A man changed after the punishment of Nicholas 1. Soldiers walked at-baty: How was the military service in tsarist Russia. The era of Catherine II

In Soviet historiography Emperor Nicholas I portrayed exclusively in negative colors. The strangler of freedoms, the gendarme of Europe, the man who destroyed Pushkin and so on - such was the portrait of a man who had headed Russia for three decades.

It could not have been otherwise: Nicholas I suppressed the uprising of the Decembrists revered in the USSR, which already ruled out the possibility of his positive assessment.

It’s not that Soviet historians were lying, it’s just that the image of the emperor was correctly drawn from only one side. In life, everything was much more complicated.

third son Paul I was born on July 6 (according to the new style), 1796, a few months before his father's accession to the throne. Unlike older brothers Alexandra and Constantine, Nikolai did not have time to get under the care of his grandmother, Catherine the Great although she had such plans.

Little Nicholas was too far in line for the throne for anyone to seriously consider preparing him for the role of emperor. The boy's nanny became Charlotte Lieven, and in 1800 Emperor Paul assigned to his son General Matvey Lamzdorf with the prescription: “Just don’t make a rake out of my son.”

General Matvey Lamzdorf. Source: Public Domain

"Victim" of General Lamzdorf

Matvey Ivanovich Lamzdorf, an executive servant, was least of all suited for pedagogical work. Nikolai and his younger brother Mikhail were taken into the grip of the strictest discipline. The guardian-general believed that the best means for proper education was drill and the suppression of any liberties. Much of what Nikolai's contemporaries will not like very much was the result of Lamzdorf's activities.

The coup of 1801, which ended in the death of his father, Nikolai remembered very vaguely, which he honestly admitted in his memoirs. At that time, the future emperor did not think about the fight between his father and brother for power, but about his beloved wooden horse.

The rigid discipline of Lamzdorf had the opposite effect - Nikolai sabotaged home schooling, as a result of which he had serious gaps in the humanities. But Nicholas was well versed in military affairs and in fortification.

Nikolai Pavlovich knew how to critically approach himself - already in adulthood, when the prospect of taking the Russian throne became real, he tried to educate himself. It turned out, frankly, not very well. The English Queen Victoria, after twenty years of the reign of Nicholas, gave him the following characterization: "His mind is not processed, his upbringing was careless."

Subsequently, Nicholas with all care will approach the issue of educating his own sons, so that they do not end up in his position.

Sudden heir to the throne

During the Patriotic War and subsequent foreign campaigns, Nikolai rushed to the front, but Alexander I kept his younger brother away from the battlefield. Instead of military glory at this time, he found a bride - a young daughter of the King of Prussia Princess Charlotte.

In July 1817, Charlotte of Prussia, who became Orthodox Alexandra Feodorovna, married Grand Duke Nikolai Pavlovich. The young were happy and did not dream of the throne.

Nicholas I and Alexandra Feodorovna. Source: commons.wikimedia.org

In 1820, Emperor Alexander summoned Nicholas and announced that from now on he would become heir to the throne. The emperor was childless, Konstantin Pavlovich renounced his rights to the throne, as he was divorced and also had no children.

It is unlikely that Nikolai was flirting when he admitted in his notes that at that moment he became really scared: “My wife and I were left in a position that I can only liken to the feeling that, I believe, will amaze a person walking calmly along a pleasant road, dotted with flowers and from which the most pleasant views open up everywhere, when suddenly an abyss opens up under his feet, into which an irresistible force plunges him, not allowing him to retreat or return.

Nicholas did not prepare for the role of monarch and did not want it for himself, but accepted this fate with the humility of a soldier, which General Lamzdorf hammered into him in his childhood.

"I am the emperor, but at what cost!"

The question of the heir hung in the air - information about the abdication of Constantine was not disclosed, and in 1825, when Alexander died, uncertainty arose that threatened with grave consequences. Officials and the military began to swear allegiance to Konstantin, the mint began printing rubles with his image. Nicholas, trying to resolve the situation, urged his brother to come to St. Petersburg from Warsaw, where he was the governor of the Kingdom of Poland.

The Decembrist uprising shocked Nicholas. The rebellion of representatives of noble and honored noble families seemed to him an unthinkable and out of the ordinary event.

Nikolai, who almost died himself when he met with the rebels right on the St. Petersburg street, was not delighted with the forceful liquidation of the performance. “I am an emperor, but at what cost, my God! At the cost of the blood of my subjects,” he wrote to his brother Konstantin.

In the Soviet period, Emperor Nicholas was presented as a kind of bloody maniac, who enthusiastically enjoyed the massacre of the rebels. In fact, nothing like that - the monarch approached traitors as condescendingly as possible. According to the current laws, for an attempt on the person of the sovereign, quartering was supposed, for participation in such a conspiracy - hanging.

As a result, Nicholas completely ruled out quartering, and only the five most active initiators of the uprising were sent to the gallows. But the liberal circles of Russian society considered this a terrible atrocity.

Emperor Nicholas I on Senate Square on December 14, 1825. Source: Public Domain

Administrator on the throne

Nicholas I carefully studied the documents of the Decembrists, especially those related to the analysis of the situation in the country. He saw pain points that required change, and in particular the problem of serfdom.

But he considered radical and revolutionary steps in this area harmful and dangerous.

Nikolai considered the centralization of power, the building of its rigid vertical, the administration of all branches of the country's life, as the main way to solve problems.

The heyday of the bureaucracy of the times of the Russian Empire fell precisely on the reign of Nicholas I. Russian writers did not spare ironically colors for the depiction of Nicholas Russia, which turned into one large state office.

To carry out the tasks of political investigation in July 1826, a permanent body was created - the Third Branch of the Personal Office - a secret service with significant powers. "Third branch", which was headed by Count Alexander Benckendorff, became one of the symbols of the reign of Nicholas I.

The emperor loved the army, but saw the guarantee of its power not in timely rearmament and modernization, but in the establishment of strict discipline. Under Nicholas, most often they began to punish by “running through the ranks” - the offender was led through the ranks of hundreds of soldiers, each of whom struck the punished with a stick. Such punishment, in fact, was a sophisticated form of the death penalty. For addiction to this type of punishment, the emperor received the nickname Nikolai Palkin.

Under Nicholas I, work was carried out to systematize Russian law and the Code of Laws of the Russian Empire was created.

Through the ranks, drawing by Geoffroy, 1845. Source: Public Domain

How Russia first got off the “raw material needle”

Almost throughout his reign, the emperor was engaged in solving the "peasant question". A ban was introduced to exile peasants to hard labor, to sell them one by one and without land, the peasants received the right to redeem themselves from the estates being sold. The "Decree on obligated peasants" and other measures of the tsarist government made it possible under Nicholas I to reduce the proportion of serfs from almost 60 percent of the population to 45 percent. The problem as a whole was far from being solved, but progress was obvious.

A reform of the management of the state village was carried out, which made it possible to improve the situation of state peasants and, at the same time, increase state revenues.

Nicholas I accepted a country that was 100 percent a raw power. The industrial revolution in Europe practically did not affect it. During the three decades of the reign of Nikolai Pavlovich, the output per worker in Russian industry has tripled.

The volume of output of cotton products in Russia increased 30 times, and the volume of engineering products - 33 times.

The share of the urban population under Nicholas I doubled and exceeded 9 percent.

"Only you and I do not steal"

Under Nicholas I, the construction of railways of an all-Russian scale began. We also owe him a wider railway gauge compared to the European one, which remains to this day. The monarch believed that the unification of Russia was not needed, because it was not worth creating amenities for a potential aggressor in terms of delivering troops to Russian territory.

Success, however, could not allow Russia to catch up with the leading European countries in terms of development. The vertical of power created by Nikolai, while solving certain problems, simultaneously hampered many promising undertakings.

And, of course, the emperor also faced such a phenomenon as corruption. Nikolai made regular audits the norm, and mercilessly sent stealing officials to court. By the end of his reign, the number of convicted officials was measured in the thousands every year. But, despite the rigidity of the monarch, the situation did not improve.

“In Russia, only you and I don’t steal,” Nikolai said with bitter irony to the heir to the throne, the future emperor Alexander II.

Nicholas I at construction work. 1853

Kuharuk Oleksandr Vasilyevich - Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor of the Chernihiv State Institute of Law and Social Technologies

The reign of Nicholas I is one of the most interesting and important periods in the history of Russia. It can also be viewed as a whole epoch (1). The study of it continues to be one of the priority and at the same time problematic areas of historical science both in modern Russia and abroad. However, despite the research of recent years, the Nikolaev era in many respects remains "unknown land" not only for the public, but also for professional historians (2).

This is probably due to the fact that, paradoxically, the assessments of this period are characterized by a certain uniformity, mainly in generalizing works. The nature and reasons for the strength of this trend are brilliantly characterized in a recent work by M. M. Shevchenko (3).

To characterize the mentioned tradition, and as a touch to determine its direction, let us allow a short excerpt from a highly professional generalizing study: “On how the Polish uprising of 1830-31. accelerated the recognition by the imperial elite of the military-strategic vulnerability of Russia under serfdom, see the recent work: Kagan F. W. The military reforms of Nicholas I. The origins of the modern Russian army. New York, 1999, pp. 209–241. Kagan shows that the anxiety of Nicholas and his closest advisers for the security of the empire in the early 1830s,
in fact, it anticipated the confusion experienced by the authorities after the Crimean defeat (??) “(4).

