Political scientist Valery Solovey: "Putin will be elected and leave according to the Yeltsin scenario in two or three years." Political scientist Valery Solovey: we are facing very serious political changes Valery Soloviev political scientist

Valery Solovey: by 2024 there will be 15-20 regions in Russia and state ideology

Valery Solovey, a political scientist and professor at MGIMO, expressed his opinion on rumors about an imminent constitutional reform in Russia.

The other day the chairman of the constitutional court Valery Zorkin spoke about the need to change the country's Constitution.

According to Professor Nightingale, by 2024 in Russia the number of subjects of the federation will be reduced through unification and state ideology will be introduced.

Valery Solovey:

I already had to write and speak on this topic, I will repeat myself with pleasure.

1. Preparation of the constitutional reform, or rather cardinal changes in a wide range of constitutional laws, began in the fall of 2017.

2. Changes were developed in the following areas:

a) the formation of a new configuration of state power and administration;

b) a radical reduction in the number of subjects of the federation (up to 15-20) by combining them for the purpose of ease of management, leveling the levels of development and neutralizing ethnic separatist tendencies;

c) decisive amendments to the laws on elections and political parties (by no means in the sense of liberalization);

d) the introduction of state ideology.
Well and one more thing.

3. Initially, it was not clear which of the changes and to what extent would be given the green light, and which would not.

But in any case, they were not supposed to be implemented all at the same time due to the predicted strong negative reaction.

4. Sine qua non - the reconfiguration of state power and management, which should provide the institutional and legal framework for the transit of the system.

There are several options here too.

From the well-known model with the establishment of the State Council as an analogue of the Politburo and reducing the role of the president to representative and symbolic functions to, on the contrary, strengthening and expanding presidential powers and establishing the post of vice president. (There are several more options.)

5. The transit of the system should be carried out until 2024, in order to catch the enemies of the external and internal by surprise. It was assumed that the decisive years could be 2020-2021.

6. There is one and only reason why these terms could be shifted downward.

And this reason has nothing to do with politics and declining ratings. The situation is assessed as disturbing, but not critical and under control.

7. And even more so, there was no talk of any early elections and could not go. A radical change in the organization of state power and administration is not being carried out in order to hold elections and subject the system to severe stress.

8. Among the key beneficiaries of the reform, the authorities name three people who are already in the top ten of the elite in terms of their political and bureaucratic weight.

On the air of the radio station "Echo of Moscow" - Valery Solovey, political scientist, professor at MGIMO.

Stanislav Kryuchkov and Andrey Ezhov are on the air.

S. Kryuchkov: 15 hours 6 minutes in the Russian capital. This is "Personally yours". The program will be hosted by Andrey Yezhov and Stanislav Kryuchkov. And with us today is a political scientist, professor of MGIMO Valery Solovey. Valery, hello.

V. Nightingale: Good afternoon, gentlemen.

S. Kryuchkov: We remind you about our on-air coordinates. You can write to us by SMS +7 985 970-45-45, asking questions to our guest, messages on the air on the website, and in the Youtube chat, where the broadcast is taking place, on Twitter your questions, remarks, comments for the guest.

A. Yezhov: I remind you of the vyzvon account for those who may not remember. We also have a chat in Telegram in experimental mode, join, add and send your questions, remarks and comments there. We have thousands of opportunities to contact our studio and ask a question to political scientist Valery Solovyu, who will be with us and with you in the next hour.

V. Solovey: These elections are considered epoch-making, historic

At this point, the Kremlin decided to increase the turnout in the presidential elections, which, in my opinion, was very expected, turning voting into a holiday, arranging performances by creative teams, a consumer goods fair and even food sales. How justified is this calculation by the Presidential Administration? The Russians will really do this, in conditions when, I think, everyone guesses how these elections will end and the result is predetermined. Perhaps this will somehow work for some regions, Moscow is unlikely.

V. Solovey: You are very right to point out that for some regions this may turn out to be very important. The fact is that in Russia there are not enough holidays and, frankly, we live with you in a northern country and a rather depressive one, especially in winter and, in fact, in spring, most of it in spring and autumn too.

S. Kryuchkov: Sometimes in summer too.

V. Solovey: Sometimes it happens when the summer is depressive. Therefore, in Russia they like free holidays. Especially in the provinces. This is the first thing. The second is the revival of the Soviet tradition, which I remember, you, fortunately, not, but here you will have a chance to see how this happened at a time when the elections were really trying to turn into a holiday, to somehow attract people. I think for a certain part it will work. People will have the opportunity to come and listen to music, performances of amateur groups and, most importantly, buy something at a discount: even some kind of pastry, some kind of confectionery. This can attract part of the voters.

S. Kryuchkov: What is the reason for this planning? What is the fundamental difference from the last story with the municipal elections, when we heard over and over again about the notorious "dry turnout". It was then that they tried to lower the turnout, and now they are stimulating it.

V. Solovey: Because these elections are considered epoch-making and historic. Because this is the last election, as it is supposed, to which Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin will go and it is necessary to show him, the city and the world that his support is significant. Therefore, this notorious figure of 70%, 70% of the turnout and 70% of the votes cast for him appeared. As you know, the Presidential Administration has rejected these figures several times, saying that these are all fictions, that there are no plans, even indicative ones.

But, in fact, political competitions have already begun in the regions, and by no means in regions far from Moscow, but, in particular, in the Moscow region, for not only meeting these indicators, but even exceeding them. And I can say that they are preparing for this carefully. But there is one rule or a tough recommendation that will have to be followed - you cannot create in people in large cities, in millionaires, and in Moscow, St. Petersburg, first of all, the impression that the elections were held dishonestly. That is, there should be no noticeable falsifications at the polling stations, in order to avoid provoking political protests. These are our political authorities who will be watching.

What happens there in places of the more deaf with so-called guided or controlled voting and with the administrative resource prevailing is not a question of this. Here is Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, a few more cities - here they will try to keep everything clean. But you can provide attendance at the expense of what, you know very well. How many hundreds of thousands of municipal and federal employees live in Moscow.

A. Yezhov: You said about the Moscow region, there already in Khimki, in my opinion, kindergarten teachers were mobilized with a very psychedelic NRZB.

V. Solovey: Yes, I'll see what you mean. But, in fact, this is a blatant and ridiculous manifestation. And the robot is being carried out very carefully and quite technologically. And I have no doubt that these goals, which are not proclaimed, which are rejected, in fact, will be achieved.

A. Yezhov: But in this story, Misha from Saratov partly agrees with the lack of holidays in Russia, he says: “It is unlikely that anyone will go for food….

V. Solovey: The atmosphere, yes ...

A. Yezhov: ... or an extra day off. These are the loyal masses, respectively, will rejoice. "

V. Solovey: They can, yes.

A. Yezhov: You wrote the other day that the feeling of hopelessness in connection with the approaching 4th or 5th, differently called, the term of Putin, groundlessly we entered an era, a period of serious changes. What will they be? The withdrawal of troops from Syria is the beginning, can it be considered a harbinger of change, or did you mean a different kind of change?

V. Solovey: The withdrawal of troops from Syria is an important element of the electoral campaign, because Putin fits the new mandate, presumably the final one, and it shows that the operation was completed successfully. Just like Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin in his time in 1996, before the presidential elections, signed a decree on the armor of a tank on the end of the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya. So, everything is natural.

But, if we have already started talking about Syria at your suggestion, then I want to tell you that here, in addition to the political aspect, there is also a military-technical one. Russia does not have enough resources to participate in several local wars at the same time, and since now our private military companies are already participating in the conflict in Libya, well, they are engaged in peaceful activities there, that is, they are removing minefields, but they are already participating in Sudan and will most likely participate in Yemen, then, of course, you need to cut somewhere in order to move somewhere. Resources are scarce. Russia is a poor country, in which a significant part of the budget is spent on defense and law enforcement, law enforcement in quotation marks.

V. Solovey: The withdrawal of troops from Syria is an important element of the electoral campaign

A. Yezhov: This military expansion into Africa, which you are talking about, is, theoretically, if it is full-scale, how much it will correspond to the media with what we saw in Syria, because it is clear with Syria.

V. Solovey: Of course, it will not be full-scale, because resources are still not enough, and it will be latent, because it is very difficult. Even with Syria it was extremely difficult to explain to our society what we are doing there and why.

A. Ezhov: Not everyone can find it on the map.

V. Solovey: And what can we say about Sudan. They also tried to somehow attract Syria to our Orthodoxy. It is clear that these were just far-fetched connections. But you cannot attract Sudan or Yemen to Russian interests. For society it means.

S. Kryuchkov: But nevertheless, leave this seemingly media-cultivated Syrian vegetable garden in favor of unknown African countries ...

V. Solovey: And this will be kept silent. It is one thing that Russia may have some interests there, including one of the interests that is rather not economic, although experts on the Internet will explain to us what important geopolitical interests there are. No, the logic is very simple. As a rule, we try to put the wick on the Americans and the West in general wherever we can. The President of Sudan complained that he was under pressure, we - okay, why not help. And he needs this in order to successfully negotiate with the United States as well.

S. Kryuchkov: Regarding the final cadence, returning to the elections, the 4th, 5th, as you say, is Putin's, what gives reason to assume that this will be so? Here is the aesthetics of supplication, which we were shown at GAZ, when Putin was nominated, when the senior foreman of the site, Artyom Baranov, was shouted at ... What does this aesthetics testify to?

