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III.6.2.4. Directory (Ukrainian People's Republic)- ⇑ III.6.2. Ukraine (from 11/14/1918 in Bila Tserkva, from 12/14/1918 in Kyiv, from February 1919 in Vinnitsa, from July 1919 in Kamenets Podolsky, in December 1919 and May June 1920 in Kyiv). Vladimir Kirillovich Vinnichenko (Chairman of the Directory 11/14/1918 ... ... Rulers of the World

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• Non-Soviet Ukrainization. The authorities of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania and the "Ukrainian question", Borisenok Elena Yurievna. After the collapse of the Romanov and Habsburg empires, the Ukrainian movement made an attempt to create its own national state. On the map of revolutionary Europe, the Ukrainian People's...
• Non-Soviet Ukrainization of the power of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania and the Ukrainian question in the interwar period, Borisenok E. After the collapse of the Romanov and Habsburg empires, the Ukrainian movement attempted to create its own national state. On the map of revolutionary Europe, the Ukrainian People's...
• Non-Soviet Ukrainization: The Authorities of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania and the "Ukrainian Question" in the Interwar Period, Elena Borisyonok. After the collapse of the Romanov and Habsburg empires, the Ukrainian movement made an attempt to create its own national state. On the map of revolutionary Europe, the Ukrainian People's... eBook

Mikhail Grushevsky, depicted on the Ukrainian fifty-hryvnia banknote, is the closest to us in terms of time among all domestic figures who “got on the money”. And his biography and contribution to the development of the Ukrainian state are known perhaps better than others. However, here the reader can expect certain surprises.

The fact is that Mikhail Hrushevsky, now proclaimed from all the high stands and memorial plaques as the "first President of Ukraine", in fact, never was!
And this is not the only paradox associated with the personality of Grushevsky.
But let's start in order.

The future “first president” and chairman of the Ukrainian Central Rada was born on September 17 (29), 1866 in the town of Kholm, Lublin province of the Russian Empire (now the city of Chelm, Poland) in the family of a gymnasium teacher. His father, Sergei Fedorovich Grushevsky, was the author of a textbook of the Church Slavonic language accepted by the Ministry of Education and repeatedly republished in Russia. The copyright for this textbook brought the family, and later Mikhail Grushevsky himself, a stable income that allowed him to focus on his own historical research.

Shortly after the birth of Mikhail, the family moved to the Caucasus, where he spent his childhood and adolescence in Stavropol, Vladikavkaz and Tiflis. After graduating from the Tiflis gymnasium in 1885, he entered the Faculty of History and Philology of the Kyiv University of St. Vladimir, where he studied with Professor Vladimir Antonovich. Under his leadership, he prepared works on southern Russian castles in the first half of the 16th century. and "History of the Kyiv land from the death of Yaroslav to the end of the XIV century", which was awarded a gold medal.

After Grushevsky defended his master's thesis in 1894, Professor Antonovich recommended that the Lviv University take the newly minted master instead of himself for the position of professor in the newly created department of history.

The fact that Mikhail Grushevsky, a subject of the Russian Emperor, moved to Lvov in 1894, which was then under the rule of Austria-Hungary, and received a high professorship there, subsequently gave rise to a lot of rumors. Allegedly insidious Austrians even then, twenty years before the start of the First World War, decided to put a "mine" under the national "unity" of the Russian Empire, and for this ... they came up with Ukrainians. As the Kyiv Governor-General Dragomirov used to say: "Only dumplings, borscht and varenukha are Ukrainian, everything else was invented by Austria!"

And now the vile Austrians urgently needed someone who would compose a story for these "fictitious" Ukrainians in order to present them as a separate people. And the role of this "evil genius" was chosen by 28-year-old Russian citizen Mikhail Grushevsky.

But then a completely logical question arises: how can one, even if very talented, young scientist independently invent and compose the history of an entire nation? Moreover, besides, as stated, a fictitious people that never existed before?

In response to this question, the “sworn lovers” of Hrushevsky and everything Ukrainian retort that, you see, he was not alone, that the Austrian General Staff helped him in this!

Strange logic. It would seem that what prevented the Russian General Staff, in turn, from trying in the same way to undermine the no less “national-monolithic” Austria-Hungary from within? And to do something similar in relation to the Ukrainian subjects of Emperor Franz Joseph? You look, they would have created a department of the history of Ukraine at the Kiev University, and the age-old foundations of the “Danubian Empire” would immediately stagger. And the “Austrian-subjects” Ukrainians would simply reach out in shoals under the paternal hand of the sovereign Nikolai Alexandrovich. But it was not there…

It is clear that this whole legend about the insidious Austrians was invented in Russia already retroactively in order to justify the policy of denying Ukrainians the right to any national and cultural identity. And also to hide the fact that in “somewhere” Austria-Hungary, the Slavic peoples, in particular the Ukrainians, enjoyed much broader rights and even had national representation in the Vienna Parliament. Still, the then Austria-Hungary, unlike Russia, was not an absolute, but a constitutional monarchy.

However, the facts stubbornly show that official Vienna also did not really recognize Ukrainians as a full-fledged nation. So the Austrian Minister Gauch completely denied the significance of science behind Ukrainian history. Therefore, at Lviv University, a department was opened not at all Ukrainian, as is commonly believed, but general history with a special review of the history of Eastern Europe. It was precisely at this department that Mikhail Grushevsky took the professorial position.

Be that as it may, while giving an annual course of lectures at Lviv University, Mikhail Grushevsky simultaneously decided to create a generalizing History of Ukraine-Rus that had not been written by anyone before him. He developed an innovative scheme for the historical development of the Ukrainian people, which is still a bone in the throat of official Russian historians, depriving Russia of the coveted monopoly on the right to be called the successor of Kievan Rus.

The scheme of Ukrainian history proposed by Hrushevsky was as follows:

1) Ukrainians as a separate people (albeit under other names: Antes, Polans, Rusyns) have existed since the early Middle Ages;
2) in Kievan Rus, Ukrainians represented the core of the state, a nationality separate from the northeastern (in the future - Great Russian) nationality;
3) the heir to the statehood of Kievan Rus was not Vladimir-Suzdal, but the Galicia-Volyn principality, which gradually lost its independence and was incorporated by neighboring states - Lithuania, Poland, Hungary.

The Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in his opinion, was the same equivalent center for the unification of the ancient Russian lands, as was the Principality of Moscow. However, as Lithuania became Catholicized and Polonized, the contradictions between Lithuanians and Orthodox Litvins and Rusyns (Belarusians and Ukrainians) intensified, and the latter reoriented towards Muscovy.

Having lost their former independence and being part of the Commonwealth and the Muscovite kingdom, the Ukrainians, Hrushevsky concluded, were either simply a passive object of control, or were in opposition to the authorities. The only content of their history now remains cultural and economic processes.

Naturally, such a version of the history of Kievan Rus could not suit the official Russian circles, who, even after the conclusion of the Pereyaslav Treaty, considered themselves the exclusive owners of the rights to the Kievan inheritance.

Therefore, accusations of Professor Grushevsky of "separatism" immediately began to be heard in the Russian Empire. These attacks were particularly intensified after in 1899 he bluntly raised the issue of allowing abstracts in the Ukrainian language at the archaeological congress, which was to be held in Kyiv. This demand aroused strong opposition in Russian professorial circles and was rejected. Then Hrushevsky and other Ukrainian scientists from Austria-Hungary declined to participate in the congress.

In 1906, Kharkov University dared to raise Mikhail Grushevsky to the degree of an honorary doctor of Russian history. However, Grushevsky's candidacy, put up for the chair of Russian history at Kiev University in 1907, was rejected for political reasons.

Grushevsky tried to engage in politics long before the formation of the Ukrainian People's Republic - back in Austria-Hungary. In 1899, he took an active part in the creation of the Ukrainian National Democratic Party, which, in his opinion, was supposed to unite the scattered forces of the Ukrainian patriots of Austria-Hungary. However, Grushevsky's hopes were not destined to come true - throughout its history, the UNDP most of the time was engaged in intra-party squabbles, and before the First World War, it was on the verge of final collapse.

On the eve of the First World War, Grushevsky intended to leave the department of Lviv University and return to Kyiv. But the war broke the plan to move. Because of the persecution of the police, who saw him as a Russian agent, the scientist moved to Italy, and then returned to Kyiv through Romania.

But here in Hrushevsky they already saw an agent of the Austrians! Therefore, in December 1914, Grushevsky was arrested and, after several months in prison, he was forced to leave Ukraine. The order of the head of the Kyiv military district said: “Professor of Lviv University Mikhail Grushevsky, as a propagandist of Ukrainian separatism and a prominent figure in the Ukrainian national-democratic party, should be sent to Simbirsk for the duration of the state of the areas from which he was expelled, under martial law.” From Simbirsk he was allowed to move to Kazan, where he was able to continue his scientific work, and later to Moscow.

Vladimir Vernadsky himself was involved in the petition for the transfer of Grushevsky to Moscow. He, along with other scientists from the Russian Academy of Sciences and Moscow University, sent a letter to Minister of the Interior Khvostov stating that all measures taken against Grushevsky were reckless and unacceptable.
It was in Moscow that Grushevsky found the February Revolution.

The outskirts of the former Russian Empire begin to move and, in the wake of a national upsurge, declare their claims to autonomy and independence. Ukraine was no exception. In March 1917, the Ukrainian Central Rada was created in Kyiv - a body of national self-government, which urgently needed a popularly known and respected leader. And then the founders of the Central Rada remembered Hrushevsky.

“No one was more suitable for the role of a national leader than Grushevsky,” wrote Dmitry Doroshenko, a well-known political figure of those years. Numerous telegrams from Kyiv began to arrive at Grushevsky's Moscow address asking him to immediately return and take the post of head of the Ukrainian Central Rada. Taking with him only valuable books, on March 11 he left for Ukraine.

Grushevsky's return to his homeland turned out to be very peculiar. The night on the train passed quietly, but in the morning, not far from Bryansk, a fire started in the car where he was traveling. The flames from the neighboring compartment quickly engulfed the entire carriage. Grushevsky rushed to collect his books, but it was too late. Literally in five minutes the car burned to the ground.

Because of this incident, the train arrived in Kyiv very late. No one was waiting at the Grushevsky station. The people of Kiev, who were preparing for his meeting, had already dispersed. There were no relatives either. Having wandered through the unlit streets and through the wet snow without galoshes (they were burned on the train), in the same underwear, with a blanket on his shoulders, he got home only in the morning. So unusually and more than modestly, Grushevsky returned to his native land.

On Tuesday, March 14, he came to the first meeting of the Central Rada. Here the meeting was already more solemn, Grushevsky was literally carried in his arms. He enthusiastically spoke to the audience, spoke about the goals of the revolution, called on his compatriots to actively build a new Ukraine, however, so far only as an autonomy within Russia. At that time, the majority did not even think about the complete separation of Ukraine. The national inferiority complex, which had been implanted for centuries, had an effect. How! After all, there are "only" thirty million Ukrainians. Where are they before their own state, in comparison with the eight millionth Swedes or there, the Dutch? “Ukrainians have no intention of separating from the Russian Republic,” Grushevsky wrote in the pamphlet “Where did Ukrainianism come from and where does it lead”, published in the summer of 1917. "They want to remain in a voluntary and free association with her."

Defending the position of the Central Rada, Grushevsky proved the groundlessness of the accusations of separatism made against her, emphasizing: “We think just that Ukraine is not only for Ukrainians, but for everyone who lives in Ukraine and loves it, and loving, wants to work for the good of the region and its inhabitants. And so anyone who shares such views is a dear fellow citizen for us, regardless of who he may be - a Great Russian, a Jew, a Pole, a Czech.

In July 1918, Mikhail Grushevsky was elected chairman of the Ukrainian Central Rada. The first steps of the historian Grushevsky in this post were more than strange. In general, the behavior of the then leaders of the UNR, who sought to look “holier than the Pope” in their state activities, is completely bewildering!

On the one hand, he, together with the head of the People's Secretariat (Government) of the UNR, writer Vladimir Vinnichenko, negotiates on equal terms with the Russian Provisional Government on granting Ukraine wide autonomy and writes generalists declaring this autonomy.

On the other hand, he is doing everything for the collapse of the Ukrainian armed forces that are still being created.
Grushevsky, you see, tried to convince everyone and everything that the newly created Ukrainian state is democratic and exclusively peaceful and is not going to fight with anyone, and therefore does not need a professional army.

An armchair scientist, he did not understand real politics at all, remaining an adherent of "paper" theories and schemes. And this is in the context of the ongoing World War and the beginning of the Civil War!

As a result, the UNR was left without an army, and there was simply no one to defend the Central Rada.

And Grushevsky, along with other members of the Central Rada, under the threat of an offensive by the Bolsheviks, had to urgently flee from Kyiv. True, before that, he still managed to send detachments of Kyiv high school students and students to certain death near Kruty. Who, being fit for Grushevsky's grandchildren, paid with their lives for the "theories" of our professor.

Thus, one can draw a completely logical conclusion that this handsome "father of the nation" did harm to this very nation no less than any of its enemies.

Mikhail Grushevsky managed to return to Kyiv quite soon, but with the German troops, who responded to the call of the Central Rada to clear the territory of Ukraine from Russian and local Bolsheviks in exchange for food. Truly, he who does not want to maintain his own army will feed someone else's!

After returning to Kyiv, Grushevsky was re-elected chairman of the Central Rada and began to pursue the same political line. Having promised the German allies regular food supplies, Grushevsky simply brushed aside their legitimate demands to fulfill the promise, saying that the required measures to confiscate food and restore order in the country were undemocratic.
Naturally, the German occupation authorities needed a more obedient Ukraine, and on the night of April 29-30, as a result of a coup d'état, the UNR of Grushevsky and Vinnichenko ceased to exist. Its place was taken by the Ukrainian State headed by Hetman Skoropadsky.

The last chord of the political activity of Mikhail Hrushevsky as the head of the Central Rada can be considered the adoption literally on the eve of the hetman's coup on April 29, 1918 of the Constitution of the UNR. According to this document, Ukraine became a sovereign parliamentary state that guaranteed the rights of all the peoples living here. Power was divided into executive, legislative and judicial. The Supreme body of the UNR proclaimed the National Assembly - the legislative power of the Ukrainian Republic.

It is with the Constitution that the myth of Grushevsky's presidency that still exists, which has long been exploited by historians and publicists, is connected. In the mid-90s, almost all researchers and journalists wrote that at the last meeting of the Central Rada, along with the adoption of the Constitution, a president was also elected. Very quickly, this unproven fact migrated from TV screens and newspaper pages to school textbooks and became entrenched in the minds of millions of Ukrainians.

It is believed that this myth came from among Ukrainian emigrants. While any positive references to the independent Ukrainian state were prohibited in the USSR, they, on the contrary, in every possible way emphasized the usefulness of this state. And in their interpretation, the chairman of the Central Rada, Mikhail Grushevsky, turned into a president. Perhaps this is due to the fact that in foreign languages ​​\u200b\u200b(French, German) the post
The “chairman” of the Rada was referred to as the president (du parlement), but corresponded only to the position of the speaker of the parliament. In any case, Grushevsky's then ally, Vladimir Vinnichenko, directly points out in his memoirs that sometimes the chairman of the Central Rada, Mikhail Grushevsky, was called the president, but this name was not official.

As a result, it turned out that there were no documents confirming the fact of Grushevsky's presidency. And in the Constitution of the UNR, with which everything seems to have begun, not a single word is said about such an institution of power. Its text read as follows: “The National Assembly convenes and is led by the head elected by the National Assembly. The power of the head lasts all the time until a new meeting is called and a new head is elected.

Researchers believe that in this way a parliamentary form of government was introduced in Ukraine, and not presidential or parliamentary-presidential, so Hrushevsky could hardly be elected to a position that did not exist at that time.

True, in the early 1990s, there was an opinion that Leonid Kravchuk, who considered himself such, prevented the recognition of the historian Grushevsky as the first president of Ukraine at the state level. He allegedly once said: "I understand that Grushevsky is the first president, but I'm not the second either."

The ex-president himself, when asked who he considers the first, almost always answers: “I am the first president of Ukraine. But Hrushevsky was elected president of the Ukrainian People's Republic, and not by the people, but by the deputies. And he was in this position for one night. That is, there are no documents signed by President Grushevsky. Therefore, most researchers of this problem believe that Grushevsky was not the first president at all.
Indeed, in all the minutes of the meetings of the Rada, he is listed exclusively as the head.

And yet, despite the scientific conclusions of historians, many Ukrainians consider the head of the Central Rada, Mikhail Grushevsky, to be the first president of the country. Apparently, the ancient philosophers were right, who believed that a myth is much easier to create than to debunk.

At the end of 1918, when the Ukrainian Directory replaced the hetmanate, Grushevsky again tried to revive the ideas of the Central Rada, but, having met opposition from the new government, he left Kyiv and Ukrainian politics. But as it turned out, not for long.

Modern Ukrainian historians, as a rule, write about Hrushevsky's fate after the end of the Civil War in passing. In Ukraine, it is somehow not particularly customary to spread that the symbol of Ukrainian Independence returned to the USSR in 1924 and turned into an apologist for Soviet power and the communist regime. In the Soviet academician, chairman of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, author of heartfelt articles about the great socialist state. However, that is exactly what it is.

The only thing they usually write about in detail is how Hrushevsky was arrested in the fabricated case of the “Ukrainian National Center”. But at the same time, after several interrogations, he was released. But few people managed, having fallen into the field of view of the all-powerful NKVD, to go free without a trial and a prison term. Moreover, Grushevsky was transferred to work in Moscow, treated in the Kislovodsk sanatorium and buried, after his death in 1934, with full honors at the prestigious Kiev Baikove cemetery.

And the thing is that Grushevsky, in the end, signed all the protocols and denunciations that the Chekists offered him. And against themselves and against those who should have been taken in the case of the "Ukrainian National Center". And his testimony, even after the death of Grushevsky, was sent under execution articles and to the camps of many innocent people.

And only some time after his death, it was announced that he led an illegal bourgeois-nationalist organization. For this, his works were later banned, and many relatives were repressed, including his own daughter Catherine. She was already a well-known culturologist, sociologist, folklorist, who continued his scientific work after Grushevsky's death, but died in exile in 1943.

At one time, Grushevsky became the only one of the leaders of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-1921 who returned to the USSR. This caused a violent negative reaction among Ukrainian emigrants. They stigmatized him as one of the "renegades who absolutely calmly went into the service of the worst enemy, went shamefully, without any concessions on his part." "Political death" called the return of Grushevsky former UNR Minister Nikita Shapoval in an article of the same name, published on March 18, 1924. “Grushevsky ... was vikresliv ... to himself from among the fighters for Ukraine. Turning into a political corpse, which, while walking, the Ukrainians are guilty of covering their noses.

I wonder how his daughter assessed this act of Grushevsky before her own death? And how should we evaluate Grushevsky's personality?