Once again, the idea of ​​the strength of the ruling elite of Russia in hindsight, of the ripening of reforms out of confusion before the conditional "West" is offered to the public consciousness in passing to consolidate. The need to reform both land relations and the armed forces was obvious to the governments of Alexander I, and then Nicholas I, long before the November uprising in Warsaw and the Russian-Polish war of 1830–31. (5) Naturally, the continuous cycle of wars 1826– 1831 made some adjustments to the idea of ​​the priority of certain transformations; but they themselves had an organic character, developing along the lines set by military science from the beginning of the 19th century. Problems related to the reform of the Armed Forces were repeatedly considered at the meetings of the “Committee on December 6”, worked out at the General Staff under the leadership of I. I. Dibich6.

On the grounds formulated after a long preliminary work, on May 1, 1832, the "Project for the formation of the War Department" was adopted. It adequately reflects the basic principles of military reforms. At the same time, the “Project” itself was recognized as exemplary, that is, open. Based on the presented grounds, changes began in the military command and control industry itself (7).

The plan for reforming the military land administration in accordance with the "Project" was outlined by A. I. Chernyshev in a memorandum to Nicholas I dated June 23, 1832. Having made a brief review of the order of military administration and outlining ways to reform it, A. I. Chernyshev promotes the idea of ​​the inexpediency of maintaining in peacetime the division of military administration into the General Staff and the Ministry of War. This division, which corresponded and corresponds to the principles of military administration, also existed in peacetime after the establishment in 1815 of the rules of administration on the basis of the "Institution for the management of a large active army." But due to the imperfection of the “Institution”, hastily created in 1812, various contradictions arose, in particular, in the field of division of rights and responsibilities between the chief of the General Staff and the Minister of War (8).

According to the highest approved "Regulation" on December 12, 1812, re-confirmed in 1815, the General Staff consisted of: Chief of Staff, Minister of War, Feldzeugmeister General, Inspector General of Engineer, Quartermaster General, General on Duty, Provision Master General, General krieg commissar, auditor general, adjutant general and wing, commandant of the Imperial apartment, waggenmeister general, inspector general of the medical unit, captain of the counselors, chief priest. Accordingly, for the first time, the headquarters of the armies and corps received a uniform structure.

Since 1815, the chief of the General Staff concentrated in his hands the conduct of military and combat issues. The Minister of War was responsible for the military and economic part. However, being subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff for Military Affairs and standing lower in seniority, the Minister of War had independence in the economic part, which caused a certain contradiction in matters of subordination of lower structures and office work for the inspectorate, engineering, quartermaster general, etc. Based on these considerations, A. I. Chernyshev, who by 1832 served as chief of the General Staff and Minister of War, proposed ways to transform the military administration. They were based on the idea of ​​combining two main parts: purely military, front-line and economic in one department.

It was about merging the structures of the General Staff and the War Ministry into one structure called either the General Staff or the War Ministry. In addition, A. Chernyshev proposed the creation of two offices: a general and a special one for secret cases that are not related to the exact conduct of certain branches of government, about awards, determination and dismissal, about denunciations and complaints about the actions of officials. It was supposed to introduce a new order of administration by issuing a decree to the Governing Senate, defining new relations between government offices and officials (9).

Nicholas I carefully studied the minister's proposals. There was much that was attractive in the ideas of the Minister of War, but they also aroused certain doubts. The concentration of leadership of all land forces in the hands of one person, although close to the royal family, obviously could not receive the unconditional support of the emperor, not to mention his entourage. Among other things, the management of the front-line and the military economy requires different personal qualities that are almost impossible to combine in one person. Therefore, Nicholas I, who believed that the most successful was a collegial management system in conjunction with personal responsibility, made his own changes and proposed to rework the project. The emperor personally finalized a plan for the transformation of military administration (10).

Based on his remarks, significant changes were made to the concept of A. I. Chernyshev. It was envisaged that the Minister of War would be in charge of the entire military unit, would become a speaker for all parts of the military department. But the entire economic part was transferred to the subordination of the Military Council under the Ministry of War, including the departments: artillery, engineering, commissariat, provisions, medical, the economic part of the military settlements came under the collegial administration of the Council. Thus, the division of responsibility in the front and economic parts was maintained. The Minister of War presided over the Military Council, although he was not a senior in rank. Council matters were decided by majority vote. The name of the General Staff was abolished in peacetime, but the title of the General Staff was retained for the persons who previously composed it. If necessary, the headquarters was easily revived. The Office of the Minister of War was also reformed. It was divided into parts: a) economic - for cases subject to the conduct of the Military Council; b) the actual military under the minister.

The Auditorate, which constituted a special department of the War Ministry, headed by an auditor general, was removed from the subordination of the Minister of War. Moreover, the Supreme Military Court was drawn up on similar grounds to the Military Council from generals of choice. Taking into account these instructions, Adjutant General Chernyshev presented two more reports (11).

On July 1, 1832, the Commission for the Transformation of the War Ministry began to operate; on July 11, the Military Council was formed. He was entrusted with coordinating the course of military reforms. In the same year, on the basis of the "Regulations of October 4, 1830", the Academy of the General Staff was created (12).

The thoughtfulness and planned nature of the reforms is evidenced by the consistent creation of a number of committees engaged in preparing various branches of the military economy for reform. Among them: the Committee for the transformation of the army infantry, the Committee for the active army, the Committee for the transformation of the cavalry (13).

The desire of Nicholas I to the maximum unification of the principles of activity of the Military Ministry with other ministries is quite clearly traced, but taking into account the specifics of the military industry. A. I. Chernyshev had to seek advice from M. M. Speransky to coordinate the “Instruction to the Military Ministry” with the limits of responsibility of other branches of government. The editorial committee paid much attention to bringing the "Instruction to the Ministry of War" in line with the "Code of Laws of the Russian Empire" (14).

After a long work on harmonizing different branches of legislation, on March 29, 1836, a decree was issued to the Governing Senate and the approved “Establishment of the Military Ministry”, “General Staff of the Ministry”, “Regulations on the Procedure for Proceedings in the Ministry” (15).

The first paragraph of the "Establishment of the War Ministry" provided that "in the order of state administration, the department of the Ministry of the Military owns all the military ground forces, in their composition, organization, food, supplies, weapons, deployment, movement and action" (16).

That is, all the Land Forces were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War, but not the Minister of War, which cannot be ignored, especially when comparing the reforms of the 30s and 40s with the reforms of the 60s and 70s of the 19th century. According to paragraph 2: “The Ministry consists of: 1) General Staff, 2) Military Council, 3) Auditor General; departments: 4) General Staff, 5) Inspection, 6) Artillery, 7) Engineering, 8) Commissariat, 9) Provision, 10) Military settlements, 11) Medical, 12) Audit, 13) Office of the Ministry. As well as various institutions and persons who are under the Ministry of War and assigned to it ”(17).

The Ministry was headed by the General Staff of His Imperial Majesty, the Military Council and the Auditor General. There is a separation of powers and a combination of collegiality in management with the principles of one-man command, as well as the preservation of the independence of the most important parts of military command and control. At the same time, the post of minister of war remained key to the activities of the ministry. It was the minister who chaired the Military Council and was the rapporteur to the sovereign on military issues. But the Military Council and the Auditorate retained their independence in making decisions in their area of ​​competence. Only in the case of a special position of the Minister of War, the controversial case was presented to the sovereign for decision. The development of military legislation also began to belong to the department of the Military Council (18).

The development and adoption of the "Mandate to the Ministry of War", which determined the competence of various parts of the ministry and the limits of their responsibility, was of great importance. If the "Establishment of the War Department" was adopted in 1812, then the "Instruction" was not developed (19). Among the most important provisions of the "Nakaz" was the exact definition of the duties of the Minister of War. For example, the relationship of the Minister of War to the Auditor General: "In the same relationship as the Minister of Justice to the Governing Senate" (20). Basically, the functions of the minister turned into supervising and controlling, excluding only the range of cases that were under his direct jurisdiction. But at the same time it was emphasized: “The essence of the power of the Minister of War is based on the principles of the Establishment of Ministries, solely to the executive order: no new law, no new institution or the abolition of the former can be established by the power of the Minister of War” (21). His intervention in the field of command and control was even more strictly limited: “When inspecting troops and places that fall within the competence of the commander in chief of the army, in case of any unrest or malfunctions, he communicates with the commander in chief” (22).

It becomes obvious that the Minister of War, having considerable power, actually representing the supreme command of the Land Forces, was a person, in fact, executing the will of the Emperor, and exercised the functions of the highest command only in the part of the War Ministry directly subordinated to him, and in parts of the troops, his immediate subordinates. These included the 5th and 6th Army Corps, reserve and spare parts. In other cases, he was forced to act, referring to the persons to whom the troops were directly subordinate: the commander-in-chief of the army, the commander of separate corps (23). Naturally, the rights of the minister were limited in relation to the decisions of the Military Council, the Auditorate, the economic part of the ministry, especially the artillery and engineering departments (24).

Considering the foregoing, there is no need to talk about the existence of excessive centralization of military control. With such a management system, the government created a management balance in the War Department, which optimized the management structures and made it almost impossible for anyone to use the troops for a conspiracy or for personal purposes. Key powers for combat command and control of troops were transferred to the localities: the commander-in-chief of the Army in the field, the commander of individual corps. Probably, the excessive centralization of military administration in the literature is usually understood as the subordination of all fairly independent bodies of the Military Department not to the minister, but personally to Nicholas I.