A. Yezhov: Stylistically, in my opinion, it just looked Kafkaesque.

V. Solovey: I have a little more experience, in this case it may be a drawback of some kind. I can say that it all reminds me of the Chernenko era. End of the Soviet era. Then there was a massive feeling that it had exhausted itself. And now this feeling of exhaustion, by the way, I do not compare Putin with Chernenko in any sense, they are completely different people in health and psychotype, but there is a feeling of exhaustion of the historical era, and it is both massive and elite in nature. Everyone understands that nearly 20 years have come to an end and we must move on to some new quality. But no one has any idea about this new quality, or about the paths of transition.

Of course, the Presidential Administration is preparing, developing some options, including constitutional reform, but no one knows how this will go. Nobody even knows where to move, but everyone has a feeling that was formulated during the years of Perestroika, was very popular - you can't live like this. The era is over. This is now massive. The overwhelming majority of society wants changes, and the elite, even if they did not want changes, understands that they are already ripe and they are inevitable.

A. Yezhov: You say that we are entering a period of serious changes after March 18. And what will be, trite, the three main steps that we will see? It is clear that forecasts are ungrateful ...

V. Solovey: Formation of the government, of course. A government will be formed in May.

A. Yezhov: After the inauguration.

V. Solovey: Yes. And with a high probability the former prime minister may remain there, but a new person may also come.

S. Kryuchkov: What surprises can we expect?

V. Solovey: One of the surprises may be related, I am participating, in particular, now in the election campaign at the headquarters of Mr. Titov, one of the surprises may be connected with his successful performance. If he successfully campaigns and speaks, then it can secure a future for him that goes beyond the electoral perspective. But we are still in the subjunctive mood.

As for the post of prime minister, it is now believed that Dmitry Anatolyevich should stay. But this does not mean that this will happen, since life is changeable, the mood of Vladimir Vladimirovich and our idea of ​​his plans, of his future may also change. Several people are believed to have received hints of the possibility of taking over as prime minister. Or they took it as a hint. And, as you know, Sergei Semenovich Sobyanin even publicly renounced this high honor, saying that Moscow is his favorite city and it is much more important than Russia. A real man should deal with Moscow, not Russia.

S. Kryuchkov: Coming back to what you were talking about - the feeling of the exhaustion of an era - is this something with which in Putin's next term they will be working in the media? Because, after all, there was such a feeling, in my opinion, on the wave of protests at the turn of the 11th-12th years, but it was overcome.

V. Solovey: It was overcome largely thanks to the Crimea. Because if there were no Crimea, this feeling of exhaustion would have come much earlier. Because Crimea was a powerful vaccine, which was able for a while, not forever, and even for a short time, to reverse the psychological and socio-cultural situation. And now the media, after March 18, will face a fundamentally unsolvable task, because they will have to create a positive image of the future, because they can no longer speculate in Ukraine, they will no longer succeed in Syria, on the enemies. People are no longer interested in this. This is well understood from the polls. They are interested in their own future here and now in a country called Russia.

What can the media offer? If there is a global discrepancy between the picture they are trying to paint and reality, then this will cause, as in Soviet times, growing aggression. Our society is very aggressive, extremely. It is angry, partly demoralized, but partly very angry. A lot of hatred, anger has accumulated in him, and all this can break through.

The main demand now in Russia, the main deficit is not even a shortage of money, it is a lack of perspective and a lack of understanding of the future. Sociology shows this in general. And that, I think, shows your personal feeling. People cannot plan their own lives, they are not able to. You will have to work with this. But in order to give an answer, as the media give to society, they must first get an answer from the supreme power. What is the supreme power planning? It is not clear yet.

A. Yezhov: If we proceed from the expectation of a better life after the formation of the government, we should wait for some loud statements, some next national projects.

V. Solovey: I think that three reforms will be launched, they are being prepared. This is a reform of public administration, this is a reform of the legal system and what is called economic reform. But all these reforms will bear, as I imagine, a pronounced technocratic character, that is, the goal of legal reform is not to create an independent court, but to make the court work quickly. Likewise, the goal of economic reform is not to liberate small and medium-sized businesses, to lower taxes - not to increase labor productivity.

There is such a good historical analogy, it was with this that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev began, in 1985 - 56 he tried to accelerate, that is, using the resources of the socialist model, to use its advantages to accelerate economic growth. Here is the idea of ​​increasing labor productivity, and the program was developed by Mr. Oreshkin, it is typologically similar to the idea of ​​Gorbachev's acceleration. Please note that these are precisely technocratic reforms. And in the reform of public administration, in the criterion, the word "democracy" is absent at all, simply not. As I know. Maybe it will appear in the final version.

But what is most curious is when these reforms, and they need to be carried out, because somehow it is necessary to respond to these massive expectations, which we just talked about, that people want clarity and they want something positive. As soon as these reforms begin to be carried out, they will be carried out with the ugliness inherent in Russia and, moreover, on a colossal scale, this can provoke a deterioration, you know, this is how it is here. And that is why some of the most sophisticated officials say: “Listen, we have developed a wonderful project with you, wonderful, but you don’t think that if we start doing something, it will not get worse”. “Yes, yes,” they say, “but you can't leave the state of affairs as it is, everyone is already tired of that. People want at least some external movement. " And so you and I found ourselves in such an unpleasant situation, unpleasant for everyone - for society, and for the elites, and for the supreme power too. What not to do is not allowed and to do is dangerous.

A. Yezhov: By the way, by the way, Putin has already allegedly won the upcoming campaign in propaganda, having put forward an initiative on monetary incentives for the birth of first-borns. Is it really a strong move? Money, in general, is not the most outrageous.

V. Solovey: Firstly, this is a lot of money for the Russian provinces, 10.5 thousand rubles on average per month for a newborn, this is very fair at very low salaries, this allowance will be comparable to the salary.

A. Yezhov: But not everyone will get it.

V. Solovey: Of course. But it is not important. The propaganda potential will begin to be realized only after the New Year. Can you imagine what reports will be sent to the media space by our television media, here is a happy family, the whole country will see it. No one will ponder the details, in which, as usual, the devil is hidden, that this is not for everyone, there are a number of restrictions. Everyone will be: "Great, it never happened." And this is the image of the future. This is a substitute, that is, a replacement, in fact, of the future. When you start to stimulate the birth rate - here we are looking to the future. It will be presented in this way, and I am sure that the propaganda potential of this bill is underestimated, the propaganda around it will be extremely successful. Because, from the point of view of PR, I still teach PR, the best speculation is speculation on children. But also on cats.

A. Yezhov: It is clear, an eternal theme. There are three months before the elections ...

V. Solovey: Well, what three months, what are you ...

A. Ezhov: In fact, I mean calendar ones.

V. Solovey: Oh, yes. Chronologically yes.

V. Solovey: Russia does not have enough resources to participate in several local wars at the same time

A. Yezhov: The prospect of a new wave of protests in connection with the fact that Alexei Navalny has already stated that the campaign is not just disobedience, but the recognition of these elections as illegitimate if he is not registered, it is clear that most likely he will not be registered , is it worth waiting for some kind of development here?

V. Solovey: I think that after January 10, when it becomes finally clear that Alexei Navalny will not be able to participate in the elections and the New Year holidays are over, he will have to go to some kind of protest actions. That is, in the language of psychotherapy, close the gestalt. Otherwise, this whole story with signature verification and the like will turn out to be meaningless. But well, you went there, spoke at rallies, you have to react somehow. This will be the first step, which means protest actions. I don't know how large-scale and successful they will be, I'm not sure. Because those actions are successful which, even if they do not look spontaneous, are in fact carefully prepared. This is the first thing. And secondly, yes, he will call for a boycott, of course, for a boycott of the elections after these protests. But I do not believe in the success of the boycott.

A. Ezhov: Do you follow the Sobchak campaign against this background? I see the girl does not get out of the federal channels, just a few hours ago.

V. Solovey: Crimea was a powerful vaccine, which was able to temporarily reverse the psychological and sociocultural situation

V. Solovey: She does not get out of the federal channels precisely because she compensates for Navalny. She should act in the federal public, media space as a replacement for Alexei Navalny, this is, firstly, this is a fairly obvious political technological move, but generally accurate. And she even got carte blanche, since Navalny's popularity is not declining as quickly as the Presidential Administration would like. This is the first thing. And second, that it should win over to its side some of those who would participate in the boycott of the elections and would support Navalny's protest. Young people who, as far as I know, in sociology, in the absence of Navalny, are ready to vote for Sobchak.

S. Kryuchkov: Titov, whose headquarters you came to, is an alternative candidate from the liberals for people over 40. That is, not for young people.

V. Solovey: Yes, you are trying to complete this scheme, which I started. No, he is still oriented towards a different audience, I think the audience is 25+.

S. Kryuchkov: The sites write: "Valery Solovey came to Titov's headquarters in order to supervise ideological issues." What does it mean? What does it mean to supervise the ideology at the headquarters of a businessman.