Yes, it was Hrushevsky who created the capital history of Ukraine. Yes, it was he who led the newborn Ukrainian state. But, at the same time, it was he who doomed this state to death, leaving it at the most decisive moment without an army. It was he who brought the occupying troops to his native land. It was he, being a living symbol of Ukrainian Independence, who publicly renounced his political views and went over to the service of Soviet power. And it was according to his testimony that the color of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was destroyed by this very government.

Such an ambiguous state symbol is obtained from Mikhail Grushevsky ...
And what would have happened to our country if the UNR had managed then to keep its nearly one million strong army?

We will try to understand this issue by analyzing the acts of Vladimir Vynnichenko and Symon Petlyura, already mentioned earlier, in the article "Petlyura Uncut".

1. Prerequisites for the declaration of independence of the UNR. The independence and sovereignty of the UNR were proclaimed by the Ukrainian Central Rada in the IV Universal. keynote of this document was the thesis: "From now on, the Ukrainian People's Republic becomes an independent, independent, free, sovereign state of the Ukrainian people." The Ukrainian Central Rada called on all citizens of the republic to defend "welfare and freedom" in the fight against "Bolsheviks and other attackers."

Basic prerequisites The Declaration of Independence of the UNR were:

The age-old aspirations of the Ukrainian people for freedom and independence;

Traditions of the national liberation struggle;

Long-term anti-Ukrainian policy of the imperial center;

The devastating consequences of the First World War for Ukraine;

The offensive of the Bolshevik troops on Ukraine, which began in December 1917, deprived the leadership of the Central Rada of illusions about the possibility of turning Russia into a democratic federal republic and the autonomy of Ukraine as part of such a republic;

Foreign policy conditions required the participation of the UNR delegation in a peace conference on the cessation of hostilities on the fronts of the First World War; such participation became real only when Ukraine received the legal status of an independent sovereign state;

Only as an independent state, as a subject of international law, could the UNR rely on international assistance, including military assistance, to protect itself from outside aggression, in particular from the Moscow-Bolshevik intervention.

2. Adoption of the IV Universal. On January 11 (24), 1918, when the Bolshevik troops, who were rushing to the capital of Ukraine, were already on the outskirts of Kyiv, the Malaya Rada adopted And V Universal. The final text was developed on the basis of projects by Mikhail Grushevsky, Vladimir Vinnichenko, M. Shapoval.

The following main provisions of the IV Universal can be defined:

a) in the foreign policy sphere:

- The universal obligated the government to complete negotiations with the Central States and conclude peace;

Declared the desire for friendly relations with the neighbors of Ukraine - Russia, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and other countries;

b) in the agricultural sector:

- proclaimed the nationalization (transfer of ownership into the hands of the state) of all natural resources (forests, waters, subsoil, etc.), the elimination of land ownership;

The transfer of land to the peasants without redemption by the beginning of spring work was guaranteed;

c) in the field of industry:

- the demilitarization of enterprises was proclaimed (the transfer of enterprises to a peaceful track, the production of peaceful products);

The fight against unemployment;

Providing social assistance to the unemployed affected by the war;

The monopoly of the state on the production and trade in iron, tobacco and other goods was proclaimed;

d) in the military sphere:

- the intention was proclaimed after the end of the war to demobilize the army and replace it with the people's militia;

e) in the field of finance:

The establishment of state control over banks was proclaimed;

f) in the field of interethnic relations:

- the right of national minorities to national-personal autonomy was confirmed.

The task was set to convene in the near future Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, who would approve the Constitution of the UNR.

On the day of the proclamation of the IV Universal, Malaya Rada adopted the law on national-territorial autonomy; the right to autonomy was automatically recognized for three large national groups - Russians, Jews and Poles; Belarusians, Germans, Czechs, Moldavians, Tatars, Greeks and Bulgarians could get this right, provided that their petitions in this matter collect at least 10 thousand votes.

3. The historical significance of the IV Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada.

For the first time in modern history, the Ukrainian people have reached the most important decision - proclamation of an independent sovereign Ukrainian state, finally breaking off relations with the imperial center and laying the foundations for the next state building.

With the proclamation of the IV Universal autonomism and federalism as part of Russia, Ukrainian socio-political thought is finally becoming a thing of the past.

IV Universal gave a new qualitative status to the Ukrainian state; state power has become the only within its territory, independent of other states.

The Ukrainian Central Rada finally rejected the hesitation and took a radical decision land issue- the main thing for a country in which the rural population prevailed.

The Ukrainian National Movement reaffirmed its democratic character: in the most difficult times for the revolution, the Central Rada continued to defend democratic freedoms, the rights of national minorities (including Russians).

IV Universal contained the constitutional foundations of state building, became a significant step towards building Ukrainian statehood.

Unfortunately, the historic decisions of the Ukrainian Central Rada were taken at a time when the fate of the Ukrainian democratic government had already been decided.

Lessons The Ukrainian national democratic revolution in general and the activities of the Ukrainian Central Rada in particular are very valuable for modern independent Ukraine.

4. Further development of events in Ukraine (January-February 1918). But this important document (IV Universal) was proclaimed too late, when the climax of the Ukrainian national movement had already been passed. At the beginning of 1918, the UCR was losing position after position - in mid-January, Soviet power was established in many cities of Ukraine. The distrust of the people in the ability of the UCR to solve pressing state issues increased, social problems took precedence over national ones.

4.1. Battle of Kruty . The indecision and inconsistency of the UCR led to the fact that at the climax of January 16 (29), 1918, in the battle near Kruty (the station between Nizhyn and Bakhmach), where the fate of Kyiv was decided, she could only count on the bayonets of 420 students, high school students and cadets, most of whom died in an unequal confrontation with the 4,000th Bolshevik army of Mikhail Muravyov.

4.2. Uprising at the Arsenal factory. On January 5 (January 18), 1918, Bolshevik troops launched an offensive against Kyiv. To support this offensive, on January 15 (28) the Kyiv Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which was dominated by the Bolsheviks, decided to start an uprising in the city. The uprising, led by a specially created revolutionary committee, began on January 16 (29). Its stronghold was a factory "Arsenal". The uprising swept the whole of Kyiv.

But on January 21 (February 3), those transferred by Simon Petliura from the front entered the city. "smoke of death" who reinforced the detachments of "free Cossacks" and Gaidamaks. The position of the rebels deteriorated sharply, the Arsenal was cut off from the city and was subjected to heavy artillery fire. After continuous fighting, by decision of the Revolutionary Committee, the arsenalers stopped the fight. Some of them secretly left the territory of the plant to join the Soviet troops advancing on Kyiv. The Gaidamaks burst into the factory and brutally dealt with the rebels, shot more than 300 Red Guards, and with them several dozen women and children.

4.3. The entry into Kyiv of the Bolshevik troops under the command of M. Muravyov. After the uprising at the Arsenal plant was suppressed, the UCR troops failed to keep Kyiv. After a five-day bombardment, on January 26, 1918, the Bolshevik units under the command of M. Muravyov entered the capital of the UNR. The UNR government was forced to relocate to Zhytomyr, and soon to Sarny.

After the capture of Kyiv, N. Muravyov ordered "to destroy all officers, junkers, haidamaks, monarchists and all enemies of the revolution." “Muravyov's troops carried out a massacre in Kyiv, which the city has not seen since the time of Andrei Bogolyubsky,” D. Doroshenko described these events in this way. Various numbers of victims were given: 5,000 or more, 3,000 were shot on the first day. They shot mainly Russian and Ukrainian foremen - those who had a certificate from the UCR, and some public figures. There were cases of extermination of people just because they spoke the Ukrainian language.

4.4. Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. On January 26 (February 9), 1918, the UNR delegation signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with representatives of the Quadruple Union.

The countries of this bloc recognized state independence and independence of the UNR, and its borders with Austria-Hungary were established according to the pre-war delimitations between Russia and Austria-Hungary (along the line Khotyn-Gusyatin-Zbarazh-Brody-Sokal. According to the agreement, almost the entire Kholmshchina and Podlachie were to return to the UNR. The final border with Poland later, a special mixed commission was to determine, taking into account the ethnic composition of the population of the border regions and their desires ...

Signed contract also provided: renunciation of mutual claims for compensation for damage caused by the war; mutual exchange of prisoners of war; mutual exchange of surplus industrial and food products; the establishment of mutual customs privileges and the most favored nation treatment in border trade; establishment of diplomatic relations.

Soviet Russia must immediately conclude peaceful agreement from the UNR, withdraw the Red Guard troops from here and not interfere in the internal life of Ukraine. To restore the power of the UNR, the 450,000-strong occupation Austro-German army entered the territory of Ukraine, which could not be resisted by the 25,000-strong Bolshevik army of Ukraine, together with detachments of volunteers from Petrograd and Moscow.

For the provision of large-scale military assistance to the UNR in accordance with secret agreement, signed in the spring of 1918, Ukraine undertook to supply Germany and Austria-Hungary with a significant amount of food, as well as regularly supply them with iron and manganese ore, etc.

Already in early March 1918, German, Austro-Hungarian and Petliurist troops occupied Kyiv and the Ukrainian Central Rada, the government of the UNR and other government agencies returned here. Until the end of April, the Red Army was driven out from almost the entire territory of eastern Ukraine and Crimea.

4. Ukrainian People's Republic: 1919–1920

Determining political perspectives

The entry of the troops of the Directory into Kyiv, the parade of rebel troops in the capital of Ukraine marked the restoration of the Ukrainian People's Republic. In December 1918 the Directory experienced a triumph. But before every political force that wins in the struggle for power, the question certainly arises: what to do next? The duration of the period of rule of power largely depends on internal and external factors, in particular on how correctly, in accordance with the current moment, the form of the state system is chosen, its socio-economic foundation is laid. It is hard for those political forces that become at the helm of the state only as a result of the denial of the programs of the previous regime. A vivid example of this is the history of the UNR since the Directory.

On December 21-24, a provincial peasant congress was held in Kyiv. The 700 delegates expressed their sincere gratitude to the Directory and promised it support "in the struggle for the Ukrainian Labor Republic", but only if it immediately fulfills a number of tasks of a state and socio-economic nature. As it turned out, neither the Directory nor the highest Ukrainian political circles had unanimous views on the prospects for state-nation building. The only thing that rallied the political parties around the Directory, which were part of the Ukrainian National Union and the insurgent peasant detachments, was the idea of ​​fighting the hetman's regime. On other issues, positions diverged, sometimes in diametrically opposite directions, so compromises were necessary, and this, in turn, led to an endless showdown between different political currents and even individual figures.

This circumstance manifested itself already during the state meeting in Vinnitsa on December 12–14, held by the Directory with the leaders of political parties and public organizations that were members of the ONS. Its participants were divided into two camps, one of which defended the parliamentary system of power, and the second - the Soviet one. Despite obvious disagreements, the Directory tried at first to preserve the unity of Ukrainian political forces. On December 26, she approved the UNR government (headed by the Social Democrat V. Chekhovsky), which included representatives of all political parties united in the UNS. On the same day, the Directory announced its program declaration, built on the basis of the so-called "labor" principle. According to its creators, it absorbed the best features of the Soviet and parliamentary systems. Quite quickly, life showed that this was a palliative way out of the situation.

The constructive part of the declaration contained a lot of generalities, it lacked clear, specific ideas. The directory declared itself temporary, although the supreme authority of the revolutionary period. She promised, having received power from the people, to the people and to transfer it to the Congress of the Working People of Ukraine, which "will have the supreme rights and powers to resolve all issues of the social, economic and political life of the republic." Power in the UHP, it was noted in the declaration, should belong only to “the working classes - the working class and the peasantry”, and the non-working, exploiting classes that destroyed the region, destroyed the economy and accompanied their stay in power with cruelty and reaction, do not have the right to participate in management state.

At the first acquaintance with this declaration, the naivety and short-sightedness of Ukrainian politicians is striking. They sorely lacked the experience of state activity, and they proclaimed a course towards state control over the main sectors of the Ukrainian economy, and the implementation of social reforms. The word "socialism" was absent from the declaration, but its hypnotic influence on the UNR politicians was not hidden. The declaration proclaimed the UNR a neutral country, desiring peaceful coexistence with the peoples of other states. Meanwhile, the UNR found itself in an extremely difficult foreign policy situation. By signing the Brest Peace Agreement, Ukraine has tied itself to the Quadruple Alliance. Despite the fact that it was a forced measure, the Entente countries represented the Ukrainian state as an enemy satellite. Having won the war, they made it clear to the hetman diplomats that they perceive Ukraine as an independent state without much enthusiasm. The Entente was suspicious of the restoration of the UNR by the Directory, as they looked at Ukraine only as the southern part of Russia, guided by the principle of restoring a non-Bolshevik "one and indivisible" Russia.

At the end of November, Odessa newspapers published a declaration of the Entente states, which spoke of the imminent arrival in Ukraine of the armed forces of the Allies in sufficient numbers to maintain order here. On December 2, the first French warship, the battleship Mirabeau, appeared in Odessa, and on December 15, the landing of a 15,000th contingent of Anglo-French troops began. On December 18, White Guard detachments, supported by French troops, entered the battle with the Ukrainian garrison of Odessa and forced him to leave the city.

On January 13, 1919, the headquarters of the French airborne division headed by General d "Anselm arrived in Odessa. He demanded that the Ukrainian troops liberate the area around Odessa and withdraw to the Tiraspol - Birzula - Voznesensk - Nikolaev - Kherson line. At the same time, his order was issued, in which it was noted that "France and the allies came to Russia to enable all factors of goodwill and patriotism to restore order in the country"... The existence of the Ukrainian People's Republic was not even mentioned.In January 1919, the Entente troops entered Nikolaev.

With the landing of the troops of the Entente in the south, the appearance of the troops of Soviet Russia on the northern and northeastern borders of the UNR coincided. Under the pretext of helping the workers and peasants who rebelled against the hetman, they launched an offensive deep into the territory of the UNR in two directions: Vorozhba-Sumy-Kharkiv and Gomel-Chernihiv-Kyiv. But the fall of the hetman's power did not stop the further advance of the Bolshevik troops. More details about the Bolshevik expansion into Ukraine will be described in the next paragraph, but here we only note that the Ukrainian People's Republic, not yet standing on its feet, found itself between two fires.

6th Sich Rifle Division UIIIR in Stanislavov. 1919 Artist L. Perfetsky

In addition to foreign policy problems, internal ones were added. The peasantry, which constituted the majority of the republic's population, supported the idea of ​​Ukrainian statehood in the resolutions of various congresses, but when the need arose to defend it, they showed complete indifference. The anarchist mentality of the Ukrainian peasant did not go well with national interests. This feature was clearly manifested in the autumn of 1918 - in the winter of 1919. Having created a multi-thousand rebel army of the UNR in the wake of the struggle against the hetman's regime, the peasant rebels after the overthrow of the hetman's regime began to go home. The army of the UNR turned out to be ill-prepared to fight against the Bolshevik troops, easily succumbed to their agitation.

Under these conditions, the Directory and the leading political forces of Ukraine had to decide with whom they should be: with Western democracy against the Bolsheviks or with the Bolsheviks against the Entente. Obviously, there was no independent way. “The general condition of the army that took part in the anti-Hetman uprising did not give any reason to believe that Ukraine could stand on its own without an alliance with one or the other of the external forces,” noted I. Mazepa, one of the prominent figures of the UNR. The Western parliamentary system, with its democracy and advanced achievements in the organization of society, first of all impressed the Ukrainian intelligentsia, who saw in it the desirable goal of their political activity, but it did not agree well with the politically undeveloped majority of the population, which, on the contrary, sympathized with the Soviet form of power. However, this power in 1919 was already far from democratic democracy, in fact turned into a Bolshevik dictatorship. The search for forms of state building split Ukrainians into several camps, and if in 1917 political tastes were entirely consistent with the programs of individual parties, then at the end of 1918 and especially at the beginning of 1919 the problem of orientation finally led to a split in the leading Ukrainian parties.

At the beginning of January 1919, the 6th Congress of the USDRP met in Kyiv. The central moment of the congress was the discussion of the report of A. Pesotsky on the political situation in Ukraine. The speaker insisted on using the principle of Soviet power and organizing the national economy on socialist principles. One of his arguments was that a world revolution was unfolding in Western Europe. A. Pesotsky was supported by M. Tkachenko, A. Dragomiretsky, Yu. Mazurenko, M. Avdienko. The anti-Soviet position was occupied by Yekaterinoslav I. Mazepa, P. Fedenko, I. Romanchenko, T. Grabovy, Y. Kapustnyak. All the others, according to I. Mazepa, "did not have a clear view of the matter and wavered between the soviets and general suffrage." Thus, the head of the UNR government, V. Chekhovsky, advocated the introduction of the Soviet system of power, but without the Bolshevik dictatorial methods. V. Vinnichenko, who back in Vinnitsa ardently supported this system, rejected it at the USDRP congress. The head of government and the head of the Directory saw the prospect of the formation of state power in different ways, which in itself was an alarming symptom. In the end, the idea of ​​convening a parliament and electing local self-government bodies through the exercise of general suffrage won out.

I. P. Mazepa

The USDRP congress did not clarify the political orientation of the society, therefore, on the eve of the opening of the Labor Congress, the Directory decided to hold a regular state meeting in Kyiv. It opened on January 16th. Representatives of the Sich Riflemen O. Nazaruk and Y. Chaikivsky supported the establishment of a military dictatorship in Ukraine in the form of a triumvirate of S. Petlyura, E. Konovalets and A. Melnyk, but most of the participants rejected this proposal. We find a general summary of the meeting in I. Mazepa: “Of the members of the Directory, Petliura spoke out sharply against the Bolsheviks. Shvets spoke inexpressively. Vinnichenko, as always, improvised and did not have a clear view of the matter. In general, the anti-Bolshevik trend prevailed among the speakers, but everyone knew that the masses were "neutral" or were following the Bolsheviks. When, after all these speeches, the representatives of the Sich Riflemen withdrew their proposal, the meeting could not think of anything else than, they say, let everything remain as it was. It should be added to the above that the position of the Sich Riflemen was not shared by the entire army of the UNR. Ataman Zeleny's division stood in Soviet positions and in January refused to obey the orders of the high command. Detachments of Ataman N. Grigoriev in February went over to the side of the Red Army. In general, the arbitrariness of atamans became a hallmark of the UNR army, which was losing its combat capability catastrophically quickly.

The policy of the Directory was not supported by the All-Ukrainian Council of Peasants' Deputies. On January 14-15, its executive committee held a meeting in Kyiv with representatives of provincial councils, at which it demanded that the Directory immediately transfer power to the executive committees of the All-Ukrainian Councils of Peasants' and Workers' Deputies.