In general, as a result of the reform of the early 30s of the 19th century, the Military Department received a well-thought-out, harmonious system of administration, corresponding to military science and the specifics of the military industry, coordinated both with the practical needs of the troops and with other branches of the state mechanism.

Despite the fact that the minister was the rapporteur on military issues, the other persons who made up the Military Council were in close enough relations with the emperor to find an opportunity to turn to him in the event of a conflict of departmental interests and present the matter in a more favorable way for themselves. This was all the more true for Commander-in-Chief of the Active Army I.F. Paskevich, Commander of the Guards and Grenadier Corps, Feldzeugmeister General and Inspector General-Engineer of Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich - persons undoubtedly closer to the emperor than A.I. Chernyshev, as well as having the advantage of seniority. At the same time, we see that only a part of the functions of the Chief of the General Staff passed to the Minister of War in peacetime, and the actual field of activity of the former War Ministry in an expanded form passed into the competence of the Military Council. The main functions of the General Staff in peacetime were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Main Staff of the Active Army, the General Staff of the Guards and Grenadier Corps, that is, they were closer to the organs of command and control of troops.

With the transformation of the War Ministry on new grounds, work continued to harmonize its activities with other branches of government. In October 1836, the "Regulations on changing laws" (25) was adopted. In order to separate and clarify the functions of the Feldzeugmeister General and the Ministry of War, a corresponding law was adopted in 1838 (26), as well as an almost similar “Regulation on the Inspector General for Engineering” (27). These departments traditionally retained considerable independence and were able to respond flexibly enough to the demands of the troops.

In parallel with the reform of the Military Ministry, as the body of the highest military command, there was also a reform of the drill command, the organizational structure of the troops. The reorganization of the troops began with the largest branch of the armed forces - the infantry. In addition to the representatives of the General Staff, the committee for its reform included the chiefs of staff of the 1st and the Army in the Field A. I. Krasovsky and M. D. Gorchakov. The Committee acted extremely quickly and by December 1832 developed a "Draft Regulation on the Transformation of the Army Infantry" (28). The basis of the changes was determined by the idea of ​​the need to have troops capable, if necessary, of operating in various theaters of war. A general unification of management was assumed while maintaining a flexible organizational structure. In order to save money and increase combat effectiveness, it was proposed to reduce the number of divisions and regiments while bringing the number of infantry to the regular strength, softening the traditional scourge of the Russian army - the shortage of troops and the weakness of the combat strength of the regiments, with bloated headquarters and massive distraction of personnel. The funds freed up from the quantitative reduction of the directorates of regiments and divisions were used to improve the maintenance of troops (29).

In the active infantry, a separate Grenadier Corps and 6 army infantry corps, 23 infantry divisions were transformed. The staff of each corps included 3 infantry divisions. The composition of the Grenadier - respectively 1-3 Grenadiers, each army corps consisted of three infantry divisions of the corresponding numbering (for example, the 1st corps of 1-3, the 5th of 13-15 divisions). Each division consisted of two brigades. All regiments of the first brigades of grenadier and infantry divisions were respectively called grenadier and infantry. They seemed to keep the traditions of the linear or heavy infantry. The second brigades consisted of carabinieri regiments in the Grenadier Corps and Chasseurs in the infantry corps, more adapted to operations in loose formation. A separate Caucasian corps received two divisions, then their number was also increased to three.

Infantry regiments wore red and white epaulets, chasseurs light blue and green. The number of division directorates decreased by 4, brigades by 30, regiments by 62. The role of 22–23 divisions has changed. In order to unify management, they became part of the Orenburg, Siberian corps and troops located in Finland. These divisions, which did not have a regimental structure, were reduced to line battalions stationed in the respective regions. As a result of the management of these divisions, they were territorial bodies that led local troops, but retained the general order of service (30).

At the same time, the cadre of reserve troops was reorganized. With each of the army corps, reserve divisions were formed, staying in a cadre and consisting of half-staff battalions. In the Grenadier Corps, regiments were introduced with 3 battalions, in infantry corps 4. Enormous work on the reorganization of the infantry, mass movements of troops was carried out mainly within two years - 1833–1834 (31).

An even more difficult task was the reform of the cavalry, but even here the general organizational principles were preserved. Such unity was achieved, among other things, by the fact that the same commission essentially worked on the draft changes, only A.I. Krasovsky and M.D. Gorchakov were replaced by Count A.D. Guryev and Adjutant General V.F. Adlerberg, which was foreseen in advance (32). The transformation of the cavalry was given relatively more attention, in the 19th century the cavalry was still considered the main mobile strike units. And it was on the eve of the reforms that she was in a severe crisis (33).

The program provisions on reforming the cavalry can be divided into three parts. The first part consists of proposals for the reorganization of the cavalry, the second part - the expected consequences to which it should lead, and, finally, the third part - direct orders for the reorganization (34).

The focus of the reform of the cavalry was to increase its effectiveness, taking into account the experience of the wars of the beginning of the century, and especially the war of 1830-1831. As before, the division of cavalry into heavy and light remained. The heavy cavalry remained a mobile strike force and consisted of regiments of cuirassiers. The light cavalry performed various functions to support the actions of the infantry. A special place was occupied by the dragoons so beloved by Nicholas I. According to their purpose, they approached the heavy cavalry, but in the time of Nikolaev, the first eight squadrons of dragoons
regiments were actively preparing for actions on foot. All these
circumstances, as well as a host of other factors, undoubtedly could not be ignored when reorganizing the cavalry. As a result of the reforms, it was supposed to receive a qualitatively new composition. The structure, composition, number, staff changed, a large number of staff structures were reduced. Considerable attention was paid to bringing the remaining regiments to the state.

16 cavalry divisions were to be reformed. The cavalry regiments were liquidated. Cuirassiers, lancers, hussars received regiments of 8 squadrons, dragoons of 10 squadrons, and the 9th and 10th squadrons of dragoon regiments were armed with pikes and carbines instead of rifles, which suggested that they could, following the model of lancers squadrons, serve for ensuring the actions of the remaining squadrons on foot (35).

Let us dwell in more detail on the reform of the cavalry in order to illustrate the complexity, scale and thoughtfulness of the reform with this example. First, consider the course of the reorganization of the dragoon divisions, which were included in the new 3rd Reserve Cavalry Corps. At the time of the reform, he was in the Dnieper and the Central Black Earth region.

To bring the 1st Moscow Dragoon Regiment into full-time staff, the following were sent to apartments in the vicinity of the city of Romny: the 1st division and the reserve squadron of the abolished Seversky cavalry regiment, the 5th squadron of the Tiraspol cavalry regiment, and finally, ½ of the reserve squadron Polish uhlans. Transfer routes ranged from 146 to 218 miles. Similar distances had to be overcome by units planned to bring other regiments of the 1st Dragoon Division into the new state: 2nd Kargopol, 3rd Kinburn, 4th Novorossiysk. Of these, the Novorossiysk regiment was in a more difficult position. If the 1st division of the abolished Nezhinsky cavalry regiment and its reserve squadron were some 152 miles to their new apartments in Pyryatin, then the 5th squadron of the Arzamas regiment had to overcome 328 miles (36).

According to the accepted norms for the transfer of troops, the entire transformation took from a week to two. Crossings were planned from 18 to 35 miles per day, with 2 days for 5 days of march. At the same time, units of the 2nd Dragoon Division, located in the Oskol-Korocha-Belgorod-Viluyki area, had more time to reorganize.

For example, for the reorganization of the 6th Alexander Duke of the Württemberg Dragoon Regiment, stationed in Korocha, not only the 3rd division of the King of the Württemberg regiment, which was located 94 miles away in Tim, but also the 6th squadron of the Tatar Lancers, based 525 versts in the Kyiv province (37).

An even more difficult technical task was the creation of seven light cavalry divisions according to the new state, which were included in the Grenadier and the newly formed Infantry Corps. So, the light cavalry division of the 1st Infantry Corps included the Sumy and Klyastitsky hussar, St. Petersburg and Courland uhlan regiments.

If the 2nd Klyastitsky hussar regiment moved only from Vilkomir to Rossien for 120 miles, then the 1st division of the Chernigov cavalry regiment sent to its composition had to overcome 1144 ½ versts from Kremenchug in marching order. The Uhlan regiments were in a much worse position. So, the St. Petersburg uhlans, having made the transition from Berdichev to Panevezh at 812 versts, had to simultaneously accept the property and personnel of the 1st division of the Polish uhlan regiment stationed in Stavischi, from where it was considered 957 versts to Panevezh (38).

The thoughtfulness and professionalism of the movement plan, the maximum consideration of the traditions of reforming regiments, the desire to create equivalent balanced units and formations is admirable. So in the 2nd Light Cavalry Division, as in the 1st Light Cavalry Division, one hussar regiment - Elisavetgradsky, retains its original base in Lenchits of the Kingdom of Poland. At the same time, the Lubensky hussars from Panevezh, yielding their apartment district to the St. Petersburg uhlans, moved 670 miles to the 1st division of the Irkutsk hussar regiment in Petrikov, including it in the regiment (39).

Thus, at any moment of the transformation of the cavalry, the division headquarters, and, accordingly, the corps, retained at its disposal a mobile cavalry core capable, albeit temporarily in a more limited volume, of performing combat missions. It is quite easy to trace the desire for the prudent use of property, to save money, but at the same time, the maintenance of the combat capability of the units is not forgotten for a minute. We can also speak of a certain equalization of problems between the leadership of all the light cavalry divisions. Approximately the same number of their composition moved, on average, approximately the same distance. Although, undoubtedly, more attention was paid to units in the Western region, united in the Army in the field.