V. Solovey: It sounds, of course, a little Soviet-style, but, in fact, this is a very interesting task. I don’t know if it will be fully implemented, because it’s very difficult in the tech and tech. Both Titov and, in general, the Party of Rost, of which he is the leader, adhere to the position of right-wing liberalism, this is very honorable and effective, at least in the world of ideology, but in Russia it was not possible to adapt it to our soil. I'll explain to you, let's just on the fingers. We have 18 million self-employed people in our country, several million small and medium-sized businessmen, the views of these people are economic, not political, these are absolutely liberal views, not just liberal - libertarian. They want low taxes, they do not want to deal with the state, which you know very well, this is a ready ground for the Liberal Party. But we need to find an approach to them, we need to find a message to which they would be sensitive.

S. Kryuchkov: This is an aim for what perspective?

V. Solovey: This is a long-term sight. Because if some elections end, others will begin. I can say that the Party of Growth is already preparing for regional elections, now already.

S. Kryuchkov: So we are talking about party history, not about Titov's individual history?

V. Solovey: No, individuals and parties. In this case, they are inextricably linked. But this is the task of adapting ideology. We'll see what comes of it.

A. Ezhov: Here are many of our listeners who write SMS messages to the number +7 985 970-45-45 and use the Twitter account vyzvon, disagree with you about the expectations of changes in society: “Where did Valery Solovey see an angry society, maybe at a gas plant, where the people rejoiced? " Well, here's this kind of message. This is a story, rather about big cities or ...

V. Solovey: It is now believed that Dmitry Anatolyevich should stay.

V. Solovey: No, this story concerns everyone in Russia, they just react differently. You can be extremely angry and, which is very often the case in Russia, go after drinking vodka, go to stuff the face of a neighbor or have a fight. Aggression can spread like that. As for the GAZ plant, we know what kind of audience there was and who proposed to Vladimir Vladimirovich, it was still not a worker, well, what about it. Even if there had to be specially trained crowd crowd, you can imagine how afraid really-minded people are.

A. Yezhov: We talked about the electoral prospects of Vladimir Putin, first of all, for almost half of the first program, but Elena Ivankovskaya on Youtube in a chat, asks a somewhat naive question: “Is there another scenario possible besides the election of Putin? Nobody expected Trump to win, but he did. Or does this not work in our reality? "

V. Solovey: This is not such a naive question. This is one of the reasons, perhaps the main one, for which Alexei Navalny will not be allowed to participate in the elections. Not because he could win, but because his participation in itself could trigger completely unforeseen political dynamics. That is, it would not be the Trump effect or the Brexit effect like in Great Britain, but the very participation of an alternative candidate with an alternative program, speaking on central television channels, could have a completely unforeseen effect. He is trying to avoid this effect, because in Russia, and this applies not only to the presidential elections, the authorities want to control everything, they are afraid of the unforeseen, they are afraid of those spheres that are out of control. Pay attention to how she tries to take control of everyday life, even intimate life, invades all spheres of culture, art, let alone business. She is essentially afraid of everything that is out of control. Because there, from her point of view, a threat lurks. You know how children are afraid of the dark, because someone is hiding in the dark. Dentists are okay. So the government is afraid of everything that is outside its control. At least the power groups.

S. Kryuchkov: Substantially afraid of what goes beyond her, but within herself. Let's say you note in your place that Prime Minister Medvedev mentioned that he does not see himself as president in the current electoral season.

V. Solovey: This can be either a subtle game on the part of Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev, this is what I do not really believe, or just an inability to accurately formulate my idea. Although, if he was helped to prepare answers to these questions, then, perhaps, this is a subtle far-reaching hint, but the fact is that it is necessary to calculate the public reaction, our public does not perceive, and the Western, I can say absolutely for sure, too, that comes from the mouth of our premier as a strategic and subtly thought-out game.

A. Ezhov: Let's talk a little about the events in Moscow.

V. Solovey: What is happening?

A. Yezhov: Watch what is happening. The action of the revolutionary communist youth union took place here with the pasting of offensive stickers in Moscow on Alexander Solzhenitsyn Street, they call the writer a literary Vlasov. And literally on the eve of the Artdokfest there was an attack by SERB activists. Here is the fact that law enforcement agencies react very calmly to this, is it carte blanche?

V. Solovey: Why calm? They also opened a criminal case against these SERB activists.

A. Yezhov: Yes, but at the same time there is a curator of the SERB activists in Center E and his name is known.

V. Solovey: Yes, I understand. In general, the authorities use non-conventional means, let's call it such a beautiful term, in order to maintain control. Since you cannot use the law enforcement agencies to openly violate the Constitution, although this framework is already blurred in our country, you are trying to "mobilize" supposedly public activists, who are actually controlled by you, to imitate public reaction. And this is a very good means of control for the time being, until these tools, as was the case with the campaign against Matilda, begin to get out of your control. This is the first thing.

And second, there is always a danger that when you limit your own monopoly on violence, violence in a figurative sense, in favor of some groups you alienate it, compromise, then it begins to erode. And then do not be surprised that in a critical situation a lot of people suddenly appear, as was the case in Donbass, who will say: “Yes, we will put things in order ourselves, we will now create squads, self-defense units, people's squads for the imposition of morality, people's squads for defending liberalism, whatever. And we ourselves will take action. " We must then be ready for this, this is an inevitable consequence of the policy of such encouragement of unauthorized activity that imitates public activity.

V. Solovey: Igor Ivanovich Sechin cannot moderate his appetites

S. Kryuchkov: Are those who play this game and send such signals ready for the return of this wave?

V. Solovey: They are confident that they are in control of the situation. This is a perpetual delusion, similar to the story of Pope Carlo. Remember, he made a beautiful boy out of a log and equipped him for school, and the boy where he went, he sold everything and went to the circus. It's the same with these golems, in which they breathed life and lets them go. But they will turn against them. But the main thing is that people look: “Listen, why don't we have the right ...” This idea of ​​legitimizing violence will certainly be in the public consciousness, it is already there.

And the aggression that we talked about in the first part is dispersed, widespread, when you hit your neighbor's face after drinking a glass of vodka, it may well be directed against the boss, against the director of DEZ, against the manager, against the owner of the enterprise. It's all like in the 17th year. It can turn instantly, I stress, historically instantly, within literally a few weeks. As soon as the semblance of power collapses or weakens, all of a sudden people will understand: “Look, the police are only protecting themselves, they are afraid of us. I'll go get some social justice. I will take revenge on those who, from my point of view, offended me. "

A. Ezhov: Our viewer Alexei Frolov, who watches us on the Echo of Moscow Youtube channel, still cannot calm down on the topic of a worker from the GAZ plant: “Who was he, a major of the FSO?”

V. Solovey: Well, he was not a worker, for sure.

A. Yezhov: I think Alexei Frolov was happy with the answer.

S. Kryuchkov: I would not leave the topic with Vladimir Vladimirovich, even if he is our hero ...

V. Solovey: He will not leave us.

S. Kryuchkov: He will hold a press conference this week, and the United Russia Congress will follow it. In addition to the listed topics, the declared victory and the withdrawal of troops from Syria, demographic history, what else will become such chips?

V. Solovey: At the beginning of next year, his blitz visits to the regions about responding to complaints. This is a direct connection between the king and the people. People beat their brows and say that there is a dump or the water is flowing rusty.

A. Yezhov: You can buy a dress for a girl, you can give a puppy as a present.

V. Solovey: Yes, yes. These scripts have already been written, the only question is in which regions they will be. And he immediately solves the problem. Since we cannot solve the social problems of society, well, there are not enough resources, strength, desire, but you can create the impression that problems are being solved in general, by solving some particular, local issues. And it always works very well as a propaganda tool, like a television picture. Boyars on the side, why did they overlook, they really won’t be impaled, although the people would warmly welcome it if the boyars were impaled or thrown to the archers to be punished. But to solve someone's private problem - yes.

A. Yezhov: As for media money, after all this story with the removal of Russia from the Olympics, the reaction of the Kremlin, it seemed to me, was rather mild. The hysteria on state channels, in talk shows, continued, but Putin himself spoke rather restrainedly, it was not a ready-made decision on participation-non-participation, or is it part of ...

V. Solovey: It seems to me that the decision was ready, everything was thought out, because it was more or less clear what was going on, the scenarios were thought out and decided to choose, firstly, the one that minimizes losses, and secondly, it was a compensator is Vladimir Vladimirovich's announcement that he is going to the polls. I think I initially assumed that he would report it a little later, but it compensated very well, this classic supplanting of unwanted news by dangerous, stronger news.

S. Kryuchkov: But there is also a parallel story, if we announce a boycott, then two subsequent Olympics are already in Putin's cadence.

V. Solovey: Sobchak does not leave federal channels precisely because she compensates Navalny

V. Solovey: Naturally. And now you can use a very moderate anti-Westernism - they are trying to shit on us with all their might, but despite this, we behave with dignity and gain victories.

A. Yezhov: Concerning anti-Westernism. The official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Maria Zakharova demonstrated new lexical heights. She accused her Western partners of wanting to "capitalize on our military achievements." It seems to me, or for a high official of the foreign policy department, by the way, you teach at MGIMO, is this a normal selection of terminology? What do you think? Or is everything in context?

V. Solovey: Since I am at MGIMO, affiliated with the Foreign Ministry, I never comment on the official statements of the Foreign Ministry. This is corporate ethics. I think that you will treat this with understanding.