The opening in Kyiv (January 23) of the Labor Congress was preceded by the proclamation of the union of the eastern and western Ukrainian lands into a single conciliar state. It was a long-awaited event in the history of Ukraine. For the first time, the idea of ​​conciliarity of the Ukrainian lands divided between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires was formulated as early as 1848. Since that time, it has become the core of the Ukrainian national idea. Boston Galicia played the role of the Ukrainian Piedmont for several decades. In October 1918, after the proclamation of the Western Ukrainian state in Lvov, the question of its reunification with Eastern Ukraine immediately arose. In early December 1918, representatives of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic reached an agreement with the Directory on the entry of the ZUNR into the UNR. On January 22, a special Universal of the Directory was approved and solemnly announced, which proclaimed “the reunification of the parts of a united Ukraine that have been torn apart for centuries” . The next day, the Congress of the Working People of Ukraine approved and approved this document of the Directory. The final decision on this issue was to be made by the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, until that moment the ZUNR government enjoyed wide powers and was practically not accountable to the Directory, as it will become clear later, both Ukrainian governments often pursued an inconsistent policy, serious friction and disagreement arose between them. In this regard, it should be said that more was expected from reunification than received. According to one of the participants in the reunification, N. Shapoval, it was "more theoretical and legal than actual."

Of the 593 deputies provided for by the electoral law, over 400 arrived at the Congress of the Working People, 36 of them represented the western regions of the Ukrainian People's Republic (30 UNR). The largest faction was the Socialist-Revolutionary, peasant. She, as P. Khristyuk noted, “could, on condition of internal solidarity, clarity of her positions and resolute implementation of them, play a decisive role in this difficult moment of the Ukrainian revolution”, but “diluted with elements from the peasant faction, she broke up, split into the right and the left wings, which could not create a common platform, and as a result acted and voted (according to their division) for different resolutions.

The USDRP faction turned out to be the main and guiding force of the Congress of the Working People, followed by the majority of the delegates. January 28 Labor Congress spoke in favor of a democratic system in Ukraine, drafting a law on the election of a national parliament. It was decided, given the dangerous wartime, "to further, until the next session of the Congress of the Working People of Ukraine, carry out the state work of the Directory."

The decision of the Labor Congress was largely influenced by the offensive of the Bolshevik Soviet troops on Kyiv, launched in January 1919. It strengthened the positions of the adherents of the alliance with the Entente and anti-Bolshevik sentiments in the Directory. On January 16, she declared a state of war with Soviet Russia. On the other hand, there was a consolidation of the left, the opposition to the Directory of pro-Soviet forces. Immediately after the completion of the work of the Congress, a conference of the UPSR (centrist trend) was held in Kyiv. In contrast to the faction of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who demonstrated a divergence of views in the Congress, the participants in the party conference in the final resolution unanimously spoke in favor of the transfer of power "to the hands of the class bodies, that is, the Soviets of Peasants' and Workers' Deputies." In the resolution, the conference stressed that the UPSR "as a party cannot take responsibility for government policy."

An even more radical position towards the Directory was taken by the Left Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries and Independent Social Democrats, who began to make contacts with the Bolsheviks and prepare an uprising against the Directory.

National democracy, in general, perceiving and professing the idea of ​​the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State, was, as in previous periods, divided into separate camps that contradicted each other in matters of the social and economic orientation of the UNR. Some saw it as a democratic legal republic modeled on Western states, while others were under the influence of socialist illusions. The very fact of such a separation and the extremely unfavorable foreign policy situation called into question the continued existence of the UNR and testified that the Ukrainian revolution had entered a period of general crisis.

Orientation to the Entente and its failure

The offensive of the Bolshevik troops forced the Directory to leave Kyiv immediately after the completion of the work of the Labor Congress. On February 2, Vinnitsa became the center of her stay. On the same day, the Directory held a regular state meeting, at which it discussed the conditions proposed by the French command for an agreement with the Entente. The French proposed reorganizing the Directory and the government, withdrawing Vinnichenko, Petliura and Chekhovsky from them, creating an army of 300,000 to fight the Bolsheviks and subordinating it to the allied command. One of the conditions was the temporary transfer of the railway and finances of Ukraine under the control of France, as well as an appeal to the latter with a request to accept Ukraine under the French protectorate. The question of the state independence of Ukraine was to be decided by the Paris Peace Conference. These demands aroused the indignation of the participants in the state meeting, but things on the anti-Bolshevik front were so bad that they instructed the Directory, not accepting the proposed conditions, to continue developing contacts with the French.

On February 6, a new stage of negotiations between the French and Ukrainian sides began in Birzul near Odessa. The head of the Ukrainian delegation, S. Ostapenko, on behalf of the Directory, sought recognition by the Entente of the sovereignty of Ukraine, assistance in the fight against the Bolsheviks, and the admission of the UNR delegation to participate in the work of the Paris Peace Conference. The chief of staff of the French troops, Colonel Fraidenberg, repeated the earlier formulated demands, especially emphasizing the need to remove Vinnichenko and Petlyura from their posts. The parties did not come to an agreement, and the Ukrainian delegation returned to Vinnitsa.

The current circumstances called for immediate action. “The more the Bolsheviks invaded Ukraine, the more the orientation towards the Entente became stronger,” wrote N. Shapoval. According to him, back in early February, it was decided that the government of V. Chekhovsky would resign. On February 9, the Central Committee of the USDRP withdrew its representatives from the government and the Directory, citing "new international moments in Ukrainian state affairs." Given this decision, V. Vinnichenko announced his withdrawal from the Directory and soon went abroad. S. Petliura behaved differently. In a letter sent on February 11 to the Central Committee of the USDRP, he announced the temporary suspension of his membership in the party and the further fulfillment of state duties: to stand and work in the affairs of state". The decision to recall their representatives from the government was made by the Central Committee of the UPSR, in connection with which another member of the Directory - F. Shvets - announced his withdrawal from the party.

These steps were supposed to demonstrate to the Entente the concessions to the Directory. In addition, the talks in Moscow of the Ukrainian delegation headed by S. Mazurenko from the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, which began in mid-January, were terminated. On February 10 and 12, the plenipotentiary representative of the UNR at the peace conference in Paris, G. Sidorenko, addressed its participants with notes that spoke about the war of the RSFSR against the UNR and the imperialist policy of the Bolsheviks, and suggested that the recognition of the independence of the UNR by the Entente states and the USA "should be considered an act of elementary justice and in agreement with the principles proclaimed by the states of the Entente and the United States of America".

On February 13, the Directory decided on the new composition of the Council of People's Ministers. It was headed by that time non-partisan S. Ostapenko. The government included representatives of three parties: the federalist socialists, the independent socialists and the people's republicans, who were guided by the democratic foundations and the state of the Entente. Two leading left Ukrainian parties (USDRP and UPSR) voluntarily relinquished power. It seemed that in this way it would be possible to remove the obstacles to agreement with the Entente. But it soon became clear that this was not the best way out. The right-wing democratic government of S. Ostapenko, having staked on agreement with the Entente, did not seek the support of the masses. It never published a single program document explaining its domestic policy. In the conditions of the development of the revolution, when changing the mood of broad sections of the population was of greater importance than the tanks of the Entente, this was a gross mistake. The government was completely isolated. “... It was at this time that the general anarchy and chaos on the Ukrainian front reached its highest level,” I. Mazepa testified. - Under the government of Ostapenko, there was neither power nor control. Therefore, many millions that were issued for various new formations were wasted. There was no end to the abuse of chieftains: they took money, but at the first opportunity they left the front, they disappeared wherever they wanted, mostly to Galicia, and this brought even greater disorganization both at the front and in the rear.

Under the influence of the Bolshevik agitation aimed, in particular, at the elimination of private ownership of land and its total egalitarian distribution, pro-Soviet sentiments quickly spread in Ukraine. They also embraced the UNR army. Even the Sich Riflemen, who had consistently and firmly taken anti-Bolshevik positions, switched to the Soviet platform, declaring in their declaration of March 13 that they would “enthusiastically support Soviet power on the ground, which establishes discipline and order” . Of course, the archers were not talking about supporting the Bolsheviks, but about the Ukrainian national Soviet power.

On March 21, in Vapnyarka, the command of the Southwestern Front, cut off (due to the capture of Zhmerinka by the Bolshevik troops) from the main forces of the UNR army, created a revolutionary committee (atamans Volokh, Zagrodsky, Kolodiy), which also announced its transition to the Soviet platform. On March 22, in Kamenetz-Podolsky, under the chairmanship of V. Chekhovsky, the Committee for the Protection of the Republic was formed from representatives of the USDRP and the UPSR (central current). He formulated his program as follows: 1) protection of order and peace; 2) an agreement with the Directory on the immediate termination of negotiations with the French command in Odessa and the development of negotiations with the Soviet government of Ukraine on the basis of the recognition by the Soviet governments of Ukraine and Russia of the independence of Ukraine, the withdrawal of Bolshevik troops from the territory of Ukraine and the formation of a new Ukrainian government. Although this committee self-liquidated on March 28, it dealt a serious blow to the pro-Entente positions in the Directory and the government of S. Ostapenko. The efforts of the government of the UNR seemed absolutely futile, since he could not manage to move the negotiations with the French off the ground.

General d "Anselm was interested in involving Ukrainian troops in the fight against the Bolsheviks, but was in no hurry to help them with weapons. He further insisted on the removal of Petliura and Andrievsky from their posts and did not support the idea of ​​​​recognizing the independence of Ukraine by the Entente. All this stalled the negotiations. In addition in March it became clear that the Entente did not have the strength to deploy large-scale military operations in Ukraine and Russia.As a result of Bolshevik propaganda, its troops disintegrated.In March, under pressure from the Red Army, which consisted mainly of the rebel units of Ataman N. Grigoriev, they had to leave Kherson and Nikolaev, and in early April - Odessa. It became obvious that the orientation towards the Entente would not bring the desired results in the near future. On April 9, in Rivne, members of the Directory of S. Petliura and A. Makarenko authorized the creation of a new (again socialist) government of the UNR, headed by B Martos It included A. Livitsky, N. Kovalevsky, I. Mazepa, G. Sirotenko. Since the Directory did not formally stop negotiations with the Entente, the appointment of a new government testified to the collapse of the pro-Entente orientation, which did not provide the UNR with foreign policy support and even led to significant social complications, isolating the UNR government from the masses, which made it possible for the Bolsheviks to seize power over most of Ukraine. The reorganization of the government was a desperate attempt to get out of the political trap in which the Directory fell.

The political situation in the UNR in April - June 1919

On April 12, the government of B. Martos announced its “program declaration”. It said that the independence of the Ukrainian people was hindered by two enemies: the “Polish pandom” and the “Osat communist Bolshevik army.” The new UNR government called on all Ukrainian political and social forces "to prevent foreigners from completely destroying their native land", to rise up to fight for a free and independent Ukraine. The cabinet of B. Martos, in contrast to the previous government, solemnly declared that "it will not call for help from someone else's military force from any state." Declaring self-orientation, the new government promised to pay special attention to providing for the army and the families of military personnel, as well as to actually carry out the unification of western and eastern Ukrainian lands proclaimed in Kyiv on January 22, 1919.

Trying to combine the democratic state system with the Soviet one, the government provided for control over the activities of the authorities by the workers' and peasants' labor councils. The peasants were promised a democratic land reform, the workers - assistance in restoring the work of factories and factories, the free functioning of trade unions. The mentioned declaration did not contain a single word about the possibility of negotiating with the Soviet government of Ukraine. After all, by that time the enthusiasm of the broad masses, caused by the winter of 1919, the Bolshevik slogans, had already evaporated. Having seized power in Ukraine, the Bolsheviks moved from populist promises to the policy of "war communism", an integral part of which was the nationalization of the land, the use of the land fund for the creation of state farms and communes, the restriction of free trade, and the delivery of grain to the state through surplus appropriation. All this raised the village against the communist regime. Already in April, the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR outlawed the chieftains of Zeleny, Sokolovsky, and Batrak. Peasant anti-communist actions and uprisings that swept Ukraine encouraged the government of B. Martos. It was on the alliance with the rebels and the political currents that led this movement (Ukrainian Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Independent Social Democrats) that the UHP government staked, proclaiming a course on its own forces. But this time, too, the government of B. Martos failed to finally unite the national forces into a united front. And the Directory itself lacked unity. A. Andrievsky and E. Petrushevich did not agree with the creation of the leftist government of B. Martos. Sharp disagreements arose between them, S. Petliura and A. Makarenko. “Member of the Directory A. Andrievsky simply did not recognize this government, rallying around him in Galicia the former Ostapenko ministers and, in general, all the dissatisfied atamans, former top members of the government, and now unemployed bourgeois politicians,” noted P. Khristyuk. The conservative Ukrainian forces, just like the democratic ones in their time, did not want to admit their defeat and join the national liberation struggle under the slogans proposed by the government of B. Martos.

E. Petrushevich

The most indicative from this point of view was the speech of Ataman V. Oskilko, the commander of the Volyn group of the UNR army. V. Oskilko - a young man from the people's teachers - belonged to the party of independent socialists and was under the influence of A. Andrievsky. Relying on the commander, the independent socialists and people's republicans launched agitation among the troops of the group against the new government and S. Petliura. When the latter issued an order to dismiss the commander, V. Oskilko, having pulled up troops to Rovno, on April 29, 1919, rebelled, arrested members of the government and declared himself the chief ataman of the UHP army. The rebellion failed, the army refused to obey V. Oskilko, but the performance completely undermined its strength. On May 5, the government of B. Martos was forced to leave Rovno and evacuate to Radivilov. Members of the Directory S. Petlyura, F. Shvets, A. Makarenko also moved there from Zdolbunov. On May 9, they elected S. Petliura as the head of the Directory, and on May 13, at a meeting with the government, A. Andrievsky was removed from its composition. However, these organizational and political actions failed to improve the situation.

On May 14, the Polish army under the command of General Haller, formed in France to fight the Bolsheviks, launched an offensive in North-Western Volhynia against the troops of the UNR. A huge amount of ammunition and ammunition, which were stored in warehouses in Lutsk, fell into the hands of the Poles. Having lost the remnants of their own territory, the Directory, the government and the army of the UNR were forced to retreat to the territory of the ZO UNR. First they stopped in Krasnoye and Zolochiv, and then moved to Ternopil.

V. P. Oskilko

In early June, Wener's troops found themselves in a narrow sack between two enemy armies: the Polish one, which captured Ternopil, and the Bolshevik one, which controlled Volochisk. The advanced detachments of these armies were separated by a strip no more than 10–20 km wide. It should be added to this that in the spring of 1919, after the appointment of the government of B. Martos by the Directory, relations between the leadership of the UHP and the RO of the UNR deteriorated sharply.

Despite the unfavorable conditions, in May-June the command managed to reorganize the UNR army on a regular basis. On May 13, a law was adopted on the state military inspection, headed by Colonel V. Kedrovsky. The inspection helped to increase the combat capability of the army. In early June, the UNR army launched a counteroffensive against the Bolshevik troops and reached the Starokonstantinov-Proskurov-Kamenets-Podolsky line. On June 6, the UNR government returned to its own territory. For several months, Kamenetz-Podolsky became his place of residence. A new page in the history of the UNR has begun.

Hot summer and autumn 1919

With the return to its own territory, the government of the UNR became more active, striving at all costs to implement the self-orientation declared in April. In this regard, it attached particular importance to the insurrectionary movement, which was widely deployed in the rear of the Bolsheviks. On June 9, negotiations between the government and representatives of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, which led the insurgent movement in Right-Bank Ukraine, ended in Cherny Ostrov. On behalf of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, negotiations were conducted by the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social Democrats (independents) D. Odria, T. Cherkassky, I. Chasnyk, A. Pesotsky. The parties came to an agreement that the Rovno declaration of the government remains in effect, but labor councils are formed on the ground not only with control, but also with administrative and economic functions of power. D. Odrina and T. Cherkassky entered the government of B. Martos.

On June 20, the UNR military delegation headed by General S. Delvig signed in Lviv a temporary agreement with representatives of the Polish army on the cessation of hostilities, the establishment of a demarcation line between the Polish and Ukrainian armies. This was a notable success for the government of the UNR, since it eliminated the need to fight on two fronts and created the opportunity to concentrate all the armed forces against the Bolsheviks.

At the same time, a number of important problems had to be solved. The government of B. Martos never managed to overcome the barrier that separated the democratic and liberal Ukrainian political circles. On June 29, twenty Ukrainian politicians, mostly representatives of the Socialist-Federalist Party, published in the press “Memorandum of public figures of Podolia to the Directory of the UNR”, in which they pointed out the mistakes of the state power, demanded that the Directory be reformed into a “temporary one-man presidency with a certain temporary constitution” to form a cabinet ministers on professional and not party principles, repeal the decree on labor councils and resolve the land issue by buying out the land by the peasants. However, they declared that they would not fight politically against the government.

Relations between the government and the western region of the UNR remained tense. On June 9, the Presidium of the Ukrainian National Council proclaimed E. Petrushevich the dictator of the ZO of the UNR, which could not but cause a negative reaction from the democratically oriented elite of the UPR. “We could in no way justify such a step on the part of the responsible representatives of the Galician society, which waged its national liberation struggle under the slogans of people's right,” wrote I. Mazepa. - Therefore, we believed that the act of June 9 was illegal. In other words, the Directory and the government saw a coup d'état in the act of proclaiming the dictatorship, and therefore did not recognize Petrushevich's dictatorship as legitimate. institute". In order to demonstrate its negative attitude towards the proclamation of the dictatorship of E. Petrushevich, on July 4 the Directory decided to create a special ministry within the government of the UNR for the affairs of the ZO of the UNR, and E. Petrushevich was removed from the Directory.

For his part, E. Petrushevich did not recognize the armistice agreement with the Poles signed by the delegation of General S. Delvig, since in early June the Ukrainian Galician Army (UGA) successfully launched an offensive in the Chertkov area. In a word, in June, relations between the Directory and the leadership of the DA UHP became completely cold. And then something happened that was supposed to happen when agreement disappears between comrades.

In mid-June, the Red Army, having strengthened its units in the Proskurov area, stopped the UNR army and launched a counteroffensive. In early July, the Reds were a few dozen kilometers from Kamenetz-Podolsk. There was no way to retreat because of the unsettled relations with Poland and Romania. The loss of Kamenetz-Podolsky threatened the UNR with complete liquidation.

Things were no better on the right bank of the Zbruch. The successfully launched Chertkovskaya operation stopped. On June 25, the Council of Ten of the Paris Peace Conference allowed the Poles to continue military operations up to the Zbruch line. On June 28, the Polish army launched an offensive, and the UGA was forced to retreat. The situation prompted both the Uenerites and the Galicians to join forces, but E. Petrushevich and the command of the UGA hesitated, considering the possibility of moving to Romanian territory. Only Romania's refusal to accept the UGA forced them to enter into negotiations with the UNR government. E. Petrushevich put forward three conditions for cooperation: a democratic policy without deviations towards the Soviet system, the replacement of the B. Martos government, the liquidation of the Ministry of Affairs of the 30 UNR. Given the critical state of affairs, the Directory agreed with him.