Assessing the scale of the transformations, it is difficult to agree with the thesis about some kind of hypothetical fear. Within two years, there was a consistent transformation of the troops, a significant reduction in the number of units and formations, which always leads to a temporary decrease in combat capability. During the reorganization of the cavalry, more than half of the remaining regiments and several hundred separate units changed their apartments. Such a transfer made it possible to clarify the optimal routes, to carry out an inventory of property and horse composition, to get rid of supernumerary things, which increased the mobility of troops (40).

As a result, the number of cavalry regiments decreased by 12, and the cavalry and hussar divisions were liquidated. There were only 2 Uhlan divisions in the Reserve Cavalry Corps. In connection with the new organization, the army cavalry, as it were, was divided into 2 parts. The first part consisted of light cavalry divisions of a new composition and formation. Their headquarters were organized on the basis of the headquarters of the hussar and uhlan divisions. The 1st brigade consisted of a light division of two hussar regiments, the 2nd brigade of two uhlans. Each such division was part of the army corps and took its number, from one to six. The 7th division was included in the Grenadier Corps. The constant composition of divisions, their subordination directly to the corps commander, made it possible to establish interaction between infantry and cavalry units.

In addition, a powerful strategic shock cavalry fist was created for use in decisive areas - the Reserve Cavalry Corps. The 1st and 2nd Reserve Cavalry Corps included, respectively, the 1st Cuirassier and 1st Lancers divisions, the 2nd Cuirassier and 2nd Lancers divisions. The third corps, as already noted, combined the 1st and 2nd Dragoon divisions. Subsequently, the Mixed Cavalry Corps was formed on a temporary basis. It was formed by the 5th light division and one of the light divisions attached to the corps closest to the base (41).

In reforming the cavalry, creative military specialists developed the advanced principles of organizing and using cavalry on the battlefield, which developed in the era of the Napoleonic Wars, took into account the experience of Murat's formidable strategic cavalry, and also continued the traditions of the Russian cavalry.

Causes interest and deployment of the Reserve Cavalry. As a zealous owner, Nicholas I sought to extract the maximum benefit: the reserve corps were placed in the districts of the military settlements of the cavalry, which were used as a base area, which was economically feasible. In principle, such a concentration of cavalry corresponded to the general strategic deployment of troops. Obviously, large cavalry masses could be used most effectively in the South-Western and Western directions.

On a slightly different basis, the former First Reserve Corps was reorganized. He was again given the name of the Guards Reserve Cavalry Corps. During its reorganization, as well as during the reformation of the guards infantry, first of all, the features and traditions of the guards were taken into account. The Gendarmerie Regiment, which consisted of 6 active and one reserve squadron (42), was also assigned to the cavalry.

As noted above, with the adoption of the provision on March 1, 1833, a huge work began on the reorganization and movement of the regiments. It was realized mainly by the spring of 1834. Only for a while the reorganization of the 2nd and 3rd light divisions was delayed by the aggravation of the situation in Poland in the spring of 1833 (43). A common place in the works of military specialists of the 19th century was a respectful attitude towards the Russian cavalry of the era of Nicholas I after the transformation of the early 1830s, they believed that neither before that time nor subsequently did the cavalry rise to such a level. Let us quote: “In general, it must be said that during the 30-year reign of Emperor Nicholas, the cavalry was brought to a high degree of perfection by his personal labors. Whatever was in his power, he did for his army” (44).

Following the infantry and cavalry, all artillery was reorganized. Its reformation began in the autumn of 1833. There was an increase in the flow of transformations. At the same time, there is a noticeable consistency in how the reform began: infantry → cavalry → artillery. This made it possible to control the course of the process, to take into account the experience gained. However, the completion of the reform of the combatant part of the troops was completed almost simultaneously.

As a result of the transformation of artillery, seven corps were obtained (Grenadier and six Infantry). The field artillery included an artillery division from 3 artillery brigades. They were attached to infantry and grenadier divisions. The batteries were brought into the 8-gun composition. But if each artillery brigade in the Grenadier Corps consisted of 2 battery batteries and 2 light batteries, a reserve battery and a mobile park, then in the infantry corps only the first brigades had such a composition. The second and third brigades received one battery and 3 light batteries (45).

In total, foot field artillery, excluding cavalry corps, received 31 battery batteries and 54 light batteries, combined into 21 brigades and 7 artillery divisions (46). They were organizationally adjoined by the 19th artillery brigade, originally formed for the Troops in Finland located and not part of the artillery divisions. In total, the field foot artillery included 132 batteries with 704 guns and 22 mobile reserve parks (47).

Sufficiently powerful artillery was attached to the cavalry. Each of the seven light cavalry divisions consisted of 2 light batteries, three reserve cavalry corps received 4 battery and 8 light batteries, 9 half-strength batteries went to the horse artillery reserve. In total, horse artillery combined 35 batteries with 280 guns. Batteries of horse artillery were not reduced to brigades (48).

The composition of the artillery of the Guards Corps was different from the others. Each foot brigade consisted of two battery and one light battery, for a total of 6 battery and 3 light batteries with 72 guns. The guards cavalry was to be supported by a battery and 3 light batteries - 32 guns. In total, the guards artillery in peacetime consisted of seven battery, six light, three reserve batteries, which received 104 guns (49).

The organization of artillery of a separate Caucasian corps was also unified with the general army. But as part of his artillery division, in addition to four battery and eight light batteries with 96 guns, 3 reserve batteries were brought into combat, 2 of which were armed with mountain guns (50).

In total, 195 batteries with 1208 guns were intended for the staff of artillery: field, horse, guards, Separate Caucasian Corps - in peacetime. Organizationally, they were reduced to 8 artillery divisions and 25 brigades (51). At the same time, a coherent system of training specialists for artillery was being created. The existing reserve batteries made it possible to increase the power of Russian artillery if necessary. A lot of work was done to unify the calibers and improve the supply of ammunition to the troops.

Thus, as a result of the reorganization and reformation of troops in the Russian army, the corps system was finally established. The corps, introduced into the organizational structure on the eve of the war of 1812, received a stable composition, united infantry, cavalry and artillery divisions, various units and institutions to be administered by the corps headquarters. The infantry corps turned into powerful formations with a constant composition. They had the opportunity to act independently in the theater of operations, simplifying the leadership of the General Staff (52).

At the same time, reserve and spare parts were reorganized. Measures were also taken to create personnel for the State Mobile Militia (53). The number of necessary reserve units in case of war was determined at 186 battalions and 88 squadrons (54).

For the first time in Russian history, in 1834, it was foreseen in advance, in case of a European war, to create an active army in peacetime, consisting of the Grenada and three infantry corps, supported by 1–2 Reserve cavalry corps, equipped with powerful artillery. It was believed that 180 battalions with a staff strength of 170,000 infantry, 256 squadrons of 35,000 cavalry, supported by 160 heavy and 384 light guns, at the rate of 2.65 guns per 1000 people, were enough to fulfill allied obligations and for the first echelon. The total number of such an army would reach 225-250 thousand (55).

The creation of reserves became possible as a result of the emergence of a significant number of vacation lower ranks. With the adoption on August 30, 1834 of the “Rules on indefinite leave”, the term of service in the army was determined at 20 years, in the guard at 22 years. At the same time, service in the active troops was 15 years, with a transfer to the reserve for 5 years, subject to impeccable service. The lower ranks were dismissed on indefinite leave in the guard for 2 years, and in the army for 5 years, after which they retired (56). Decisive measures were taken to improve the supply of troops and their quartering (57).

In general, in terms of thoughtfulness, plannedness, and scale in the history of Russia, it is difficult to find an analogue to the reforms of the Nikolaev time, including the concentrated transformations of the army of 1831-1836. At the same time, the entire military policy of Nicholas I deserved the following expert assessment: “In general, the Russian army made huge strides forward during his 30-year reign. European forms, which before him seemed to be only externally glued, entered under him into the flesh and blood of the Russian army, and if the struggle that broke out in the last years of his reign against
four powers, and did not end successfully, then its very duration, essentially an insignificant result for the allies, proves the qualities and significance of the activities of this unforgettable sovereign, who lived only for his country and for his army ”(58).

