and there are more and more people in power from that System. Previously, there were 62 partocrats on Okhotny Ryad, this time there are 65. Or 14.4% of the entire composition of the State Duma. The share of any secretaries of the CPSU or Komsomol on salary in Soviet times was no more than 1% of the total number of Russians. It turns out that there are now 14 times more Communist-Komsomol functionaries in parliament than there should have been "according to the proportional quota."

At the same time, many partocrats ended up in several of our groups at once. For example, the grandson of the Stalinist People's Commissar Molotov, Vyacheslav Nikonov, ended up in the group of partocrats and in the group of KGB siloviki. Here is a summary of his life path: after studying, he worked at the faculty as the secretary of the Komsomol committee and the party committee, from 1989 he headed the sector of the ideological department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in 1991-1992 he was assistant to the head of the apparatus of the president of the USSR and the chairman of the KGB.

4) Siloviki - people from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB-FSB - there were 23 people on our list. There were 28 of them in the last State Duma. But here we must understand that these data are taken from the official biographies of the deputies, and the current members of the Okhrana (who are in the so-called "personnel reserve") are not very fond of making public information about themselves.

5) Indigenous Muscovites and Petersburgers in the new Duma - 43 and 16, respectively. In the past it was - 35 and 15, respectively. There are 8 more Muscovites, and this is progress: now their share of 9.5% even slightly exceeds the ratio of Muscovites and other Russians (8.1%).

6) The share of Chechens in the Duma is approximately 2 times higher than their ratio to the entire population of Russia - 8 people, or 1.8% of the parliament (whereas 1.4 million Chechens make up 1% of all Russians). There are also very respected people among them: for example, one of the streets in the Chechen village of Roshni-Chu is named after the now living deputy Vakha Agaev.

But the share of Dagestanis - 12 people, or 2.7% of the members of the Duma - approximately corresponds to their representation in Russia (2.3% of the Russian population).

7) A new social group, singled out by us - professional wrestlers who have become deputies. There are 8 of them in the new Duma. The trend is clear: since Vladimir Vladimirovich is a wrestler (judoka), we must show respect for him. Moreover, some fighters are directly connected with Putin. For example, Vasily Shestakov. He graduated from the VTUZ at the Leningrad Mechanical Plant (1976). He was a member of the Leningrad judo team, which included Vladimir Putin. And later he published, in collaboration with him, the textbook "Judo: history, theory, practice." Now knowledge of judo techniques helps him write laws.

8) Another new social group, and also associated with Putin's life path, are people, like the president, who have one or another relation to Germany. There are 7 such people in the Duma (this is with open biographies). Here are typical biographies of the Gerusses. Alexander Tarnaev: in 1982-1987 he served in the military counterintelligence department in Germany, today Gennady Zyuganov's chief bodyguard (head of his security service). Victor Shudegov - trained at the Technical University of Dresden (1986). Maria Maksakova-Igenbergs - born in 1977 in Munich, since 2011 - soloist of the Mariinsky Theater, member of the Public Council under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

What can be the conclusion from these statistics? He is the only one: since the State Dumas repeatedly reproduce the Soviet Union within themselves, then it is necessary to return to the main principles of the legislative system that existed in the post-Stalin USSR. Among them, the chief deputy is not a legislator released from his main work. He works at his workplace, and 2 times a year he comes to parliament sessions. The current activity is carried out by a small Presidium (15-30 people). The only material privilege of such a deputy is free travel (as well as a hotel during the session; well, travel allowance).

By the way, the deputies of the Stalin era had the same privileges as now. They, like the current State Duma members, received higher salaries. So, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1938 received 600 rubles. monthly, and during the session 100 rubles. per day. Note that the average monthly salary of workers and employees then amounted to 330 rubles.

And one more provision needs to be returned: the right of citizens to write orders to their deputy on the ballots, and to the deputy to read these orders and carry them out (such ballots should be considered valid). How it then looked in practice, the deputy, writer and poet Tvardovsky wrote at one time:

“The elections were held on March 1, 1960. They voted for the candidate Tvardovsky with faith and hope that he would help, correct and improve, as evidenced by the inscriptions of voters on the ballot papers: “I vote for the best poet of our Motherland”; "Write more good poetry"; "Good man, let him go"; “Take care to keep the chickens in the village, not to take away the last piece of bread from the children. For example, I am not able to buy on the market, but here it is forbidden. I ask you to keep chickens in the village.

The late Walter Rathenau, who knew "Them" best, said: "They have such power that they can make half the world produce shit and the other half eat it." - What exactly is happening!

This planet is ruled by such creatures (meaning the Jews) who do not consider themselves one biological species with the rest of the people (non-Jews).

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History is written by the victors, and therefore it is not customary for Soviet chroniclers to mention German spies who worked behind the lines in the Red Army. And there were such scouts, and even in the General Staff of the Red Army, as well as the famous Max network. After the end of the war, the Americans transferred them to their place, to share their experience with the CIA. Indeed, it is hard to believe that the USSR managed to create an agent network in Germany and the countries occupied by it (the most famous is the Red Chapel), but the Germans did not.

And if German intelligence officers during the Second World War are not written in Soviet-Russian histories, then the point is not only that it is not customary for the winner to confess his own miscalculations.

Reinhard Gehlen - first, in the center - with cadets of the intelligence school

In the case of German spies in the USSR, the situation is complicated by the fact that the head of the Foreign Armies - East department (in the German abbreviation FHO, it was he who was in charge of intelligence) Reinhard Galen prudently took care of preserving the most important documentation in order to surrender to the Americans at the very end of the war and offer them a "goods face".

His department dealt almost exclusively with the USSR, and in the conditions of the beginning of the Cold War, Gehlen's papers were of great value to the United States.

Later, the general headed the intelligence of the FRG, and his archive remained in the United States (some copies were left to Gehlen). Having already retired, the general published his memoirs “Service. 1942-1971", which were published in Germany and the USA in 1971-72. Almost simultaneously with Gehlen's book, his biography was published in America, as well as the book of British intelligence officer Edward Spiro "Ghelen - Spy of the Century" (Spiro wrote under the pseudonym Edward Cookridge, he was a Greek by nationality, a representative of British intelligence in the Czech resistance during the war). Another book was written by the American journalist Charles Whiting, who was suspected of working for the CIA, and was called Gehlen - German Master Spy. All of these books are based on the Gehlen archives, used with the permission of the CIA and the German intelligence BND. They contain some information about German spies in the Soviet rear.

Gehlen's personal card

General Ernst Kestring, a Russian German born near Tula, was engaged in "field work" in Gehlen's German intelligence. It was he who served as the prototype of the German major in Bulgakov's book Days of the Turbins, who saved Hetman Skoropadsky from reprisals by the Red Army (in fact, the Petliurites). Kestring was fluent in the Russian language and Russia, and it was he who personally selected agents and saboteurs from Soviet prisoners of war. It was he who found one of the most valuable, as it turned out later, German spies.

On October 13, 1941, 38-year-old Captain Minishkiy was taken prisoner. It turned out that before the war he worked in the secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and earlier in the Moscow City Party Committee. From the moment the war began, he served as a political instructor at the Western Front. He was captured along with the driver when he was driving around the advanced units during the battle of Vyazemsky.

Minishky immediately agreed to cooperate with the Germans, citing some old grievances against the Soviet regime. Seeing what a valuable shot they got, they promised, when the time came, to take him and his family to the west with the provision of German citizenship. But first, business.

Minishki spent 8 months studying in a special camp. And then the famous operation "Flamingo" began, which Gehlen carried out in cooperation with the intelligence officer Bown, who already had a network of agents in Moscow, among which the radio operator with the pseudonym Alexander was the most valuable. Baun's men ferried Minishkiy across the front line, and he reported to the very first Soviet headquarters the story of his capture and daring escape, every detail of which was invented by Gelen's experts. He was taken to Moscow, where he was hailed as a hero. Almost immediately, mindful of his previous responsible work, he was appointed to work in the military-political secretariat of the GKO.

Real German agents; something like this could look like other German spies

Through a chain through several German agents in Moscow, Minishki began to supply information. The first sensational message came from him on July 14, 1942. Gehlen and Gerre sat all night, drawing up a report based on it to the Chief of the General Staff, Halder. The report was made: “The military conference ended in Moscow on the evening of July 13th. Shaposhnikov, Voroshilov, Molotov and the heads of the British, American and Chinese military missions were present. Shaposhnikov declared that their retreat would be as far as the Volga, in order to force the Germans to spend the winter in the area. During the retreat, comprehensive destruction should be carried out in the territory being abandoned; all industry must be evacuated to the Urals and Siberia.

The British representative asked for Soviet assistance in Egypt, but was told that the Soviet manpower resources were not as great as the Allies believed. In addition, they lack aircraft, tanks and guns, in part because part of the supply of weapons destined for Russia, which the British were supposed to deliver through the port of Basra in the Persian Gulf, was diverted to protect Egypt. It was decided to conduct offensive operations in two sectors of the front: north of Orel and north of Voronezh, using large tank forces and air cover. A distraction attack must be carried out at Kalinin. It is necessary that Stalingrad, Novorossiysk and the Caucasus be kept.”

It all happened. Halder later noted in his diary: “The FCO has provided accurate information on the enemy forces newly deployed since June 28, and on the estimated strength of these formations. He also gave a correct assessment of the energetic actions of the enemy in the defense of Stalingrad.

The above authors made a number of inaccuracies, which is understandable: they received information through several hands and 30 years after the events described. For example, the English historian David Kahn gave a more correct version of the report: on July 14, the meeting was attended not by the heads of the American, British and Chinese missions, but by the military attaches of these countries.

Secret Intelligence School OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr

There is no consensus about the real name of Minishkia. According to another version, his surname was Mishinsky. But perhaps it is not true either. For the Germans, it passed under the code numbers 438.

Coolridge and other authors report sparingly on the further fate of agent 438. The participants in Operation Flamingo definitely worked in Moscow until October 1942. In the same month, Gehlen recalled Minishkiy, arranging, with the help of Bown, a meeting with one of the leading reconnaissance detachments of the Wally, who ferried him across the front line.

In the future, Minishkiy worked for Gehlen in the information analysis department, worked with German agents, who were then transferred across the front line.

Minishkia and Operation Flamingo are also named by other respected authors, such as the British military historian John Eriksson in his book The Road to Stalingrad, by the French historian Gabor Rittersporn. According to Rittersporn, Minishkiy actually received German citizenship, after the end of the Second World War he taught at an American intelligence school in southern Germany, then moved to the United States, having received American citizenship. The German Stirlitz died in the 1980s at his home in Virginia.

Minishkiy wasn't the only super spy. The same British military historians mention that the Germans had many intercepted telegrams from Kuibyshev, where the Soviet authorities were based at that time. A German spy group worked in this city. There were several "moles" surrounded by Rokossovsky, and several military historians mentioned that the Germans considered him as one of the main negotiators for a possible separate peace at the end of 1942, and then in 1944 - if the assassination attempt on Hitler would be successful. For reasons unknown today, Rokossovsky was seen as a possible ruler of the USSR after the overthrow of Stalin in a coup of the generals.

It looked like a unit of German saboteurs from Brandenburg. One of his most famous operations was the capture of the Maykop oil fields in the summer of 1942 and the city itself.

The British knew well about these German spies (it is clear that they know now). This is also recognized by Soviet military historians. For example, the former military intelligence colonel Yuri Modin, in his book The Fates of the Intelligence Officers: My Cambridge Friends, claims that the British were afraid to supply the USSR with information obtained through the decoding of German reports, precisely because of the fear that there were agents in the Soviet headquarters.

But they personally mention another German superintelligence officer - Fritz Kauders, who created the famous Max intelligence network in the USSR. His biography is given by the aforementioned Englishman David Kahn.

Fritz Kauders was born in Vienna in 1903. His mother was Jewish and his father was German. In 1927 he moved to Zurich, where he began working as a sports journalist. Then he lived in Paris and Berlin, after Hitler came to power he left as a reporter in Budapest. There he found himself a profitable occupation - an intermediary in the sale of Hungarian entry visas to Jews fleeing Germany. He made acquaintances with high-ranking Hungarian officials, and at the same time met the head of the Abwehr station in Hungary, and began working for German intelligence.

He makes acquaintance with the Russian emigrant general A.V. Turkul, who had his own intelligence network in the USSR - later it served as the basis for the formation of a more extensive German spy network. Agents are thrown into the Union for a year and a half, starting in the autumn of 1939. The annexation of Romanian Bessarabia to the USSR helped a lot here, when at the same time they “attached” dozens of German spies, abandoned there in advance.

General Turkul - in the center, with a mustache - with fellow White Guards in Sofia

With the outbreak of war with the USSR, Kauders moved to Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, where he headed the Abwehr radio post, which received radiograms from agents in the USSR. But who these agents were has not been clarified so far. There are only fragments of information that there were at least 20-30 of them in various parts of the USSR. The Soviet super-saboteur Sudoplatov also mentions the Max intelligence network in his memoirs.

As mentioned above, not only the names of German spies, but also the minimum information about their actions in the USSR is still closed. Did the Americans and the British pass information about them to the USSR after the victory over fascism? Hardly - they needed the surviving agents themselves. The maximum that was then declassified was secondary agents from the Russian émigré organization NTS.

(quoted from the book by B. Sokolov "Hunting for Stalin, hunting for Hitler", publishing house "Veche", 2003, pp. 121-147)

  1. I came across an interesting document, which also mentions the Smolensk region.
    Many posts mention German intelligence and counterintelligence agencies.
    I propose in this thread purposefully spread interesting facts on them.