On July 15, the UGA crossed to the left bank of the Zbruch, and the two armies united to fight on the Bolshevik front. The UNR saved itself from a possible military catastrophe, but in political terms, the unification did not bring the desired unity. E. Petrushevich moved to Kamianets-Podilskyi with state services of the 30th UNR, which sheltered both Ukrainian state centers. The arrival of the dictator of the 30th UNR activated the center-right Ukrainian political forces, which announced the formation of the Ukrainian National-State Union. In early August, the union submitted a program declaration to the head of the Directory, S. Petlyura, in which he sharply criticized the socialist course of the government of B. Martos. A kind of dual power arose in Kamenetz-Podolsk. “In essence, it was a struggle of different understanding of the then revolutionary events in Ukraine, and therefore to a different approach to determining the immediate tasks of the Ukrainian leadership,” noted one of the participants in these events. - Ukrainian socialists proceeded from the assessment of the revolution as a socio-historical process of great importance, and so, taking into account the revolutionary moods of the masses, they tried to use them in the interests of the Ukrainian liberation struggle by appropriate policies. Right-wing Ukrainian groups, on the contrary, looked at the revolutionary events for the most part as a “consequence of the activity” of the left parties, therefore they defined their immediate tasks as if there were no revolutionary movement in Ukraine at that time.

Under such circumstances, a unified Ukrainian leadership could be formed either through a coup d'état (but none of the parties dared to do so), or through concessions and compromises. S. Petliura began to lean toward the need to change the political course and replenish the government with center-right figures. On August 12, a new government declaration was signed, which stated that the government of the UHP should rely on the entire people, involve all sections of society in state work, and also about the creation in the near future of reformed local governments based on a popular, secret, equal and proportional suffrage, to hold elections for a parliament that would have the rights of a Constituent Assembly. The government called on "the democracy of Ukraine of all nationalities to support the actions of the government aimed at the implementation of a democratic system in Ukraine and, together with the Ukrainian democracy, build an independent and independent Ukrainian People's Republic." Thus, the turn to parliamentary democracy was proclaimed.

After this declaration, B. Martos, whose relations with the Directory deteriorated, left the post of head of government. On August 27, a new composition of the Cabinet of Ministers was formed. It was headed by I. Mazepa. A socialist-federalist I. Ogiyenko appeared in the government. In addition, the portfolios of ministers of foreign affairs and education were offered to this party. However, the Esefs could not find suitable candidates to fill these posts. The reorganization of the government changed little in the relations of the Directory with the opposition.

The discrepancies mentioned above were also reflected in the unification of the armed forces, which was only of an operational nature. The total number of fighters in both armies reached 80 thousand, of which 45 thousand were in the UGA. On August 11, the Headquarters of the Chief Ataman was created for the operational management of the joint forces. It was headed by General N. Yunakiv.

After the operational unification of the armies, a successful offensive against the Bolsheviks was launched. In July, the Red Army, which was simultaneously fighting with General A. Denikin, left Proskurov, Novaya Ushitsa, Vapnyarka. In early August, Ukrainian units captured Zhmerinka and Vinnitsa.

I. I. Ogienko

After the creation of the Headquarters of the Chief Ataman, it was decided to start a general campaign of the Ukrainian armies against the Bolsheviks. When determining the direction of the strategic strike, opinions were divided. The command of the UNR army considered the march to Kyiv as its main goal, and the command of the UGA offered to capture Odessa in order to establish contacts with the Entente, and only then launch an offensive against Kyiv. Both sides agreed to a compromise: they decided to attack both Kyiv and Odessa at the same time. Units of the UNR army launched an offensive against Odessa, and mixed units under the general leadership of the UGA General A. Kravs attacked Kyiv. On August 30, his group captured Kyiv. Developing the offensive of the UNR army in Right-Bank Ukraine, its command hoped that before the end of the fight against the Bolsheviks, it would be possible to avoid a direct armed conflict with the Whites. General of the UNR army V. Salsky, analyzing the strategic and political situation in Ukraine in 1919, wrote that the Ukrainian army in no way considered Denikin’s enemies to be its enemies, “the mutual struggle seemed so meaningless and unnecessary in front of the common enemy." Generals N. Yunakiv, V. Sinclair, colonels M. Kapustyansky, I. Omelyanovich-Pavlenko, who at that time held high staff positions in the UNR army, spoke out for reaching agreements with the Volunteer Army. S. Petliura suggested that the natural demarcation line between the Whites and Ukrainians would be the Dnieper. The expectations of the Ukrainians were not justified. A few hours after the occupation of Kyiv by the Ukrainian units of General A. Kravs, the White Guard Denikin units of General N. Bredov entered the city from the east. Immediately there was a conflict. After the ultimatum demands of the whites, General A. Kravs withdrew Ukrainian troops from Kyiv to the Ignatievka-Vasilkov-Germanovka line. A new hotbed of tension arose, the cause of which was A. Denikin's frank Ukrainophobia, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Accordingly, a hostile attitude towards whites began to form on the Ukrainian side. On September 24, the Directory, by a special declaration signed by the dictator of the ZO of the UNR E. Petrushevich, declared war on Denikin’s people and called on all Ukrainians, “who cares about the democratic united conciliar Ukrainian Republic”, to a decisive last battle with the enemy. A few days before. On September 20, in Zhmerinka, an agreement was signed between the command of the UHP army and the headquarters of the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine (Makhnovists) on a common fight against volunteers.

N. Yunakiv

A. Krovs

On September 26, desperate battles unfolded in Right-Bank Ukraine between the UHP army and the White Guards, commanded by General Y. Slashchev. On October 25, Ukrainian units began to lose combat effectiveness due to a typhus epidemic, lack of weapons and equipment. The autumn hostilities revealed not only the insufficient preparation of the army, but also the general weakness of the Ukrainian state apparatus. According to P. Fedenko, the lack of trained personnel both in the army and in the state apparatus became a huge obstacle in the struggle for the independence of Ukraine. The drama of the situation was aggravated by the old disease - discord. Denikin's propaganda aimed at separating the UGA from the rest of the army of the U IIP proved to be effective. On November 4, in Zhmerinka, at a meeting with the participation of members of the Directory, the high command and the government, it became clear that the command of the UGA, defeated by typhus, was striving for a truce with Denikin, but preventive measures aimed at preventing contacts between the command of the UGA and the Whites were not taken. As a result, on November 6, at the Zyatkovtsy station, on the instructions of the commander of the UGA, General M. Tarnavsky, a truce was signed between the armed forces of the South of Russia and the Ukrainian Galician army. By order of the dictator of the ZO UHP, this separate and secret agreement was canceled, and General Tarnavsky was put on trial. But the agreement did its job - the UGA, being in a serious condition, finally lost its combat capability.

V. P. Salsky

On November 12, the dictator of the ZO of the UNR, E. Petrushevich, convened a meeting of representatives of Galician political and public organizations, the Directorate and the government of the UNR in Kamyanets-Podilskyi, at which he stated that the creation of an independent Ukraine was unrealistic and that an agreement should be reached with Denikin. On November 16, he and the government of the 30 UNR left Ukraine, heading for Vienna. In Odessa, General O. Mikitka, who was appointed commander of the UGA, signed a new agreement with Denikin, according to which the Galician army was transferred to the full disposal of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the South of Russia.

On November 16, Polish troops entered Kamenetz-Podolsky. S. Petlyura, who was entrusted with the "supreme command of the affairs of the Republic", went to Proskurov, and members of the Directory A. Makarenko and F. Shvets went abroad. On December 2, at a meeting in Chertorye, S. Petliura and members of the government decided to suspend regular army operations and switch to partisan forms of struggle. The next day, the government addressed the population of Ukraine with a corresponding appeal. A few days later, S. Petlyura, having appointed General M. Omelyanovich-Pavlenko as commander of the army, left for Warsaw. On December 6, at a meeting of government members with the command in Novaya Chertoryya, it was finally decided to carry out a partisan raid on the rear of Denikin by the army.

Ukrainian People's Republic in 1920

The November catastrophe of 1919 dealt a crushing psychological blow to the Ukrainian political forces. Many leading statesmen went abroad, and only a small part of the members of the government, headed by I. Mazepa, remained in Ukraine. On December 6, the 5,000-strong UPR army, consisting of cavalry and infantry mounted on carts, launched a raid on Denikin's rear. The raid eventually became known as the "First Winter Campaign". Having broken through the enemy front between Kozyatyn and Kalinovka, the army quickly marched to the southeast. A week later, she ended up in the Lipovets area, and on December 24 she captured Vinnitsa, where she met with separate parts of the UGA. Immediately, an agreement was signed on the unification of the Ukrainian armies, but the commander of the UGA, General O. Mykytka, did not approve it, and it remained unrealized. On December 31, the UNR army entered Uman. During the first half of 1920, when the Bolsheviks again took power in Ukraine, the UNR army carried out raids in Right-Bank Ukraine under extremely harsh conditions, experiencing great difficulties due to the lack of weapons and equipment. The "Winter Campaign" was of great moral and political significance, as it stimulated the Ukrainian movement, supported the insurgent peasant detachments, which, growing in numbers and strengthening, opposed the Bolshevik policy of "war communism". P. Fedenko called the "Winter Campaign" "the enzyme of the nation", which had a positive impact on the continuation of the national liberation struggle, supported the faith and desire of the masses to defend an independent Ukraine. A participant in these events, at that time the head of the UNR government, I. Mazepa, noted that during the five months of the campaign, “the army never bowed the national flag. Save yourself mentally and physically. The population fed and clothed the army, provided it with everything it needed and helped in every way, as they saw in it their army, which fought for the interests of the people.

G Chief Ataman of the UHP Troops S. Petliura, in the presence of Prime Minister of the Government of the UNP L. Livitsky, Generals V. Salsky and V. Petriv, Minister of Education I. Ogiyenko, receives a report from the commander of the honorary hundred of the cadet school. Kamenetz-Podolsky, 1920

The "winter campaign" ended on May 6, 1920. In the meantime, the political situation had changed significantly. In Ukraine, after the defeat of Denikin, Soviet power was restored, but the Bolshevik regime remained isolated in the international arena. Western Ukraine was occupied by Polish troops, although it was considered under the control of the Paris Peace Conference, which was supposed to finally determine its future fate. Wener's politicians found themselves once again in political isolation. Again there was a problem of choice.

A. I. Denikin

In December 1919, the Ukrainian National Council was established in Kamianets-Podilsky, occupied by the Poles, headed by the esef M. Korchinsky. The Council became in opposition to the Directory, advocated the liquidation of the latter, as well as the reorganization of the government, considering them to be the culprits of the disaster. At that time, different political groups tried to shift the responsibility for failures to one another. January 29, 1920 in the same Kamenetz-Podolsky held a meeting of the Central Committee of the USDRP. This party did not enter the National Council and continued to support the government. The meeting of the Central Committee was attended by the head of the UNR government I. Mazepa. Current issues were discussed. The adopted resolution spoke of the need to preserve the Cabinet of Ministers until the convocation of the Pre-Parliament with legislative functions, as well as the need to restore the state center of the UHP, the regular army, and to determine the competence of the Directory through the adoption of a special law. The meeting was categorically against inviting foreign troops to the territory of Ukraine. The Government of the UNR at a meeting on February 14 adopted the "Temporary Law on the State Structure and Legislation of the UNR", thus creating the preconditions for the convocation of the Pre-Parliament. After that, the government suspended its activities, and its head, I. Mazepa, went to the army of the Winter Campaign.

On March 11, 1920, Ukrainian-Polish negotiations resumed in Warsaw. As early as the end of 1919, under extremely unfavorable conditions, under pressure from the Polish side, the Ukrainian diplomatic mission was forced to recognize the Zbruch River as the border between both states and further along the line through North-Western Volhynia. When negotiations resumed in March 1920, representatives of the Polish government took a hard line on the definition of the border line, making it clear to the Wener delegation that if their conditions (the border along Zbruch and Volhynia) were not accepted, they would agree to an agreement with Soviet Ukraine.

On April 21, 1920, after lengthy negotiations in Warsaw, an agreement was concluded between the UNR and Poland, according to which the latter recognized the "Directory of the independent Ukrainian People's Republic, headed by the chief ataman S. Petlyura, as the supreme power of the UNR" . The Polish government assumed obligations not to enter into any agreements with third countries hostile to Ukraine. Poland recognized for the UNR the right to the territory east of the Polish border of 1772. So, Ukraine had to pay for the treaty at the cost of huge territorial concessions. Eastern Galicia, Kholmshchyna, Podlyashye, part of Polissya and seven districts of Volyn departed to Poland.

The agreement had a secret character, but in general terms it was known in Ukraine. It aroused great indignation, especially in Galicia, whose struggle for an independent Ukraine was called into question. For the head of the UNR government, I. Mazepa, the Warsaw Pact came as a surprise; in May 1920, he resigned. The new government was formed by Egef V. Prokopovich.

The Warsaw Pact contained, in addition to a political convention, also a military one, according to which on April 25, 1920, the combined armed forces of Poland and the UNR went on the offensive against the Red Army. At first, two Ukrainian divisions took part in the fighting. On April 27, one of them under the command of A. Udovichenko captured Mogilev. In early May, the army of the "Winter Campaign" joined the combined forces and began to fight on the right flank of the 6th Polish Army. On May 6, Polish-Ukrainian troops captured Kyiv. After that, hostilities acquired for some time a positional character, since the Poles, having reached the borders of 1772, did not want to continue the offensive. The Ukrainian army itself did not have enough forces for this. As of June 1, 1920, it consisted of 9100 officers and men. The Poles allies prevented its further deployment.

In early June, the Soviet command regrouped and strengthened its forces by redeploying S. Budyonny's 1st Cavalry Army from the Caucasus. On June 13, after the Budyonnovists broke through the front of the 4th Polish Army, the Allies began a rapid retreat. On July 13, the UNR army withdrew beyond the Zbruch, for two weeks it fought defensive battles on the line of this river. On July 26, the army commander, General M. Omelyanovich-Pavlenko, was forced to give an order to retreat beyond the Seret, and on August 18, the UNR army crossed the Dniester.

In September, after the Battle of Warsaw, in which Ukrainian troops also took part, a new Polish-Ukrainian offensive unfolded. Having crossed the Dniester in mid-September, the UNR army defeated units of the 14th Soviet army and captured the territory between the Dniester and Zbruch rivers. On September 19, Ukrainian and Polish troops captured Ternopil, and on September 27 - Proskurov.

But these were temporary tactical successes. On October 12, an armistice agreement was reached between the Polish and Soviet sides in Riga. The Poles decided not to continue the war any longer, for this they did not have enough strength, and the conditions proposed by the Soviet side suited them quite well. Of course, the Riga armistice did not comply with the terms of the Warsaw Pact, but the Poles turned a blind eye to this. In fact, the small army of the UNR was left alone against the Bolsheviks. In November, she occupied the front from the Yaruga over the Dniester, along the Murafa River and further through Bar to Volkovintsy. In search of allies for further struggle against the Bolsheviks, on November 5, representatives of the UNR government signed a military convention with the Russian Political Committee headed by B. Savinkov, which recognized the state independence of the UNR. But that was little consolation. Everyone understood that after the completion of the defeat of the troops of General P. Wrangel in the Crimea, it would be impossible to resist the Red Army. On November 21, the UNR army, after defensive battles, was forced to retreat beyond Zbruch, where it was interned by Polish troops. As early as November 14, the government of the UNR, headed by A. Livitsky, left Kamyanets-Podilsky, saying goodbye to their native land forever. The government found a home in Tarnow near Krakow.

On March 18, 1921, a peace treaty was signed in Riga between Poland and Soviet Russia. Poland, in exchange for territorial concessions by the Soviet side, similar to those that took place in the Warsaw Pact, recognized Soviet Ukraine and pledged to ban all anti-Bolshevik organizations, including the UNR government, from staying on its territory. The Riga Peace Treaty put an end to the existence of the UNR, the struggle for which lasted 4 years. It was a period of revival and consolidation of the Ukrainian nation, the formation and formation of national-state institutions and political parties, the strengthening of national consciousness in all sectors of society. Although the Ukrainian democratic statehood did not resist, it declared itself in full voice. The Bolsheviks, in founding a new type of state, had to reckon with the Ukrainian question, to establish their power in the form of national statehood.

5. Reds and Whites in Ukraine

Military-political expansion of Bolshevism to Ukraine in 1919

The attempt of the Bolsheviks to extend Soviet power to the territory of Ukraine in early 1918 proved to be short-lived and unsuccessful. The Central Rada, with the help of the Austro-German troops, forced their armed formations out of Ukraine. Signing in Brest in early March 1918 a peace treaty with the countries of the Quadruple Union, the Bolsheviks undertook to recognize the UNR as a sovereign state, sign a peace treaty with it and delimit the territories. However, they did not want to come to terms with such a geopolitical reality, which called into question the plans for the deployment of the world revolution. Although their party doctrine formally proclaimed the right of oppressed nations to self-determination, the communist strategy assumed the unity of action of the proletariat regardless of its nationality. The Bolsheviks consistently adhered to this strategy in relation to Ukraine, only sometimes bashfully using the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination as a fig leaf. Indicative in this regard was the creation of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. Ukrainian national communists have been talking about creating a separate Communist Party since the end of 1917, but they were not successful. And only in July 1918 did the Central Committee of the RCP(b) decide to convene the founding congress of the CP(b)U. This was done secretly and, of course, in Moscow. The 212 delegates assembled at the congress with decisive and advisory votes represented 4,364 party members. The CP(b)U was created not as an independent party, but as a regional organization of the RCP(b). An expressive detail: this latter, as the ruling party of Russia, having recognized the sovereignty of Ukraine, illegally began to form in its ranks a structure that was intended to play the role of a Ukrainian political party, and its goal was formulated quite unambiguously: “to fight for the revolutionary unification of Ukraine with Russia on the basis of proletarian centralism in limits of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic on the way to the creation of a world proletarian commune". It is indicative that the 1st Congress of the CP(b)U, having rejected legal methods of struggle, forbade its primary organizations to interact with other political parties of Ukraine and set a course for preparing an armed uprising, again under the slogan of "restoring the revolutionary reunification of Ukraine with Russia."

For this purpose, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine, headed by G. Pyatakov, created the Central Military Revolutionary Committee, which on August 5, 1918 issued "Order No. 1" on the beginning of a general armed uprising in Ukraine. However, this time things didn't work out. The centers of the uprising, which broke out only in certain areas of the Chernihiv region, were suppressed by the German troops without much difficulty.