_______________________
1. Gershenzon M. O. The era of Nicholas I. M., 1911; Presnyakov A.E. Apogee of autocracy. Nikolay I. L., 1925; Schieman Tr. Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I. Berlin: 1908-1913. bd. I-III.; Nicholas era // Emperor Nicholas I. M., 2002. S. 31-47.
2. See: Vyskochkov L. V. Emperor Nicholas I. Man and Sovereign. SPb., 2001. S. 74-135; Owl M. D. On the return of the great Sovereign // Emperor Nicholas the First. M., 2002. S. 5-30.
3. Shevchenko M. M. The historical significance of the political system of Emperor Nicholas I: a new point of view // XIX century in the history of Russia: Modern concepts of the history of Russia in the XIX century and their museum interpretation / Proceedings of the State Historical Museum. Issue. 163. M., 2007. S. 281-302.
4. Miller A. I., Dolbilov M. D. From the constitutional charter to the Paskevich regime // Western outskirts of the Russian Empire. M., 2006. S. 119.
5. See Mironenko SV Pages of the secret history of the autocracy. M., 1990.
6. Collection of the Russian Historical Society. T. 98.
7. PSZ II. T. VII. N 5318. Project for the formation of the War Department; Education Project of the War Department. SPb., 1832.
8. Establishment for the management of the Large Active Army. SPb., 1812. Ch. 1–4.
9. Centenary of the War Department. Annex to T. 2. St. Petersburg, 1902. Applications 1–2.
10. Ibid. pp. 57–60.
11. Ibid. Appendix 3-4.
12. PSZ II. T. V. No. 3975. Regulations on the Academy of the General Staff.
13. RGVIA. F. 38. Op. 4. D. 9. L. 2–28 (On the reorganization of the army infantry); F. 14014. Op. 1. D. 16. L. 4–12 (On the composition of the army ...); F. 38. Op. 4. D. 52. L. 1-1ob. (About the reorganization of the cavalry ...)
14. Journal of the Ministry of Justice. No. 1. St. Petersburg, 1916. S. 233–245.
15. PSZ II. T. XI. No. 9038. Establishment of the War Department. SPb., 1836.
16. Ibid. P. 1.
17. Ibid. P. 2.
18. Ibid. P. 5.
19. Ibid. P. 425–445.
20. Ibid. P. 443.
21. Ibid. P. 556.
22. Ibid. P. 563.
23. Ibid. P. 641.
24. Ibid. P. 583, 639, 572, 712-713.
25. PSZ II. T. XI. No. 9038. Regulation on changing laws.
26. Ibid. No. 11170.
27. Ibid. No. 11171.
28. PSZ II. T. VIII. No. 5943. Regulations on the transformation of the army infantry. St. Petersburg, 1833.
29. RGVIA. F. 38. Op. 4. D. 9. L. 3–47. (On the transformation of the infantry).
30. PSZ II. T. VIII. No. 5943. P. 1–12.
31. RGVIA. F. 38. Op. 4. D. 9. L. 48–117.
32. RGVIA. F. 38. Op. 4. D. 52. L. 1–1 rev. (On the transformation of the cavalry).
33. Briks G. History of the cavalry. Book. 2. M., 2001. S. 249.
34. RGVIA. F. 38. Op. 4. D. 52. L. 1–1 rev.
35. Ibid. L. 2–9 vol.
36. Ibid. L. 21–21 rev.
37. Ibid. L. 21v.–31v.
38. Ibid. L. 32–32 rev.
39. Ibid. L. 32–34.
40. Ibid. L. 50–224.
41. PSZ II. T. VIII. No. 6065. Items 1–23. Regulations on the transformation of the cavalry.
42. PSZ II. T. VII. No. 5383. On the transformation of the guards cavalry.
43. RGVIA. F. 38. Op. 4. D. 52. L. 223-226v.
44. Brix G. Decree. Op. S. 268.
45. RGVIA. F. 38. Op. 4. D. 22. L. 1–96 rev. (On the reformation of artillery in 1833–1834)
46. ​​Ibid. L. 2v.–4.
47. Ibid. L. 2–4 vol., 12–15.
48. Ibid. L. 3, 15–17v.
49. Ibid. L. 1–1 vol.
50. Ibid. L. 4–4 vol.
51. Calculated on the basis of: RGVIA. F. 38. Op. 4. D. 22.
52. RGVIA. F. 38. Op. 4. D. 29. On the new composition of the army.
53. See: Livchak B. F. People's militia in the Russian Armed Forces, 1806–1850. Sverdlovsk, 1961.
54. RGVIA. F. VUA. D. 18027. L. 157–227.
55. RGVIA. F. 38. Op. 4. D. 29; D. 22. L. 19–19 rev.
56. PSZ II. T. IX. No. 6864. Regulations on indefinite leave of lower ranks.
57. RGVIA. F. 38. Op. 4. D. 26. L. 1–12 (On the food districts of the troops).
58. Brix G. Decree. Op. S. 250.

Conversation with Doctor of Philology, specialist in the legacy of Emperor Nicholas I

Until recently, in school textbooks, one could read the pamphlet nickname of this king - Nikolai Palkin. The appearance in the press of positive assessments of Emperor Nicholas I was excluded. Meanwhile, Pushkin wrote: "No, I'm not a flatterer when I compose free praise to the tsar." At the same time, the sovereign with "tin eyes" (they scare us a little less often than the Stalinist mustache) was declared almost the killer of the great poet.

And here is Zagoskin in “Moscow and Muscovites”: “You should look at the Kremlin when our big bell hums and the Russian Tsar, engulfed on all sides by waves of countless crowds of people, will go across the entire square to perform prayers in the Assumption Cathedral.
- How? interrupted Duvernier. - Is it possible that your sovereign is walking along this square with such a crowd of people? .. - Yes, yes, on foot; and even sometimes it is very crowded. - What are you saying!.. But, probably, the police?.. - Where the sovereign, there is no police. - Have mercy! But how is it possible?.. To walk alone in the midst of a disorderly crowd of people, without any guards ... - I see, gentlemen of the French, - I said, looking almost with compassion at the traveler, - you will never understand us. Our tsar does not need guards: his guards are all Russian people.
Yes, it was the emperor, rolling down the hill with the boys, marching everywhere without guards. There were no more. Soon after the death of Nikolai Pavlovich, the autocratic idyll crumbled.
Nicholas I carried out no less reforms than his son, laid the foundations for the industrial development of the empire. But he did his best to maintain political calm. Was there a dead end?

- Boris Nikolaevich! Our hero was not the eldest son of Emperor Paul; in his youth he had few chances to take the throne. Was he preparing for royal service?

- He never prepared directly for the royal service, but he was ready for it, because from an early age he was guided by the sacred concepts of “duty” and “service”. In one of his letters he wrote: “Debt! Yes, this is not an empty word for someone who is accustomed from youth to understand it the way I do. This word has a sacred meaning, before which every personal impulse recedes, everything must fall silent before one feeling and yield to it until you disappear into the grave. That is my slogan."

- And now - the elder brothers, Alexander and Konstantin, for various reasons, give way to the throne for him ... The beginning of the reign of Nicholas I is associated with dramatic events in Russian history. How do you assess the Decembrist movement? How did the destructive and patriotic dreams of the Russian nobility correlate in it?

- At the heart of the Decembrists' enthusiasm for new ideas and their possible adaptation to Russian reality were noble motives, they dreamed of destroying "various injustices and oppressions" and bringing the estates together for the growth of social prosperity. Examples of the dominance of foreigners in the highest administration, extortion, violation of legal proceedings, inhuman treatment of soldiers in the army, and trade in serfs excited the lofty minds of young nobles, inspired by the patriotic upsurge of 1812.

At the same time, the “great truths” of freedom, equality, honor, necessary for the good of the Fatherland, were associated in the minds of the Decembrists only with republican institutions and European social forms, which they, in theory, mechanically transferred to Russian soil, seeking to “transplant France into Russia”. The abstractness and speculation of such a transfer consisted in the fact that it was carried out without correlation with the historical past and national traditions, which for centuries formed the spiritual values, psychological and everyday way of Russian life. The sincere hopes of the Decembrists for a forced change in the established system, for the legal order, as a panacea for all troubles, came into objective conflict with their noble intentions. For in a strategic perspective, they opened the way for the development of mercantile egoistic relations far from nobility, the increasing leveling of the peoples and cultures of Russia, the decrease in the spiritual demands of the individual, the dictatorship of the money bag.

- Did Nikolai Pavlovich know Russia better?

- In his spirit, upbringing and accepted traditions, Nicholas I was averse to the “general infection of self-interest”, the ways of “commercial peoples”, the dominance of egocentric passions that tear away human rights from his duty and duties. From the materials of the investigation of the Decembrists, he learned that they were extremely disunited not only with the government, but also with the people. Moreover, their transformational plans, which turned into a military coup, were fraught with, according to the later expression of A.I. Herzen, "the embryo and mental center of the coming revolution."

Indeed, motives for the extermination of the royal family or the dismemberment of Russia actively seeped into the vague plans for the introduction of representative government in Russia in the form of either a constitutional monarchy, or a Swiss or American republic. Discussed (although many rejected) and practical methods familiar to future generations, not only from Dostoevsky's novel "Demons". So, Yakubovich, ready to kill the emperor, offered to open taverns for the mob, rebel the soldiers and peasants, give them vodka to drink, and then send this “mixture” to the Winter Palace and plunder the rich quarters of St. Petersburg. In case of failure, the option of setting fire to the capital and retreating to Moscow to join the Southern Association was worked out. Pestel, who did not approve of revolutions from below and was thinking about preventing their consequences, hatched no less radical plans: to establish a ten-year dictatorship, distract the people with wars of conquest, bring in thirty times more gendarmes than under the autocracy of Nicholas I, and thus move towards a “civilized society” .

- Pushkin wrote about Nicholas I: "To the one whom he obviously punishes, / He secretly does mercy." Isn't it about the Russian nobility? After all, it can be assumed that the emperor saved him from revolutionary extermination!

- At the same time, Pushkin called the Decembrists the "best color" of the generation. This is the complexity of the era.

– Decembrists are always romanticized. And the deeds of the king are not known to the general public. Although what is the story of Pushkin's poem "Hero" ...