    TOP SECRET
    TO THE MINISTERS OF STATE SECURITY OF THE UNION AND AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS
    TO THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS OF THE MGB OF TERRITORIES AND REGIONS
    TO THE HEADS OF COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENTS OF THE MGB MILITARY DISTRICT, TROOP GROUPS, FLEET AND FLEET
    TO THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND SECURITY DEPARTMENTS OF THE MGB FOR RAILWAY AND WATER TRANSPORT
    At the same time, a "Collection of reference materials on the German intelligence agencies operating against the USSR during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" is sent.
    The collection includes verified data on the structure and activities of the central apparatus of the Abwehr and the Main Directorate of Imperial Security of Germany - RSHA, their bodies operating against the USSR from the territory of neighboring countries, on the East German front and on the territory of the Soviet Union temporarily occupied by the Germans.
    ... Use the materials of the collection in undercover development of persons suspected of belonging to German intelligence agents, and in exposing arrested German spies during the investigation.
    Minister of State Security of the USSR
    S. IGNATIEV
    October 25, 1952 mountains Moscow
    (from directive)
    In preparing an adventure unprecedented in its dimensions, Hitlerite Germany attached particular importance to the organization of a powerful intelligence service.
    Soon after seizing power in Germany, the Nazis created a secret state police - the Gestapo, which, along with the terrorist suppression of opponents of the Nazi regime inside the country, organized political intelligence abroad. The leadership of the Gestapo was carried out by Heinrich Himmler, the imperial leader of the guard detachments (SS) of the fascist party.
    The scale of espionage and provocative activities within the country and abroad by the intelligence of the fascist party - the so-called. the security service (SD) of the guard detachments, which henceforth became the main intelligence organization in Germany.
    The German military intelligence and counterintelligence "Abwehr" significantly intensified its work, for the leadership of which in 1938 the "Abwehr-Abroad" Directorate of the General Staff of the German Army was created.
    In 1939, the Gestapo and the SD were merged into the Imperial Security Main Directorate (RSHA), which in 1944 also included military intelligence and counterintelligence "Abwehr".
    The Gestapo, the SD and the Abwehr, as well as the foreign department of the fascist party and the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched active subversive and espionage activities against the countries designated as targets of attack by fascist Germany, and primarily against the Soviet Union.
    German intelligence played a significant role in the capture of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia, Greece and the fascistization of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Relying on its agents and accomplices from the ruling bourgeois circles, using bribery, blackmail and political assassinations, German intelligence helped to paralyze the resistance of the peoples of these countries to German aggression.
    In 1941, having started an aggressive war against the Soviet Union, the leaders of fascist Germany set the task for German intelligence: to launch espionage and sabotage and terrorist activities at the front and in the Soviet rear, as well as mercilessly suppress the resistance of the Soviet people to the fascist invaders in the temporarily occupied territory.
    For these purposes, together with the troops of the Nazi army, a significant number of specially created German reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence agencies were sent to Soviet territory - operational groups and special commands of the SD, as well as the Abwehr.
    CENTRAL APPARATUS "ABWERA"
    The German military intelligence and counterintelligence body "Abwehr" (translated as "Otpor", "Protection", "Defense") was organized in 1919 as a department of the German War Ministry and was officially listed as the counterintelligence body of the Reichswehr. In reality, from the very beginning, Abwehr conducted active intelligence work against the Soviet Union, France, England, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries. This work was carried out through the Abverstelle - the Abwehr units - at the headquarters of the border military districts in the cities of Koenigsberg, Breslavl, Poznan, Stettin, Munich, Stuttgart and others, official German diplomatic missions and trading companies abroad. Abverstelle of the internal military districts carried out only counterintelligence work.
    Abwehr was headed by: Major General Temp (from 1919 to 1927), Colonel Schvantes (1928-1929), Colonel Bredov (1929-1932), Vice Admiral Patzig (1932-1934), Admiral Canaris (1935-1943) and from January to July 1944 Colonel Hansen.
    In connection with the transition of fascist Germany to open preparations for an aggressive war, in 1938 the Abwehr was reorganized, on the basis of which the Abwehr-Abroads Directorate was created at the headquarters of the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW). This department was given the task of organizing extensive intelligence and subversive work against the countries that fascist Germany was preparing to attack, especially against the Soviet Union.
    In accordance with these tasks, departments were created in the Abwehr-Abroad Administration:
    "Abwehr 1" - intelligence;
    "Abwehr 2" - sabotage, sabotage, terror, uprisings, decomposition of the enemy;
    "Abwehr 3" - counterintelligence;
    "Ausland" - foreign department;
    "CA" - the central department.
    _______WALLY HQ_______
    In June 1941, to organize reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence activities against the Soviet Union and to manage this activity, a special body of the Abwehr-Abroad Management on the Soviet-German front was created, conventionally called the Wally headquarters, field mail N57219.
    In accordance with the structure of the Central Directorate of "Abwehr-Abroad", the headquarters of "Valli" consisted of the following units:
    Department "Valley 1" - leadership of military and economic intelligence on the Soviet-German front. Chief - major, later lieutenant colonel, Bown (surrendered to the Americans, used by them to organize intelligence activities against the USSR).
    The section consisted of abstracts:
    1 X - reconnaissance of ground forces;
    1 L - reconnaissance of the air force;
    1 Wi - economic intelligence;
    1 D - production of fictitious documents;
    1 I - providing radio equipment, ciphers, codes
    Personnel department.
    Secretariat.
    Under the control of "Valley 1" were reconnaissance teams and groups attached to the headquarters of army groups and armies to conduct reconnaissance work in the relevant sectors of the front, as well as economic intelligence teams and groups that collected intelligence data in prisoner of war camps.
    To provide agents deployed to the rear of the Soviet troops with fictitious documents, a special team of 1 G was located at “Valli 1”. It consisted of 4-5 German engravers and graphic artists and several prisoners of war recruited by the Germans who knew office work in the Soviet Army and Soviet institutions.
    Team 1 G was engaged in the collection, study and production of various Soviet documents, award signs, stamps and seals of Soviet military units, institutions and enterprises. The team received forms of difficult-to-execute documents (passports, party cards) and orders from Berlin.
    The 1 G team supplied the Abwehr teams, which also had their own 1 G groups, with prepared documents, and instructed them regarding changes in the procedure for issuing and processing documents on the territory of the Soviet Union.
    To provide the deployed agents with military uniforms, equipment and civilian clothing, Wally 1 had warehouses of captured Soviet uniforms and equipment, a tailor's and shoe workshops.
    Since 1942, Wally 1 was directly subordinate to the special agency Son der Staff Russia, which carried out undercover work to identify partisan detachments, anti-fascist organizations and groups in the rear of the German armies.
    "Valli 1" was always located in the immediate vicinity of the department of foreign armies of the headquarters of the high command of the German army on the Eastern Front.
    The "Valli 2" department led the Abwehr teams and Abwehr groups to carry out sabotage and terrorist activities in units and in the rear of the Soviet Army.
    The head of the department at first was Major Zeliger, later Oberleutnant Müller, then Captain Becker.
    From June 1941 until the end of July 1944, the Wally 2 department was stationed in places. Sulejuwek, from where, during the offensive of the Soviet troops, he left deep into Germany.
    At the disposal of "Wally 2" in seats. Suleyuwek were warehouses of weapons, explosives and various sabotage materials to supply the Abwehrkommandos.
    The Wally 3 department supervised all counterintelligence activities of the Abwehrkommandos and Abwehrgroups subordinate to it in the fight against Soviet intelligence officers, the partisan movement and the anti-fascist underground on the occupied Soviet territory in the zone of front, army, corps and divisional rear areas.
    Even on the eve of the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, in the spring of 1941, all the army groups of the German army were given one reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence team of the Abwehr, and the armies were given Abwehr groups subordinate to these commands.
    Abwehrkommandos and Abwehrgroups with their subordinate schools were the main bodies of German military intelligence and counterintelligence operating on the Soviet-German front.
    In addition to the Abwehrkommandos, the Wally headquarters was directly subordinate to: the Warsaw School for the Training of Intelligence Officers and Radio Operators, which was then transferred to East Prussia, in places. Neuhof; reconnaissance school in places. Niedersee (East Prussia) with a branch in the mountains. Arise, organized in 1943 to train scouts and radio operators left in the rear of the advancing Soviet troops.
    In some periods, the headquarters of the "Valli" was attached to a special aviation detachment of Major Gartenfeld, which had from 4 to 6 aircraft for being thrown into the Soviet rear of agents.
    ABWERKOMAND 103
    Abwehrkommando 103 (until July 1943 it was called Abwehrkommando 1B) was attached to the German army group "Mitte". Field mail N 09358 B, call sign of the radio station - "Saturn".
    The head of Abwehrkommando 103 until May 1944 was Lieutenant Colonel Gerlitz Felix, then Captain Beverbrook or Bernbruch, and from March 1945 until disbanded, Lieutenant Bormann.
    In August 1941, the team was stationed in Minsk on Lenina street, in a three-story building; in late September - early October 1941 - in tents on the banks of the river. Berezina, 7 km from Borisov; then relocated to places. Krasny Bor (6-7 km from Smolensk) and housed in the former. dachas of the Smolensk Regional Executive Committee. In Smolensk on the street. Fortress, d. 14 was the headquarters (office), the head of which was Captain Sieg.
    In September 1943, due to the retreat of the German troops, the team moved to the area of ​​vil. Dubrovka (near Orsha), and in early October - to Minsk, where she was until the end of June 1944, located along Communist Street, opposite the building of the Academy of Sciences.
    In August 1944, the team was in the field. Lekmanen 3 km from the mountains. Ortelsburg (East Prussia), having crossing points in the towns of Gross Shimanen (9 km south of Ortelsburg), Zeedranken and Budne Soventa (20 km northwest of Ostrolenka, Poland); in the first half of January 1945, the team was stationed in places. Bazin (6 km from the city of Wormditta), in late January - early February 1945 - in places. Garnekopf (30 km east of Berlin). In February 1945 in the mountains. Pasewalk on Markshtrasse, house 25, there was a collection point for agents.
    In March 1945, the team was in the mountains. Zerpste (Germany), from where she moved to Schwerin, and then through a number of cities at the end of April 1945 arrived in places. Lenggris, where on May 5, 1945, the entire official staff dispersed in different directions.
    The Abwehrkommando carried out active reconnaissance work against the Western, Kalinin, Bryansk, Central, Baltic and Belorussian fronts; conducted reconnaissance of the deep rear of the Soviet Union, sending agents to Moscow and Saratov.
    In the first period of its activity, the Abwehrkommando recruited agents from among Russian White émigrés.
    and members of Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalist organizations. Since the autumn of 1941, agents were recruited mainly in prisoner-of-war camps in Borisov, Smolensk, Minsk, and Frankfurt am Main. Since 1944, the recruitment of agents was carried out mainly from the police and personnel of the "Cossack units" formed by the Germans and other traitors and traitors to the Motherland who fled with the Germans.
    The agents were recruited by recruiters known under the nicknames "Roganov Nikolai", "Potemkin Grigory" and a number of others, the official employees of the team - Zharkov, aka Stefan, Dmitrienko.
    In the autumn of 1941, the Borisov intelligence school was created under the Abwehr command, in which most of the recruited agents were trained. From the school, the agents were sent to the transit and crossing points, known as the S-camps and the state bureau, where they received additional instructions on the merits of the assignment received, equipped according to the legend, supplied with documents, weapons, after which they were transferred to the subordinate bodies of the Abwehr command.
    ABWERKTEAM NBO
    Naval intelligence Abwehrkommando, conditionally named "Nahrichtenbeobachter" (abbreviated as NBO), was formed in late 1941 - early 1942 in Berlin, then sent to Simferopol, where it was located until October 1943 on the street. Sevastopolskaya, 6. Operationally, it was directly subordinated to the Abwehr-Abroad Administration and was attached to the headquarters of Admiral Schuster, who commanded the German naval forces of the southeastern basin. Until the end of 1943, the team and its units had a common field mail N 47585, from January 1944 -19330. The call sign of the radio station is "Tatar".
    Until July 1942, the captain of the naval service, Bode, was the head of the team, and from July 1942, the corvette captain Rikgoff.
    The team collected intelligence data on the Soviet Union's navy in the Black and Azov Seas and on the river fleets of the Black Sea basin. At the same time, the team conducted reconnaissance and sabotage work against the North Caucasian and 3rd Ukrainian fronts, and during their stay in the Crimea, they fought against partisans.
    The team collected intelligence data through agents thrown into the rear of the Soviet Army, as well as by interviewing prisoners of war, mostly former servicemen of the Soviet navy and local residents who had anything to do with the navy and merchant fleet.
    Agents from among the traitors to the Motherland underwent preliminary training in special camps in places. Tavel, Simeize and places. Rage. Part of the agents for deeper training was sent to the Warsaw intelligence school.
    The transfer of agents to the rear of the Soviet Army was carried out on planes, motor boats and boats. Scouts were left as part of residencies in settlements liberated by Soviet troops. Agents, as a rule, were transferred in groups of 2-3 people. The group was assigned a radio operator. Radio stations in Kerch, Simferopol and Anapa kept in touch with the agents.
    Later, the NBO agents, who were in special camps, were transferred to the so-called. "Legion of the Black Sea" and other armed detachments for punitive operations against the partisans of the Crimea and carrying out garrison and guard duty.
    At the end of October 1943, the NBO team relocated to Kherson, then to Nikolaev, from there in November 1943 to Odessa - the village. Big Fountains.
    In April 1944, the team moved to the mountains. Brailov (Romania), in August 1944 - in the vicinity of Vienna.
    Reconnaissance operations in the areas of the front line were carried out by the following Einsatzkommandos and forward detachments of the NBO:
    "Marine Abwehr Einsatzkommando" (naval front-line intelligence team) Lieutenant Commander Neumann began operations in May 1942 and operated on the Kerch sector of the front, then near Sevastopol (July 1942), in Kerch (August), Temryuk (August-September), Taman and Anapa (September-October), Krasnodar, where it was located on Komsomolskaya st., 44 and st. Sedina, d. 8 (from October 1942 to mid-January 1943), in the village of Slavyanskaya and mountains. Temryuk (February 1943).
    Advancing with the advanced units of the German army, the Neumann team collected documents from surviving and sunken ships, in the institutions of the Soviet fleet and interviewed prisoners of war, obtained intelligence data through agents thrown into the Soviet rear.
    At the end of February 1943, the Einsatzkommando, leaving in the mountains. Temryuk head post, moved to Kerch and located on the 1st Mitridatskaya street. In mid-March 1943, another post was created in Anapa, headed first by sergeant major Schmalz, later by Sonderführer Harnack, and from August to September 1943 by Sonderführer Kellermann.
    In October 1943, in connection with the retreat of the German troops, the Einsatzkommando and its subordinate posts moved to Kherson.
    "Marine Abwehr Einsatzkommando" (naval front-line intelligence team). Until September 1942, it was headed by Lieutenant Baron Girard de Sucanton, later Oberleutnant Cirque.
    In January - February 1942, the team was in Taganrog, then moved to Mariupol and settled in the buildings of the rest house of the plant named after Ilyich, in the so-called. "White cottages".
    During the second half of 1942, the team "processed" prisoners of war in the Bakhchisaray camp "Tolle" (July 1942), in Mariupol (August 1942) and Rostov (end of 1942) camps.
    From Mariupol, the team transferred agents to the rear of the Soviet Army units operating on the coast of the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov and in the Kuban. The training of scouts was carried out in Tavelskaya and other schools of the NBO. In addition, the team independently trained agents in safe houses.
    Of these apartments in Mariupol identified: st. Artema, d. 28; st. L. Tolstoy, 157 and 161; Donetskskaya st., 166; Fontannaya st., 62; 4th Slobodka, 136; Transportnaya st., 166.
    Individual agents were instructed to infiltrate Soviet intelligence agencies and then seek to be transferred to the German rear.
    In September 1943, the team left Mariupol, proceeded through Osipenko, Melitopol and Kherson, and in October 1943 stopped in the mountains. Nikolaev - Alekseevskaya st., 11,13,16,18 and Odessa st., 2. In November 1943, the team moved to Odessa, st. Schmidta (Arnautskaya), 125. In March-April 1944, through Odessa - Belgrade, she left for Galati, where she was located along the Main Street, 18. During this period, the team had in the mountains. Reni on Dunayskaya street, 99, the main communication post, which threw agents into the rear of the Soviet Army.
    During their stay in Galați, the team was known as the Whiteland intelligence agency.
    sabotage and reconnaissance teams and groups
    The sabotage and reconnaissance teams and the Abwehr 2 groups were engaged in the recruitment, training and transfer of agents with tasks of a sabotage-terrorist, insurgent, propaganda and intelligence nature.
    At the same time, teams and groups created from traitors to the Motherland special fighter units (jagdkommandos), various national formations and Cossack hundreds to capture and hold strategically important objects in the rear of the Soviet troops until the approach of the main forces of the German army. The same units were sometimes used for military reconnaissance of the front line of defense of the Soviet troops, the capture of "tongues", and the undermining of individual fortified points.
    During operations, the personnel of the units were equipped in the uniform of the military personnel of the Soviet Armies.
    During the retreat, the agents of the teams, groups and their units were used as torchbearers and demolition workers to set fire to settlements, destroy bridges and other structures.
    Agents of reconnaissance and sabotage teams and groups were thrown into the rear of the Soviet Army in order to decompose and induce military personnel to treason. Distributed anti-Soviet leaflets, conducted verbal agitation at the forefront of defense with the help of radio installations. During the retreat, she left anti-Soviet literature in the settlements. Special agents were recruited to distribute it.
    Along with subversive activities in the rear of the Soviet troops, teams and groups at their place of deployment actively fought against the partisan movement.
    The main contingent of agents was trained in schools or courses with teams and groups. Individual training of agents was practiced by employees of the intelligence agency.
    The transfer of sabotage agents to the rear of the Soviet troops was carried out with the help of aircraft and on foot in groups of 2-5 people. (one is a radio operator).
    The agents were equipped and supplied with fictitious documents in accordance with the developed legend. Received tasks to organize the undermining of trains, railroad tracks, bridges and other structures on the railways going to the front; destroy fortifications, military and food depots and strategically important facilities; commit terrorist acts against officers and generals of the Soviet Army, party and Soviet leaders.
    Agents-saboteurs were also given reconnaissance missions. The deadline for completing the task was from 3 to 5 or more days, after which the password agents returned to the side of the Germans. Agents with missions of a propaganda nature were transferred without specifying a return date.
    Reports of agents about acts of sabotage carried out by them were checked.
    In the last period of the war, the teams began to prepare sabotage and terrorist groups to leave behind the lines of the Soviet troops.
    For this purpose, bases and storage facilities with weapons, explosives, food and clothing were laid in advance, which were to be used by sabotage groups.
    6 sabotage teams operated on the Soviet-German front. Each Abwehrkommando was subordinate to 2 to 6 Abwehrgroups.
    KOITREVIDATIVE TEAMS AND GROUPS
    The counterintelligence teams and Abwehr 3 groups operating on the Soviet-German front in the rear of the German army groups and armies to which they were attached carried out active undercover work to identify Soviet intelligence officers, partisans and underground workers, and also collected and processed captured documents.
    Counterintelligence teams and groups re-recruited some of the detained Soviet intelligence agents, through whom they conducted radio games in order to misinform the Soviet intelligence agencies. Counterintelligence teams and groups threw some of the recruited agents into the Soviet rear in order to infiltrate the MGB and intelligence departments of the Soviet Army in order to study the working methods of these bodies and identify Soviet intelligence officers trained and thrown into the rear of the German troops.
    Each counterintelligence team and group had full-time or permanent agents recruited from traitors who had proven themselves in practical work. These agents moved along with teams and groups and infiltrated the established German administrative institutions and enterprises.
    In addition, at the place of deployment, teams and groups created an agent network of local residents. During the retreat of the German troops, these agents were transferred to the disposal of the reconnaissance Abwehr groups or remained in the rear of the Soviet troops with reconnaissance missions.
    Provocation was one of the most common methods of undercover work of the German military counterintelligence. So, agents under the guise of Soviet intelligence officers or persons transferred to the rear of the German troops by the command of the Soviet Army with a special assignment settled with Soviet patriots, entered into their confidence, gave tasks directed against the Germans, organized groups to go over to the side of the Soviet troops. Then all these patriots were arrested.
    For the same purpose, false partisan detachments were created from agents and traitors to the Motherland.
    The counterintelligence teams and groups carried out their work in contact with the organs of the SD and the GUF. They conducted undercover development of suspicious, from the point of view of the Germans, persons, and the obtained data was transferred to the bodies of the SD and the GUF for implementation.
    On the Soviet-German front, there were 5 counterintelligence Abwehrkommandos. Each was subordinate to 3 to 8 Abwehrgroups, which were attached to the armies, as well as rear commandant's offices and security divisions.
    ABVERKOMAIDA 304
    It was formed shortly before the German attack on the USSR and attached to the Nord army group. Until July 1942, it was called "Abwehrkommando 3 Ts". Field mail N 10805. The call sign of the radio station is "Shperling" or "Shperber".
    The team leaders were majors Klyamrot (Cla-mort), Gesenregen.
    During the invasion of German troops into the depths of Soviet territory, the team was successively located in Kaunas and Riga, in September 1941 moved to the mountains. Pechory, Pskov region; in June 1942 - to Pskov, on Oktyabrskaya street, 49, and was there until February 1944.
    During the offensive of the Soviet troops, the team from Pskov was evacuated to places. White Lake, then - in the village. Turaido, near the mountains. Sigulda, Latvian SSR.
    From April to August 1944, there was a branch of the team in Riga, called "Renate"
    In September 1944, the team moved to Liepaja; in mid-February 1945 - in the mountains. Sweenemünde (Germany).
    During their stay on the territory of the Latvian SSR, the team did a lot of work on radio games with the Soviet intelligence agencies through radio stations with the call signs "Penguin", "Flamingo", "Reiger", "El-ster", "Eizvogel", "Vale", "Bakhshteltse" , "Hauben-Taucher" and "Stint".
    Before the war, German military intelligence carried out active intelligence work against the Soviet Union by sending in agents, trained mainly on an individual basis.
    A few months before the start of the war, Abverstelle Koninsberg, Abverstelle Stettin, Abverstelle Vienna and Abverstelle Krakow organized reconnaissance and sabotage schools for the mass training of agents.
    At first, these schools were staffed with cadres recruited from white émigré youth and members of various anti-Soviet nationalist organizations (Ukrainian, Polish, Belarusian, etc.). However, practice has shown that agents from the White emigrants were poorly oriented in Soviet reality.
    With the deployment of hostilities on the Soviet-German front, German intelligence began to expand the network of reconnaissance and sabotage schools for the training of qualified agents. Agents for training in schools were now recruited mainly from among prisoners of war, an anti-Soviet, treacherous and criminal element who had penetrated the ranks of the Soviet Army and defected to the Germans, and to a lesser extent from anti-Soviet citizens who remained in the temporarily occupied territory of the USSR.
    The Abwehr authorities believed that agents from prisoners of war could be quickly trained for intelligence work and easier to infiltrate in parts of the Soviet Army. The profession and personal qualities of the candidate were taken into account, with preference given to radio operators, signalmen, sappers and persons who had a sufficient general outlook.
    Agents from the civilian population were selected on the recommendation and with the assistance of German counterintelligence and police agencies and leaders of anti-Soviet organizations.
    The basis for recruiting agents in schools was also anti-Soviet armed formations: the ROA, various so-called Germans created from traitors. "national legions".
    Those who agreed to work for the Germans were isolated and, accompanied by German soldiers or the recruiters themselves, were sent to special test camps or directly to schools.
    When recruiting, methods of bribery, provocations and threats were also used. Those arrested for real or imaginary offenses were offered to atone for their guilt by working for the Germans. Usually, the recruits were previously tested in practical work as counterintelligence agents, punishers and police officers.
    The final registration of recruitment was carried out at the school or test camp. After that, a detailed questionnaire was filled out for each agent, a subscription was selected on a voluntary agreement to cooperate with German intelligence, the agent was assigned a nickname under which he was listed at school. In a number of cases, recruited agents were sworn in.
    At the same time, 50-300 agents were trained in intelligence schools, and 30-100 agents were trained in sabotage and terrorist schools.
    The training period for agents, depending on the nature of their future activities, was different: for scouts in the near rear - from two weeks to a month; deep rear scouts - from one to six months; saboteurs - from two weeks to two months; radio operators - from two to four months or more.
    In the deep rear of the Soviet Union, German agents acted under the guise of seconded military personnel and civilians, the wounded, discharged from hospitals and having exemptions from military service, evacuated from areas occupied by the Germans, etc. In the front line, the agents acted under the guise of sappers, carrying out mining or clearing the front line of defense, signalmen, engaged in wiring or correcting communication lines; snipers and reconnaissance officers of the Soviet Army performing special tasks of the command; the wounded heading to the hospital from the battlefield, etc.
    The most common fictitious documents with which the Germans supplied their agents were: identity cards of command personnel; various types of travel orders; settlement and clothing books of command personnel; food certificates; extracts from orders for transfer from one part to another; powers of attorney to receive various types of property from warehouses; certificates of medical examination with the conclusion of the medical commission; certificates of discharge from the hospital and permission to leave after injury; red army books; certificates of exemption from military service due to illness; passports with appropriate registration marks; work books; certificates of evacuation from settlements occupied by the Germans; party tickets and candidate cards of the CPSU(b); Komsomol tickets; award books and temporary certificates of awards.
    After completing the task, the agents had to return to the body that prepared them or transferred them. To cross the front line, they were provided with a special password.
    Those who returned from the mission were carefully checked through other agents and through repeated oral and written cross-examinations about dates, places
    location on the territory of the Soviet Union, the route to the place of the assignment and return. Exceptional attention was paid to finding out whether the agent was detained by the Soviet authorities. The returning agents isolated themselves from each other. Testimony and reports of internal agents were compared and carefully rechecked.
    BORISOV INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL
    The Borisov school was organized in August 1941 by the Abwehrkommando 103, at first it was located in the village. Furnaces, in the former military camp (6 km south of Borisov on the road to Minsk); field mail 09358 B. The head of the school was Captain Jung, then Captain Uthoff.
    In February 1942, the school was transferred to the village. Katyn (23 km west of Smolensk).
    In places. A preparatory department was created in the furnace, where the agents were checked and preliminary trained, and then sent to the places. Katyn for intelligence training. In April 1943, the school was transferred back to vil. Furnaces.
    The school trained intelligence agents and radio operators. It simultaneously trained about 150 people, including 50-60 radio operators. The term of training for scouts is 1-2 months, for radio operators 2-4 months.
    When enrolling in a school, each scout was given a nickname. It was strictly forbidden to give your real name and ask others about it.
    Trained agents were transferred to the rear of the Soviet Army, 2-3 people each. (one - a radio operator) and alone, mainly in the central sectors of the front, as well as in the Moscow, Kalinin, Ryazan and Tula regions. Some of the agents had the task of sneaking into Moscow and settling there.
    In addition, school-trained agents were sent to partisan detachments to identify their deployment and location of bases.
    The transfer was carried out by planes from the Minsk airfield and on foot from the settlements of Petrikovo, Mogilev, Pinsk, Luninets.
    In September 1943, the school was evacuated to the territory of East Prussia in the village. Rosenstein (100 km south of Koenigsberg) and was located there in the barracks of the former French prisoner of war camp.
    In December 1943, the school relocated to places. Malleten near vil. Neindorf (5 km south of Lykk), where she was until August 1944. Here the school organized its branch in the village. Flisdorf (25 km south of Lykk).
    Agents for the branch were recruited from prisoners of war of Polish nationality and trained for intelligence work in the rear of the Soviet Army.
    In August 1944, the school relocated to the mountains. Mewe (65 km south of Danzig), where it was located on the outskirts of the city, on the banks of the Vistula, in the building of the former. German school of officers, and was encrypted as a newly formed military unit. Together with the school he was transferred to the village. Grossweide (5 km from Mewe) and the Flisdorf branch.
    At the beginning of 1945, in connection with the offensive of the Soviet Army, the school was evacuated to the mountains. Bismarck, where it was disbanded in April 1945. Part of the staff of the school went to the mountains. Arenburg (on the Elbe River), and some agents, dressed in civilian clothes, crossed into the territory occupied by units of the Soviet Army.
    OFFICIAL COMPOSITION
    Jung is a captain, head of the organ. 50-55 years old, medium height, stout, gray-haired, bald.
    Uthoff Hans - captain, head of the organ since 1943. Born in 1895, medium height, stout, bald.
    Bronikovsky Erwin, aka Gerasimovich Tadeusz - captain, deputy head of the body, in November 1943 he was transferred to the newly organized school of resident radio operators in places. Niedersee as Deputy Head of School.
    Pichch - non-commissioned officer, radio instructor. Estonian resident. Speaks Russian. 23-24 years old, tall, thin, light brown-haired, gray eyes.
    Matyushin Ivan Ivanovich, nickname "Frolov" - teacher of radio engineering, former military engineer of the 1st rank, born in 1898, a native of the mountains. Tetyushi of the Tatar ASSR.
    Rikhva Yaroslav Mikhailovich - translator and head. clothing warehouse. Born in 1911, a native of the mountains. Kamenka Bugskaya, Lviv region.
    Lonkin Nikolai Pavlovich, nicknamed "Lebedev" - teacher of undercover intelligence, graduated from the intelligence school in Warsaw. Former soldier of the Soviet border troops. Born in 1911, a native of the village of Strakhovo, Ivanovsky District, Tula Region.
    Kozlov Alexander Danilovich, nickname "Menshikov" - intelligence teacher. Born in 1920, a native of the village of Aleksandrovka, Stavropol Territory.
    Andreev, aka Mokritsa, aka Antonov Vladimir Mikhailovich, nickname "Worm", nickname "Voldemar" - teacher of radio engineering. Born in 1924, native of Moscow.
    Simavin, nickname "Petrov" - an employee of the body, a former lieutenant of the Soviet Army. 30-35 years old, average height, thin, dark-haired, face long, thin.
    Jacques is the house manager. 30-32 years old, average height, scar on the nose.
    Shinkarenko Dmitry Zakharovich, nickname "Petrov" - head of the office, also engaged in the production of fictitious documents, a former colonel of the Soviet Army. Born in 1910, a native of the Krasnodar Territory.
    Panchak Ivan Timofeevich - sergeant major, foreman and translator.
    Vlasov Vladimir Alexandrovich - captain, head of the training unit, teacher and recruiter in December 1943.
    Berdnikov Vasily Mikhailovich, aka Bobkov Vladimir - foreman and translator. Born in 1918, a native of the village. Trumna, Oryol region.
    Donchenko Ignat Evseevich, nickname "Dove" - ​​head. warehouse, born in 1899, a native of the village of Rachki, Vinnitsa region.
    Pavlogradsky Ivan Vasilyevich, nickname "Kozin" - an employee of the intelligence point in Minsk. Born in 1910, a native of the village of Leningradskaya, Krasnodar Territory.
    Kulikov Alexey Grigorievich, nickname "Monks" - teacher. Born in 1920, a native of the village of N.-Kryazhin, Kuznetsk district, Kuibyshev region.
    Krasnoper Vasily, possibly Fedor Vasilyevich, aka Anatoly, Alexander Nikolaevich or Ivanovich, nickname "Viktorov" (possibly a surname), nickname "Wheat" - a teacher.
    Kravchenko Boris Mikhailovich, nickname "Doronin" - captain, teacher of topography. Born in 1922, native of Moscow.
    Zharkov, onzhe Sharkov, Stefan, Stefanen, Degrees, Stefan Ivan or Stepan Ivanovich, possibly Semenovich-lieutenant, teacher until January 1944, then head of the S-camp of the Abwehrkommando 103.
    Popinako Nikolai Nikiforovich, nickname "Titorenko" - physical training teacher. Born in 1911, a native of the village of Kulnovo, Klintsovsky district, Bryansk region.
    SECRET FIELD POLICE (SFP)
    The secret field police - "Geheimfeldpolizei" (GFP) - was the police executive body of military counterintelligence in the army. In peacetime, the GUF bodies did not operate.
    The directives of the GUF units were received from the Abwehr Abroad Directorate, which included a special report of the FPdV (field police of the armed forces), headed by police colonel Krichbaum.
    The GFP units on the Soviet-German front were represented by groups at the headquarters of army groups, armies and field commandant's offices, as well as in the form of commissariats and commands - at corps, divisions and individual local commandant's offices.
    The SFG groups at the armies and field commandant's offices were headed by field police commissars, subordinate to the head of the field police of the corresponding army group and at the same time to the Abwehr officer of the 1st Central army department or field commandant's office. The group consisted of 80 to 100 employees and soldiers. Each group had from 2 to 5 commissariats, or the so-called. "Outdoor teams" (Aussenkommando) and "Outdoor squads" (Aussenstelle), the number of which varied depending on the situation.
    The secret field police performed the functions of the Gestapo in the combat zone, as well as in the near army and front rear areas.
    Its task was mainly to make arrests at the direction of military counterintelligence, conduct investigations into cases of treason, treason, espionage, sabotage, anti-fascist propaganda among the German army, as well as reprisals against partisans and other Soviet patriots who fought against the fascist invaders.
    In addition, the current instructions assigned to the subdivisions of the GUF:
    Organization of counterintelligence measures to protect the headquarters of the serviced formations. Personal protection of the unit commander and representatives of the main headquarters.
    Observation of war correspondents, artists, photographers who were at the command instances.
    Control over the postal, telegraph and telephone communications of the civilian population.
    Facilitating censorship in the supervision of field postal communications.
    Control and monitoring of the press, meetings, lectures, reports.
    The search for the soldiers of the Soviet Army remaining in the occupied territory. Preventing the civilian population from leaving the occupied territory behind the front line, especially those of military age.
    Interrogation and observation of persons who appeared in the combat zone.
    The GUF bodies carried out counterintelligence and punitive activities in the occupied areas, close to the front line. To identify Soviet agents, partisans and Soviet patriots associated with them, the secret field police planted agents among the civilian population.
    The GUF units had groups of full-time agents, as well as small military formations (squadrons, platoons) of traitors to the Motherland for punitive actions against partisans, raids in settlements, protection and escort of those arrested.
    On the Soviet-German front, 23 HFP groups were identified.
    After the attack on the Soviet Union, the fascist leaders entrusted the bodies of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security of Germany with the task of physically exterminating Soviet patriots and ensuring the fascist regime in the occupied areas.
    For this purpose, a significant number of security police units and special forces were sent to the temporarily occupied Soviet territory.
    divisions of the RSHA: mobile operational groups and teams operating in the front line, and territorial bodies for the rear areas controlled by the civil administration.
    Mobile formations of the security police and the SD - operational groups (Einsatzgruppen) for punitive activities on Soviet territory - were created on the eve of the war, in May 1941. In total, four operational groups were created under the main groupings of the German army - A, B, C and D.
    The operational groups included units - special teams (Sonderkommando) for operations in the areas of the forward units of the army and operational teams (Einsatzkommando) - for operations in the rear of the army. The operational groups and teams were staffed by the most notorious thugs from the Gestapo and the criminal police, as well as SD employees.
    A few days before the outbreak of hostilities, Heydrich ordered the operational groups to take their starting points, from where they were to advance together with the German troops on Soviet territory.
    By this time, each group with teams and police units consisted of up to 600-700 people. commanders and rank and file. For greater mobility, all units were equipped with cars, trucks and special vehicles and motorcycles.
    Operational and special teams numbered from 120 to 170 people, of which 10-15 officers, 40-60 non-commissioned officers and 50-80 ordinary SS men.
    Tasks were assigned to operational groups, operational teams and special teams of the security police and SD:
    In the combat zone and near rear areas, seize and search office buildings and premises of party and Soviet bodies, military headquarters and departments, buildings of the state security bodies of the USSR and all other institutions and organizations where there could be important operational or secret documents, archives, file cabinets, etc. similar materials.
    To search for, arrest and physically destroy party and Soviet workers left in the German rear to fight the invaders, employees of intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, as well as captured commanders and political workers of the Soviet Army.
    To identify and repress communists, Komsomol members, leaders of local Soviet bodies, public and collective farm activists, employees and agents of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence.
    Persecute and exterminate the entire Jewish population.
    In the rear areas to fight against all anti-fascist manifestations and illegal activities of the opponents of Germany, as well as to inform the commanders of the rear areas of the army about the political situation in the area under their jurisdiction.
    The operational organs of the security police and the SD planted among the civilian population agents recruited from the criminal and anti-Soviet element. Village elders, volost foremen, employees of administrative and other institutions created by the Germans, policemen, foresters, owners of buffets, snack bars, restaurants, etc. were used as such agents. Those of them who, before being recruited, held administrative positions (foremen, elders), were sometimes transferred to inconspicuous work: millers, accountants. The agency was obliged to monitor the appearance in cities and villages of suspicious and unfamiliar persons, partisans, Soviet paratroopers, to report on communists, Komsomol members, and former active public figures. Agents were reduced to residencies. The residents were traitors to the Motherland who had proven themselves to the invaders, who served in German institutions, city governments, land departments, construction organizations, etc.
    With the beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops and the liberation of the temporarily occupied Soviet territories, part of the agents of the security police and the SD were left in the Soviet rear with reconnaissance, sabotage, insurgent and terrorist tasks. These agents were transferred to the military intelligence agencies for communication.
    "SPECIAL TEAM MOSCOW"
    Created in early July 1941, moved with the advanced units of the 4th Panzer Army.
    In the early days, the team was led by the head of the VII Department of the RSHA, SS Standartenführer Siks. When the German offensive failed, Ziks was recalled to Berlin. SS Obersturmführer Kerting was appointed chief, who in March 1942 became chief of the security police and SD of the “Stalino General District”.
    A special team advanced along the route Roslavl - Yukhnov - Medyn to Maloyaroslavets with the task of returning to Moscow with advanced units and capturing the objects of interest to the Germans.
    After the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, the team was taken to the mountains. Roslavl, where it was reorganized in 1942 and became known as the Special Team 7 C. In September 1943, the team was due to heavy losses in a collision with Soviet units in places. Kolotini-chi was disbanded.
    SPECIAL COMMAND 10 A
    A special team of 10 a (field mail N 47540 and 35583) acted jointly with the 17th German army, Colonel General Ruof.
    The team was led until mid-1942 by SS Obersturmbannführer Seetzen, then SS Sturmbannführer Christman.
    The team is widely known for their atrocities in Krasnodar. From the end of 1941 until the beginning of the German offensive in the Caucasian direction, the team was in Taganrog, and its detachments operated in the cities of Osipenko, Rostov, Mariupol and Simferopol.
    When the Germans advanced to the Caucasus, the team arrived in Krasnodar, and during this period its detachments operated on the territory of the region in the cities of Novorossiysk, Yeysk, Anapa, Temryuk, the villages of Varenikovskaya and Verkhne-Bakanskaya. At the trial in Krasnodar in June 1943, the facts of the monstrous atrocities of the team members were revealed: mockery of those arrested and burning of prisoners held in the Krasnodar prison; mass killings of patients in the city hospital, in the Berezansk medical colony and the children's regional hospital on the farm "Third River Kochety" in the Ust-Labinsk region; strangulation in cars - "gas chambers" of many thousands of Soviet people.
    The special team at that time consisted of about 200 people. The assistants to the head of Christman's team were employees Rabbe, Boos, Sargo, Salge, Hahn, Erich Meyer, Paschen, Vinz, Hans Münster; German military doctors Hertz and Schuster; translators Jacob Eicks, Sheterland.
    When the Germans retreated from the Caucasus, some of the team's official members were assigned to other security police and SD groups on the Soviet-German front.
    ________"ZEPPELIN"________
    In March 1942, the RSHA created a special reconnaissance and sabotage body under the code name "Unternemen Zeppelin" (Zeppelin Enterprise).
    In its activities, "Zeppelin" was guided by the so-called. "A plan of action for the political disintegration of the Soviet Union". The main tactical tasks of the Zeppelin were determined by this plan as follows:
    “... We must strive for tactics of the greatest possible variety. Special action groups should be formed, namely:
    1. Intelligence groups - to collect and transmit political information from the Soviet Union.
    2. Propaganda groups - for the dissemination of national, social and religious propaganda.
    3. Rebel groups - to organize and conduct uprisings.
    4. Subversive groups for political subversion and terror.
    The plan emphasized that political intelligence and sabotage activities in the Soviet rear were assigned to the Zeppelin. The Germans also wanted to create a separatist movement of bourgeois-nationalist elements, aimed at tearing away the union republics from the USSR and organizing puppet "states" under the protectorate of Nazi Germany.
    To this end, in the years 1941-1942, the RSHA, together with the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Regions, created a number of so-called. "national committees" (Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Turkestan, North Caucasian, Volga-Tatar and Kalmyk).
    The listed "national committees" were chaired by:
    Georgian - Kedia Mikhail Mekievich and Gabliani Givi Ignatievich;
    Armenian - Abegyan Artashes, Baghdasaryan, he is also Simonyan, he is also Sargsyan Tigran and Sargsyan Vartan Mikhailovich;
    Azerbaijani - Fatalibekov, aka Fatalibey-li, aka Dudanginsky Abo Alievich and Israfil-Bey Israfailov Magomed Nabi Ogly;
    Turkestan - Valli-Kayum-Khan, aka Kayumov Vali, Khaitov Baimirza, aka Haiti Ogly Baimirza and Kanatbaev Karie Kusaevich
    North Caucasian - Magomaev Akhmed Nabi Idriso-vich and Kantemirov Alikhan Gadoevich;
    Volga-Tatar - Shafeev Abdrakhman Gibadullo-vich, he is Shafi Almas and Alkaev Shakir Ibragimovich;
    Kalmytsky - Balinov Shamba Khachinovich.
    At the end of 1942, in Berlin, the propaganda department of the headquarters of the German Army High Command (OKB), together with intelligence, created the so-called. "Russian Committee" headed by a traitor to the Motherland, former lieutenant general of the Soviet Army Vlasov.
    The "Russian Committee", as well as other "national committees", involved in the active struggle against the Soviet Union unstable prisoners of war and Soviet citizens who were taken to work in Germany, processed them in a fascist spirit and formed military units of the so-called. "Russian Liberation Army" (ROA).
    In November 1944, on the initiative of Himmler, the so-called. "Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia" (KONR), headed by the former head of the "Russian Committee" Vlasov.
    The KONR was tasked with uniting all anti-Soviet organizations and military formations from among the traitors to the Motherland and expanding their subversive activities against the Soviet Union.
    In its subversive work against the USSR, the Zeppelin acted in contact with the Abwehr and the main headquarters of the German army high command, as well as with the imperial ministry for the occupied eastern regions.
    Until the spring of 1943, the Zeppelin command center was located in Berlin, in the service building of the VI RSHA Directorate, in the Grunewald area, Berkaerst-Rasse, 32/35, and then in the Wannsee area - Potsdamer Strasse, 29.
    At first, the Zeppelin was led by SS-Sturmbannführer Kurek; he was soon replaced by SS-Sturmbannführer Raeder.
    At the end of 1942, Zeppelin merged with abstracts VI Ts 1-3 (intelligence against the Soviet Union), and the head of the EI Ts group, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr. Grefe, began to lead it.
    In January 1944, after Graefe's death, the Zeppelin was led by SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Hengelhaupt, and from the beginning of 1945 until the surrender of Germany, by SS-Obersturmbannführer Rapp.
    The management staff consisted of the office of the head of the body and three departments with subdivisions.
    The CET 1 department was in charge of staffing and operational management of grassroots bodies, supplying agents with equipment and equipment.
    The CET 1 department included five subdivisions:
    CET 1 A - leadership and monitoring of the activities of grassroots bodies, staffing.
    CET 1 B - management of camps and account of agents.
    CET 1 C - security and transfer of agents. The subdivision had escort teams at its disposal.
    CET 1 D - material support of agents.
    CET 1 E - car service.
    Department CET 2 - agent training. The department had four subdivisions:
    CET 2 A - selection and training of agents of Russian nationality.
    CET 2 B - selection and training of agents from the Cossacks.
    CET 2 C - selection and training of agents from among the nationalities of the Caucasus.
    CET 2 D - selection and training of agents from among the nationalities of Central Asia. The department had 16 employees.
    The CET 3 department processed all materials on the activities of special camps for front teams and agents deployed to the rear areas of the USSR.
    The structure of the department was the same as in the CET 2 department. The department had 17 employees.
    At the beginning of 1945, the Zeppelin headquarters, along with other departments of the VI Directorate of the RSHA, was evacuated to the south of Germany. Most of the leading employees of the Zeppelin central apparatus ended up in the zone of American troops after the end of the war.
    ZEPPELIN TEAMS ON THE SOVIET-GERMAN FRONT
    In the spring of 1942, Zeppelin sent four special teams (Sonderkommandos) to the Soviet-German front. They were given to the operational groups of the security police and the SD under the main army groups of the German army.
    Special Zeppelin teams were engaged in the selection of prisoners of war for the training of agents in training camps, collected intelligence information about the political and military-economic situation of the USSR by interviewing prisoners of war, collected uniforms for equipping agents, various military documents and other materials suitable for use in intelligence work.
    All materials, documents and equipment were sent to the commanding headquarters, and selected prisoners of war were sent to special Zeppelin camps.
    The teams also transferred trained agents across the front line on foot and by parachute from aircraft. Sometimes agents were trained right there on the spot, in small camps.
    The transfer of agents by aircraft was carried out from special Zeppelin crossing points: at the Vysokoye state farm near Smolensk, in Pskov and the resort town of Saki near Evpatoria.
    Special teams at first had a small staff: 2 SS officers, 2-3 junior SS commanders, 2-3 translators and several agents.
    In the spring of 1943, special teams were disbanded, and instead of them, two main teams were created on the Soviet-German front - Russland Mitte (later renamed Russland Nord) and Russland Süd (otherwise - Dr. Raeder's Headquarters). In order not to scatter forces along the entire front, these teams concentrated their actions only in the most important directions: northern and southern.
    The Zeppelin's main command, with its constituent services, was a powerful intelligence body and consisted of several hundred employees and agents.
    The team leader reported only to the Zeppelin headquarters in Berlin, and in practical work he had complete operational independence, organizing the selection, training and transfer of agents on the spot. His actions, he was in contact with other intelligence agencies and the military command.
    "BATTLE UNION OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISTS" (BSRN)
    It was created in March 1942 in the Suvalkovsky leger of prisoners of war. Initially, the BSRN had the name "National Party of the Russian People." Its organizer is Gil (Rodionov). The "Combat Union of Russian Nationalists" had its own program and charter.
    Everyone who joined the BSRN filled out a questionnaire, received a membership card and took a written oath of allegiance to the "principles" of this union. The grassroots organizations of the BSRN were called "combat squads".
    Soon the leadership of the union from the Suwalkowski camp was transferred to the Zeppelin preliminary camp, on the territory of the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. There, in April 1942, the BSRN center was created,
    The center was divided into four groups: military, special purpose (training of agents) and two training groups. Each group was led by a Zeppelin official. After some time, only one BSRN personnel training group remained in Sachsenhausen, and the rest left for other Zeppelin camps.
    The second training group of the BSRN began to be deployed in the mountains. Breslavl, where the "SS 20 Forest Camp" trained the leadership of special camps.
    The military group, headed by Gill, in the amount of 100 people. left for the mountains. Parcheva (Poland). There was created a special camp for the formation of "teams N 1".
    A special group dropped out in places. Yablon (Poland) and joined the Zeppelin reconnaissance school located there.
    In January 1943, a conference of organizations of the "Fighting Union of Russian Nationalists" was held in Breslavl, which was attended by 35 delegates. In the summer of 1943, part of the members of the BSRN joined the ROA.
    "RUSSIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY OF REFORMISTS" (RNPR)
    The "Russian People's Party of Reformists" (RNPR) was created in a prisoner of war camp in the mountains. Weimar in the spring of 1942 by the former major general of the Soviet Army, traitor to the Motherland Bessonov ("Katulsky").
    Initially, the RNPR was called the "People's Russian Party of Socialist Realists."
    By the autumn of 1942, the leading group of the "Russian People's Reformist Party" settled in the Zeppelin special camp, on the territory of the Buchenwald concentration camp, and formed the so-called. "Political Center for the Fight against Bolshevism" (PCB).
    The PCB published and distributed anti-Soviet magazines and newspapers among prisoners of war and developed a charter and program for its activities.
    Bessonov offered the leadership of Zeppelin his services in bringing an armed group into the northern regions of the USSR to carry out sabotage and organize uprisings.
    To develop a plan for this adventure and prepare an armed military formation of traitors to the Motherland, Bessonov's group was assigned a special camp in the former. monastery Leibus (near Breslavl). At the beginning of 1943, the camp was moved to places. Lindsdorf.
    The leaders of the Central Bank visited prisoner-of-war camps to recruit traitors to Bessonov's group.
    Subsequently, a punitive detachment was created from the participants in the PCB to fight the partisans, which operated on the Soviet-German front in the mountains. Great Luke.
    MILITARY FORMATIONS ______ "ZEPPELIN" ______
    In the Zeppelin camps, during the preparation of agents, a significant number of “activists” were eliminated who, for various reasons, were not suitable for being sent to the rear areas of the USSR.
    The "activists" of Caucasian and Central Asian nationalities expelled from the camps were mostly transferred to anti-Soviet military formations ("Turkestan Legion", etc.).
    From the expelled Russian "activists" "Zeppelin" in the spring of 1942 began to form two punitive detachments, called "teams". The Germans intended to create large selective armed groups to carry out subversive operations on a large scale in the Soviet rear.
    By June 1942, the first punitive detachment was formed - "squad N 1", numbering 500 people, under the command of Gill ("Rodionov").
    "Druzhina" was stationed in the mountains. Parchev, then moved to a specially created camp in the forest between the mountains. Parchev and Yablon. It was attached to Operational Group B of the security police and the SD and, on its instructions, served for some time to protect communications, and then acted against partisans in Poland, Belarus and the Smolensk region.
    Somewhat later, in the special camp of the SS "Guides", near the mountains. Lublin, was formed "squad N 2" numbering 300 people. led by a traitor to the Motherland, former captain of the Soviet Army Blazhevich.
    At the beginning of 1943, both "teams" were united under the command of Hill into the "first regiment of the Russian people's army." A counterintelligence department was created in the regiment, headed by Blazhevich.
    The "First Regiment of the Russian People's Army" received a special zone on the territory of Belarus, centered in seats. Meadows of the Polotsk region, for independent military operations against partisans. A special military uniform and insignia was introduced for the regiment.
    In August 1943, most of the regiment, led by Gill, went over to the side of the partisans. During the transition, Blazhevich and German instructors were shot. Gill was subsequently killed in battle.
    "Zeppelin" gave the rest of the regiment to the main team "Rusland Nord" and later used it as a punitive detachment and a reserve base for acquiring agents.
    In total, more than 130 reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence teams of the Abwehr and SD and about 60 schools that trained spies, saboteurs and terrorists operated on the Soviet-German front.
    The publication was prepared by V. BOLTROMEYUK
    Consultant V. VINOGRADOV
    Magazine "Security Service" No. 3-4 1995