S. Kryuchkov: Let's go back to the neutral flag and the Olympics in South Korea. This will take place on the eve of the presidential elections. Will it affect the internal agenda? After all, it’s a win-win, look, they broke everyone under the neutral flag - they proved that the decision was right, they lost - but everything went well under the neutral flag.

V. Solovey: I think there will be victories as usual. And we have candidates who are able to win, these victories will be brightly highlighted, they will create a very good background. Then the president will meet with the winners, treat them kindly, and reward them. And those who do not win, you can forget about them, say: "They fought with dignity, but everything was against them." Remember how the green lawn, the beautiful weather, the support of the stands are against our players, in general, everyone is against us. That’s all against the losing Olympians.

V. Solovey: The main deficit of Russia is the lack of perspective and understanding of the future

A. Yezhov: A listener from the Krasnodar Territory is interested in: “Human rights activist Lyudmila Alekseeva was given a state award - is this a new flirtation, democracy 5.0?”, As an unsubscribed listener writes. Subscribe.

V. Solovey: This is an attempt by a part of the Russian leadership to maintain a certain balance and pursue a pragmatic policy. That is, there are quite a few people who supervise internal politics, information policy, who are all these stupid cruelties, horror stories, they do not lead to anything good. That they only turn society away from power, set up negatively the intelligentsia, a significant part of which is liberal, therefore it is better to pursue a pragmatic policy, there is no need to frighten unnecessarily, to nothing, everything is in order, everything is under control. This is the position of conditionally pragmatists, realists. And there is another group that says: “No, no, guys, what about you. God forbid you give them a little slack, they will immediately come out. Do you remember how it was in 1989 - 91? Therefore, in no case. " This is the group that was traumatized in August 1991 and are still experiencing the consequences of that birth trauma for themselves. This group is very influential. Therefore, different groups adhere to different positions, but I would not say that this is a cleverly conceived game, subtly. Nothing like this. Some say: "Don't do this." Others: “No, no. We'd better do it in order to avoid it. "

A. Yezhov: As for the situation around Suleiman Kerimov, who was detained in France. How do you like this whole story? And you wrote that a similar fate could probably await other Russian officials after February.

V. Solovey: Therefore, other Russian officials will not go outside the Russian Federation to celebrate the New Year.

A. Ezhov: And to friendly countries?

V. Solovey: Friendly countries - China, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, by the way, are among these countries. The Maldives is wonderful, but you understand that you cannot have an estate in the Maldives, and you will not have vineyards there. Estates and vineyards elsewhere. For at least six months, no one will go abroad now.

A. Yezhov: That is, such a serious story?

V. Solovey: The point is not even whether it is an accident or a trend. This is fear. Really scared. If Matvienko has stated several times: "We accept you, but the Federation Council is like a possible beginning of political purges, a political witch hunt." How gracefully she phrased it. This is a mass mood. And the recommendation was repeated that gentlemen, you have to choose: you are either loyal to the countries where your families live, your relatives, where your real estate is, or you are loyal to Russia. Take your pick.

A. Yezhov: Matvienko and his delegation are going to the DPRK, I don't know.

V. Solovey: With the delegation, with the delegation.

A. Yezhov: I am not hinting at anything.

V. Solovey: Do you think there will be no extradition from the DPRK either? No, wait.

A. Yezhov: Well, maybe the poster will rip off.

V. Solovey: No, wait.

V. Solovey: In the reform of public administration, in the criterion, there is no word "democracy" at all

S. Kryuchkov: Let's talk about those who might potentially have, yes, most likely, these estates and vineyards in the West. The litigation between Rosneft and AFK Sistema will not fade away. This is ping-pong, which continues against the background of the starting election campaign, persons associated with the names of the president and the main candidate, what does it testify to? Now Rosneft again for 131 billion, then back to AFK ...

V. Solovey: What to do with AFK when they press you in the corner and want to ruin you. It is clear that Igor Ivanovich Sechin needs money, but so what, many people need money. What do you want to take away everything? Therefore, this is the only way for AFK now is to roll out a counter-risk with a huge amount in order to attract public attention. Because the PR people of AFK, I give it their due, are quite professional people, they perfectly understand that the more noise, the less the Kremlin likes it. The Kremlin said through the mouth of the president: "Well, you will come to an agreement in the end." Igor Ivanovich Sechin cannot moderate his appetites.

But the president doesn't like all these stories. He doesn't like them because they attract unwanted attention, well, Russian society may not really interest him, the West. Because it really affects the investment climate. This is how people will look: “Listen, AFK can be ruined there, this is the largest non-resource corporation in Russia, they can ruin it in your country. You call on the digital economy to develop, to invest. So you are capable of ruining any non-resource corporation, because someone wanted it. " These are all very nasty reputational stories.

A. Yezhov: Since we have already remembered Igor Ivanovich Sechin, two words about Ulyukaev. The former minister made a final speech last week. How do you expect the verdict, conditional, real, will any scheme be applied?

V. Solovey: I assumed that his article would be re-qualified so that he could get out and receive a suspended sentence. Let's see, because Igor Ivanovich Sechin was still able, despite the unfavorable course of the process, unfavorable means public. Because he was absolutely sure that the trial would be held in secret, not in the light of Jupiter and the spotlights. But he still managed to achieve a fighting draw for sure, Igor Ivanovich. Let's see, the result of the trial will be seen.

S. Kryuchkov: If this will be used as some kind of PR effect? Suppose they give the conditional "bribe-taker" a term, they introduce some mistake into the verdict, then, after the fanfare of the elections dies down, they will pass on the appeal and release them on a sly.

V. Solovey: Such a scenario is also possible, let's see. You see how Russia is arranged. Here, in fact, there is elite pluralism, the president is in the role of the referee, I am the heavyweights in the ring.

A. Ezhov: Valery Solovey, a political scientist and professor at MGIMO, was today a guest of the “Personally Yours” program. Thank you for watching and listening.

V. Solovey: Thank you.

A. Ezhov: We'll be back in a little over 10 minutes in the “Day U-turn” program. These are Stas Kryuchkov, Andrey Yezhov. Join us.

This interview with Valery Solovy - a political scientist, doctor of historical sciences, professor of MGIMO - in recent months one of the most (if not the most) accurate predictor of the reshuffle in the highest echelons of Russian power - was published on the Internet on September 24 this year.

There is a lot of information to think about here:

- The idea of ​​early presidential elections has been discussed in the political establishment of Russia since late spring of this year. The economic and social situation is getting worse and they know that it is getting worse. Because of this, it would be counterproductive to hold the presidential elections in 2018, when the situation will be much worse and the mood of the masses may turn out to be completely different. As for the fact that Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin will not go to the polls, there are some reasons, I cannot, unfortunately, disclose them, on which he may not go to the polls. There is a serious reason, it is highly plausible, but I do not know how reliable it is, we do not know for sure yet. Already in Moscow, candidates are being discussed who could replace him. And some of the surnames have been spoken, some of them create a sense of déjà vu, nevertheless they are being discussed. There are about half a dozen of them, 6–8 people.

- Can you name them?

- I can name at least one person besides the one who creates the feeling of déjà vu. This is the Tula governor Dyumin. Although to me personally, this option seems extremely unlikely. But this is if not Putin will go to the polls. If there really are early elections, and Vladimir Vladimirovich goes to them, I think it is very important that Mrs. Yarovaya headed the Duma committee on constitutional legislation. Because then the Constitution will have to be edited, and quickly.

- Why?

- If we are talking about early elections, it is necessary that the powers of the president were terminated ahead of schedule. If the president early terminates his own powers, now, according to the law, he cannot participate in the elections. This means that it is necessary to amend the law. Since Mrs. Yarovaya brilliantly managed to pass openly insane laws through the Duma, and at the same time enjoys the support of that irresistible force that breaks down all obstacles in and around the Duma, her proposed appointment as head of the Duma committee on constitutional legislation will look very eloquently.

- That is, Yarovaya is an argument in favor of the fact that it is Putin who is going to the presidential elections?

- If we are talking about early elections, when, from your point of view, are more likely? In the spring, what did you write about in one of your posts? And when in another post you wrote about the "new window of opportunity" a year later (and this is autumn), did you write about something else?

- If you hold early elections, it is reasonable to do this in the spring, while everyone is in a state of grogg after the "brilliant" results of the parliamentary elections, while the opposition is morally devastated and crushed and society is still ready by inertia to move within the framework of the electoral model that has been imposed on it. And speaking about what may happen in a year, I had in mind other circumstances: a qualitatively new dynamics may appear, but this dynamics can be laid down precisely in the spring of 2017.

And further. Judging by what I know, and here my assessments are based not on speculative guesses, but on the opinions of people who are much more knowledgeable than me, the situation in the economy is rather bad. It is worse than we think, and the economy's margin of safety may be exhausted just by the fall of next year. This is not a matter of running out of the Reserve Fund, these are other problems.

And third: the restructuring of public administration, which is now actually beginning to be carried out, does not lead to an increase in efficiency, but to disorganization. This is clearly seen in the history of the Russian Guard and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The guard does not de facto yet, it exists rather de jure, and the capacity of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has sharply decreased. If the planned personnel changes begin to be carried out at least halfway, we will see the disorganization of the entire power apparatus from top to bottom. Russia is so structured that if the bosses change, then all their subordinates begin to change. Therefore, in the fall of 2017, we can see some qualitatively new dynamics, some of its intermediate results.