- Pushkin was delighted with the absolute fearlessness of the emperor during the cholera epidemic in Moscow in 1830. Despising the danger, the king visited cholera wards in hospitals, ordered new hospitals to be built in different parts of the city and shelters for children who had lost their parents, personally gave orders for financial and food assistance to the poor, constantly appeared on the streets in order to raise the fallen spirit of the inhabitants. Encouraged Muscovites have become more willing to comply with security measures and compete in donations. It was the decisive and courageous actions of Nicholas I that inspired Pushkin to write the poem “Hero”, which tells about the courage and mercy of Napoleon, who allegedly visited the plague hospital in Jaffa, and hints at the arrival of the tsar in Moscow. "What is the sovereign? well done!" - the poet wrote to Vyazemsky.

- Who in those years was much more frondier, was skeptical about autocracy. And unlike Pushkin, he did not welcome the strengthening of tsarist power. Vyazemsky will turn into a guardian of the autocracy towards the end of the reign of the emperor ... During the reign of Nicholas I, two revolutionary waves swept across Europe. What concept of development did the Russian emperor oppose to the revolutionaries?

- Nicholas I strove to strictly follow the legitimist principles of the Holy Alliance. As you know, this political-mystical union of European monarchies was created at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to carry out Christian policy. The states were obliged "to be guided by no other rules than" the commandments of this holy faith, the commandments of love, truth and faith, "and also give each other benefits, reinforcements and help, like brothers and compatriots."

The revolutionary explosion in France, which eliminated Charles X from the political arena in 1830, was perceived by the tsar as a challenge to the "old order". At the same time, Belgian independence was gained in a revolutionary way, also recognized by European states. It became clear that the members of the Holy Alliance were quite free to the previously established agreements and manipulated them for their own strategic purposes and diplomatic maneuvers. Nevertheless, under the influence of these coups and the Polish uprising of 1830-1831, Russia, Austria and Prussia in 1833 concluded an agreement confirming the Vienna principles of 1815. As a result, Russia pledged to intervene in European affairs and "support power wherever it exists, reinforce it where it weakens, and defend it where it is openly attacked."

After the agreements were concluded, the Russian tsar found himself in a difficult position. When another revolution broke out in France in February 1848, he spoke in his manifesto about the spread of "rebellion and anarchy" in neighboring Germany and about their threat to Austria, Prussia and "Russia entrusted to us by God." Nicholas I exaggerated the danger to Russia of European revolutions and, under the influence of the insincere and short-sighted diplomacy of his foreign minister, Nesselrode, overly trusted and helped his European allies, who, in fact, were not such.

- Ideological battles also took place within the empire. Can the feudal system be called slavery or is it a journalistic exaggeration? How did the public discussion about serfdom develop under Nicholas I?

– The feudal system in Russia differed from classical slavery in the total and strict sense of this concept, since it was of a mobile nature, constantly refined and changed, filled with national identity and individual relationships. Within the framework of government guardianship, it was gradually forbidden to sell serfs at public auctions with the fragmentation of families, give them as gifts or pay private debts with them, give them to factories and exile them to Siberia at their discretion. The landlords received the right to release householders into the wild without land by mutual agreement, and the serfs - the right to redeem freedom when selling estates. Nobles who did not have estates were forbidden to buy peasants without land, and the latter, with the consent of the landlords, were allowed to acquire real estate.

Nicholas I was well aware of the fundamental importance for Russia of the peasant question and was aware not only of the moral incompatibility of serfdom with Orthodox and autocratic principles, but also of its economic inexpediency. After all, economic initiative, industrial and commercial blood circulation were held back. The following words were attributed to him: "I do not want to die without doing two things: the publication of a code of laws and the abolition of serfdom." The king believed that a person could “become a thing” only by “cunning and deceit on the one hand and ignorance on the other.” During the years of his reign, eleven secret committees for the liberation of the peasants were created and private measures were taken to limit their personal dependence.

- The aphorism of Nicholas I is known: "I look at human life as a service, because everyone serves." In my opinion, this is a much wiser principle than democratic speculation. Service, business, and not political coquetry, not competition of compromising materials and demagogy. Did he manage to create an efficient administrative system? What were its fruits?

- The course of life required competent officials, engineers, agronomists, doctors, teachers, and the government of Nicholas I responded to these requirements by developing a wide network of primary and secondary educational institutions. The number of gymnasiums in these years increased significantly, and the number of students in them almost tripled. In St. Petersburg, the Main Pedagogical Institute was restored, the Higher School of Law was opened to train lawyers, and the Technological Institute trained engineers. The Construction, Agricultural, Surveying Institutes in Moscow began their work ...

The reign of Nicholas I accounts for the construction of half of the entire network of highways designed in Russia until 1917, as well as a railway link from St. Petersburg to Tsarskoye Selo and to Moscow. The first steamboats appeared on the Volga and the Baltic, manufactories began to be replaced by factories with modern equipment.

At the same time, contradictions grew in the administrative system of Nicholas I, shaking it from the inside. Following Karamzin, he was well aware of the enormous role played not by formal institutions, but by intelligent, honest, and unflatteringly devoted people. Nevertheless, his government lacked the taste and ability to use such people, and it was easier to live and think among, albeit sometimes morally untenable, but habitual official loyalty.

The crisis of confidence on the part of the official authorities was clearly manifested in the prohibition of the magazine "European", created in the early 30s by Ivan Kireevsky, who was distinguished by a deep mind and spiritual purity, nobility of nature and understanding of his own vocation. At one time, even the tutor of the Tsarevich Zhukovsky fell into the number of unreliable. The Slavophiles, who were natural allies, became enemies, whom the Moscow military governor-general Zakrevskii called "Reds" and "Communists." Especially clearly, the peculiar personnel deafness of the emperor manifested itself in the removal from active work of General Yermolov, who was suspected of being disloyal to him at the suggestion of officials.

A powerful mediastinum of bureaucracy gradually formed between the tsar and the people, becoming an independent force. This fettered the healthy forces of the nation.

“But the emperor received the main blows not from internal revolutionaries, but from external allies. How did it happen that Austria, which would have collapsed if not for the help of Russia and its emperor, took an anti-Russian position in the 1850s? Why was Russia left alone against a "united Europe"? Is it possible to talk about the fatal mistakes of Russian diplomacy during this period?

- Russia's support for the national liberation movement of the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula, its increased authority among the South Slavic peoples, the strengthening of positions in Constantinople, the expansion of maritime trade could not but disturb Western diplomacy and implicitly prepared the inevitable preconditions for the coming Crimean War, which would be the last act of the reign of Nicholas I. And when in the late 40s. In the 19th century, the contradictions between the interests of European countries in the Middle East escalated again, with the parallel development of the national liberation movement in the Balkans, Nicholas I failed to choose a balanced policy in resolving the Eastern question and in response to the political cataclysms of the West.

Following the spirit and letter of previous conventions, the tsar sent Russian troops in March 1849 to put down the Hungarian uprising against the legitimate government of Austria. However, he soon had to be convinced of the insincerity and peculiar "gratitude" of the Allies, when Austria and Prussia united with England and France in order to weaken the state power of Russia and inflict a military defeat on it at a convenient opportunity. After behind-the-scenes negotiations with European diplomats, the Turkish government declared war on Russia, against which all Western countries and parties soon united. In cursing the autocracy, the Polish emigrants stood up under the Turkish banner, the Hungarian revolutionaries linked up with the Austrian emperor, Marx and Engels found a common language with Napoleon III and Palmerston.

- What kind of autocracy did Nikolai strive for? Is it right to believe that with the inevitable strengthening of the bourgeoisie, the foundations of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality were shaken?

- The kind of autocracy Nicholas I aspired to can be judged by his appeal to his heir: “God forbid that I manage to hand over Russia to you the way I tried to make it: strong, independent and good - we are good, no one is evil” . For this, the Uvarov trinity of Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality should have served, the origins of which can be seen in Karamzin's Note on Ancient and New Russia.

Ideal tasks in the unity of Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality were weakened from within by their imperfect embodiment, by the shortcomings of the emerging administrative system. In addition, the inevitable strengthening of the bourgeoisie directed the steady course of the history of the newest peoples, in the words of N. Turgenev, along the “dirty road” of selfishness and self-interest, shook the spiritual foundations of life.

—Did Nicholas I already have that diabolical force that would engage in terror under his son? And what are the reasons for its appearance?

– Terrorism as such in Russia, however, manifested itself later – in the spring of 1862, when Pyotr Zaichnevsky drew up the “Young Russia” proclamation, in which terror was openly presented as a means of achieving social and political transformations. On April 4, 1866, Karakozov's shot was fired. In 1869, an illegal organization "People's Punishment" was formed, headed by Nechaev.

It was difficult to imagine such a thing in the reign of Nicholas. But in his last years, a nihilistic atmosphere was already felt and gradually gained strength, which manifested itself in the activities of Petrashevsky's circle and the logic of which was traced by Dostoevsky in Possessed. According to him, Nechaevism was the result of the renunciation of the nobility and the Western intelligentsia from Orthodoxy and original development, blind faith in "new ideas" regardless of understanding the contradictions of human nature.

– Among the great Russian thinkers and writers there were both admirers and opponents of Nikolai Pavlovich. Whose opinion is most valuable to you? Who determined the historical reputation of this emperor?

– I think that the philosopher Vl. Solovyov, who responded to the 40th anniversary of his death: “The mighty Autocrat, whom the Russian kingdom piously commemorates today, was not only the personification of our external strength. If he were only this, then his glory would not survive Sevastopol. But behind the harsh features of the formidable ruler, who spoke sharply at the request of state necessity (or what was considered such a necessity), Emperor Nikolai Pavlovich hid a clear understanding of the highest truth and the Christian ideal, which raised him above the level of not only then, but also the present public consciousness. …

In addition to the generous character and human heart in this "iron giant" - what a clear and firm understanding of the principles of Christian politics! “We shouldn’t do this, precisely because we are Christians” - these are the simple words with which Emperor Nicholas I “outstripped” both his and our era, this is the initial truth that our society has to be reminded of!”