  2. SPECIAL COMMUNICATION about the detention of German intelligence agents TAVRIMA and SHILOVA.
    September 5 p. in at o'clock in the morning the head of the Karmanovsky RO NKVD - Art. militia lieutenant VETROV in the village. German intelligence agents were detained in Karmanovo:
    1. TAVRIN Petr Ivanovich
    2. SHILOVA Lidia Yakovlevna. The arrest was made under the following circumstances:
    At 1 hour 50 min. on the night of September 5, the Head of the Gzhatsky District Department of the NKVD - the captain of state security, comrade IVA-NOV, was informed by telephone from the post of the VNOS service that an enemy aircraft appeared in the direction of the city of Mozhaisk at an altitude of 2500 meters.
    At 3 o'clock in the morning from the air observation post for the second time it was reported by telephone that the enemy aircraft after shelling at the station. Kubinka, Mozhaisk - Uvarovka, Moscow region came back and began to land with a fire engine in the district of vil. Yakovleve - Zavrazhye, Karmanovsky district, Smolensk region about this The Gzhatsky RO of the NKVD informed the Karmanovsky RO of the NKVD and sent a task force to the indicated place of the plane crash.
    At 4 o'clock in the morning, the commander of the Zaprudkovskaya group for the protection of order, comrade. DIAMONDS by phone reported that an enemy aircraft had landed between vil. Zavrazhye and Yakovlevo. A man and a woman in the uniform of servicemen left the plane on a German-made motorcycle and stopped in the village. Yakovlevo, asked the way to the mountains. Rzhev and were interested in the location of the nearest regional centers. Teacher ALMAZOVA, living in the village. Almazovo, showed them the way to the regional center of Karmanovo and they left in the direction of the village. Samuylovo.
    For the detention of 2 servicemen who left the plane, the Head of the Gzhatsky RO of the NKVD, in addition to the exiled task force, informed the security groups at the s / councils and informed the Head of the Karmanovsky RO of the NKVD.
    Having received a message from the Head of the Gzhatsky RO of the NKVD, the head of the Karmanovsky RO - Art. militia lieutenant comrade VETROV with a group of workers of 5 people left to detain the indicated persons.
    2 kilometers from the village. Karma-novo in the direction of vil. Samuylovo early. RO NKVD comrade. VETROV noticed a motorcycle moving in the village. Karmanovo, and according to signs, he determined that those who were riding a motorcycle were those who left the landing plane, began to pursue them on a bicycle and overtook them in the village. Karmanovo.
    Riding on a motorcycle turned out to be: a man in a leather summer coat, with the shoulder straps of a major, had four orders and a gold star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.
    A woman in an overcoat with shoulder straps of a junior lieutenant.
    Having stopped the motorcycle and introduced himself as the head of the NKVD RO, comrade. VETROV demanded a document from a major riding a motorcycle, who presented an identity card in the name of Petr Ivanovich TAV-RIN - Deputy. Beginning OCD "Smersh" 39th Army of the 1st Baltic Front.
    At the suggestion of Comrade VETROV to follow to the RO NKVD, TAVRIN categorically refused, arguing that every minute is precious to him, as he arrived on an urgent call from the front.
    Only with the help of the arrived employees of the RO UNKVD, TAVRINA was delivered to the RO NKVD.
    In the district department of the NKVD, TAVRIN presented certificate No. 1284 dated 5/1X-44. with the stamp of the head of p.p. 26224 that he is sent to the mountains. Moscow, the Main Directorate of the NPO "Smersh" and a telegram of the Main Directorate of the KRO "Smersh" of the NPO of the USSR No. 01024 and a travel certificate of the same content.
    After checking the documents through the Head of the Gzhatsky RO NKVD comrade. IVANOV was requested by Moscow and it was established that TAVRIN was not called to the Main Directorate of the KRO "Smersh" by the NPO and that he did not appear at work in the KRO "Smersh" of the 39th army, he was disarmed and confessed that he was transferred by plane by German intelligence for sabotage and terror .
    During a personal search and in a motorcycle on which TAVRIN followed, 3 suitcases with various things, 4 order books, 5 orders, 2 medals, the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union and a guards badge, a number of documents addressed to TAVRIN, money in state signs 428.400 rubles, 116 mastic seals, 7 pistols, 2 center-fire hunting rifles, 5 grenades, 1 mine and lots of ammo.
    Detainees with things. evidence delivered to the NKVD of the USSR.
    P. p.
    7 DEP. OBB NKVD USSR
  3. Reconnaissance Battalion - Aufklarungsabtellung