- A few days ago, there was official information that more than 14 billion rubles were allocated for the presidential elections in the 2017 budget, not 2018. The authorities do not hide that it will be in 2017?

- Preparation of the budget began on the eve of the summer, and at the same time rumors began to circulate about early presidential elections, the decision on which should be made based on the results of parliamentary elections. I am not an expert on the budget process, maybe this is how it should be, that it is necessary to allocate funds in 2017 for the preparation of the 2018 elections. But it is possible that we are talking specifically about the elections in 2017. (The New Times argues that "money is not put into the budget in advance - namely, for the year when it should be spent." - Note.)

- We need to discuss the nature of your predictions. You have a humorous post on Facebook: "Friends from the administration called to congratulate. We asked to keep them informed about what is happening in the country in the future. Reluctantly promised." You seem to be talking directly about the nature of awareness. For many years, the Putin administration was famous for its absolute secrecy. Now we see the information appears. It may be strange, one-sided, but it appears. Is this change due to the fact that the government has split into groups, and they feel free enough to announce their picture of what is happening?

- In my opinion, the internal tension has grown a lot - because of the strong external pressure. By external pressure, I mean by no means only relations between Russia and the West, although this is an extremely important factor for the self-awareness and personal strategies of high-ranking representatives of the Russian elite, both political and financial and economic. Those at the top who remain sober understand perfectly well that we are moving not from victory to victory, but from bad to worse. And in a crisis, the struggle for dwindling resources is intensifying. When all this together - increasing tension, a struggle for resources - then, naturally, information begins to come out. Many people are no longer able to remain silent, they let it slip about how bad they are, how hard and joyless everything is. In addition, the information begins to be used to fight real and potential opponents, in order to prevent any personnel reshuffle, for defamation of certain people. For example, the attack on Igor Shuvalov was prompted by the fact that he was considered a likely contender for the post of prime minister. At least he considered himself so. And now, the top person of the state is very attentive to high-profile scandals, especially those related to personal immodesty. The second example is attacks on Igor Sechin. His very influential opponents (I can say that one of them claims to be prime minister) wanted to moderate the appetites of Igor Ivanovich and his corporation. Or, for example, the relatively recent information attacks on the incumbent prime minister, behind which a high-ranking official stood. Information begins to go beyond this narrow circle, circulate - and becomes available to an increasing number of people. There is nothing in what I say and write that would not be known to all those who in Moscow are professionally interested in politics. But this information must be analyzed and systematized, and its reliability evaluated.

- This information comes from different sides, it is often unverifiable.

- Therefore, I consider it a very good result for myself if I am right in 50 percent of cases. This is almost the accuracy of the weather forecast, at least in Russia. This is a brilliant indicator (laughs)! Perhaps it's just that I share my thoughts on Facebook, and someone does not. I am by no means the only one who can tell you about the future with such precision.

- You mentioned the attack on Shuvalov, Navalny wrote about Shuvalov, that is, you accused Navalny of working for ...?

- No, I think, in this case, everything is more complicated. Alexei Anatolyevich Navalny thinks like a politician - he has very serious political ambitions, and it is not unreasonable - and reasonably believes that the dissemination of such information, among other things, is in his interests. For any opposition - in Russia or in another country - chaos in the elite is beneficial. And it is especially beneficial in those countries where the opposition is virtually unable to participate in the legal political process, its electoral chances are insignificant or do not allow them to be realized. So there is nothing surprising in Navalny's informational activity.

- Let's talk about the rearrangements, which are now being carried out on a large scale. We see a long list of candidates for the reshuffle you have. By the way, you have security officials and other groups opposing them, but there is a feeling that there are many different groups inside the security officials. Do you have a sense of the integrity of what is happening or is it such a war of all against all? Is there a common logic behind the wave of personnel decisions?

- There is logic in it, which does not mean that the permutations are performed according to some orderly plan. Remember how in "War and Peace" Tolstoy describes the disposition developed by the Austrian general, and then how the troops act on their own? The logic is as follows: the higher authorities have a very distinct feeling that something needs to be done. What? She cannot compromise with the West - this would mean, from her point of view, the most serious reputational damage. It does not want to carry out institutional reforms in the economy. And so she is trying, as it seems to her, to update the public administration system in order to give dynamics to all spheres of life. As Karamzin wrote in his time, Russia does not need a constitution, Russia needs 50 smart and honest governors. This means that we will find smart and honest civil servants, including governors. Where to get the staff from? It is clear that the staff is drawn from the places where people who are very trusted. And this, if we talk about the security forces, strengthens not so much the FSB as the Federal Security Service and the Presidential Security Service, which have a rather serious conflict with the Federal Security Service. And the FSB is very much afraid that the new head of the service may come from a rival department. The same is now feared in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Moreover, now in all those law enforcement agencies that have their own security services, including the Prosecutor's Office, the Investigative Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, they will be headed and staffed by people from the FSB, which also means tension within the power corporation. Where it leads? Certainly not to increase the efficiency of the apparatus. This already leads to his disorganization, to the fact that established communications are being broken. What quality they were is another matter, but they were, they worked. These communications are torn, new ones are not being built, because it takes time to build them. Nervousness is growing, everyone looks at each other with distrust, if not with hatred. So the general logic is the logic of the preservation and survival of power and in power, nothing more. This is not logic aimed at carrying out what we might call modernization, economic and political reforms.

- If you look at your list of predictions: Medvedev is "up", a silovik for prime minister, Kudrin is "crossed out", Volodin for the Duma, Naryshkin for the SVR and so on, can we say that the logic of these appointments is based on the fact that in 2017 Will Medvedev replace Putin?

- (Laughs) And this is also possible. Remember what it was like in 2007 - before handing over the presidential farm to a replacement, Vladimir Vladimirovich placed in key positions - deputy ministers and the like - people from the corporation to which he professionally belonged. So you can describe it that way. You see, we are not even dealing with facts yet, we are discussing mainly assumptions. From these assumptions, we can build any concept we want, the most sophisticated conspiracy theories, but there is no guarantee that it will be correct. This can be perceived both as the creation of a safety net in case a new presidential candidate from the authorities appears, and simply as an increase in the efficiency of the apparatus, an increase in loyalty, an attempt to dynamize the apparatus, what young people call "movement." Some kind of "movement" will appear, and lazy fat cats will begin to catch mice.

- The current elections, you write, have shown that the opposition has failed and cannot come to power by legal means, but it has "other ways." In addition, surprisingly, after these elections, we see in the public field the dissatisfied statements of pro-Putin-minded people, they are dissatisfied with the way the elections were held. There is a feeling that there are dissatisfied with the elections at all levels. Does this create a revolutionary situation?

- It does not create a revolutionary situation, it simply expresses the growing misunderstanding, irritation and confusion in all strata of society, from top to bottom. Nobody understands where we are going. Russia now very much resembles a ship without rudders and sails. What are our goals, what is the strategy, what we are trying to achieve - it is not clear. The overwhelming majority of people have a persistent sense of deterioration, which is already very serious, and for a long time, they do not see prospects. It is enough to read the official forecasts of government departments, and it becomes clear: they expect that the crisis, the recession will last at least another three to four years. And people in horror think: how are we going to live? Our real incomes go down every year! This has not yet resulted in any radical political and social behavior. Well, we see separate flashes - an attempt to march tractor drivers to Moscow.

- Farmers meet with Putin.

- And this is a very correct step from the point of view of the authorities. This should have been done earlier, not to disperse them, not to hinder them, but to ensure that they would meet, if not with Putin, then with someone else, in order to calm them down. Another thing is that these specific ones can be reassured, but there is no money in the country to flood all such problems with them all the time. Therefore, discontent will grow. It is now very similar to smoldering peat: everything seems to be all right, everything has adapted, but this is not so. This is not what it seems. There is a not very visible, but serious change in public consciousness. And sociologists know this, they record these changes. They anticipate that the changes will be of a qualitative nature. But no one can give an answer to the question of when these changes will result in new social behavior and what this social behavior will be. The only time-based predictions I have seen from sociologists indicated that 2017 will see a turning point in mass consciousness. But this does not mean that this will be a turning point in political and social behavior. We discussed that there are tensions and conflicts in the elite, but these conflicts can become a split only if the elite feels massive pressure from below. As soon as we see that riots and social protests are engulfing several regions of Russia - simultaneously or sequentially, it does not matter - we will immediately notice that the elite has some kind of independent political position, different from the position of the supreme power. This is the normal logic of all political changes in the world, if you do not take such extreme forms as a military mutiny and a coup d'état, which in Russia will not reach. In our country, changes will take place according to the classic scenario, if they happen.

- And what is this classic scenario?

- The classic scenario is very simple. Unexpectedly for everyone - and this always happens unexpectedly - the social degree in society rises, protest actions begin - most likely, first in the provinces, in industrial regions, because in Moscow everything is cemented, the opposition is openly afraid, and it has reasons afraid. Unrest breaks out, and the people who will take to the streets - workers, tractor drivers, drivers, combine operators - cannot be accused of being a "fifth column" supporting the State Department's money. After that - political speeches in large cities, primarily in the capitals, in Moscow and St. Petersburg. At the same time, the hesitation of the elite, which begins to think about how to lend a hand to the people. And then it turns out that some groups of the elite have always been with the people, have always been democrats, have always wanted change and fought to keep things from getting worse. This is a classic scenario.