However, the historical process was dominated by the assessments of the revolutionary democrats, who called the reign of Nicholas I a period of gloomy reaction and hopeless stagnation, when despotic arbitrariness, barracks order and cemetery silence were erected everywhere. The tamer of revolutions, the gendarme of Europe, the jailer of the Decembrists, the incorrigible martinet, the “fiend of uniform education”, the “boa constrictor that strangled Russia for thirty years” - these are typical stereotypes that have come down to our days. Alas…

– Is it time to respectfully investigate the activities of Emperor Nicholas I, including the experience of defeats?

– The imposing figure of this emperor is worthy of respectful memory. I would like to believe that we will no longer cross it out of the context of the "golden age" of our culture.

Interviewed by Arseniy Zamostyanov

Tarasov Boris Nikolayevich - Rector of the Literary Institute, Doctor of Philology, specialist in the legacy of Emperor Nicholas I

Uniform of a military officer

The Russian military uniform has undergone many changes, improvements and innovations throughout its history. This was due to the will of the ruler, a change in ideology, and the influence of Western European military fashion.

Most of the Russian emperors were adherents of the military fashion of Western Europe, so the Russian military uniform was often similar to the uniforms of other European armies. And only Emperor Alexander III gave the military uniform the appearance of national clothes.

Pre-Petrine era

in Russia until the end of the 17th century. There were almost no standing troops, so there were no military uniforms. The squads of princes were dressed in the same clothes as civilians, only armor was added.

True, some princes sometimes acquired uniform clothes for their squad, but these were isolated cases.

The government of Tsar Michael in 1631, expecting a war with Poland, sent Colonel Alexander Leslie to Sweden to hire 5,000 infantry soldiers.

In the 17th century, during the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich, “Regiments of the Foreign System” were formed - military units formed from “eager” free people, Cossacks, foreigners and others, and later from subordinate people on the model of Western European armies.

The first unified military uniform in Russia can be considered the clothes of the archery regiments. They appeared in the 17th century.

archers

Sagittarius- service person rider or infantryman armed with "fiery battle". Archers in Russia made up the first regular army.

Streltsy regiments had a uniform and obligatory dress uniform for all (“colored dress”). It consisted of an upper caftan, a hat with a fur band, trousers and boots, the color of which (except for trousers) was regulated in accordance with belonging to a particular regiment.

caftan- outerwear for men

Common in weapons and clothing of all archers:

• gloves with brown leather cuffs;
• in the campaign, the muzzle of a squeak or musket was closed with a short leather case;
• the berdysh was worn behind the back over any shoulder;
• a sash was worn over the waist belt;
• there were no buttonholes on the marching caftan;
• The external distinction of the senior officers (“initial people”) was the image of the crown embroidered with pearls on the cap and the staff, as well as the ermine lining of the upper caftan and the edge of the cap (which indicated high-born princely origin).

The dress uniform was worn only on special days: during the main church holidays and during ceremonial events.

Every day and in military campaigns, a “wearable dress” was used, which had the same cut as the dress uniform, but was made of cheaper gray, black or brown cloth.

S. Ivanov "Archers"

Streltsy regiments during the struggle for power opposed Peter I and were repressed by him. The form of the European model in Russia was introduced by Peter I, mainly borrowing it from the Swedes.

The era of Peter I

Peter I created a regular army on the basis of the "Regiments of a foreign system", which existed during the reign of his father, and archery units. The army was recruited on the basis of recruitment (also, until the middle of the 18th century, the obligatory service of the nobles was preserved). Peter, from his predecessors, inherited an army already adapted for further reconstruction. There were two “elected” regiments in Moscow (Butyrsky and Lefortovsky), commanded by “foreigners” P. Gordon and F. Lefort.

In his "amusing" villages, Peter arranged two new regiments: Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky, completely according to a foreign model. By 1692, these regiments were finally trained and made up the 3rd Moscow elective regiment, headed by General A. M. Golovin.

Officer of the Life Guards of the Semyonovsky Regiment from 1700 to 1720

At first, the officer uniform of the Peter's army was no different from the soldier's. Then they introduced the "commander's insignia" - an officer's scarf. This detail was borrowed from the Swedes, with the exception of the colors, which reproduced the colors of the Russian flag. According to the rules, the scarf was worn over the right shoulder and tied at the left hip, but our officers adapted to wear it around the waist - it was more convenient in battle. Petrovsky's scarf, with changes, survived to the present - in the form of a ceremonial officer's belt.

Grenadier of an infantry regiment from 1700 to 1732

The armament of each soldier consisted of a sword with a harness and a fuse. Fuzeya - a gun, the castle of the fuzei was flint; in necessary cases, a baguinet was mounted on the fusee - a five- or eight-pointed trihedral bayonet. The cartridges were placed in leather bags attached to the sling.

Captain and Lieutenant of the Musketeer Companies of the Infantry Regiment from 1763 to 1786

Captains and the sergeants instead of the fusee were armed with halberds - axes on a three-yard shaft.

Sergeant of the Infantry Regiment with a halberd from 1700 to 1720

One of the companies in each regiment was called the grenadier, and the peculiarity of its weapons were wick bombs, which were kept by the grenadier in a special bag. grenadiers- selected units of infantry and / or cavalry, designed to storm enemy fortifications, mainly in siege operations.

Dragoons- the name of the cavalry (cavalry), capable of also acting on foot. Dragoons in Russia were mounted and on foot.

Fanen Junker of the Nizhny Novgorod Dragoon Regiment, 1797-1800

Since 1700, the uniform of a soldier consisted of a small flattened cocked hat, a caftan, an epanchi, a camisole and trousers.

Cocked hat

Epancha- a wide sleeveless round raincoat with a hood for men, and for women - a short, sleeveless fur coat (obepanechka). Imported from the Arab East.

Camisole- men's clothing, sewn to the waist, knee-length, sometimes sleeveless worn under a caftan.

The hat was black, the edges of the brim were trimmed with braid, and a copper button was attached to the left side. When listening to orders from the elders, the younger ones took off their hat and held it under their left armpit. Soldiers and officers wore their hair long to the shoulder, and in ceremonial occasions they powdered it with flour.

The caftans of the infantrymen were made of green cloth, those of the dragoons were made of blue, single-breasted, without a collar, with red cuffs (a lapel on the sleeve of men's clothing).

Cuff of the 8th Cuirassier Regiment of the French Army (1814-1815)

The caftan was knee-length and supplied with copper buttons; epancha for cavalry and infantry was made of red cloth and had two collars: it was a narrow cape that reached to the knees and poorly protected from rain and snow; boots - long, with light bells (funnel-shaped expansion) were worn only on guard and when hiking, and ordinary shoes were stockings and blunt-toed greased heads with a copper buckle; the stockings of the army soldiers were green, and the Preobrazhenians and Semyonovtsy after the Narva defeat were red, according to legend, in memory of the day when the former "amusing" regiments did not flinch, with a general "embarrassment" under the onslaught of Charles XII.

Fuselier of the Life Guards of the Semyonovsky Regiment, from 1700 to 1720

The Grenadiers of the Guard differed from the Fusiliers (soldiers armed with flintlock guns) only in their headdress: instead of a triangular hat, they wore leather helmets with an ostrich plume.

The cut of the officer's uniform was the same as that of the soldiers, only sheathed along the edges and on the side with gold galloon, the buttons were also gilded, the tie, instead of black cloth, like the soldiers, was white linen. Attached to the hat plume from white and red feathers.

Infantry general in a hat with a plume

In full dress, officers were required to wear powdered wigs on their heads. The officer was also distinguished from the ordinary by a white-blue-red scarf with silver, and the staff officer had gold tassels, which were worn high on the chest, near the collar.

Under Peter I in Russia, epaulettes also appeared on military clothing. The use of shoulder straps as a means of distinguishing the servicemen of one regiment from the servicemen of another regiment began in 1762, when shoulder straps of various weaving from a garus cord were installed for each regiment. At the same time, an attempt was made to make the shoulder strap a means of distinguishing between soldiers and officers, for which in the same regiment officers and soldiers had different weaving of shoulder straps.

In the future, the form of uniforms changed, although in general the samples of Peter the Great were preserved, which became more and more complicated. After the Seven Years' War, the cult of Frederick the Great developed. The convenience in the form of uniforms was forgotten; they tried to make a fine fellow out of a soldier and give him such a uniform, the maintenance of which in order would take all his free time from service. Especially a lot of time was required for the soldiers to keep their hair in order: they combed it into two boules and a braid, powdered it on foot, and on horseback it was allowed not to powder their hair and not to curl it into boules, taking it into one dense braid, but it was required to grow and to comb a mustache high or, who does not have one, to have overhead.

The soldier's clothes were narrow, which was caused by the requirement of the then standing and especially marching without bending the knees. Many parts of the troops had elk trousers, which, before putting on, were wetted and dried already in public. The outfit was so uncomfortable that in the manual for training, the recruit was ordered to put it on no earlier than after three months in order to teach the soldiers how to use such clothes.