    In peacetime, the Wehrmacht infantry divisions did not have reconnaissance battalions, their formation began only during the mobilization of 1939. The reconnaissance battalions were formed on the basis of thirteen cavalry regiments, united as part of the cavalry corps. By the end of the war, all cavalry regiments were divided into battalions, which were attached to divisions for reconnaissance. In addition, spare reconnaissance units stationed on the territory of the garrisons of individual divisions were formed from the cavalry regiments. Thus, the cavalry regiments ceased to exist, although towards the end of the war a new formation of cavalry regiments began. The reconnaissance battalions played the role of the "eyes" of the division. Scouts determined the tactical situation and protected the main forces of the division from unnecessary "surprises". Reconnaissance battalions were especially useful in a mobile war, when it was necessary to neutralize enemy reconnaissance and quickly detect the main enemy forces. In some situations, the reconnaissance battalion covered open flanks. During a fast offensive, scouts, along with sappers and tank destroyers, advanced in the forefront, forming a mobile group. The task of the mobile group was to quickly capture key objects: bridges, crossroads, dominant heights, etc. The reconnaissance units of infantry divisions were formed on the basis of cavalry regiments, so they retained the cavalry unit names. The reconnaissance battalions played a big role in the early years of the war. However, the need to solve a large number of tasks required appropriate competence from the commanders. It was especially difficult to coordinate the actions of the battalion due to the fact that it was partially motorized and its units had different mobility. Infantry divisions, formed later, no longer had cavalry units in their battalions, but received a separate cavalry squadron. Instead of motorcycles and cars, the scouts received armored cars.
    The reconnaissance battalion consisted of 19 officers, two officials, 90 non-commissioned officers and 512 soldiers - a total of 623 people. The reconnaissance battalion was armed with 25 light machine guns, 3 light grenade launchers, 2 heavy machine guns, 3 anti-tank guns and 3 armored vehicles. In addition, the battalion had 7 wagons, 29 cars, 20 trucks and 50 motorcycles (28 of them with sidecars). The staffing table called for 260 horses in the reconnaissance battalion, but in reality the battalion usually had more than 300 horses.
    The structure of the battalion was as follows:
    Battalion headquarters: commander, adjutant, deputy adjutant, intelligence chief, veterinarian, senior inspector (head of the repair detachment), senior treasurer and several staff members. The headquarters had horses and vehicles. The command vehicle was equipped with a 100-watt radio station.
    Department of couriers (5 cyclists and 5 motorcyclists).
    Communication platoon: 1 telephone department (motorized), radio communication department (motorized), 2 departments of portable radio stations type ”d” (on horseback), 1 telephone department (on horseback), 1 horse-drawn cart with signalmen's property. Total number: 1 officer, 29 non-commissioned officers and soldiers, 25 horses.
    Heavy weapons platoon: headquarters section (3 motorcycles with a sidecar), one section of heavy machine guns (two heavy machine guns and 8 motorcycles with a sidecar). The rear services and a bicycle platoon numbered 158 people.
    1. Cavalry squadron: 3 cavalry platoons, each with a headquarters section and three cavalry sections (each with 2 riflemen and one calculation of a light machine gun). Each squad has 1 non-commissioned officer and 12 cavalrymen. The armament of each cavalryman consisted of a rifle. In the Polish and French campaigns, cavalrymen of the reconnaissance battalions carried sabers, but in late 1940 and early 1941 sabers fell into disuse. The 1st and 3rd squads had an additional pack horse, which carried a light machine gun and boxes of ammunition. Each platoon consisted of one officer, 42 soldiers and non-commissioned officers, and 46 horses. However, the combat strength of the platoon was less, as it was necessary to leave the grooms who kept the horses.
    Convoy: one field kitchen, 3 HF1 horse-drawn carts, 4 HF2 horse-drawn carts (one of them housed a field forge), 35 horses, 1 motorcycle, 1 motorcycle with a sidecar, 28 non-commissioned officers and soldiers.
    2. Squadron of cyclists: 3 bicycle platoons: commander, 3 couriers, 3 squads (12 people and a light machine gun), one light mortar (2 motorcycles with a sidecar). 1 truck with spare parts and mobile workshop. The bicycle units of the Wehrmacht were equipped with an army bicycle of the 1938 model. The bicycle was equipped with a trunk, and the soldier's equipment was hung on the steering wheel. Boxes with machine gun cartridges were attached to the bicycle frame. Soldiers held rifles and machine guns behind their backs.
    3. Heavy weapons squadron: 1 cavalry battery (2 75 mm infantry guns, 6 horses), 1 tank destroyer platoon (3 37 mm anti-tank guns, motorized), 1 armored car platoon (3 light 4-wheeled armored vehicles (Panzerspaehwagen ), armed with machine guns, of which one armored car is radio-equipped (Funkwagen)).
    Convoy: camp kitchen (motorized), 1 truck with ammunition, 1 truck with spare parts and a camp workshop, 1 fuel truck, 1 motorcycle with a sidecar for transporting weapons and equipment. Non-commissioned officer and assistant gunsmith, food convoy (1 truck), convoy with property (1 truck), one motorcycle without a sidecar for the hauptfeldwebel and treasurer.
    The reconnaissance battalion usually operated 25-30 km ahead of the rest of the division's forces or took up positions on the flank. During the summer offensive of 1941, the cavalry squadron of the reconnaissance battalion was divided into three platoons and acted to the left and right of the offensive line, controlling a front up to 10 km wide. Cyclists operated close to the main forces, and armored vehicles covered the side roads. The rest of the battalion, along with all the heavy weapons, were kept ready to repel a possible enemy attack. By 1942, the reconnaissance battalion was being used more and more to reinforce the infantry. But for this task, the battalion was too small and poorly equipped. Despite this, the battalion was used as a last reserve, which plugged holes in the division's positions. After the Wehrmacht went on the defensive along the entire front in 1943, the reconnaissance battalions were practically not used for their intended purpose. All cavalry units were withdrawn from the battalions and merged into new cavalry regiments. From the remnants of the personnel, the so-called rifle battalions (such as light infantry) were formed, which were used to reinforce the bloodless infantry divisions.