The defeat forced the Bolsheviks to change tactics. Due to the lack of forces on the territory of Ukraine, from the end of the summer of 1918, they began to form detachments in the "neutral zone" - a narrow 10-kilometer strip along the northern border of Ukraine with Russia, created by agreement between the German and Soviet commands. Here they had no right to operate the troops of either side. Nevertheless, it was tactically convenient and beneficial for the Russian Soviet government to accumulate troops in the “neutral zone” for a future offensive against Ukraine, since it was not formally responsible for them. Although these units were called the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Insurgent Divisions, their organization, supplies and weapons were controlled and carried out by the Russian side. True, the total number of divisions did not exceed 6 thousand soldiers. This was not enough for an attack on Ukraine. And such an immediate task was not set before them until a certain moment. In order to avoid a direct confrontation with the Germans, Lenin complied with the terms of the Brest peace agreement. In the end, the Bolsheviks completely lost the initiative on the territory of Ukraine. On October 17, the 2nd Congress of the CP(b)U opened in Moscow. “Recognizing that mass terror is necessary to weaken the enemy...,” its resolution noted, “the party strongly and categorically speaks out against such a guerrilla war, especially in the border zone, which could draw the workers of Ukraine and Russia into an untimely general action or make it easier for the German command to introduce anger and rallying into occupation troops against Soviet Russia.

So, just when Ukraine was preparing for a nationwide uprising, "defenders of the interests of the workers and peasants", having made another strategic miscalculation, opposed the uprising. The CP(b)U limited its tasks to terror and the resolution of organizational issues.

But the Bolsheviks quickly realized their mistake. The plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, held at the end of October 1918 in Moscow, supported the previously established Central Military Revolutionary Committee on the territory of Ukraine as an organ of the uprising. However, there could be no talk of a broad action without the support of the Central Committee of the RCP(b). Things got off the ground only after the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR on November 11 ordered the Revolutionary Military Council of the republic to prepare troops for a campaign in Ukraine for 10 days. For intervention on November 1, 7, by a common decision of the Central Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan11 (b) and the RSFSR RNC, a governing body was created called the Revolutionary Military Council of the Kursk Direction Forces Group. It included V. Antonov-Ovseenko, I. Stalin and V. Zatonsky. The very same group of troops consisted of two Ukrainian and several Russian divisions. At the end of December, it numbered about 22 thousand fighters.

On November 28, at the direction of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraine was created in Kursk. It is located in the city of Sudzha. The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR V. Chicherin, in response to the question of the head of the government of the UNR V. Chekhivsky, on what grounds Russia is conducting an armed offensive against Ukraine, officially answered that there are no Russian troops in Ukraine, and the Directory is dealing with the troops of the Ukrainian Soviet government, which is acting completely independent of Russia.

The Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraine did not show itself in any way. At the end of November, it issued a manifesto on the overthrow of the hetman's power, and then mired in internal intrigues. Supporters of the head of government Y. Pyatakov and government member Artem (F. Sergeev) could not find a common language for a long time. Finally, the government crisis was overcome in Moscow by appointing H. Rakovsky as the new head of the Soviet government of Ukraine. Arriving in Kharkov, he prepared a document that clearly demonstrated the nature and tasks of the Ukrainian Soviet government and the command of the Bolshevik troops. We quote this document in full: “1. The Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraine was created by a decree of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, is its body and carries out all orders and orders of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party unconditionally. 2. The Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraine, not being, in essence, independent, did not create and is not going to create its own independent command, calling the Revolutionary Military Council of the Kursk direction "Revolutionary Military Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Army" solely in order to be able to talk about the Soviet army of Ukraine , and not about the offensive of the Russian troops, that is, to continue the policy that was started by the formation of the Provisional Workers 'and Peasants' Government of Ukraine. This renaming by no means meant and does not mean any change in essence, especially since the personnel of this Revolutionary Military Council was not determined by us, but by the central institution of the RSFSR and behind the scenes it is the same Revolutionary Military Council of the Kursk Direction Forces Group, which received only a different sign for Ukraine.

The "government crisis" in the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraine by no means hindered the offensive of the Soviet troops. On January 3, they captured Kharkov, and the next day, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian Front was created, which was tasked with advancing in two directions: south through Kharkov-Donbass and Kyiv, reach the Dnieper line and gain a foothold in the most important cities of the Dnieper region: Kyiv , Cherkassy, ​​Kremenchug, Yekaterinoslav, Aleksandrovsk. By mid-February 1919, it was completed. By the beginning of April 1919, the troops of the Ukrainian Front, reinforced by Ukrainian insurgent detachments, took control of the vast majority of the territory of Ukraine. The rebels of N. Grigoriev, reorganized first into a brigade, and then into a division, captured Nikolaev, Kherson, Odessa and forced the Entente landing to leave Ukraine. For effective combat operations, N. Grigoriev was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of War. In April-May, fierce battles in the Donbass were fought by the detachments of N. Makhno, who captured Berdyansk and Mariupol.

The beginning of the spring of 1919 for the Soviet leadership was a period of great hopes and expectations. It was confident in the swift and inevitable victory of the world revolution. Since November 1918, Germany and the former Austria-Hungary were engulfed in revolutionary flames, in March 1919, Soviet power was proclaimed in Hungary. Speaking on April 7 at a solemn meeting of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, the commander of the Ukrainian Front, V. Antonov-Ovseenko, announced with revolutionary pathos: “The revolution is moving forward. Following Hungary, the movement is being transferred to other countries, and this movement will be further strengthened with the advance of our Red Army. In Kyiv, we are standing in the corridor that leads to Europe.

On March 23, Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army I. Vatsetis reported to V. Lenin a long-term plan for the combined actions of the Red and Soviet Hungarian armies. On the same day, he sent a directive to the commander of the Ukrainian Front, which ordered to advance troops in the direction of the borders of Bukovina and Galicia. Thus, Ukraine was seen by the Bolshevik leadership as an advantageous strategic springboard for an offensive against Europe. At the same time, it was also considered as a food source capable of saving the Land of the Soviets from starvation.

On January 6, 1919, by decree of the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraine, which had moved to Kharkiv a few days earlier, Ukraine was proclaimed the "Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic" (Ukrainian SSR). Although Ukraine officially received the status of an independent "Soviet Republic", already on January 25, the government of Kh. Rakovsky declared the need to unite the Ukrainian SSR with the RSFSR on the basis of a socialist federation. In the Ukrainian SSR, a policy began to be consistently implemented, which in the RSFSR had already developed into an integral system of centralization of political and economic life (over time, it was called "war communism"). The features of this policy will be considered in more detail in the next section, but here we only briefly outline its characteristic manifestations.

At the end of March 1919, the commodity funds of the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR were merged, they were placed at the disposal of a special commission of the Supreme Economic Council of the RSFSR. A common economic policy was established, and on June 1, 1919, a military-political union of the Soviet republics was formed, which involved the unification of the armed forces under a single command, the unification of the economic management system, and a common financial system. It is not difficult to imagine that under such conditions “Ukrainian independence” was purely declarative.

The Bolsheviks immediately made it clear that they were not going to share power with any of the Ukrainian left parties, which recognized the Soviet form of power and did a lot to spread it in Ukraine. The 3rd congress of the CP(b)U, which took place in March 1919, like the two previous ones, spoke out in favor of the inexpediency of concluding political agreements with the Ukrainian petty-bourgeois parties.

In the economic sphere, an attempt was made to directly introduce communist relations, as a result of which the industry practically stopped working. There was a rupture of economic ties between the city and the countryside. As a result, the domestic political situation in Ukraine has changed dramatically. Artyom (F. Sergeev), who left Kharkov after the January “government crisis”, returning to the city in early April, reported to the secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b): “In the workers’ quarters, we have lost a lot of the influence that we had. A mood is growing against us, which will be very difficult to fight. In the strongest factories, where there were no or almost no Mensheviks, where they could not appear, they are now listened to with attention and zealously applauded. The Ukrainian peasantry reacted much more radically to "war communism".

The dissatisfaction of the peasantry with the policy of “war communism” began to manifest itself from the end of the winter of 1919. On February 21, a telegram was received from Alexandria addressed to the head of the Soviet government of Ukraine Kh. recognize as a single popular - Soviet power, but "chosen freely, without violence from any side." The resolution of the congress demanded equal representation for workers and peasants at the future 3rd All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, the issuance of a law on the socialization of land, protested against the arrests by the VUCHK of members of "our peasant party of the Ukrainian Left Socialist Revolutionaries" .

On March 28, the Kommunist newspaper (an organ of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U) wrote: "At the last congresses of soviets, the blind hatred of the prosperous peasantry for the communes and communism was especially pronounced." On April 10, a congress of representatives of the 71st volosts of Aleksandrovsky, Berdyanek, Bakhmut, Pavlogradsky districts and delegates of the 3rd Zadneprovskaya brigade of N. Makhno took place in Gulyai-Pole, the agenda of which included the current political situation, land and food issues. Discussing them, the delegates came to the conclusion that the party of "Communist-Bolsheviks", having seized state power, does not shy away from anything in order to retain and secure it for itself. As noted in the Gulyai-Polye resolution, the 3rd All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets did not become "a real and free expression of the will of the working people." The delegates protested against the methods used by the Bolshevik commissars and agents of the Cheka, and also demanded the socialization of the land, the replacement of the food policy and "requisition detachments with a correct system of commodity exchange between town and countryside", complete freedom of speech, press, and assembly for leftist political movements. The clear and irreconcilable position of the Gulyai-Polye congress aggravated the relations between the authors of the policy of "war communism" and N. Makhno.

Peasant dissatisfaction was not limited to the adoption of resolutions, in the spring of 1919 it spilled over into the anti-communist insurrectionary movement. In January, Ataman Zeleny (D. Terpilo) broke ties with the UNR army and announced the transition to the Soviet platform, and in March raised an anti-communist uprising. On April 1, 1919, the government of the Ukrainian SSR outlawed it. A few days later, the government outlawed the atamans Sokolovsky, Gonchar (Batrak), Orlovsky. The number of anti-communist speeches grew rapidly. In April, according to the NKVS, there were over 90 of them. At first, uprisings broke out in the Kyiv, Chernigov and Poltava provinces, and then covered the entire territory of the Ukrainian SSR. As the Bolshevik leaders themselves admitted, in 1919 Soviet power in Ukraine did not extend beyond the boundaries of provincial and district centers.

The official Bolshevik ideology called the insurrectionary anti-communist movement an exclusively kulak counter-revolution. The concept of "fist", which did not have a clear social and economic content, was most often used as a political bogey in the struggle against the peasantry. The April (1919) plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U defined the "merciless suppression of the kulak counter-revolution" as the most important task of the party. To this end, 21,000 soldiers and commanders of the Red Army were recruited in April, and a special Internal Front was created. In fact, the fight against the insurgent movement was not much different from the front-line actions of regular units. The infantry, cavalry, artillery and even the ships of the Dnieper flotilla actively participated in the liquidation of the Zeleny's uprising, which more than once fired cannons at the rebellious villages.

On July 17, the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense of the Ukrainian SSR issued a resolution "On the suppression of kulak and white guard revolts in the countryside", which provided for emergency methods of struggle: mutual responsibility, military blockade, hostage-taking, the imposition of indemnities, the eviction of the families of the leaders of the uprisings. However, these cruel actions not only failed to pacify the village, but further strengthened its resistance. In the first two decades of July 1919, the NKVD registered 207 anti-communist demonstrations on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. Many of them were massive. So, the detachments of Ataman Gonchar in the Vasilkovsky district numbered up to 8 thousand rebels, and Ataman Zeleny - about 12 thousand. Up to 20 thousand people took part in the performance in mid-May in the Podolsk province.

All peasant Ukraine rebelled against the attempt to reorganize its life on the basis of communist ideology. The mass insurgent anti-communist movement became one of the main reasons for the fall of Soviet power in Ukraine in the summer of 1919.

The policy of "war communism", and then the deployment of the insurrectionary movement, extremely quickly undermined the morale of the units of the Ukrainian Front. Back in the spring of 1919, V. Antonov-Ovseenko noticed the threat of the negative impact of "military-communist" measures on the army. On April 17, he informed Lenin: “Our almost exclusively peasant army is being shaken by a policy that confuses the middle peasant with a kulak […] that implements a ‘food dictatorship’ with the support of the Moscow pro-Darmeys, with the almost complete absence of Soviet power in the localities (in the villages). On Pravoberezhnaya In Ukraine, the work of emergency workers and food forwarders, relying on "international" detachments, revives nationalism, raising the entire population without exception to fight the "occupiers". Meshcheryakov's land policy does not take into account local features […]. The Ukrainian army, which was built not only by the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, Anarchists, is difficult to discipline, has not escaped the partisan, insurrectionary spirit, and by no means can for the most part be considered our entirely reliable support.Our land and national policy in Ukraine fundamentally undermines all the efforts of the military to overcome these influences of decay ".

The commander of the Ukrfront proposed to radically change the general political course, agrarian policy, to introduce representatives of political parties associated with the peasantry into the government of the Ukrainian SSR, not to forget about national tact and local characteristics. V. Antonov-Ovseenko offered the right solutions, but the Bolshevik-Soviet leadership did not consider it necessary to listen to him.

Meanwhile, discontent in the army was growing. On May 9, N. Grigoriev issued a Universal to the Ukrainian people, in fact announcing a speech against the government of H. Rakovsky. The reason for this was the dissatisfaction of the fighters of the division, who, having recaptured Odessa from the troops of the Entente, returned home to the Elizavetgrad district for rest and saw that the food detachments robbed their villages. Grigoriev called on the peasants to form insurgent detachments, seize district centers, and he himself moved his units (15 thousand fighters) to Kyiv, Yekaterinoslav, Poltava. Quite easily, the Grigorievites took Yekaterinoslav, Cherkassy, ​​Kremenchug, Nikolaev, Kherson, without encountering significant resistance from units of the Red Army. Many Red Army units went over to the side of Grigoriev.

The speech forced the Bolsheviks to change tactics somewhat. In May, they allowed some left-wing parties to publish newspapers. The government included representatives of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries (Borotbists), and the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine included representatives of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (Borotbists). Part of the lands of Ukrglavsahara was transferred to equal distribution, district emergency commissions were liquidated, in which most of the abuses were committed. However, not a single state or party Bolshevik document called into question the very policy of "war communism". Changes in her course were purely cosmetic. The main means of struggle against the rebels remained the force of arms. With her help, with incredible efforts, at the end of May, it was possible to eliminate Grigoriev's speech. The rebels were dispersed, but not destroyed, Ataman Grigoriev switched to partisan methods of struggle in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bhis native village of Verblyuzhki.

K. Voroshilov, who carried out the general leadership of the suppression of the Grigoriev uprising, reported to Moscow at the end of May that the task was only half completed. “At the critical moment,” his report noted, “there was not a single full-fledged, persistent unit to speak out against Grigoriev. Many regiments went over to his side, others declared [themselves] neutral, some, following the military order, began with the defeat of the Cheka, Jewish pogroms, etc.” .

On May 16, L. Trotsky, head of the Revolutionary Military Council of the RSFSR, arrived in Ukraine. The main purpose of his trip was the deployment of the fight against partisans in the Red Army. Trotsky and Lenin were the initiators of strengthening the centralization of control, put forward the initiative to liquidate the Ukrainian Front, to resubordinate its formations to other fronts. In May, Lenin wrote the "Draft Directive of the Central Committee on Military Unity." Trotsky, like Lenin, considered necessary a "decisive and firm turn of the helm", carried out by radical means: "purges of the commissars", "executions and sending to concentration camps", "a decisive struggle against the protesting commanders" . On May 19, he held a joint meeting of members of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and the Central Committee of the CP(b)U. At the meeting, it was decided to disband the Ukrainian Front, and to subordinate its armies to the command of the Southern and Western Fronts. The next day, the Kommunist newspaper published L. Trotsky's article "Ukrainian Lessons" with calls to eradicate partisanship using the "hot iron" method. All those commanders who did not share the Bolshevik doctrines were considered adventurers. The anarchist N. Makhno, a talented rebel commander who led the 3rd Zadneprovsky brigade and in May received an order to reorganize it into a division, was announced as such. The Makhnovist units selflessly held back the breakthrough of the White Guards in the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov. Contrary to this, the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense of the Ukrainian SSR, on the initiative of L. Trotsky, on May 25 approved the decision to "eliminate Makhno in the shortest possible time."

The operation to eliminate N. Makhno failed because the Red Command did not have sufficient forces to carry it out successfully.

The Bolsheviks managed to capture and shoot several Makhnovist staff workers. Insulted, hurt to the quick, the brigade commander himself refused command positions in the Red Army and offered his units to make a choice: either go to the disposal of the Southern Front, or "break into independent units and work in the interests of the people."

All this finally undermined the combat effectiveness of the Red Army units on the Southern Front. They began to rapidly retreat in the Donbass, the interaction of parts deteriorated, discipline fell, relapses of partisanship increased. At the end of May, the deputy chairman of the Higher Military Inspectorate reported that discontent prevailed among the units of the Ukrainian Front, calls were being made to “Kill the Jews!”, “Away with the commune!”, “Away with the Chechens!” The Supreme Military Inspectorate noted that “many parts of the front, in particular the 1st and 2nd regiments (Bogunsky and Tarashchansky), are politically unreliable. To save the general situation, extreme measures must be taken; it is necessary to dress and shoe the Red Army soldiers and, at least, change the command staff in the regiments, removing their leaders from unreliable units.

On June 1, the creation of a military-political union of the Soviet republics was announced in Moscow, according to this decision, unified armed forces with a single command were created, economic unification was carried out, but these attempts to improve the state of affairs by administrative-command and repressive measures were not successful. Appointed commander of the 14th Army, formerly called the 2nd Ukrainian, K. Voroshilov wrote on June 13 to X. Rakovsky that “there is no army as an organism. Headquarters and various institutions are, at best, a crowd of idlers, and at worst, drunkards and saboteurs; the supply organs have neither weapons nor uniforms; parts are ridiculously small, decomposed, barefoot, with swollen and bloody legs, torn off.

Under pressure from Denikin, the Reds left Left-Bank Ukraine by the end of June. On June 25, the Whites entered Kharkov, and on June 28, Yekaterinoslav.

In early August, the united army of the UHP stepped up its operations, its units ousted the Reds from the Right-Bank Ukraine. At the end of August, Soviet government agencies were forced to urgently leave Kyiv. Soviet power in Ukraine, having suffered a military defeat, having lost political authority and social support in the city and countryside, fell a second time.

Denikin regime in Ukraine

The White movement as a mass ideology began to take shape at the end of 1917 and was a reaction to the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd. Generals M. Alekseev, L. Kornilov, A. Denikin, as well as the leadership of the Cadets Party, stood at the origins of the creation of the movement. The white idea, the core of which was the slogan of saving Russia, fighting Bolshevism, was poorly developed, primarily because the movement, according to Russian historians, “represented a motley conglomeration of various forces that not only failed to unite, but also failed to work out how many any constructive goals and objectives. The Whites did not proclaim anything specific, except that they were fighting for Russia. In general agreeing with this conclusion, we note that in this conglomerate the activity of Russian nationalist and great-power chauvinist forces was very noticeable and active. Already at the beginning of November 1917, General M. Alekseev, formulating preliminary ideas and plans for future actions, spoke of the Ukrainian Central Rada as an enemy. M. Alekseev considered at that moment an open struggle with the Ukrainian government untimely due to the lack of necessary resources, but insisted on finding ways to discredit the Ukrainians.