- When you talked about the scenario that not Putin, but Medvedev goes to the elections, did you mean that the highest authorities in Russia understand the situation exactly as you describe it and are preparing to somehow prevent it? Did you mean that these are some personal decisions of Vladimir Putin?

- Yes, it has a slightly different motivation. But the factor I'm talking about is always taken into account. The authorities are very interested in the mood of the masses, they are afraid of mass demonstrations, they learned from the experience of late 2011 - early 2012, when these performances began unexpectedly for everyone, like the devil from a snuffbox. And there is one more important circumstance: in order to keep the economy afloat in Russia, let alone to ensure at least some minimal development, it is critically important to lift the sanctions regime or at least seriously weaken it. But the government that is in Russia now cannot agree on this with the West, which is well known to everyone in Russia and in the West. Accordingly, another government is needed, formally different, which could take the initiative to defuse tensions in Russian-American relations, which now, judging by the events in Syria, are moving towards a very dangerous line. Someone must unblock the situation, or we will move along the path of further escalation, if not military, then verbal, political and strategic, and this will simply undermine our economy. Russia is not strong enough to allow itself to compete with the West in the economy and in the military-strategic sphere.

- Tell us about your new book and about the revolution. How does your book relate to the situation in Russia?

- My book is called "Revolution! Fundamentals of the Revolutionary Struggle in the Modern Era" and in terms of genre has a historical and sociological character, not historical. I write about revolutions in general. But I am primarily interested in the experience of the so-called "color" revolutions that have taken place over the past ten years, and I am especially interested in the post-Soviet space. I also interpret the Russian experience of 2011–12 as an attempt at a revolution, which the authorities successfully stopped, in contrast to the revolutions in Ukraine and some other post-Soviet and not only post-Soviet countries. I pose the question of whether a revolution can be predicted at all. Based on what I know, and what everyone who has studied revolutions writes, no revolution was predicted anywhere and by anyone, all revolutions always began unexpectedly. I analyze, like any person who is interested in Russian politics and history, the risk factors that exist in Russia now. I believe that we do not fully understand what the main risk factor is.

- In what?

- It consists in the fact that in 2014 Russia itself began a new dynamic. Everything connected with Ukraine, with Crimea, was the beginning of a new dynamic. By the end of 2013, the situation in Russia was completely cemented. However, very often crises begin not due to external and internal pressure, but due to the actions of the authorities themselves. A power that has no challenges loses its sense of self-preservation. What started in 2014 happened in the realm of geopolitics, but the system is designed in such a way that if you start to dynamize one part of it, you inevitably turn on dynamics for other parts of the system. And this is also a classic of the changes taking place in the world. The Soviet Union did not collapse because the West won, it collapsed because of the dynamics that began in the Soviet Union itself. If we look at world history, we will see that reforms or military expansion began in certain countries in order to strengthen the regime, give it a new breath, and all ended with the fact that the regime was destroyed. But we'll only see it when and if it starts to unfold. Moreover, the beginning of political changes can occur so quickly that we, say, went to bed in one country, and wake up in a completely different one.

- We were taught that there is a certain driving force of the revolution: the working class, or not the working class, but there must be some class. Who could this be? These tractor drivers, miners? Who are these people?

- The peculiarity of modern revolutions is that they do not have a hegemonic class, there is not even a political hegemon. Situational protest coalitions are emerging in them, and thanks to social networks, the Internet - why the authorities are so afraid of social networks and the Internet - these coalitions are emerging rapidly. If you look at the Egyptian "lotus" revolution, you will see that Westernized students who demanded democratization and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood stood side by side in Tahrir Square. Or what we saw on the Kiev Maidan. Situational protest coalitions are emerging very quickly, because between these political and ideological clusters, if not cooperation, then communication on the Internet and social networks has already been established. Studies of the Russian social blogosphere have shown a very interesting thing: we have political and ideological clusters that seem to be opposite - nationalists, liberals, leftists - unlike other countries, they intensively communicate and cooperate. They don't close in their own ghettos. That is, the cultural and communication basis for such a protest coalition already exists. It is just necessary that several circumstances come together, and we will see this coalition, it will emerge very quickly. Moreover, a coalition of this kind always acts under the slogan "We want justice." The coalition members put their own content into this concept, but they have the same slogan: "Justice!" And their second slogan: "The government is unfair, so it must be overthrown or changed." That is the whole ideology of the revolution. This is exactly what has happened in the last 15–20 years. No party of a new or new type, no advanced class is simply needed.

- There is an important amendment here. In 2014, after Crimea, Russian nationalists moved to another trench, and the breastwork of the trenches is so high that it is difficult to imagine that they will again unite with the liberals in the fight against the regime of Vladimir Putin. Do you insist that there can be nationalists, liberals, democrats in the new coalition?

- Both the leftists, environmentalists, and animal advocates ... The issue of Crimea, the issue of Ukraine is tertiary now for Russian political discourse. They are not on the top-priority agenda of Russian society. You can turn Crimea into an insurmountable obstacle, or you can leave it out of the parenthesis by saying: we have more important problems, and when we solve the important problems, we will deal with the rest. What PARNAS did by including the nationalist Maltsev indicates that such a coalition can work. Was there really a question about Crimea in the parliamentary campaign? No. Was there a question about the attitude to the war in Ukraine, to the Donbass? Nothing like this. Society is no longer interested in this. He has other problems, and these problems are described in one word - justice. Russian society is sorely lacking in justice. It is not enough, for example, for those who are engaged in business, they believe that they are unjustly offended, they are under strong administrative, fiscal and illegal pressure. Any group about itself can say that it is unfairly offended. Crimea and Ukraine do not have and will not have any significance for the Russian political agenda in the future.

- For a successful revolution, in addition to performances from below, there must be a part of the elite ready to go over to the side of the speakers. You say that Kudrin has been "erased", but the economic bloc of the government is still in the hands of the liberals. That is, the notorious "systemic liberals" do not have political weight, but, perhaps, they are betting on Medvedev's promotion - this is all such idle reasoning. It cannot be that all these leaks that have appeared that we are talking about are just an attempt by some part of the elite to let it know somewhere outside that, in principle, there is someone in the elite who is ready at some point support something?

- No, it would be too strategically difficult for them. They think exclusively in group categories, although they may have some kind of implicit ideology. But this implicit ideology - systemic liberals, security officials - will become apparent in a situation of increasing social suppression. The elite split when it sees pressure from below and performs an operation of rational choice: why should I drown with the regime if I can reach out to the rebellious people (let's call it that)? And immediately the competition will begin for who will be the first to lend a hand! Which group of the elite will turn out to be lucky is difficult to say, it depends on the circumstances. But I can say that no one will particularly resist. One should not exaggerate the ability of the ruling elite of Russia and the regime in general to resist. He tries to give the impression of being very tough, brutal, ready for anything, and successfully produces. However, our power is not a granite rock, not a monolith, it is spongy Swiss cheese. She simply has not yet faced serious pressure from below, even with not very serious pressure from below, she has not yet faced. As soon as it collides, we will see how the cheese begins to crumble.

- At one time you described yourself as a "nationalist in the best sense of the word", a liberal and a democrat. There are people in power who communicate with you, and we can assume that usually people communicate with those who are close to them in some sense. If we imagine that some part of the elite will support actions from below, who will it be - nationalists in the best sense, liberals, democrats, and someone else?

- I think that, most likely, it will be technocrats. There is a considerable technocratic stratum in power in Russia. He is not very noticeable, because these people do not shine, they prefer not to be public, but they are very influential. As a rule, these are people with the rank of deputy ministers. And some ministers too. These are people who understand that the problems facing the country must be solved proceeding not from ideologies, but from common sense and economic logic. In Russia, it is necessary to ensure economic development, it is necessary to restore social subsystems. This is not about reforming health care and education, but about restoring their normal activities. It is necessary to restore the effectiveness of the administrative apparatus. And we need to create a working legal system. These are large-scale, but technocratic tasks, they do not imply any ideological background. We are not saying that we want to change the form of ownership, that we want to return revolutionary expediency and proletarian legality to the place of a formally working judicial system. In Russia there are some shells of institutions, they need to be filled with working content. Even in the event of the most ambitious changes, this is not a social revolution. What happened in 1917 will not happen. There will be no large-scale redistribution of property, no civil war. The energy potential in society is too low for it to go to some kind of war. We will have to deal with the problems of survival and development, acting outside ideological paradigms. As for the ideology of protest, any appeal to society from the part of the protest coalition will be populist. There is no need to be afraid of this, this is the norm in all countries where such changes have begun.

- And this hypothetical person - a successor who will be formulated within the government, or a person brought by this group of pressure from below - the elite of technocrats should accept him, and he will be their ideological cover?

https: //www.site/2016-03-25/politolog_valeriy_solovey_my_pered_ochen_sereznymi_politicheskimi_peremenami

"After the elections, serious restrictions on the exit of citizens from the country will be introduced"

Political scientist Valery Solovey: we are facing very serious political changes

Historian, political analyst, publicist Valery Solovey has published a new book - “Absolute Weapon. Fundamentals of Psychological Warfare and Media Manipulation ”. Why are Russians so easily amenable to propaganda processing and how can they be “decoded”? How, proceeding from this, will the internal political processes develop in the near future? What is the most likely outcome of the election? Will our connections with the outside world change?