  4. Chronology of sabotage and reconnaissance operations of the Abwehr (selectively, because there are many)
    1933 Abwehr began equipping foreign agents with portable shortwave radios
    Abwehr representatives hold regular meetings with the leadership of the Estonian special services in Tallinn. Abwehr is starting to create strongholds in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, China and Japan to conduct sabotage and reconnaissance activities against the USSR
    1936 Wilhelm Canaris visits Estonia for the first time and conducts secret negotiations with the Chief of the General Staff of the Estonian Army and the head of the 2nd Department of Military Counterintelligence of the General Staff. An agreement was reached on the exchange of intelligence information on the USSR. Abwehr is starting to create an Estonian intelligence center, the so-called "Group 6513". The future Baron Andrey von Uexkul is appointed as a liaison officer between the "fifth column" of Estonia and the Abwehr
    1935. May. Abwehr receives official permission from the Estonian government to deploy sabotage and reconnaissance bases on Estonian territory along the border with the USSR and equips the Estonian special services with cameras with telescopic lenses and radio interception equipment to organize covert surveillance of the territory of a potential enemy. Photographic equipment is also installed on the lighthouses of the Gulf of Finland to photograph warships of the Soviet military fleet (RKKF).
    December 21: The delimitation of powers and the division of spheres of influence between the Abwehr and the SD was recorded in an agreement signed by representatives of both departments. The so-called "10 principles" assumed: 1. Coordination of the actions of the Abwehr, Gestapo and SD within the Reich and abroad. 2. Military intelligence and counterintelligence are the exclusive prerogative of the Abwehr. 3. Political intelligence - the diocese of the SD. 4. The whole complex of measures aimed at preventing crimes against the state on the territory of the Reich (surveillance, arrest, investigation, etc.) is carried out by the Gestapo.
    1937. Pickenbrock and Canaris leave for Estonia in order to intensify and coordinate intelligence activities against the USSR. To conduct subversive activities against the Soviet Union, the Abwehr used the services of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The Rovel Special Purpose Squadron based in Staaken is starting reconnaissance flights over the territory of the USSR. Subsequently, Xe-111, disguised as transport workers, flew at high altitude to the Crimea and the foothills of the Caucasus.
    1938 Dismissed Oberst Maasing, former head of the 2nd Division of the Estonian General Staff (military counterintelligence), arrives in Germany. Under the leadership of the new head of the 2nd department, Oberst Willem Saarsen, the counterintelligence of the Estonian army is actually turning into a "foreign branch" of the Abwehr. Canaris and Pickenbrock fly to Estonia to coordinate sabotage and reconnaissance activities against the USSR. Until 1940, the Abwehr, together with the Estonian counterintelligence, threw sabotage and reconnaissance detachments into the territory of the USSR - among others, the “Gavrilov group” named after the leader. On the territory of the Reich, Abwehr-2 begins an active recruitment of agents among Ukrainian political emigrants. In the camp on Lake Chiemsee near Berlin-Tegel and in Quenzgut near Brandenburg, training centers are being opened to train saboteurs for actions in Russia and Poland.
    January. The Soviet government decides to close the diplomatic consulates of Germany in Leningrad, Kharkov, Tbilisi, Kyiv, Odessa, Novosibirsk and Vladivostok.
    As part of the Anti-Comintern Pact concluded in 1936 between the governments of Japan and Germany, the Japanese military attache in Berlin, Hiroshi Oshima and Wilhelm Canaris, signed an agreement in the Berlin Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the regular exchange of intelligence information about the USSR and the Red Army. The agreement provided for meetings at the level of heads of friendly counterintelligence organizations at least once a year to coordinate sabotage and reconnaissance operations of the Axis member countries.
    1939 During a visit to Estonia, Canaris expresses his wish to the Commander-in-Chief of the Estonian Armed Forces, General Laidoner, to orient the country's special services to collect information on the number and types of aircraft of the Soviet Air Force. Baron von Uexküll, a liaison officer of the Abwehr and Estonian special services, moved to permanent residence in Germany, but until 1940 he repeatedly went on business trips to the Baltic states.
    March 23: Germany annexes Memel (Klaipeda). March - April: The squadron of special purpose "Rovel" based in Budapest, secretly from the Hungarian authorities, makes reconnaissance flights over the territory of the USSR, in the region Kyiv - Dnepropetrovsk - Zhytomyr - Zaporozhye - Krivoy Rog - Odessa.
    July: Canaris and Pickenbrock went on a business trip to Estonia. The Rovel squadron commander gave Canaris aerial photographs of certain regions of Poland, the USSR and Great Britain.
    Within six months, only in Torun Voivodeship (Poland) 53 Abwehr agents were arrested.
    September 12: The Abwehr leadership takes the first concrete steps to prepare an anti-communist uprising in Ukraine with the help of OUN militants and its leader Melnyk. Abwehr-2 instructors train 250 Ukrainian volunteers at a training camp near Dachstein.
    October: On the new Soviet-German border until the middle of 1941, the Abwehr equips radio interception posts and activates undercover intelligence. Canaris appoints Major Horachek as head of the Warsaw branch of the Abwehr. To intensify counterintelligence operations against the USSR, branches of the Abwehr are being created in Radom, Ciechanow, Lublin, Terespol, Krakow and Suwalki.
    November: The head of the Abwehr regional office in Warsaw, Major Horachek, deploys additional surveillance and information gathering services in Biala Podlaska, Wlodawa and Terespol, located opposite Brest on the other side of the Bug, in preparation for Operation Barbarossa. Estonian military counterintelligence seconded Hauptmann Lepp to Finland to collect intelligence information about the Red Army. The information received is forwarded to the Abwehr as agreed.
    The beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war (until March 12, 1940). Together with the Finnish counterintelligence VO "Finland", the Directorate of Ausland / Abwehr / OKW conduct active sabotage and reconnaissance activities on the front line. The Abwehr manages to obtain especially valuable intelligence information with the help of Finnish long-range patrols (the Kuismanen group - the Kola region, the Marttin group - the Kumu region and the Paatsalo group from Lapland).
    December. Abwehr carries out a massive recruitment of agents in Byala Podlaska and Vlodava and throws OUN saboteurs into the border zone of the USSR, most of which are neutralized by employees of the NKVD of the USSR.
    1940 On the instructions of the foreign department of the Abwehr, the Rovel Special Purpose Squadron increases the number of reconnaissance sorties over the territory of the USSR, using the runways of airfields in the occupied Czechoslovakia and Poland, air bases in Finland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The purpose of aerial reconnaissance is to collect information about the location of Soviet industrial facilities, compiling navigation charts for a network of roads and rail tracks (bridges, railway junctions, sea and river ports), obtaining information about the deployment of Soviet armed forces and the construction of airfields, border fortifications and long-term air defense positions , barracks, depots and defense industry enterprises. As part of the Oldenburg operation, the Design Bureau intends to "make an inventory of the sources of raw materials and centers for its processing in the West of the USSR (Ukraine, Belarus), in the Moscow and Leningrad regions, and in the oil production areas of Baku."
    To create a "fifth column" in the rear of the Red Army, the Abwehr forms the "Strelitz Special Purpose Regiment" (2,000 people) in Krakow, the "Ukrainian Legion" in Warsaw and the "Ukrainian Warriors" battalion in Lukenwald. As part of Operation Felix (occupation of the Strait of Gibraltar), the Abwehr is creating an operational center in Spain to collect information.
    February 13: At the headquarters of the Design Bureau, Canaris reports to General Yodl on the results of aerial reconnaissance over the territory of the USSR of the Rovel Special Purpose Squadron.
    February 22: Abwehr Hauptmann Leverkühn with a Reichs diplomat's passport leaves for Tabriz/Iran via Moscow to find out the possibilities for the operational-strategic deployment of an expeditionary army (army group) in the Asian region with the aim of invading the oil-producing regions of the Soviet Transcaucasia as part of the Barbarossa plan.
    March 10: The "insurgent headquarters" of the OUN sends sabotage groups to Lviv and the Volyn region to organize sabotage and civil disobedience.
    April 28: From the Bordufos airfield in northern Norway, reconnaissance aircraft of the Rovel Special Purpose Squadron conduct aerial photography of the northern territories of the USSR (Murmansk and Arkhangelsk).
    May: Abwehr 2 liaison officer Klee flies to a secret meeting in Estonia.
    July: Until May 1941, the NKVD of the Lithuanian SSR neutralized 75 Abwehr sabotage and reconnaissance groups.
    July 21 - 22: The Operations Department begins developing plans for a military campaign in Russia. August: OKW instructs the Ausland/Abwehr Directorate to conduct appropriate preparations as part of an offensive operation against the USSR.
    August 8: At the request of the chief of staff of the German Air Force, experts from the foreign department of the OKW draw up an analytical review of the military-industrial potential of the USSR and the colonial possessions of Great Britain (except for Egypt and Gibraltar).
    From December 1940 to March 1941, the NKVD of the USSR liquidated 66 Abwehr strongholds and bases in the border areas. For 4 months, 1,596 agents-saboteurs were arrested (of which 1,338 were in the Baltic States, Belarus and Western Ukraine). In late 1940 and early 1941, Argentine counterintelligence discovered several warehouses with German weapons.
    On the eve of the invasion of the USSR, the foreign department of the Abwehr carries out a massive recruitment of agents among Armenian (Dashnaktsutyun), Azerbaijani (Mussavat) and Georgian (Shamil) political emigrants.
    From the Finnish air bases, the Rovel special-purpose squadron conducts active aerial reconnaissance in the industrial regions of the USSR (Kronstadt, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk and Murmansk)
    1941 January 31: The German High Command of the German Land Forces (OKH) signs the plan for the operational-strategic deployment of ground forces as part of Operation Barbarossa.
    February 15: Hitler orders the OKB to conduct a large-scale operation to disinform the leadership of the Red Army on the German-Soviet border from February 15 to April 16, 1941.
    . March: Admiral Canaris issues an order to the Directorate to speed up intelligence operations against the USSR.
    March 11: The German Foreign Ministry assures the USSR military attache in Berlin that "the rumors about the redeployment of German troops in the area of ​​the German-Soviet border are a malicious provocation and do not correspond to reality."
    March 21: Von Bentivegni reports to the OKB on carrying out special measures (Abwehr-3) to disguise the Wehrmacht's advance to its starting positions on the Romanian-Yugoslav and German-Soviet borders.
    Abwehr major Schulze-Holtus, aka Dr. Bruno Schulze, travels to the USSR under the guise of a tourist. The major collects intelligence information about military and industrial facilities, strategic bridges, etc., located along the Moscow-Kharkov-Rostov-on-Don-Grozny-Baku railway line. Returning to Moscow, Schulze-Holthus passes the collected information to the German military attaché.
    April-May: The NKVD registers the intensification of German intelligence activities on the territory of the USSR.
    April 30: Hitler sets the date for the attack on the USSR - June 22, 1941.
    May 7: The German military attache in the USSR, General Köstring, and his deputy, Oberst Krebs, report to Hitler on the military potential of the Soviet Union.
    May 15: Abwehr officers Tilike and Schulze-Holtus, undercover pseudonym "Zaba", conduct intensive reconnaissance of the border regions of the south of the USSR from the territory of Iran, using informant agents from among local residents. The son of the police chief of Tabriz and the staff officer of one of the Iranian divisions stationed in Tabriz were successfully recruited.
    May 25: The OKB issues "Directive No. 30", according to which the transfer of expeditionary troops to the zone of the British-Iraqi armed conflict (Iraq) is postponed indefinitely in connection with preparations for a campaign in the East. The OKB informs the General Staff of the Finnish Army about the timing of the attack on the USSR.
    June: SS Standartenführer Walter Schellenberg is appointed head of the 6th Directorate of the RSHA (SD Foreign Intelligence Service).
    After training in intelligence schools in Finland, the Abwehr-2 throws over 100 Estonian emigrants into the Baltic states (Operation Erna). Two groups of agents-saboteurs in the form of soldiers of the Red Army land on the island of Hiiumaa. The ship with the third Abwehr group is forced to leave the territorial waters of the USSR after a collision with Soviet border boats in the waters of the Gulf of Finland. A few days later, this sabotage and reconnaissance group parachuted into the coastal regions of Estonia. The commanders of the special units of the “front intelligence” of the Army Group “North” were tasked with collecting intelligence information about the strategic objects and fortifications of the Red Army in Estonia (especially in the Narva-Kohtla-Jarve-Rakvere-Tallinn region). The Abwehr sends agents from among Ukrainian emigrants to the USSR to compile and clarify "proscription lists" of Soviet citizens "to be destroyed in the first place" (communists, commissars, Jews ...).
    June 10: At a meeting of the top leadership of the Abwehr, the Sipo (security police) and the SD in Berlin, Admiral Canaris and SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich conclude an agreement on coordinating the actions of the Abwehrgroups, units of the security police and Einsatzgruppen (operational groups) of the SD on the territory of the USSR after the occupation. June 11: Sub-department "Abwehr-2" of the Krakow branch of Ausland / Abwehr / OKB throws 6 paratrooper agents into the territory of Ukraine with the task of blowing up sections of the Stolpu Novo - Kyiv railway line on the night of June 21-22. The operation is aborted. The Design Bureau issues Directive No. 32 - 1. “On measures after the operation Barbarossa. 2. "On the support of the Arab liberation movement by all military, political and propaganda means with the formation of the "Sonderstab F (elmi)" at the headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the occupation forces in Greece (South-East)". June 14: The OKB sends the last directives before the attack on the USSR to the main headquarters of the invading armies. June 14 - 19: According to the order of the leadership, Schulze-Holthus drops agents from the territory of Northern Iran to the Kirovabad/Azerbaijan region to collect intelligence information about Soviet civilian and military airfields in this region. When crossing the border, an Abwehrgroup of 6 people collides with a border detachment and returns to the base. During the fire contact, all 6 agents receive severe gunshot wounds.
    June 18: Germany and Turkey sign the Mutual Cooperation and Non-Aggression Pact. Divisions of the 1st echelon of the Wehrmacht entered the area of ​​operational deployment on the Soviet-German border. The battalion of Ukrainian saboteurs "Nightingale" advances to the German-Soviet border in the Pantalovice area. June 19: The Abwehr branch in Bucharest reports to Berlin about the successful recruitment of about 100 Georgian emigrants in Romania. The Georgian diaspora in Iran is being effectively developed. June 21: The Ausland/Abwehr/OKW Directorate announces "readiness No. 1" to the departments of military counterintelligence at the headquarters of the fronts - "Headquarters of Valli-1, Valli-2 and Valli-3". The commanders of the special units of the "frontal intelligence" of the army groups "North", "Center" and "South" report to the leadership of the Abwehr about the advance to their original positions near the German-Soviet border. Each of the three Abwehrgroups includes from 25 to 30 saboteurs from among the local population (Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, Cossacks, Finns, Estonians ...) under the command of a German officer. After being thrown into the rear (from 50 to 300 km from the front line), soldiers and officers of the Red Army, dressed in military uniforms, commandos of the "front intelligence" units carry out acts of sabotage and sabotage. The “Brandenburgers” of Lieutenant Katwitz penetrate 20 km deep into the territory of the USSR, capture the strategic bridge across the Beaver (the left tributary of the Berezina) near Lipsk and hold it until the approach of the Wehrmacht tank reconnaissance company. The company of the battalion "Nightingale" seeps into the Radimno area. June 22: Beginning of Operation Barbarossa - attack on the USSR. Around midnight, on the site of the 123rd Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht, Brandenburg-800 saboteurs dressed in the uniform of German customs officers mercilessly shoot at the squad of Soviet border guards, ensuring a breakthrough of the border fortifications. At dawn, sabotage Abwehr groups strike in the area of ​​Augustow - Grodno - Golynka - Rudavka - Suwalki and capture 10 strategic bridges (Veyseiai - Porechye - Sopotskin - Grodno - Lunno - Bridges). The consolidated company of the 1st battalion "Brandenburg-800", reinforced by the company of the battalion "Nightingale", capture the city of Przemysl, cross the San and capture the bridgehead near Valava. Abwehr-3 "front intelligence" special units prevent the evacuation and destruction of secret documents of Soviet military and civilian institutions (Brest-Litovsk). The Ausland / Abwehr / OKW Directorate instructs Major Schulze-Holtus, Abwehr resident in Tabriz / Iran, to intensify the collection of intelligence information about the Baku oil industrial region, lines of communication and communication in the Caucasus-Persian Gulf region. June 24: With the help of the German ambassador in Kabul, Lahousen-Wivremont organizes anti-British sabotage actions on the Afghan-Indian border. The Ausland/Abwehr/OKW administration plans to raise a massive anti-British uprising on the eve of the landing of the Wehrmacht expeditionary army in this region. Oberleutnant Roser, authorized by the "commission for the conclusion of a truce", at the head of an intelligence unit, returns from Syria to Turkey. Brandenburg-800 saboteurs make night landings from an ultra-low altitude (50 m) between Lida and Pervomaisky. The "Brandenburgers" capture and hold for two days the railway bridge on the Lida - Molodechno line until the approach of the German tank division. During fierce fighting, the unit suffers severe losses. Reinforced company of the battalion "Nightingale" is redeployed near Lvov. June 26: Finland declares war on the USSR. Subversive units of "long-range intelligence" penetrate into the Soviet rear through gaps in the lines of defense. The Finnish intelligence services are transmitting the received intelligence reports to Berlin for systematization and examination.
    WAR.
    To be continued.
  5. 1941