The Russian national idea was an important part of the political outlook of General A. Denikin, who from 1918 headed the White movement. Speaking on November 1, 1918 at the opening of the Kuban Rada, Denikin with pathos convinced the audience that there should be no “Volunteer, Don, Kuban, Siberian Army. There must be a United Russian Army, with a united front, a united command, invested with full power and responsible only to the Russian people in the person of their future legitimate supreme power. The unity and indivisibility of Russia - Denikin's political creed could not but leave an imprint on his attitude towards Ukraine. “If we evaluate the events according to the logic of an exclusively anti-Bolshevik struggle, it turns out that during the critical year of 1918 there were no insurmountable obstacles to cooperation between two moderately conservative, but firmly anti-communist centers on the territory of the former Russian Empire: the regime of Hetman Pavel Skoropadsky and the main stronghold of the White movement - Volunteer army, ”says the American researcher A. Protsik. But nevertheless, she notes, A. Denikin consistently avoided official contacts with P. Skoropadsky, and later in his memoirs portrayed him as an opportunist who betrayed Russia for the sake of his own ambitions and class interests. Denikin's attitude towards the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic in 1919 was much tougher.

Watching the successful advance of the UNR army in August, representatives of the Entente tried to persuade A. Denikin to common actions with S. Petliura on the anti-Bolshevik front. The British Minister of War telegraphed trying to convince Denikin that "in the present critical situation, it would be prudent to go as far as possible towards the Ukrainian separatist tendencies." Similar attempts, according to A. Denikin, were made by representatives of the US and French governments. A. Denikin answered these proposals with a categorical “no”. Over time, in “Essays on Russian Troubles,” he frankly wrote: “... to go along with Petliura, striving to tear Ukraine and Novorossiya from Russia, would mean breaking with the idea of ​​a United, Indivisible Russia - an idea that had deeply penetrated the consciousness of the leaders and the army, and thus instill dangerous confusion in its ranks.

The tricolor national banner repelled some and attracted others. But only under its shadow it was possible to gather and move to Moscow those forces that served as a stronghold of the Russian White armies.

And therefore, in agreement with the command of the volunteer, Kyiv and Novorossiysk, I decided the question in the negative. Representatives of the Consent were informed in advance, on August 3, that it was impossible for any kind of interaction with Petliura.

In the end, the British and French commands accepted this point of view / ... / I instructed the volunteer troops: “... I do not recognize an independent Ukraine. Petliurists can either be neutral, in which case they must immediately surrender their weapons and go home; or join us, recognizing our slogans, one of which is the broad autonomy of the border regions. If the Petliurists do not fulfill these conditions, then they should be considered the same enemy as the Bolsheviks ... ""

At the same time, the need was pointed out for "a friendly attitude towards the Galicians, in order to extract them from the subordination of Petliura ... If this is not achieved, then consider them as a hostile side."

Denikin's regime in Ukraine was a frank attempt at revenge on Russian nationalism and great-power chauvinism, which was carried out under the slogans of restoring "united and indivisible Russia", "united Great-Power Russia", the struggle for "Holy Rus'". Denikin's leadership basically avoided using the name "Ukraine", emphatically replacing it with "Little Russia". For example, in the Interim Commission of the National Question, at the Special Meeting, there was a Little Russian section, headed by the well-known Russian nationalist and Ukrainophobe V. Shulgin. Indicative in this regard is the "Appeal of the Commander-in-Chief to the population of Little Russia", published in the press in August 1919, when Denikin's troops were approaching Kyiv. In the understanding of A. Denikin, there was no Ukrainian people, but only a “Little Russian branch of the Russian people”, respectively, and the Ukrainian national movement is only a German intrigue. Let us quote the main semantic part of the appeal: “The regiments are approaching ancient Kyiv, the“ mother of Russian cities ”, in an unstoppable desire to restore to the Russian people the unity they have lost, that unity, without which the great Russian people, weakened and fragmented / ... / would not be able to defend their independence; that unity, without which a complete and correct economic life is unthinkable, when the north and south, east and west of a vast power in free exchange carry to each other everything that every land, every region is rich in; that unity, without which a powerful Russian speech, woven in equal proportion by the centuries-old efforts of Kyiv, Moscow and Petrograd.

Wanting to weaken the Russian state before declaring war on it, the Germans, long before 1914, sought to destroy the unity of the Russian tribe, forged in a hard struggle.

To this end, they supported and inflated a movement in the south of Russia, which set itself the goal of separating its nine southern provinces from Russia under the name of the “Ukrainian State”. The desire to tear away the Little Russian branch of the Russian people from Russia has not been abandoned to this day. who laid the foundation for the dismemberment of Russia, continue to do their evil deed of creating an independent Ukrainian State and fighting against the revival of a united Russia.

L. Denikin's troops in Kyiv. Autumn 1919

Everything connected with the name of S. Petliura seemed hostile and treacherous to A. Denikin, but he also understood that a total disregard for the national question would cause misunderstanding and protest not only among Ukrainians, but also among part of the Russian population. How did A. Denikin intend to solve the "Little Russian question"? He proposes to respect "the vital features of local life." Without questioning the state status of the Russian language, Denikin does not object to the fact that "everyone can speak Little Russian in local institutions, zemstvo, government offices and courts." In private schools, the language of instruction can be any language, but in state schools, only in the primary grades "may the use of the Little Russian language be allowed to facilitate the students' assimilation of the first rudiments of knowledge."

In this regard, a tangible blow was dealt to the Ukrainian system of education and science, which had just taken shape during the years of the revolution. It was deprived of state funding, Ukrainian state universities actually turned into private institutions, which put them in a rather difficult position, students lost their respite from military conscription. For a long time, the fate of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences remained unresolved. The Denikin government was categorically against the preservation of its Ukrainian status and reorganized its regional Kyiv Academy of Sciences, whose activities in the future were to be subordinated to the all-Russian Academy of Sciences, and the working language was to be Russian. Thus, the Denikin regime turned out to be hostile not only to the independent Ukrainian state, but also to the idea of ​​the national-territorial autonomy of Ukraine. A. Denikin practically used the Kadet idea of ​​local territorial self-government. The territory of Ukraine was divided into three regions (Kyiv, Kharkov and Novorossiysk), which were ruled by generals with special powers.

Such an ideology and policy could not but lead to an aggravation of relations between the whites and the UNR government. Above, we have already talked about the hostilities between them since the end of September 1919. Here I would like to talk about the struggle against the Denikin regime of the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine (Makhnovists).

The rejection of A. Denikin was caused not only by national, but also by social motives. Workers, artisans and peasants associated the white regime with the restoration of the old socio-economic system. And although the Denikin government eliminated the policy of "war communism", declared the restoration of free trade and the inviolability of private property, promised to carry out agrarian reform, it did not find support among the peasantry of Ukraine. Quite quickly, a mass insurrectionary movement unfolded in the rear of Denikin. Only a few chieftains, who fought stubbornly against the Bolsheviks, went to the service of the Whites. The rest of the detachments, in particular, Ataman Zeleny (died in battle with Denikin in the autumn of 1919), opposed them.

But the main role in the defeat of Denikin's rear was played by the detachments of N. Makhno. The activities of the rebel army led by him during this period was the apotheosis of the Makhnovshchina. On August 5, Makhno signed an order to create the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine (Makhnovists). It noted: “The task of our revolutionary army and every insurgent who joined it is an honest struggle for the complete liberation of the working people of Ukraine from all enslavement, for the complete emancipation of their labor. Therefore, every insurgent is obliged to remember and see to it that among us there can be no place for persons who, behind the back of the revolutionary insurrection, seek personal gain, robbery or robbery / ... / There can be no injustice in our midst. There can be no offense from us to at least one son or daughter of the working people, for whom we are fighting.

Already in August-September, Denikin's people felt the strength of this military formation. The headquarters of the commander of the troops of the Novorossiysk region, General N. Schilling, who was entrusted with the implementation of the directive on the offensive to the west and northwest, informed Denikin's headquarters: outnumbered and not at all sensitive to our detours [...] It is necessary before carrying out the directive to decisively put an end to the Makhno group near Novoukrainka. This can be achieved by introducing into battle not only all our forces, but also sufficient forces from the 2nd Corps.

The commander of the White troops in the Right-Bank Ukraine threw against the Makhnovists a consolidated group of General Ya. Slashen, which included a division and several officer regiments. Other military units interacted with it. Under the onslaught of the Whites, the Makhnovists, stubbornly defending themselves, had to retreat northwest to Uman. The Makhnovists were sorely lacking in ammunition, and their movement was hampered by a huge convoy, in which up to 8,000 wounded and sick with typhus had accumulated. On September 26, 1919, the Makhnovists signed an alliance agreement with the UNR army, from which they received ammunition. The next day, near the village of Peregonovka, a decisive battle took place between Denikin and Makhnovists. Of all the defeats of Denikin in the autumn of 1919 in the Right-Bank Ukraine, this was the most cruel. The Whites lost several officer regiments. Subsequently, A. Slashchev called N. Makhno "a typical bandit", but nevertheless considered it necessary to give him his due "in the ability to quickly form and hold his units in his hands, introducing even a rather severe discipline. Therefore, clashes with him were always of a serious nature, and his mobility, energy and ability to conduct operations gave him a number of victories over the armies that met / ... / Makhno knew how to conduct operations, showed remarkable organizational skills and knew how to influence a large part of the local population who supported him and filling his ranks. Consequently, Makhno was a very strong opponent and deserved special attention from the Whites, especially taking into account their small number and the vastness of the assigned tasks.

The victory at Peregonovka opened the way for the rebels to their native places. Yekaterinoslav was declared the base of the Makhnovist army. She moved there rapidly, overcoming on some days 60 or more miles. “As if the Makhnovists flew into a bewitched, sleepy kingdom,” wrote the ideologist and historian of the Makhnovshchina, anarchist P. Arshinov. - No one yet knew about the breakthrough near Uman, had no idea where they were; the authorities did not take any measures, being in the usual rear hibernation. Therefore, everywhere the Makhnovists appeared to the enemy, like spring thunder, unexpectedly.

Already on the night of September 29, the central column of the insurgent army took possession of Novoukrainka, and at dawn on October 5, they took Aleksandrovsk and crossed to the left bank of the Dnieper. Leaving the army headquarters in the city, Makhno moved east the next day. In the evening, its units captured the Orekhovo station, and on October 7 - Gulyai-Pole and the Pologi station. A few days later, Tsarekonstantinovka, Gaichur, Kermenchik, Chaplino, Grishino, Avdeevka and Yuzovka were in their hands.

The Makhnovists were active in other areas as well. The Azov Corps under the command of Vdovichenko captured Bolshoi Tokmak, and on October 8 approached Berdyansk, where Denikin's ammunition depots were located. After a stubborn battle, the rebels took possession of the city. On October 14, Vdovichenko captured Mariupol and headed for Taganrog, where Denikin's headquarters was.

On October 4, the Crimean Corps under the command of Pavlovsky captured Nikopol. By the middle of the month, he controlled almost all of Tavria. The Makhnovists occupied Kakhovka, Melitopol, Genichesk, Novoalekseevka, Oleshki, and held Yekaterinoslav for six weeks.

In the Revolutionary Insurgent Army (Makhnovists) by the autumn of 1919, there were 40 thousand infantrymen and 10 thousand cavalrymen, about 1 thousand machine guns mounted on carts, and 20 cannons. The personnel moved on 12 thousand carts. Without cumbersome rear services, the army was extremely mobile. During the day, the rebels overcame up to 100 miles. The army had a complex structure, was divided into 4 corps, each of which was divided in turn into regiments, battalions, companies, hundreds, platoons and half-platoons. The highest governing body of the army was the Military Revolutionary Council. Commander N. Makhno was a member of the council, but did not lead it. The headquarters of the army, which carried out the organizational and operational leadership of the rebel troops, was of great importance.

Makhnovists in the city of Starobelsk, Kharkov province. 1919

The rebel army made a breakthrough to the south of Ukraine precisely during the period of intense fighting near Orel, where the fate of both the Whites and the Reds was being decided. As the next events showed, the strike of the Makhnovists on the rear turned out to be mortally dangerous for Denikin. The command of the whites was forced to withdraw from the front the most combat-ready cavalry units of Generals Mamontov and Shkuro to fight in the rear, where, in essence, a second front had arisen - an internal one.

Returning to their native places, the rebel army received strong support from the local peasantry. The general peasant character of the Makhnovist movement, the enormous scale that it acquired in a matter of weeks, could not be denied by either the White Guards or the Bolsheviks, who remained underground. On November 15, the organ of the Yekaterinoslav Provincial Committee of the CP(b)U, the newspaper Zvezda, wrote: “Only completely short-sighted people can not see that the Makhnovist advance into the depths of the regions captured by the Denikin clique is something more than a simple military operation. This is also a broad popular movement, which captured and led in its spontaneous and irresistible development the vast strata of the working masses, which finally resulted in a revolution full of enormous inclinations. How discordant this confession was with everything that the Bolshevik press wrote about the Makhnovist movement earlier and later!

In the territories under their control, the Makhnovists preached the anarchist ideas of the “free Soviet system”. They were most fully presented in the "Draft Declaration of the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine (Makhnovists)", which N. Makhno called the hasty fruit of the work of the Gulyai-Polye group of anarchists. They saw in the “free Soviet order” such a system of public organizations and councils that would be representative bodies of power of the working people, and not executive controlled structures of political parties, primarily the Bolshevik one. The very basis of the "free Soviet system" was the idea of ​​self-government. Thus, the solution of the land issue was transferred directly into the hands of the producers - the peasants. The food problem was to be solved on the principles of mutually beneficial trade between town and country. Such a program found support from the peasantry and made the Makhnovshchina a broad social movement. True, the Makhnovists failed to bring the "free Soviet system" to life. First of all, because after the defeat of Denikin's rear, the insurgent army had to engage in long bloody battles with Denikin's elite units.

By order of A. Denikin, the Tver and Chechen cavalry divisions, as well as the Don Cavalry Brigade, concentrated in the Volnovakha region to fight the rebels. In addition to these military formations, 9 cavalry Cossack regiments and 2 brigades of scouts were put up against the Makhnovists. In mid-October, the Whites tried to surround the Makhnovists. The ring turned out to be gigantic - after all, the Makhnovo-Denikin front stretched for 1150 miles. However, in early November, the rebel army was forced to retreat to the right bank of the Dnieper, where it captured the territory of Pyatikhatka - Krivoy Rog - Apostolovo - Nikopol, and then launched an offensive in the direction of Elisavetgrad, Nikolaev and Kherson. On the night of November 9, she once again captured Yekaterinoslav.

A big problem for the rebels was the typhus epidemic. In early December, this disease struck down 35,000 soldiers. They fettered the movement of the army, forcing it to resort to a tactic not inherent in the rebels - positional defense. In the fierce December battles with the Whites, the rebel army suffered huge losses, but continued to resist.

Meanwhile, on the Northern Front, Denikin's army attacked to retreat quickly. The Makhnovists, undermining the rear of the Whites, contributed to the success of the Red Army and considered themselves its allies. In early January 1920, units of the Revolutionary Insurgent and Red armies met near Aleksandrovsk. The Makhnovists announced their intention to occupy one of the sectors of the front for a joint fight against Denikin. But the command of the Red Army had other plans. Even on the approach of the Reds to the Makhnovo region, the head of the Revolutionary Military Council of the RSFSR L. Trotsky signed order No. 180 with a list of measures aimed at eliminating the Makhnovshchina. Formally, on January 8, Makhno was offered to immediately redeploy his army to the Western Front, and the next day, the All-Ukrrevkom, the supreme and extraordinary body of Soviet power in Ukraine, without waiting for a response, outlawed Makhno and the Makhnovists as deserters and traitors. The main argument put forward by the Bolsheviks was that Makhno and his group allegedly betrayed the Ukrainian people by selling out to the "Polish pans." All those who support the traitors of the Ukrainian people will be mercilessly destroyed, the resolution of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee said. The head of the Estonian division, Palvadre, who was thrown into the fight against the rebels, set the task for his subordinates even more harshly and frankly: “Mercilessly crack down on the Makhno gangs and the population that shelters them. In case of resistance of the Makhnovists in the area of ​​Gulyai-Pole [...] behave with them in the most cruel way, completely destroying the points of resistance and leveling them to the ground. Points red commander called villages and farms. By the autumn of 1920, units of the Red Army, changing one another, tried to defeat Makhno using the “Red Terror” methods. But they could not boast of special success.

Taking advantage of the fact that the Reds concentrated their attention and offensive energy on the fight against Makhno, the remnants of Denikin's army in the winter of 1920 concentrated in the Crimea, taking up defensive positions on the Perekop Isthmus. The final defeat of the White Guards, which could be successfully carried out by the forces of the Red and Revolutionary insurgent armies, was postponed to the future.

Bolshevik dictatorship in Ukraine in 1920

In early 1920, Soviet power in Ukraine was restored. In order not to repeat the mistakes of 1919, the VIII Conference of the RCP(b), which unanimously supported Lenin's thesis ("... we need a bloc with the peasantry of Ukraine"), discussed in detail the principles of Soviet construction and socio-economic policy in Ukraine. The decision of the conference put an end to the unrestrained collectivization of agriculture. On February 5, the All-Ukrrevkom adopted a new land law, which proclaimed an egalitarian distribution of land, voluntariness in the creation of communes and artels, and limitation of the land areas of state farms. However, as it soon became clear, this was only a tactical maneuver in the application of the same system of "war communism" and the dictatorship of the proletariat. In 1920, the Bolshevik policy not only retained its characteristic features, but also acquired a systemic character. Throughout the year, Ukraine remained a kind of springboard for testing and improving the communist system.

Ukrainian statehood in the Ukrainian SSR had a purely formal character. The All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, remembering that an agreement on the unification of the military, state and economic activities of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR has been in force on the territory of the republic since June 1, 1919, on January 27 annulled all decrees of the government of the Ukrainian SSR that related to the functioning of government bodies, military, national economic, food, financial institutions , and replaced them with Russian Soviet decrees.

In Ukraine, they were in no hurry with the elections of the soviets either; priority was reserved for emergency bodies - revolutionary committees, whose composition was not elected, but appointed. Even at the end of 1920, the revolutionary committees dominated the overall structure of state authorities. The Fourth Conference of the CP(b)U (March 1920) explained this state of affairs by the fact that in Ukraine “the proletariat is still partly under the influence of the social traitor parties, while in the countryside the proletarian masses and the but also under the moral dictatorship of the kulak.