"In the manipulation of consciousness, Western democracies, the Nazis and the Soviets followed the same path."

- Valery Dmitrievich, readers are wondering why you wrote another book on a question that has already been considered by dozens of other authors? For example, at one time the book by Sergey Kara-Murza "Manipulation of Consciousness" was popular. What mistakes and shortcomings do you see in it?

- In Russia there is not a single worthy book that would talk about propaganda and media manipulation. Not a single one - I will emphasize! The famous book by Kara-Murza became so popular only because it was the first in Russia on this topic. But in terms of its methodological basis and content, it is frankly mediocre. Further, my book, for the first time in literature, connects cognitive psychology with long-known stories about methods, techniques and techniques of propaganda. So far, there has been no such analysis and generalization in the literature on this topic. Meanwhile, cognitive psychology is extremely important because it explains why people are susceptible to propaganda and why propaganda is inevitable. As long as there is humanity, there will be propaganda. And, finally, I must say that I covered the topic of propaganda using actual examples that are well understood by readers. The result was a book that was even noted by the leaders of the Russian propaganda machine. As my friends told me, they said about her: "The only worthwhile book in Russian on this topic." True, they also added: "But it would be better if such a book did not come out at all." I think this is a very high mark. In addition, the first print run was sold out in three weeks. Now the second is coming out. Here is my answer to why I wrote this book.

Valery Solovey: “The first thing they pay attention to is hair. If a person is bald - by the eyes. A man needs to take care that he has good teeth and shoes. " from the personal archive of Valery Solovy

- You once said that the concept of the "Overton Window" that came from the West, revealing the secret mechanisms of undermining social norms, is nothing more than a pseudo-theory. Why?

“The Overton Window is a propaganda myth. And this concept itself is conspiracy in nature: they say, there is a group of people who are planning a strategy designed for decades to corrupt society. Never and nowhere in history has anything like this been and cannot be due to the imperfection of human nature. I suggest a person who adheres to the concept of "Overton Window" to plan his life for at least a month and live so according to his plan. Let's see what happens. A love of this kind of conspiracy is characteristic of those who are not able to control even their own lives, let alone to control anything at all.

“In our country, the Overton Window is remembered when moral problems are pointed out. Patriarch Kirill said so: "For homosexuality, pedophilia will be legalized."

- All changes in the history of mankind occur spontaneously. This does not mean that there is certainly some kind of conspiracy behind them and the legalization of homosexual marriages in some European countries will certainly lead to the legalization of pedophilia. In addition, in one case, we are talking about adults who do something voluntarily, and in the other about minors who have parents, and the legalization of pedophilia is possible only through violation of human rights and violence. Therefore, yes, what was anti-norm 100-200 years ago is suddenly becoming acceptable today. But this is a natural process, there is no need to see here the "furry paw of the Antichrist" who came to this world to arrange Armageddon through homosexual marriages or something else.

At the same time, I want to say that in the same way, in a natural way, a reaction can also occur. I do not at all exclude the possibility that European society may swing back to conservative values. And not because somewhere there will be a group of conspirators or agents of the Kremlin in Europe, but simply society will decide that enough is enough, played enough, it is necessary to think about self-preservation.

"The leaders of the Russian propaganda machine said:" The only worthwhile book in Russian on this topic. But it would be better if it did not come out "" pycode.ru

- Speaking about the manipulations of consciousness in our country, from what historical period can we count them? Since the time of the Bolsheviks or even earlier?

- If we talk about manipulation in general, then from the moment people learned to speak. But if we are talking about mass manipulation, then from the moment the channels of mass communication appeared. The emergence of the mass media can be considered the starting point of mass deception. These are, of course, newspapers, radio, television. And in this sense, all more or less developed countries followed the same path, that the Western democracies - the United States, Great Britain and so on, that Nazi Germany, that Soviet Russia. The propaganda takes place in all countries without exception.

Another thing is the quality of propaganda, sophistication, and the presence of pluralism. In the same USA, there are media holdings owned by various independent owners. Therefore, different propaganda campaigns balance each other and during electoral "marathons" citizens have freedom of choice. Well, or the illusion of freedom of choice. That is, where there is pluralism, propaganda is always more subtle and sophisticated.

- In one of your interviews you said that the BBC is one of the most objective English-speaking TV companies. Do you still think so?

- This company confirms this reputation with its many years of work. All broadcasters allow punctures, they are all addicted in one way or another, but the BBC suffers from this least of all.

"Russia has managed to create the best propaganda machine"

- And our propaganda is more kondovaya and dumb?

- I would not say that. Russia has managed to create, of course, the best propaganda machine. But it is focused exclusively on its own population, since outward propaganda was not very successful. At least in the European area. Very professional people are engaged in our propaganda. These people, in particular, learned a lesson from the information failure of the summer of 2008. Remember the war for South Ossetia, which Russia won militarily, but, according to everyone's opinion, lost in information and propaganda? Since 2014, we have seen that the propaganda mistakes of 2008 are gone.

But we must understand that any propaganda has its limits. Russian propaganda hit its limits at the turn of 2015-16. And you and I will gradually observe its extinction. Or, as they often say today, the refrigerator will gradually start to beat the TV. I think that at the turn of 2016-17, her strength will be seriously weakened.

- Today's diligent resuscitation of the Stalin cult, for example, raises doubts ...

- There is no need to fight this. This will collapse on its own as soon as the regime weakens. Stalin in the current realities is nothing more than a propaganda symbol that has no real content and materializing power under it. Those who call for the return of Stalin in our country believe that he should return only for their neighbors, but not for themselves. When it comes to selfish interests, none of these Stalinist screamers is ready to sacrifice anything. So the cult of Stalin is a fiction. It's just that the authorities are exploiting the era of Stalin in order to legitimize some of their measures of a repressive nature. But not more. There is a rule of complex social systems. It says that a return to the past, no matter who wants it, is impossible.

RIA Novosti / Evgeny Biyatov

- But to Stalin, as if enchanted, with flowers go "both old and young." Can you tell us about the methods of decoding personal and social consciousness?

- Use common sense, judge people by their deeds, read more, either don't watch TV at all, or no more than 20 minutes a day. If you are encouraged to vote for a party that promised something 5-10 years ago and has not done anything by the current date, in no case do not vote for it. Actions speak for themselves.

- And then, in the future, is it necessary to luster the propaganda media outlets? What are they doing - crimes? Are they obligated to be held accountable?

- It is known that the Nuremberg trials equated propaganda with a crime against humanity. Therefore, in a sense, this question can be answered in the affirmative. As for lustration, I do not exclude it, but it is too early to say who it will affect.

"The masses will come out, but this will not lead to a civil war and the collapse of the state"

- This year, for the first time in a long time, elections for half of the State Duma will be held in single-mandate constituencies. Can we expect that the pre-election campaign will become more diverse, and that new faces will come to the Duma, revive it, and make it a "place for discussion"?

- Despite the fact that the single-mandate constituencies were returned, I think that the most dangerous for the safety of the regime will simply not be admitted to the elections. Even at the registration stage, candidates pass through a "sieve" that allows us to weed out those disloyal to the regime. And even if some of the unwanted are allowed to the elections, they will experience the most severe pressure and generally regret having gone. At the elections, they will create the impression of competition, but not competition itself, everyone will have the same message, just the style is different. Therefore, the Duma itself, as a whole, will retain its decorative character.

RIA Novosti / Alexander Utkin

- Do you see in the country, in principle, any real opposition to the regime, capable of leading the people?

- In Russia there is the opposition, which the regime allows to exist. Because any real opposition to them is destroyed in the literal and figurative sense. But the regime is afraid of even a weak opposition.

- In this case, the reader asks, how do you, a specialist in media manipulation, assess the chances of Putin's leadership to formalize and legitimize in the eyes of the population the transformation of Russia into a semi-closed, anti-democratic autocracy similar to the countries of Central Asia?

- Indeed, today the ruling group in Russia is preoccupied with the question of how to maintain its dominance until 2035-40. At least I have heard arguments on this score from people close to the so-called "elite". But I believe that in the next couple of years we will see the limit of this regime's capabilities. I agree that its representatives will try to legitimize their power. But, one way or another, they will soon run out of opportunities for this.

- What about “physical” events like border closings?

- After the elections to the State Duma this year, serious restrictions on the exit of Russian citizens from the country will most likely be introduced.

- Do you mean the law on exit visas?

- No, it's unlikely. Unspoken recommendations will be given to officials of all levels and their families not to leave the territory of the country. And if the officials are so seriously infringed, they will not tolerate any part of society in the country to remain free. In Russia, if serfdom is introduced, this applies to all estates. This is a historical tradition. According to my information, a tourist tax will be introduced, which for many categories of citizens will cut off the opportunity to travel abroad.

fastpic.ru

- Will this not become a factor that, on the contrary, will bring the collapse of the regime closer? After all, this step will affect not only "kraakl", but also ordinary people, who previously allowed themselves for relatively little money to relax in decent hotels in Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Tunisia and so on.