    June 28: Saboteurs of the 8th company "Brandenburg-800" in the Red Army uniform seize and clear the bridge prepared for the explosion by the retreating Soviet troops across the Daugava near Daugavpils. During fierce battles, the company commander, Oberleutnant Knak, was killed, but still the company holds the bridge until the forward units of the North Army Group, which is rushing into Latvia, approach. June 29 - 30: During a lightning operation, the 1st battalion "Brandenburg-800" and reinforced companies of the battalion "Nightingale" occupy Lvov and take control of strategic objects and transport hubs. According to the "proscription lists" compiled by agents of the Krakow branch of the Abwehr, the Einsatzkommandos of the SD, together with the Nightingale Battalion, begin mass executions of the Jewish population of Lvov.
    As part of Operation Xenophon (the redeployment of German and Romanian divisions from the Crimea through the Kerch Strait to the Taman Peninsula), a platoon of Brandenburgers under Lieutenant Katwitz attacked the stronghold of the Red Army anti-aircraft searchlights at Cape Peklu.
    Von Lahousen-Wivremont, General Reinecke and SS-Obergruppenführer Müller (Gestapo) are holding a meeting in connection with a change in the procedure for keeping Soviet prisoners of war in accordance with the “Order on Commissars” signed by Keitel and the order “On the implementation of a racial program in Russia”. Abwehr-3 begins to conduct police raids and anti-partisan intimidation actions in the occupied territory of the USSR.
    July 1 - 8: During the attack on Vinnitsa/Ukraine, the Nightingale battalion punishers carry out mass executions of civilians in Sataniv, Yusvin, Solochev and Ternopil. July 12: Great Britain and the USSR sign an agreement on mutual assistance in Moscow. July 15-17: Dressed in Red Army uniforms, the commandos of the Nightingale Battalion and the 1st Brandenburg-800 Battalion attack the headquarters of one of the units of the Red Army in the forest near Vinnitsa. The attack bogged down on the move - the saboteurs suffered heavy losses. The remnants of the Nightingale Battalion were disbanded.
    August: Within 2 weeks, Abwehr agents carried out 7 major railway sabotage (Army Group Center).
    Autumn: By agreement with the OKL, a group of Abwehr agents was sent to the Leningrad Region to collect intelligence information about the location of strategic military facilities (airfields, arsenals) and the deployment of military units.
    September 11: Von Ribbentrop signs an order stating that “the institutions and organizations of the German Foreign Ministry are prohibited from employing active agents-executors of the Ausland/Abwehr/OKW. The ban does not apply to employees of military intelligence and counterintelligence who are not directly involved in sabotage operations or who organize sabotage actions through third parties...”.
    September 16: In Afghanistan, the reconnaissance group of Oberleutnant Witzel, aka Patan, is preparing to be dropped into the border region in the south of the USSR.
    September 25: Abwehr Major Shenk holds a meeting with the leaders of the Uzbek emigration in Afghanistan. October: The 9th company of the 3rd battalion "Brandenburg-800" parachutes in the area of ​​the Istra reservoir, which supplies water to Moscow. During the mining of the dam, employees of the NKVD discovered and neutralized the saboteurs.
    Late 1941: After the failure of the blitzkrieg plans on the Eastern Front, the Ausland/Abwehr/OKW Department pays special attention to the actions of agents in the deep rear of the Red Army (in the Transcaucasian, Volga, Ural and Central Asian regions). The number of each special unit of the "front intelligence" of the Ausland / Abwehr / OKW Directorate on the Soviet-German front was increased to 55 - 60 people. In a forest camp near Ravaniemi, the 15th Brandenburg-800 company completed preparations for special operations on the Eastern Front. The saboteurs were given the task of organizing sabotage on the Murmansk-Leningrad railway line, the main communication artery of the northern grouping of Soviet troops, and interrupting the food supply to besieged Leningrad. "Headquarters Valley-3" begins to introduce agents into the Soviet partisan detachments.