When the bodies of Soviet power were formed, the absolute majority in them was provided to members of the CP (b) U, who in the provincial executive committees accounted for 91.1% of the total number of employees. As in 1919, the Bolsheviks spoke to their political opponents in the language of ultimatums or through the VUCHK. If in December 1919 the Bolsheviks agreed to include in the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee one representative each from the parties of the Social Revolutionaries (Borbists and Borotbists), who had a noticeable influence on the masses, then in March of the following 1920 they achieved the self-dissolution of the Borotbist Party; only some of its representatives were accepted into the CP(b)U. A little later, the Borbist party was liquidated in a similar way. A tougher policy was applied to other political parties. So, in early March, the VUCHK arrested the entire composition of the All-Ukrainian Conference of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (Internationalists), and in September - all the participants in its congress. 20 leaders of this party were thrown into a concentration camp, after which the party ceased to exist. Large-scale repressions against the Mensheviks did not stop. From March 20 to March 23, 1920, the trial of members of this party, accused of collaborating with Denikin, lasted in Kyiv. The process was overtly political in nature and was a forerunner of the political trials of the 1930s.

Having removed other parties from active political activity, the CP(b)U has become one of the weighty components of the state apparatus. The decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U have always preceded similar decisions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR. Of course, party directives determined the content of government regulations. Repressive organs occupied a special place in the system of Soviet power. On May 12, a state of emergency was introduced in the Ukrainian SSR, in connection with which the All-Russian Central Executive Committee granted the extraordinary commissions the right to extrajudicial repressions.

In 1920, extraordinary management methods were used. In Ukraine, nationalization unfolded for the third time. 11,000 industrial enterprises passed into the hands of the state, though only 4,000 of them managed to more or less get the job done. The gross national product has significantly decreased, labor productivity has dropped catastrophically. Curtailing commodity-money relations, state bodies widely resorted to non-economic methods. In January 1920, the Ukrainian Labor Army (UTA) was created. 30 thousand UTA fighters provided labor force for individual enterprises and were repeatedly used as a coercive force. In economic practice, the militarization of work and labor duties have become widespread.

The dominance of administrative methods, harsh centralization, disregard for economic laws, the dictates of communist ideology, the difficulties of wartime - all this led to the complete collapse of the economy. The hungry and cold city barely vegetated.

The working class increasingly showed dissatisfaction with the actions of the Soviet government. On May 1, the Aleksandrovsky Uyezd Committee of the CP(b)U reported to the Central Committee of the CP(b)U: “The difficult economic situation, the acute food crisis create favorable ground for the agitation of our political opponents. The working class, compelled by economic ruin to fill the ranks of petty speculators, has adopted a psychology that is alien to our communist construction ... ".

M. Tarnavsky, General of the Ukrainian Galician Army

The village was in a difficult situation. As in the previous year, surplus appropriation was used in Ukraine. Bread was forcibly confiscated from peasant farms, and in 1920 meat, eggs, and certain types of vegetables were also taken away. I. Stalin, who headed the Ukrainian Labor Army, believed that in Ukraine there were 600 million poods of grain surpluses (a fantastic amount at that time) and “with a certain tension, these six hundred million could be taken.” Prodrazverstka was officially planned at the level of 140 million pounds. To take them away from the peasants, they created a huge army of food officials. Only the headquarters of the provincial, district and district special food committees was 60 thousand people. To them should be added the composition of the food detachments, labor army, internal service troops.

As in the previous year, the food policy went far beyond the simple provision of bread, becoming one of the main components of the class struggle. On May 18, the provincial executive committees received a government directive emphasizing that all food workers must learn as an indisputable truth that the food issue in Ukraine is primarily a political issue, a matter of struggle and overcoming the kulaks. Again, clear criteria for defining "kulaks" were not developed. Everyone who did not agree with the actions of the authorities was referred to as “kulaks”.

The victory over the "kulaks" was supposed to bring the division of the village into warring camps, thanks to the Committees of Poor Peasants (KNS), and the use of repressions against the wealthy part of the peasantry. In the provinces and districts, special "troikas" were created, in volosts - "fours". They led the food work, the fight against the "kulaks" and had, in essence, unlimited power in the localities.

The former Makhnovist rebels, the peasants of the south of Ukraine, who took a massive part in the struggle against Denikin in the ranks of the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine (Makhnovists), felt the repression most acutely. The punitive policy of 1920 acquired a huge scope, every attempt to oppose state bodies or their representatives was regarded as a counter-revolution. During the year, forced labor bodies were created in Ukraine, 18 concentration camps were equipped, through which 25-30 thousand people passed.

The cruel "military-communist" policy ruined the countryside, practically without improving the food situation of the cities. It led to the rapid growth of the state-party apparatus, which was engaged in economic redistribution, accompanied by constant abuse, the satisfaction of personal and corporate interests, and the distortion of moral principles. Bolshevik functionaries moved in flocks to Ukraine. Cut off from the population, unfamiliar with its psychology and mentality, they behaved like guardsmen. One of them, seconded from Moscow to the Odessa province, wrote: “... It can be said with confidence that it is enough just once to give a good lesson and clean the blackest volosts, and the whole county will be like silk, and we will get the full opportunity to work in the future without obstacles […]. I personally will take all measures so that the 14th Army conducts this operation well, there is a favorable reason - an uprising in the neighboring district […]. There is no need for us to change our policy. And in the labor issue, and in food, and in the field of military affairs, and in the fight against speculation - it is absolutely absolutely necessary in everything to start “screwing up” Ukraine as tightly and firmly as possible, so that, in the end, nutritious juice not only runs out of it. to Kharkov, but also to Moscow. "Nutritious juices" in the form of trains with bread, which Moscow regularly demanded from Kharkov, were accompanied by rivers of peasant blood. But the Bolshevik leaders did not pay much attention to this.

O. Mykytka, commander of the 1st Galician Corps (1919)

It is not surprising that open discontent spread in the villages of Ukraine. At the end of the spring of 1920, it again grew into a mass insurrectionary movement. Having visited the Yekaterinoslav province, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, V. Antonov-Saratovsky, brought disappointing statistics to Kharkov: out of 226 volosts of the province, Soviet sentiments prevailed only in three. Yakovlev (Epshtein), a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)U, at one of the meetings in July 1920, noted that 200–250 peasant insurgent detachments were operating in Ukraine (i.e., 2–3 detachments per county). It is clear that Yakovlev called them "gangs".

The insurrectionary movement acquired a scale that threatened the Soviet regime. It is no coincidence that F. Dzerzhinsky arrived in Kharkov on May 5, 1920, by decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). As head of the rear of the Southwestern Front, he had the task of neutralizing this movement. The number of soldiers used to fight the rebellious peasantry, according to Dzerzhinsky, was not inferior to the army: 18 infantry brigades (107 battalions), 1 cavalry division (5 regiments) and 6 artillery batteries (24 guns). Accordingly, this also testified to the forces of the rebels. The most capable part of the rebels was the Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army of Ukraine (Makhnovists) restored at the end of spring. On May 28, at a general meeting of the command staff, the Council of Revolutionary Insurgents of Ukraine (Makhnovists) was elected, which was headed by Commander N. Makhno. In the summer of 1920, the Makhnovists carried out three raids across the Left-Bank Ukraine, covering 1,400 miles. It was not easy to fight them, because, among other things, the Red Army went over to their side. As the chief of staff of the insurgent army, V. Bilash, testified, in the summer of the entire mass of the Makhnovists, 4,590 people were former Red Army soldiers. In September 1920, the size of the rebel army reached 20 thousand fighters, its leader had great authority among the peasants. “The fact that Makhno still exists, the fact that, despite all our efforts, he has not yet been destroyed, but is starting a raid that covers four provinces (Ekaterinoslav, Donetsk, Kharkov, Poltava), is explained not so much by the genius of Makhno how much the support of the village. He walks among him with his gang, ”the Chekists informed the Soviet and party leadership.

The conflict with the peasantry, the lack of reliable social support in the countryside again made the existence of Soviet power in Ukraine problematic. The Bolsheviks managed to repel the combined offensive of the Polish and Ukrainian armies, but they were stuck in Poland for a long time. Whites took advantage of the internal and external political situation.

The last duel between whites and reds on the territory of Ukraine

Denikin's army saved itself from the final defeat of the Reds by hiding behind the Crimean isthmuses. On April 4, 1920, P. Wrangel replaced A. Denikin as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia. He not only reorganized the white army and restored its combat effectiveness, but also began to change the political course of his predecessor. There could no longer be any talk of a new campaign against Moscow, nevertheless, the general resolutely rejected the attempts of Western diplomats to persuade him to negotiate with the Bolsheviks. He defined his strategy in one of the interviews as follows: “It is not by a triumphal campaign against Moscow that Russia can be liberated, but by creating, at least on a patch of Russian land, such an order and such living conditions that would predispose all the thoughts and forces of the people who are groaning under the red oppression. » .

General Wrangel immediately abandoned the ideology of "one and indivisible Russia", promised the Don and Kuban not to violate the autonomous rights of the Cossacks, took a number of steps to seek contact with the government of the UNR. He considered the normalization of relations with the peasantry through a radical agrarian reform to be the cornerstone of his platform. The land law approved by Wrangel on June 7, 1920 transferred the main part of the land to elected district and volost land councils, which were supposed to develop local land tenure standards and divide the land, which became full private property, provided that 20% of the average annual harvest was contributed to the state grain fund for 25 years.

With agrarian reform, P. Wrangel tried to gain the favor of the peasantry and use the insurgent movement in the fight against the Bolsheviks, as well as replenish his army and ensure the stability of the rear.

P. N. Wrangel

The successful offensive of the Poles pushed him to war with the "red evil spirits". On June 6, the White Army began to withdraw from the Crimea and captured Northern Tavria by June 24. The end of July and the beginning of August were spent in desperate battles with the Reds in the Aleksandrovsk area - the city changed hands several times. In mid-September, the white army, regrouped and replenished with units that arrived from the Caucasus, went on the offensive and on September 22 captured the Sinelnikovo station, and on September 28 - Mariupol. During this time, it almost doubled, several rebel atamans joined it - Savchenko, Yatsenko, Chaly, Bogomoltsev, Khmara, Golik. In the rear of the Wrangelites, in contrast to the rear of the Denikinists, there were no peasant uprisings. But there was also no mass influx of peasants into the White army. Probably, they have already managed to form stereotypes of perception of whites. P. Wrangel was able to sow doubt about their correctness, but he could not destroy them. He was a talented commander and a flexible politician. Recognizing this, his immediate opponent, the commander of the Southern Front of the Red Army, M. Frunze, wrote in 1921: “... in the person of Wrangel and the army led by him, our homeland, no doubt, had an extremely dangerous force. In all the operations of the semi-annual confrontation, Wrangel, as a commander, in most cases showed both extraordinary energy and an understanding of the situation. As for the troops subordinate to him, then they should be given an unconditionally positive review.

It can be assumed that if P. Wrangel had commanded the White armies in 1919, then the duel between the Reds and the Whites could have ended differently. In 1920, despite all the positive changes made by P. Wrangel, the struggle of his army was doomed to defeat, due to the huge inequality of forces. The Whites had practically no chance, since the Bolsheviks had already securely mastered the Russian state machine and directed the huge material and human resources of Russia to meet their military needs, their difficulties lay only in the impossibility of a quick maneuver of forces. Only at the beginning of September they were able to begin the transfer of military units from the Caucasus, Siberia, and Turkestan to the Southern Front. The Central Committee of the RCP(b) decided to send here the 1st Cavalry Army, removing it from the Polish front.

M. Frunze, appointed commander of the Southern Front, planned to surround the whites in Northern Tavria, cut them off from the Crimean isthmuses and defeat them in the steppe. He set such a task for the troops of the front on October 19. Before the offensive, the Reds outnumbered the enemy by almost three times. In addition, on October 16, they signed another military-political agreement with the rebel army of N. Makhno on common actions against the Wrangelites. Relative calm was established in the rear of the Red troops. On October 16, the Makhnovists went to the front. Retaining the status of the army, they were subordinate to the red command in operational matters. The Makhnovists were given a difficult task: to break through behind enemy lines from Aleksandrovsk no later than October 24 and pass in a raid to Orekhovo and further to capture the Crimean isthmuses. It was an almost impossible task. However, on October 24, the Makhnovist cavalry captured Orekhovo, and on October 30 - Melitopol. In a raid on the rear of the Whites, the Makhnovists covered 250 miles, inflicting several crushing blows on the enemy, but they themselves suffered significant losses.

The operation of the Southern Front in Northern Tavria ended on November 2–3 with the victory of the Reds. The Whites lost 20,000 soldiers, 100 cannons, and a lot of ammunition, but did not allow themselves to be surrounded and retreated to the Crimea, organizing the defense of Perekop, the narrow neck that connected the peninsula with the mainland.

Perekop fortifications, built with the help of British and French military fortifiers, were considered impregnable. Back in the days of the Zaporizhzhya Sich, the Tatars and Turks poured a rampart 8 versts long across Perekop. In 1920, its width at the base exceeded 15 m, and its height was 8 m. In front of the rampart there was a ditch 10 m deep and more than 30 m wide. The northern slope of the shaft had a steepness of up to 45 degrees. It was protected by two rows of trenches and barbed wire fences. 70 cannons and 150 machine guns were placed along the top of the rampart. Behind the fortifications of the Turkish Wall in the Yushun region, there was a second line of defense.

November 5 M. Frunze gave the order to attack the Crimea. The new operation was to begin without prior preparation. The entire burden of the assault fell on the shoulders of the 6th Army, to which the Makhnovists were operationally subordinate. Frunze's plan was quite simple: while the 51st division would storm the Perekop fortifications head-on, other units of the army, having crossed the Sivash, would go through the Lithuanian Peninsula to the rear of the Whites.

The frontal assault on the fortifications of the Turkish Wall began on the afternoon of November 8. Although the Reds suffered colossal human losses, Frunze insisted on frontal attacks on the fortifications, and those who hesitated were threatened with cruel reprisals. No one reckoned with the victims and paid no attention to them. One of the brigade commanders of the 15th division later recalled: “The enemy developed such a strong fire that it seemed that none of those who went on the attack would survive, everything would be swept away. But our general movement did not stop for a minute, the front ranks were mowed down by enemy fire, the following followed them / ... / The rear ones walked through the corpses of the front / ... / People died surprisingly easily these days. But decisive events unfolded on the Lithuanian peninsula, where, having crossed the Sivash, three red divisions and the insurgent Makhnovist army operated. The Whites, for whom the offensive through the Sivash came as a surprise, had to retreat from the Lithuanian Peninsula, because the defense of the Turkish Wall had lost its meaning. On November 10 and 11, fighting took place on the Yushun fortifications, after which the resistance of the whites at Perekop was finally broken. M. Frunze turned on the radio to Wrangel with a proposal to surrender within 24 hours, “... all the soldiers of the Crimean army,” he noted, “life is guaranteed and those who wish to freely travel abroad ... Anyone who puts down their arms will be given the opportunity to atone for their guilt before people with honest labor." Wrangel did not respond to the offer.

On November 13, Frunze ordered the troops of the Southern Front to finally take possession of the entire territory of the peninsula by November 20. On the same day, the 2nd Cavalry Army and the Makhnovists captured Simferopol. By this time, White had practically ceased resistance. The rest of their army was urgently loaded onto ships in the Crimean ports and sailed to Turkey. On November 16, M. Frunze briefly telegraphed V. Lenin: “Today Kerch is occupied by our cavalry. The southern front has been liquidated."

Chairman of the Civil Government of Crimea L. V. Krivoshein, General P. N. Wrangel and General P. N. Shatilov. 1920

Soviet historiography usually presented this telegram as the last point in the course of the civil war. In fact, the Crimean operation had a different, terrible ending. Upon learning of the offer that Frunze made to Wrangel, Lenin sharply scolded the front commander: “... Extremely surprised at the exorbitant pliability of the conditions / ... / If the enemy does not accept these conditions, then, in my opinion, it is impossible to repeat them anymore, we must deal mercilessly ". By order of the leader, after the capture of the Crimea, a large-scale punitive operation unfolded there. The exits from the Crimea were blocked by a network of checkpoints, which were tasked with filtering all citizens coming from the territory of the peninsula. Bulletins of the special department of the 4th Soviet Army paint a vivid picture of the wild hunt for the former Wrangel soldiers. To identify them, special officers and security officers were engaged in intelligence work, used the former Bolshevik underground, informers and scammers. All former servicemen of the Wrangel army were ordered to appear for registration. Those who carried out this order ended up in prisons and emergency situations, and were soon shot. The bulletin mentioned above reported on the execution from December 7 to December 15, 1920 of 318 Wrangel soldiers. In Feodosia, prisoners of war were shot with machine guns in batches of 100 to 300 people, and the corpses were piled in beams at Cape St. Elijah. A terrible impression of the atmosphere of the Red Terror in the Crimea at the end of 1920 - the first half of 1921 is conveyed by the information of the military censorship department of the special department of the 4th Army, which was engaged in the perusal of private correspondence. Here are a few fragments of letters seized by censorship. “During the decisive battles, the capture of Sivash, and then the Crimea, our functions of the tribunal were the most desperate: they shot the White Guards in batches, tried their own. And how many victims, suffering. You can talk about this over the course of long conversations, ”wrote the military investigator of the Revolutionary Tribunal of the 3rd Division. Repressions were directed not only against the military, but also against the civilian population, especially those who found themselves in the Crimea after 1917–1918. “Thousands and tens of thousands of people are being shot here,” an unknown sender reported from Yalta on December 4, 1920, who briefly described how this happened. - A sufficient measure for the death penalty is the word "nobleman" (not to say - an officer, a soldier. They, dying, are lifted from hospitals and taken to the forests, where they are killed indiscriminately). Arrival after 1918 is already a crime, education is a crime. Everything, everything can be enough for you to be seized at night and taken to the emergency room. In the morning, relatives are given a piece of clothing that is not subject to requisition (some remain), doctors, engineers - they all look askance. Save people - these are not courts, this is not a search for counter-revolution, this is the extermination of the cultural forces of the country. Even in March 1921, it was reported from Simferopol: "... there are a lot of executions, we go to look at the executed in ravines, some dogs have gnawed, but they are not removed."

Simultaneously with this punitive operation, the Red Command was secretly preparing to destroy the Makhnovist army. On November 23, M. Frunze reported to Lenin: “On the night of November 25-26, the liquidation of the remnants of the partisan movement should begin […]. To eliminate suspicion, the head of the rear of the 4th Army ordered a number of necessary measures to be taken. M. Frunze's plan was to encircle the Makhnovist groups in the Crimea and Gulyai-Pole under the guise of redeploying individual units, and then destroy them. The reason for the deployment of hostilities against the ally, the red command announced the violation of the military-political agreement by the Makhnovists and accused Makhno of unwillingness to redeploy his army to the Caucasus. In the order of M. Frunze to the troops on November 24, the Makhnovists were unfairly accused of attacks on the Red detachments, the murders of individual Red Army soldiers, all this, according to the Red Command, should have served as additional motivation for ordinary soldiers. The order noted: “The Makhnovshchina must be put an end to in three counts. All units to act boldly, resolutely and mercilessly. In the shortest possible time, all bandit gangs must be destroyed, and all weapons from the hands of the kulaks must be seized and handed over to state warehouses. On the night of November 26, the red units rocked the operation.