- You are right, regimes do not collapse because of the undermining by the opposition and external enemies. They collapse due to the stupidity of the managers. And sooner or later these nonsense begin to acquire a malignant character. If you look at the history of the fallen regimes, you get the impression that those who ruled them, as if they were deliberately leading things to collapse. In general, with regard to any political processes in Russia, there is an axiom that the dynamics of the masses is unpredictable. And you can never know ahead of time what seemingly insignificant things can lead to major political shifts.

- One more reader's question is pertinent here: “What scenario is the most possible in Russia? First, Shoigu (or another conservative) becomes president, punitive and protective measures are tightened, that is, the transition to the USSR No. 2. The second is the "Libyan scenario." The third is the Rose Revolution scenario. The fourth is a peaceful evolution towards European democracy. Or fifth, the disintegration of the Russian Federation into many small states as a consequence of the current colonial pseudo-federal system? "

- What I definitely do not expect is the disintegration of Russia. When they say this to me, I clearly understand that this is pure trade in fear. I believe that Russia is facing very serious political changes. They will occur in the not too distant medium term and will change our political landscape beyond recognition. These changes will be predominantly peaceful. And then we will move not very clearly where. It will depend on the outcome of the change.

- In the early 1990s, the masses also quite peacefully took to the streets and declared: "You can't live like that anymore."

- Yes, they will come out. And not for political reasons, but for socio-economic reasons. I think that this is very likely, especially in large cities. But this will not lead to a civil war or to the disintegration of the state. I do not believe in this.

RIA Novosti / Alexey Danichev

“But when a protest is peaceful, it is easy to suppress it. No wonder a person asks you a question about Shoigu and the tightening of punitive and protective measures.

- The power is constantly moving in this direction, but one should not exaggerate the loyalty of the repressive apparatus. She is not at all what it might seem. In a critical situation, they simply may not follow the order and move away.

- Not the disintegration of the country, but the decay of some regions, for example the North Caucasian ones - is this possible?

- I don't think these republics want to leave Russia. In fact, they feel good in it. Where should they go? Without her, they would not survive at all. Therefore, they will bargain, trying to impose their terms. But as a result of political changes, I think Moscow's policy towards these republics will become more balanced and meaningful. Personally, I don’t think that paying huge sums of money for political loyalty is the right thing to do. It corrupts. Yes, and already corrupted.

"Our politicians use neo-Eurasianism and religion as long as it suits them"

- And do we still have sane nationalist, or rather national-democratic forces after the Ukrainian events?

- As for organized nationalism, it drags out a miserable existence. He is not allowed to raise his head, many leaders, like Belov, are behind bars. Others, like Demushkin, understand that as soon as they show activity, they will go after Belov. But as for nationalism in general as a kind of public mood, it certainly exists. And these sentiments will soon be in demand politically.

- Are you going to revive your National Democratic Party "New Force" when the times are more favorable for public politics?

- It is frozen due to the fact that we were threatened with reprisals. But in general, I believe that both today and in the future, the party format is futile. I think that other formats will be in demand.

RIA Novosti / Yuri Ivanov

- What are the prospects for the coming to power of members of the "Committee on January 25" Igor Strelkov and other "Novorossovtsy"?

- There are different people in this organization: nationalists, Soviet "imperials", and Orthodox monarchists. I do not see that this organization has any prospects. But some, some of its leaders, do. And I do not exclude that 2-3 of them will be able to play their role in the upcoming political changes, which we talked about above.

- In general, do the Russians have a chance to organize themselves like Israel or Japan, that is, to create a national state? This is a question from one of our readers.

- Of course, there is such a chance, since the Russians feel that they are one people. Precisely Russians, not Russians. So Russia is in fact, in fact, a nation state, all that remains is to formalize the superstructure - laws - in accordance with this reality and change the policy so that it coincides with the interests of the national majority.

- Do you think that Russians have a national identity these days?

- Yes, it is, it manifests itself in everyday life. It's just that Russians are afraid to talk about it out loud. At least two-thirds of Russians feel their national consciousness. Just do not confuse real Russians and "literary" ones - national costumes, cuisine, instruments, something else. It's just a splint. The nation state is a modern state, not archaism.

“Moscow's policy towards these republics will become more balanced. Paying huge sums of money for political loyalty is wrong " RIA Novosti / Said Tsarnaev

- The overwhelming majority of today's "Russian nationalists" are Orthodox activists and are convinced that the Russian national state must stand on the foundation of Orthodoxy, without it there is nothing. Personally, this format of a nation-state is unpleasant to me. A multinational and cosmopolitan society is better, but secular and with freedom of worldview, including religious, choice.

- Your remark is appropriate. But, firstly, if you are afraid, then it is better not to do anything at all, not even leave the house. There is always a risk when you do something. And, secondly, the results of this process will depend on those who are at the head of it. Because there is a general sociological pattern: those at the bottom copy those at the top. And if the elite sets itself clear goals that are understandable and beneficial to the national majority, nothing terrible will happen.

Let's say you say: we want to provide the national majority with affordable housing in order to reverse the demographic situation. The lower classes answer: “Great! We want! " This is the nation state. But if someone, instead of clear and understandable goals, uses myths like “Stalinism” and says that it is in it that the primordially Russian character and style of behavior of those in power are concentrated, then this is no longer a national state. This is completely different.

- Is “neo-Eurasianism” that dominates the semi-official ideology of the ruling group seriously? What do you think - do they really believe in it or use it, like the notorious "Stalinism"?

- To believe or not to believe - such a question in politics is not worth it. They find it convenient for themselves. This provides some kind of ideological rationale for what they are doing. They use it as long as it suits them. And religion, by the way, too. And if suddenly the weather vane of public sentiment swings in the other direction, they will become Russian nationalists or even Muslims. Therefore, you should not focus too much on this issue.

"Russia made no effort to keep Ukraine in the orbit of its influence"

- Since we mentioned neo-Eurasianism, we will end our conversation with a series of questions about Ukraine: it is, perhaps, the main victim of the ideology of “neo-Eurasianism”, or the “Russian world”.

One of our readers recalls that Brzezinski is credited with the statement: "Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, with Ukraine, Russia automatically turns into an empire." That is, I would like to know your opinion: is the "furry paw of American imperialism" visible in the rupture of relations between Russia and Ukraine?

- I believe that the separation of Russia and Ukraine was a natural process. It began not two years ago, but back in the early 1990s. And even then, many analysts said that Ukraine would inevitably drift towards the West. Moreover, Russia did not make any special efforts to keep Ukraine in the orbit of its influence. Or, at least, she was making the wrong effort. I do not mean the supply of gas at reduced prices, but cultural and intellectual leverage. They weren't used and nobody gave a damn about that. So, I repeat, this is a completely natural process.

And after the annexation of Crimea to Russia, the war in Donbass, the point of no return has been passed. Now Ukraine will definitely never be a fraternal state with Russia. At the same time, I do not think that the West will accept Ukraine either. Most likely, she will drag out a poor existence. But this does not mean that she will come to bow to Moscow. Anti-Moscow and anti-Russian sentiments will henceforth be the cornerstone for the formation of the national identity of Ukrainians. Here the question can be closed.

RIA Novosti / Andrey Stenin

- So Russia will never be an empire again?

- Well, this was understandable even in the 1990s, and not only in connection with Brzezinski's geopolitical views. And now we are at the point of post-Soviet existence. Rather, we are stuck there and are not developing anywhere. True, this inertia has already exhausted itself. Therefore, political changes are inevitable.

- Is there an opportunity in the future to compromise the "Crimean issue" in order to get rid of the sanctions?

- I think there is a chance to freeze this problem and ensure de facto recognition of Crimea. As for the Crimean Tatars, there are not very many of them. And they can be offered such a formula, based on which they would understand that it is better to live in peace. If they understand that there is no other alternative for them, then they will make peace. This is quite enough. De jure, the recognition of Crimea as Russian territory depends on the position of Ukraine. If we talk about the sanctions against Russia, that is, those that were introduced for the Crimea, and there are those for the Donbass. And these are different sanctions. And the sanctions for Crimea are far from the most sensitive.

- What, in your opinion, awaits Ukraine in general and Donbass in particular?

- The fate of Ukraine depends on the quality of its elite. If there appears an elite capable of leading the country onto new rails of development, then everything will be fine. I don't think it will break up or become a federation. But, one way or another, he will remain "the sick man of Europe."

The fate of Donbass is dire. In any situation, it is doomed to be a kind of "black hole" on the geopolitical map. Most likely, it will turn out to be a conciliated territory, but de facto neither within Ukraine, nor within Russia. It will be a region where crime, corruption, economic decline will reign - a kind of European Somalia. There is no point in modernizing something, because Donbass is not particularly needed by anyone. For Ukraine and for Russia it is a stone on their feet. But people get used to everything. I have friends and relatives who live there, have already adapted to this lifestyle and do not want to leave there.

RIA Novosti / Dan Levy

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Valery Solovey was born in 1960. After graduating from the Faculty of History of Moscow State University, he worked at the Academy of Sciences, the Gorbachev Foundation. Completed an internship at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Doctor of Historical Sciences (the topic of the dissertation is "The Russian Question" and its influence on the domestic and foreign policy of Russia "). At present, he is a professor at MGIMO, head of the department of public relations, the author of a course of lectures on manipulating public consciousness.