  6. 1942 Finnish radio control posts and radio interception services decipher the content of radio messages from the High Command of the Red Army, which allows the Wehrmacht to carry out several successful naval operations to intercept Soviet convoys. By personal order of Hitler, the Ausland / Abwehr / OKW Directorate equips the signal troops of the Finnish army with the latest direction finders and radio transmitters. Finnish army coders, together with Abwehr experts, are trying to establish the places of permanent (temporary) deployment of military units of the Red Army by field mail numbers. Gerhard Buschmann, a former professional sports pilot, is appointed sector leader of the Abwehr branch in Reval. VO "Bulgaria" forms a special unit for the fight against partisans under the command of Sonderführer Kleinhampel. The "Baltic company" of the 1st battalion "Brandenburg-800" of Lieutenant Baron von Fölkersam is thrown into the rear of the Red Army. Commandos dressed in Red Army uniforms attack the divisional headquarters of the Red Army. The "Brandenburgers" capture the strategic bridge near Pyatigorsk/USSR and hold it until the approach of the Wehrmacht tank battalion. Before the assault on Demyansk, 200 Brandenburg-800 saboteurs parachute in the area of ​​the Bologoye transport hub. "Brandenburgers" undermine sections of the railway track on the lines Bologoe - Toropets and Bologoe - Staraya Russa. Two days later, the NKVD units manage to partially liquidate the sabotage Abwehr group.
    January: Headquarters Valli-1 begins recruiting Russian agents in POW filtration camps.
    January - November: NKVD officers neutralize 170 Abwehr-1 and Abwehr-2 agents operating in the North Caucasus/USSR.
    March: Abwehr-3 anti-terrorist units take an active part in the suppression of the partisan movement in the occupied territory. The 9th company of the 3rd battalion "Brandenburg-800" begins to "clean up the area" near Dorogobuzh - Smolensk. After completing the combat mission, the 9th company is transferred to Vyazma.
    Special forces "Brandenburg-800" are trying to capture and destroy the strongholds and arsenals of the Red Army near Alakvetti in the Murmansk direction. Commandos meet fierce resistance and suffer heavy losses in battles with Red Army units and NKVD units.
    May 23: 350 Abwehr-2 commandos in Red Army uniform are involved in Operation Gray Head on the Eastern Front (Army Group Center). In the course of protracted battles, units of the Red Army destroy 2/3 of the personnel of the Abwehrgroup. The remnants of the special forces with fighting break through the front line.
    June: Finnish counterintelligence begins sending copies of intercepted radio messages from the Red Army and the Red Army Fleet to Berlin on a regular basis.
    End of June: The "Brandenburg-800 coast guard fighter company" was tasked with cutting the supply lines of the Red Army in the Kerch region on the Taman Peninsula / USSR.
    July 24 - 25: As a result of a lightning-fast landing operation, the reinforced Brandenburg-800 company of Hauptmann Grabert takes possession of the six-kilometer hydraulic structures (railway embankments, earthen dams, bridges) between Rostov-on-Don and Bataysk in the Don floodplain.
    July 25 - December 1942: Wehrmacht summer offensive in the North Caucasus/USSR. 30 commandos of the 2nd battalion "Brandenburg-800" in Red Army uniforms parachute in the area of ​​the North Caucasian Mineralnye Vody. Saboteurs mine and blow up the railway bridge on the Mineralnye Vody - Pyatigorsk branch. 4 Abwehr agents carry out terrorist acts against the commanders of the 46th Infantry and 76th Caucasian divisions of the Red Army, stationed near Kirovograd. August: The 8th Brandenburg-800 company is ordered to capture the bridges near Bataysk, south of Rostov-on-Don, and hold them until the approach of the Wehrmacht tank divisions. The Abwehrgroup of Lieutenant Baron von Felkersam in the form of NKGB fighters is thrown into the deep rear of the Soviet army in order to capture the oil production areas near Maykop. 25 Brandenburg commandos of Oberleutnant Lange are parachuted into the Grozny region with the task of capturing oil refineries and an oil pipeline. The Red Army soldiers of the security company shoot the sabotage group while still in the air. Having lost up to 60% of their personnel, the "Brandenburgers" are fighting their way through the Soviet-German front line. The 8th company of the 2nd battalion "Brandenburg-800" captures the bridge over the Belaya River near Maikop and prevents the redeployment of Red Army units. In the ensuing battle, the company commander, Lieutenant Prochazka, was killed. The Abwehrkommando of the 6th company "Brandenburg-800" in the Red Army uniform captures the road bridge and cuts the Maikop-Tuapse highway on the Black Sea. During fierce battles, the Red Army units almost completely destroy the Abwehr saboteurs. Dedicated Brandenburg-800 units, together with SD Einsatzkommandos, take part in anti-partisan raids between Nevelemi Vitebsk / Belarus.
    August 20: The Ausland/Abwehr/OKW Directorate deploys the "German-Arab Training Unit" (GAUP) from Cape Sounion/Greece to Stalino (now Donetsk/Ukraine) to participate in OKB sabotage and reconnaissance operations. August 28 - 29: "Brandenburg-800 long-range reconnaissance" patrols in Red Army uniforms go to the Murmansk railway and lay mines equipped with pressure and delayed fuses, as well as vibrating fuses. Autumn: Shtarkman, a career intelligence officer of the Abwehr, is thrown into the besieged Leningrad.
    Bodies of the NKGB arrest 26 paratroopers of the Abwehr in the Stalingrad region.
    October 1942 - September 1943: "Abwehrkommando 104" throws into the rear of the Red Army about 150 reconnaissance groups, from 3 to 10 agents each. Only two return across the front line!
    November 1: The "Special Purpose Training Regiment Brandenburg-800" was reorganized into the "Sonder Unit (Special Purpose Brigade) Brandenburg-800". November 2: Soldiers of the 5th Brandenburg Company in Red Army uniforms capture the bridge across the Terek near Darg-Koh. Parts of the NKGB liquidate saboteurs.
    End of 1942: The 16th company of the "Brandenburgers" was transferred to Leningrad. For three months, the commandos of the Bergman (Highlander) regiment, together with the Einsatzkommandos of the SD, take part in punitive operations in the North Caucasus / USSR (mass executions of the civilian population and anti-partisan raids).
    40 Abwehr radio operators of the “radio interception and surveillance centers” of the Far East Military District in Beijing and Canton daily decode about 100 intercepted radio messages from Soviet, British and American military radio stations. Late December 1942 - 1944: Together with the 6th Directorate of the RSHA (foreign intelligence service SD - Ausland / SD), Abwehr-1 and Abwehr-2 conduct anti-Soviet and anti-British activities in Iran.
  7. I would not want the members of the forum to have a misconception about the "Brandenburg" and, in general, about German intelligence. Therefore, I recommend that you familiarize yourself with the Abwehr combat log in its entirety. (Abr cited an excerpt from him). You can do this in Julius Mader's book "Abwehr: Shield and Sword of the Third Reich" Phoenix 1999 (Rostov-on-Don). it follows from the magazine that the Abwehr did not always act so famously, including against the USSR. By the way, the level of work of the Abwehr is visible from the case with Tavrin. The description is generally funny, to catch up with a motorcycle at a distance of 2 km on a bike, you need to be able to do it. Although, considering WHAT the motorcycle was carrying, it would probably have been possible to catch up with it on foot ... without two hunting rifles with cartridges, the agent could not do it. Yes, and 7 pistols for two ... it's impressive. Taurina is apparently 4, and the woman, as a weaker creature, 2. Or maybe they were thrown into our rear to hunt. 5 grenades and only 1 mine. There is no radio station, but there is a lot of cartridges. money just right, but 116 seals (a separate suitcase, not otherwise) - this is also impressive. And not a word about the crew of the aircraft, although it may simply not have been mentioned. They throw it along with their own motorcycle, and at the same time, the landing area in the very thick of the air defense is chosen (or the crew is such that they brought it to the wrong place). In general, a pro and nothing more.
    Such prompt detention of the spies is explained by the fact that the air defense systems of the Moscow region spotted the plane on which they arrived at about two in the morning in the Kubinka region. He was fired upon and, having received damage, lay down on the return course. But in the Smolensk region he made an emergency landing right in a field near the village of Yakovlevo. This did not go unnoticed by Almazov, the commander of the local public order group, who organized surveillance and soon reported by phone to the NKVD regional department that a man and a woman in Soviet military uniforms had left the enemy plane on a motorcycle in the direction of Karmanovo. A task force was sent to detain the fascist crew, and the head of the NKVD district department decided to arrest the suspicious couple personally. He was very lucky: for some reason, the spies did not offer the slightest resistance, although seven pistols, two center-fire hunting rifles, and five grenades were seized from them. Later, a special device called "Panzerknake" was found in the plane - for firing miniature armor-piercing incendiary projectiles.