Despite the efforts of Frunze, she turned out to be poorly prepared, the Red Army did not show a desire to fight the Makhnovists - yesterday's allies. Moreover, individual red units went over to their side. N. Makhno managed to withdraw part of the rebel army from the encirclement and continue the fight against the Bolsheviks until the end of the summer of 1921 (August 28, N. Makhno crossed the border of Romania with a small detachment and was interned on its territory). The fight against the insurgency, which was conducted on the territory of Ukraine, was accompanied by tough repressive actions. So, in the political summary of the field headquarters of the 4th Army of December 24, 1920, it was reported: “The Revolutionary Tribunal, the commander of the division, responsible political workers who carried out repressions are working on the liquidation of the Makhnovshchina. In Popovka, 130 people were shot, in Andreevka - 470 people, 6 houses were burned, and 45 people were shot in Horse Discord. 196 bandits were destroyed in the battle.

M. V. Frunze

The punitive policy had a huge scale, but did not give the desired results. In combination with other elements of "war communism", it led to the growth and spread of the insurgent anti-communist movement beyond the borders of Ukraine. The headquarters of the Red Army was forced to admit this in a report dated March 29, 1921: “Looking into the history of the bandit-insurgent movement, it should be noted that from its permanent cell - Ukraine - this movement during the winter of 1920/21 spread to the Tambov-Voronezh region, captured the central part of Western Siberia, which is adjacent to the Urals, and has recently been spreading in the center of the Volga region. Small gangs also appeared in the area of ​​the Western Front.

At the beginning of 1921, the insurgency became the main form of civil war. The peasantry stubbornly resisted the dictatorship of the proletariat and its economic system - "war communism". It was the last force that continued the fight against Bolshevism. The problems of the peasantry lay in its disunity, in the lack of political forces at the beginning of 1921 capable of uniting the village. Isn't that why hundreds of small insurgent detachments were operating on the territory of Ukraine, which fought only within the boundaries of their county?

On the other hand, the communist government had no chance to emerge victorious in the struggle against the peasant element. Only a political compromise between the warring parties could put an end to the civil war. We find recognition of this in the resolution of the 1st All-Ukrainian Conference of the CP(b) of Ukraine (May 1921): “The proletarian party faced a twofold possibility: either […] go to open civil war with the mass of the peasantry […] or, by making economic concessions peasantry, to strengthen, by agreement with them, the social basis of Soviet power.

The Bolsheviks, uncompromising for three years of civil war, chose the path of concessions. In 1921, V. Lenin significantly revised his attitude towards the peasantry and "war communism". Faced with the need to make a choice between the communist idea and real state power, he chose the latter, proclaiming the course of the new economic policy. The introduction of the NEP put an end to the civil war and established Soviet power in Ukraine, the Bolsheviks were forced to agree to the national forms of Soviet statehood. This was also one of the forced concessions that the Bolsheviks made to end the civil war.

Thus, the development of the Ukrainian revolution was closely intertwined with the course of the revolution in Russia, but had a number of features and distinctive features, primarily related to the solution of the national problem. The fact that the Ukrainians during this period managed - albeit for a short time - to create several variants of their own statehood, speaks of the enormous potential of the people. At the same time, the Ukrainian revolution provides a wealth of material for critical reflection. Its characteristic feature was the close combination of national and social aspects. By the time of the revolution, Ukrainians were predominantly a peasant people. The young Ukrainian political elite - the intelligentsia - remained closely tied to the peasantry. Its national consciousness grew out of the Ukrainian peasant element, and the solution of peasant social problems constituted an important part of political consciousness. The vast majority of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was imbued with populist and socialist ideology, in which the national state was more a means than an ultimate goal. It was not until the revolution that the Ukrainian elite abandoned the slogans of autonomy and federation and replaced them with a program to create an independent state. We also note the significant inter-party tensions of the elite, the division of parties during the revolution, which weakened the ability to lead the revolutionary masses, intensified spontaneous revolutionary processes, and ultimately led the Bolsheviks to power in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, we note that the failure of Ukrainian statehood lies not so much in the mistakes of political leaders, but in the social deformity of the Ukrainian nation, its weak presence in cities, the insufficient level of national consciousness and social mobility. It should be noted that quite quickly the revolution moved from democratic political processes to the escalation of armed conflicts, unleashing a civil war, the victims of which, as a rule, were civilians. For Ukraine, the frequent changes of power, and at times the complete absence of such in certain territories, were especially indicative. The First World War and the revolution gave rise to a prolonged economic crisis, which was intensified by socialist and, especially, communist experiments and led to a break in socio-economic relations between the city and the countryside, the localization of social relations, barter, and the naturalization of agricultural production. The second important reason for the failures should be recognized as the absence of a favorable foreign policy environment. The Entente countries - the winners of the First World War - did not see independent Ukraine on the post-war map of Europe.

If the Ukrainian statehood failed to defend itself during the revolution, then this is not yet a reason for asserting the complete defeat of the Ukrainian revolution. Ukrainian historians undoubtedly see the inconsistency of the revolutionary processes and, at the same time, talk about the significant positive developments of the revolution, its positive impact on the processes of national consolidation, on the growth of national self-consciousness and self-identification. During the years of the revolution, the Ukrainian school, science and culture became real national institutions. The activities of political parties, public organizations, mass media have activated the Ukrainians. The nation at an accelerated pace was getting what it could not get under the conditions of the autocratic regime. It was these powerful modernization processes of national statehood that forced the Bolsheviks to make significant concessions - primarily to the creation of the Ukrainian SSR and giving the Bolshevik state the form of a federation of independent Soviet republics. Of course, the Soviet Ukrainian statehood was largely palliative, but still, compared with the stateless status of Ukraine before 1917, it was an important socio-political shift.

Among the losses of the revolution one cannot fail to mention the forced emigration of a large number of representatives of the national intelligentsia. On the other hand, this led to the creation of Ukrainian political emigration, which became an important factor in the next stages of the national liberation struggle, an environment in which the experience of the revolution was intensively comprehended, and the Ukrainian national and state ideology was formed.

The Institute of National Memory has collected refutations of ten historical myths about the events of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1921.

Myth 1. The "October Socialist Revolution" is a fundamental event in Russian, Soviet and world history.

Refutation. The Bolsheviks did not attach much historical significance to the seizure of power in October-November 1917.

The painting "Lenin speaks at Smolny in October 1917"

Vladimir Lenin called it an armed coup, one of the episodes of the future "world revolution". For contemporaries, it was like the unsuccessful Kornilov rebellion in September 1917. They did not see any "growing" from the "bourgeois" into the "socialist" phase of the general revolutionary process.

Only ten years later, these events were called the "Great October Socialist Revolution."

Myth 2. The Ukrainian People's Republic arose because of separation from Soviet Russia.

Demonstration at the corner of Khreshchatyk Street and Bibikovsky Boulevard in Kyiv, March 1917

Refutation. The UNR was proclaimed two weeks after the overthrow of the Provisional Government in Petrograd by the Bolsheviks.

The third Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada said that the UNR is not separated from the "Russian Republic". However, this thesis did not apply to Soviet Russia, which did not yet exist at that time.

The Ukrainian Central Rada never recognized the Leninist Council of People's Commissars (hereinafter referred to as SNK) as the legal government for all territories of the former Russian Empire.

About the situation in Russia, the III Universal said: "There is no central government, and anarchy, disorder and ruin are spreading across the country."

At the time of the proclamation of the UNR, the Council of People's Commissars was only one of the governments on the territory of the former empire, which did not have priority over others. The actual control of the SNK did not extend to most of the territories of the UNR.

Until the declaration of independence on January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Rada considered the UNR a part of only that Russia, which had yet to be restored following the results of the Ukrainian and All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

Myth 3. The territory of the UNR did not cover Eastern Ukraine. There was a separate Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic. The Bolsheviks annexed this territory to Ukraine later.

Symon Petliura meeting at the railway station in Fastov after the Bolsheviks were forced out of the city. August 29, 1919

Refutation. The borders of the UNR were first established by the 3rd Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada: “The territory includes lands inhabited mainly by Ukrainians: Kyiv region, Podolia, Volyn, Chernihiv region, Poltava region, Kharkiv region, Yekaterinoslav region, Kherson, Tavria (excluding Crimea). The final determination of the borders ... on the annexation of parts of the Kurshchyna, Kholmshchyna, Voronezh region and adjacent provinces and regions, where the majority of the population is Ukrainian, should be established by agreement of the organized will of the people.

Thus, the modern eastern regions of Ukraine were part of the then Kharkov and Yekaterinoslav provinces, except for the southern and eastern parts of the Lugansk region, which was part of the Don Cossacks region.

The territorial demands expressed in the Universal were based on ethnographic and statistical data on the settlement of the Ukrainian people in the Russian Empire. The Leninist leadership of Russia recognized such limits for Ukraine, but sought to overthrow the Central Rada and bring its own government to power.

German map of the Ukrainian People's Republic. 1918

The People's Secretariat - an alternative government of Ukraine, created on December 30 by the Bolsheviks in Kharkov - put forward claims to the entire territory of the UNR.

The Bolsheviks proclaimed the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic later - on February 12, 1918. Its leaders laid claim to the southern and eastern regions of the UNR. This happened at a time when Ukrainian and allied Austro-German troops were advancing, pushing out the Bolsheviks.

The purpose of the proclamation of the republic was to contain the offensive under the pretext of belonging to the eastern lands of "another republic". On March 3, 1918, Soviet Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany and its allies. One of his conditions was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Ukraine and the achievement of peace with the UNR.

In the spring of 1918, the Bolsheviks recognized that the Donets Basin was part of Ukraine.

After that, the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic was not remembered. In fact, her government never controlled the claimed territory, was not recognized by any state, not even by Soviet Russia.

Myth 4. The People's Secretariat is the only legitimate representative of the Ukrainian people.

Red Army soldiers in Kharkov, 1919

Refutation. On December 30, 1917, at the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in Kharkov, the Bolshevik government of Ukraine was created. It was called the People's Secretariat - as opposed to the General Secretariat of the UNR.

The presence of the Ukrainian Soviet government allowed the Bolsheviks to attribute the aggression to an internal conflict between the Kharkov People's Secretariat and the Kyiv General Secretariat, that is, to interpret it as a "civil war" in Ukraine.

The People's Secretariat performed mainly representative functions, the Bolshevik leadership tried to create the appearance of the independence of the Soviet government in Ukraine. Soon the People's Secretariat announced the overthrow of the UCR and unilaterally introduced decrees of the Council of People's Commissars of Russia in Ukraine.

In March 1918, at the Second All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, Ukraine was proclaimed a Soviet republic independent of Russia, and the People's Secretariat was reorganized: more Ukrainians joined it, Mykola Skripnik became its chairman.

The Bolshevik military detachments, which were not subordinate to the People's Secretariat, but acted on its behalf, were supposed to legitimize the aggression of Bolshevik Russia against the UNR.

Myth 5. The UNR was invented in the German General Staff in order to split Russia.

German map of the Ukrainian People's Republic. 1918

Refutation. During the beginning of the February Revolution of 1917, the First World War was still going on. Germany, which was in the coalition of the Central Powers, was interested in weakening the Entente countries and withdrawing Russia from the war. Berlin secretly financed organizations and presses in hostile countries that promoted peace.

The provisional government of Russia, formed in Petrograd in March 1917, declared its loyalty to allied obligations and its intention to wage the war "to a victorious end."

However, Germany, in order to eliminate the Eastern Front, tried to find forces in Russia that would agree to a separate peace. They were the Russian Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin.

Unlike the Bolsheviks, the Ukrainian Central Rada during 1917 supported the military goals of the Entente. In an interview with the French press, the representative of the UCR, Ivan Mayevsky, stated: “For us, there can be no question of a separate peace. We want to return the lands occupied by the Germans. We must still liberate Galicia, Bukovina and part of Ukraine.”

Only the critical situation during the war between the UNR and the Bolsheviks forced the Ukrainian government to abandon its orientation towards the Entente and seek support from Germany and its allies.

Myth 6. 300 unarmed youths - Ukrainian "Spartans" were thrown against the Bolsheviks.

Participants of the theatrical battle-historical performance "Battle near Kruty" near the memorial to the heroes of Kruty in the Chernihiv region. February 2, 2008

Refutation. From the Ukrainian side, four hundred of the 1st Kyiv Youth School named after Bohdan Khmelnitsky and the 1st hundred of the Student Kuren of the Sich Riflemen (together more than 500 soldiers and 20 foremen) took part in the battle. They were armed with rifles, 16 machine guns and a makeshift armored train - an ordinary artillery gun mounted on a railway platform.

The main force on the battlefield was the pupils of military schools under the command of experienced foremen.

The loss of the dead amounted to 41 people, including 27 soldiers of the Student Platoon, who were captured and killed.

State and political figures of the UPR, representatives of the intelligentsia took part in the funeral rally. One of the speakers, a gymnasium teacher, compared the heroism of the students at Kruty with the courage of 300 Spartans at Thermopylae.

Myth 7. Petliurism is a petty-bourgeois chauvinist movement.

Military parade on Sophia Square in Kyiv on the occasion of the introduction of the Directory.
December 19, 1918

Refutation. Soviet propaganda presented "political banditry" as the most destructive force that prevented overcoming the consequences of the First World War and the "civil" wars, the country's exit from ruin and the transition to peaceful construction.

However, "Petliurism" is a peasant insurrectionary movement of 1918-1923 under the slogans of restoring the independence of the UNR. The name comes from the name of the Chairman of the Directory and the Chief Ataman of the UNR Troops Symon Petlyura.

Some researchers begin its history in the spring of 1917, when the first detachments of the Free Cossacks were formed in the Zvenigorod region - local self-defense to protect Ukrainian villages from Bolshevik deserters. Among their commanders were Ilya Struk, Anany Volynets, Yevsey Gonchar-Burlaka, Ivan Poltavets-Ostryanitsa, Yakov Vodyanoy.

A new significant impetus to the insurgent movement was provided by the “anti-Hetman” uprising, the deployment of the second offensive by the Bolsheviks in Ukraine, repressive and punitive measures and the policy of “war communism”.

Taking the oath of the Sich Riflemen after the initial training.
Starokonstantinov, autumn 1919

Since April 1919, armed peasant uprisings have become systematic and massive.

According to official data, at the end of 1920 - the beginning of 1921, only in large insurgent detachments there were more than 100 thousand people. In the winter of 1921, the partisan-insurgent headquarters in Tarnow, headed by the rebel ataman, cornet-general of the UNR Army Yuriy Tyutyunnik, was preparing an all-Ukrainian anti-Bolshevik uprising.

After the defeat of the Second Winter Campaign of the UNR Army (October-November 1921), the insurrectionary movement in Ukraine began to decline and finally died out in 1923. However, separate detachments, for example, under the leadership of chieftains Yakov Galchevsky, Ivan Treiko, brothers Andrey and Stepan Blazhevsky, held out until the end of the 1920s.

Myth 8. Ukraine has never been united. For the first time, its lands were collected by Stalin in 1939, joining the western territory to the Ukrainian SSR.

Government of the ZUNR in Kamenetz-Podolsk, autumn 1919

Refutation. For the first time, the unification of Ukrainian lands took place on January 22, 1919, when the Universal of the UNR Directory on reunification was proclaimed on Sophia Square in Kyiv.

The next day, the Labor Congress of Ukraine approved the decision of the Ukrainian National Council of the ZUNR and the Universal Directorate of the UNR to unite the UNR and the ZUNR. The supreme power in the united state was to be exercised by the Directory, which included a representative of the Dniester Ukraine. ZUNR began to be called the Western Region of the UNR, and a trident became its coat of arms instead of a lion.

However, their final unification was prevented by the occupation of Ukrainian lands by neighboring states.

On February 5, the Directory and all government offices of the UNR were evacuated from Kyiv to Vinnitsa under pressure from the "Reds". By July 1919, most of the territory of the Western Region of the UNR was occupied by Polish troops. Northern Bukovina was taken under control by Romanian units, Transcarpathia was ceded to Czechoslovakia.

Myth 9. The leadership of the UNR did not take appropriate measures to stop Jewish pogroms during the Ukrainian revolution.

Rally on the streets of Kyiv on the occasion of the proclamation of the Ukrainian People's Republic,
November 7, 1917

Refutation. One of the manifestations of ethnic violence in 1918-1921 was the pogroms of the Jewish population in Ukraine. They were satisfied with almost all military formations that operated on the territory of Ukraine.

Most of the pogroms blamed on the Ukrainian national forces were carried out by self-organized detachments of peasant rebels who often changed political orientation and disobeyed the Ukrainian authorities.

The first official document of the UNR Directory was a proclamation dated April 12, 1919, which stated:

“The Ukrainian government will fight in every possible way against violations of public order, expose and severely punish the instigators, criminals and rioters. And above all, the government will not tolerate any pogroms directed against the Jewish population of Ukraine, and will use all means to neutralize these vile villains.

On May 27, 1919, the Directory passed a law establishing an Extraordinary Commission to investigate Jewish pogroms. On August 26 of the same year, Symon Petliura issued an order “not to commit severe deprivation of the Jews. Whoever commits such a grave crime is a traitor and an enemy of our land and must be removed from human society.”

The culprits were handed over to military tribunals.

Near Kyiv, four Ukrainians who participated in the pogroms were executed; in Raygorod - an officer and several Cossacks; in the town of Smotrych - 14 Cossacks; Ataman Semesenko, the organizer of the terrible Proskurovsky pogrom in February 1919, was also executed.

Myth 10. Mikhail Grushevsky is the first president of Ukraine.

Chairman of the Ukrainian Central Rada Mikhail Grushevsky, 1917

Refutation. Archival documents do not confirm the existence of such a position. Nor is it mentioned in the Constitution of the UNR, adopted on the last day of the Central Rada.

Not a single act is known that would have been signed by Hrushevsky as the president of the UNR.

Officially, Mikhail Grushevsky from March 1917 to April 29, 1918 served as chairman of the Central Rada of the UNR.

The Constitution of the Ukrainian People's Republic, adopted on April 29, 1918, proclaimed Ukraine a sovereign parliamentary state. The National Assembly became its supreme body, and Mikhail Grushevsky was elected chairman.

For the first time, mentions of Mikhail Hrushevsky as president appeared in the Ukrainian diaspora and were widely disseminated in newspaper publications.

It is known that Grushevsky himself used a business card, where there was an inscription in French "President du Parlament D" Ukraine "(President of the Parliament of Ukraine - now the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine), and also later signed" former President of the Ukrainian Central Rada ".

Based on materials Ukrainian Institute of National Memory.