    Runaway gambler

    The beginning of this story can be traced back to 1932, when an inspector of the city council, Pyotr Shilo, was arrested in Saratov. He lost a large sum in cards and paid with state money. Soon the crime was solved, and the unfortunate gambler faced a long sentence. But Shilo managed to escape from the bathhouse of the pre-trial detention center, and then, using false certificates, received a passport in the name of Pyotr Tavrin and even graduated from junior command staff courses before the war. In 1942, the false Tavrin was already a company commander and had good prospects. But special officers sat on his tail. On May 29, 1942, Tavrin was summoned for a conversation by an authorized representative of the special department of the regiment and bluntly asked if he had previously had the name Shilo? The fugitive gambler, of course, refused, but he realized that sooner or later he would be brought to clean water. That same night, Tavrin fled to the Germans.

    For several months he was transferred from one concentration camp to another. Once, an assistant to General Vlasov, the former secretary of the district committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Moscow, Georgy Zhilenkov, arrived in the “zone” to recruit prisoners for service in the ROA. Tavrin managed to take a liking to him and soon became a cadet of the Abwehr intelligence school. Communication with Zhilenkov continued here as well. It was this defrocked secretary who suggested to Tavrin the idea of ​​a terrorist attack against Stalin. She was very much to the liking of the German command. In September 1943, Tavrin was placed at the disposal of the head of the Zeppelin special reconnaissance and sabotage team, Otto Kraus, who personally supervised the preparation of the agent for an important special mission.

    The scenario of the attack assumed the following. Tavrin, with the documents of Colonel SMERSH, Hero of the Soviet Union, a war invalid, enters the territory of Moscow, settles there in a private apartment, contacts the leaders of the anti-Soviet organization "Union of Russian Officers" General Zagladin from the personnel department of the People's Commissariat of Defense and Major Palkin from the headquarters of the reserve officer regiment. Together they are looking for the possibility of Tavrin's penetration into any solemn meeting in the Kremlin, which would be attended by Stalin. There, the agent must shoot the leader with a poisoned bullet. Stalin's death would be the signal for a large landing on the outskirts of Moscow, which would capture the "demoralized Kremlin" and put in power the "Russian cabinet" headed by General Vlasov.

    In the event that Tavrin failed to infiltrate the Kremlin, he was to ambush the vehicle carrying Stalin and blow it up with a Panzerknake capable of penetrating 45 millimeters of armor.

    In order to ensure the authenticity of the legend about the disability of “Colonel SMERSH Tavrin”, he underwent surgery on his stomach and legs, disfiguring them with jagged scars. A few weeks before the transfer of the agent across the front line, he was personally instructed twice by General Vlasov and three times by the well-known fascist saboteur Otto Skorzeny.

    female character

    From the very beginning, it was assumed that Tavrin should carry out the operation alone. But at the end of 1943, he met Lydia Shilova in Pskov, and this left an unexpected imprint on the further scenario of the operation.

    Lydia, a young beautiful woman, worked as an accountant in the housing office before the war. During the occupation, like thousands of others, she worked according to the order of the German commandant. At first she was sent to the officer's laundry, then to the sewing workshop. There was a conflict with one of the officers. He tried to persuade the woman to cohabitation, but she could not overcome the disgust. The fascist, in retaliation, ensured that Lydia was sent to logging. Fragile and unprepared for work, she was melting before our eyes. And then the case brought her to Tavrin. In private conversations, he scolded the Germans, promised to help free Lydia from hard work. In the end, he proposed to marry him. At that time, she did not know that Peter was a German spy, and later he confessed this to her and proposed such a plan. She takes courses for radio operators and crosses the front line with him, and on Soviet territory they get lost and cut off all contact with the Germans. The war is coming to an end, and the Nazis will not be up to taking revenge on the fugitive agents. Lydia agreed. Later, during the investigation, it was established that she was completely unaware of the terrorist assignment for Tavrin and was sure that he was not going to work for the Germans on Soviet territory.

    Judging by the investigative and judicial materials, this seems to be true. How else can one explain the fact that Tavrin, armed to the teeth, offered no resistance during the arrest, and besides, he left the Panzerknak, a walkie-talkie, and many other spy accessories on the plane? So most likely there was no threat to Stalin's life in September 1944. Of course, it was beneficial for the Chekists to describe the Panzerknake operation that they had stopped in the most sinister colors. This allowed Beria to once again appear before Stalin in the role of the savior of the leader.

    Pay

    After the arrest of Tavrin and Shilova, a radio game was developed, codenamed "Fog". Shilova regularly maintained two-way radio communications with the German intelligence center. With these radiograms, the Chekists "foggy" the brains of German intelligence officers. Among the many meaningless telegrams was the following: “I met a woman doctor, has acquaintances in the Kremlin hospital. Processing." There were also telegrams informing about the failure of the batteries for the radio station and the impossibility of getting them in Moscow. They asked for help and support. In response, the Germans thanked the agents for their service and offered to unite with another group located in our rear. Naturally, this group was soon neutralized ... The last message sent by Shilova went to the intelligence center on April 9, 1945, but no answer was received: the end of the war was approaching. In peaceful days, it was assumed that one of the surviving former employees of German intelligence could go to the safe house of Tavrin and Shilova. But no one ever came.
    1943 in the area of ​​Plavsk to commit subversive actions.

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