The era of Catherine II

During the reign of Catherine II, the uniform was not observed very carefully. Guards officers were weary of it and out of order did not wear it at all. It was changed at the end of Catherine's reign at the insistence of Prince Potemkin. He said that “curling, powdering, weaving braids - is this a soldier’s business? Everyone must agree that it is more useful to wash and scratch your head than to weigh it down with powder, lard, flour, hairpins, braids. The soldier's toilet should be such that he got up, then he's ready. The uniform of the army was simplified and consisted of a wide uniform and trousers tucked into high boots;

Cavalier guard in full dress (1793)

Private and chief officer of an infantry regiment in the form of 1786-1796.

But in the cavalry, and especially in the guards, the uniform remained shiny and uncomfortable, although complex hairstyles and leggings disappeared from the ordinary uniform of the troops.

The era of Paul I

Paul I carried out his own reform of the army, because. discipline in the regiments suffered, titles were given out undeservedly (noble children were already assigned to some rank, to this or that regiment from birth. Many, having a rank and receiving a salary, did not serve at all). Paul I decided to follow Peter the Great and take as a basis the model of the modern European army (Prussian), seeing in it a model of discipline and perfection. The military reform was not stopped even after the death of Paul.

S. Schukin "Portrait of Emperor Paul I in ceremonial uniform and cocked hat"

The uniform consisted of a wide and long uniform with tails and a turn-down collar, tight and short trousers, patent leather shoes, stockings with garters and boot-shaped boots and a small triangular hat. The regiments differed in the color of collars and cuffs, but without any system, they were difficult to remember and were poorly distinguished.

Hairstyles again become important - the soldiers powder their hair and braid it into regular length braids with a bow at the end; the hairstyle was so complicated that hairdressers were brought into the troops.

Powder is not gunpowder

Buckles are not guns,

A scythe is not a cleaver

I am not a Prussian, but a natural hare!

Grenadier of the Pavlovsky Regiment

Grenadiers wore tall cone-shaped hats (grenadiers) with a large metal shield in front; these hats, like a ceremonial headdress, were preserved in the Pavlovsky Life Guards Regiment.

According to eyewitnesses, the soldiers on the campaign suffered the most from varnished shoes and tight trousers that rubbed their legs.

The era of Alexander I

Emperor Alexander I was a supporter of a magnificent military uniform, which became even more uncomfortable. Pavlovskaya form in 1802 was replaced by a new one. Wigs were destroyed, boots-like boots and shoes were replaced with boots with trouser clasps; the uniforms were significantly shortened, narrowed and looked like tailcoats (the tails on the uniforms were left, but the soldiers had short ones); standing solid collars and shoulder epaulettes and epaulettes were introduced; officers' collars were decorated with embroidery or buttonholes and were generally colored; shelves were distinguished by their colors. The light and comfortable cocked hats were replaced by new hats, high, heavy and very uncomfortable; they bore the common name of shakos, while the straps on the shakos and the collar rubbed the neck.

Shako- a military headdress of a cylindrical shape, with a flat top, with a visor, often with a decoration in the form of a sultan. It was common in many European armies at the beginning of the 19th century.

The highest commanding officers were assigned to wear the then huge double-cornered hats with feathers and edging. It was warm in the bicorne in winter, but very hot in summer, so the peakless cap also became popular in the warm season.

S. Schukin "Alexander I in the form of the Life Guards of the Preobrazhensky Regiment"

Shoulder straps were introduced at first only in the infantry (red), then the number of colors was increased to five (red, blue, white, dark green and yellow, in order of the regiments of the division); officer shoulder straps were sheathed with galloon, and in 1807 they were replaced by epaulettes.

D. Dow "Portrait of General Pyotr Bagration with epaulettes"

Epaulets- shoulder insignia of a military rank on a military uniform. They were common in the armies of European countries in the XVIII-XIX centuries, especially during the Napoleonic wars. By the middle of the 20th century, they had practically gone out of circulation.

Subsequently, epaulettes were also given to the lower ranks of some cavalry units.

Pavlovsky cloaks were replaced by narrow overcoats with standing collars that did not cover the ears. The equipment included a mass of belts, which was difficult to keep in good order. The uniform was complex and hard to wear.

From the day of the accession to the throne of Alexander I and until 1815, officers were allowed to wear particular dress outside of service; but at the end of the foreign campaign, as a result of fermentation in the army, this right was abolished.

Staff officer and chief officer of the grenadier regiment (1815)

The era of Nicholas I

Under Nicholas I, uniforms and overcoats were at first still very narrow, especially in the cavalry - officers even had to wear corsets; nothing could be put under the overcoat. The collars of the uniform were fastened tightly and strongly propped up the head. The shakos were too high, during parades they were decorated with sultans, so the entire headdress was about 73.3 cm high.

Bloomers (cloth in winter and linen in summer) were worn over boots; boots with five or six buttons were worn under them, since the boots were very short. Ammunition of white and black lacquered belts required constant cleaning. A huge relief was the permission to wear, first out of order, and then on the campaign, caps similar to the current ones. The variety of forms was great.

Chief officer of the Life Guards Volynsky Regiment (1830)

Simplifications in the form of uniforms began only from 1832: in 1844, heavy and uncomfortable shakos were replaced by high helmets with a sharp pommel, officers and generals began to wear caps with visors; The troops were provided with mittens and earmuffs. Since 1832, officers of all branches of arms have been allowed to wear mustaches, and officers' horses are not allowed to trim their tails or cut their heads.

Non-commissioned officer of laboratory companies (1826-1828) - peaked cap

In the last years of the reign of Nicholas, the uniform acquired instead of the French Prussian cut: dress helmets with ponytails were introduced for officers and generals, uniforms for the guards were sewn from dark blue or black cloth, coattails on army uniforms became short, and white trousers with full dress and On solemn occasions they began to sew on red stripes, as in the Prussian army.

In 1843, transverse stripes were introduced on soldier's shoulder straps - stripes, according to which ranks were distinguished.

In 1854, shoulder straps were also introduced for officers. Since that time, the gradual replacement of epaulettes by shoulder straps began.

The era of Alexander II

I. Tyurin "Alexander II in the form of the Life Guards of the Preobrazhensky Regiment"

The troops received a convenient form of uniform only in the reign of Emperor Alexander II. It had a beautiful and spectacular appearance and was at the same time spacious and allowed the insulation to be pulled out in cold weather. In February 1856, tailcoat-like uniforms were replaced by uniforms with a full skirt. The cavalry retained their shiny uniforms and their colors, but the cut was made more comfortable. All received spacious overcoats with a turn-down collar with cloth buttonholes that covered their ears; uniform collars were lowered and broadened.

The army uniform was first double-breasted, then single-breasted. Bloomers were worn in boots only on a campaign, then always at the lower ranks; in summer the trousers were linen.

Private and adjutant of the Life Guards of the Lithuanian Regiment (in everyday and dress uniforms), 1862

Beautiful, but uncomfortable helmets remained only with the cuirassiers and in the guard, who, in addition, had caps without visors. The ceremonial and ordinary dress was a kepi. Lancers continued to wear diamond-topped shakos.

A convenient and practical hood was introduced, which helped the soldier in the winter. Backpacks and bags were lightened, the number and width of straps for wearing them were reduced, and the soldier's burden was lightened.

The era of Alexander III

I. Kramskoy "Portrait of Alexander III"

By the beginning of the 70s of the XIX century. short hair was required. The uniform of this era was quite comfortable. The emperor sought to nationalize the military uniform. Only the guards cavalry retained their former rich clothing. Uniformity and ease of wearing and fitting were put at the basis of the new uniform. The headgear, both in the guards and in the army, consisted of a low, round lamb hat with a cloth bottom; the hat is decorated with the St. Andrew's star in the guard, in the army - with the coat of arms.

Cossack of the Ural Cossack army, chief officer of the Life Guards of His Majesty's Cossack regiment and adjutant general of the Cossack troops (1883)

A uniform with a standing collar in the army with a straight back and a side without any edges was fastened with hooks that can be freely altered, broadening or narrowing the uniform. The guards uniform had a slanting border with a piping, a colored high collar and the same cuffs; the uniform of the cavalry, with its transformation exclusively into dragoon regiments (except for the guards), became similar to the uniform of the infantry, only somewhat shorter.

Lamb ceremonial hat

The lamb ceremonial hat resembled an ancient boyar. Wide trousers tucked into high boots. In the army, overcoats were fastened with hooks so that in sunny weather a shiny object would not draw the attention of the enemy and cause fire. For the same reason, sultans and helmets with brilliant coats of arms were abolished. In the guards, overcoats were fastened with buttons. In the infantry and other types of weapons, caps with bands were introduced, the difference between one regiment and another was based on a combination of colors of shoulder straps and bands. The division differed from the division by the numbers on the shoulder straps.

V. Vereshchagin "Officer of the line battalion in a white tunic and red trousers"

Alexander II introduced tunics and linen shirts for wearing in hot weather, and Alexander III made sure that the uniform of a soldier resembled peasant clothes. In 1879, a tunic with a standing collar, like a shirt-shirt, was introduced for soldiers.

The era of Nicholas II

G. Manizer "Portrait of Emperor Nicholas II in the uniform of the 4th Infantry Imperial Family of the Life Guards Regiment with the badge of the Order of St. Vladimir IV degree"

Emperor Nicholas II almost did not change the form of uniforms. The form of the guards cavalry regiments of the era of Alexander II was only gradually restored. The officers of the entire army were given galloon (instead of the simple leather introduced by Alexander III) shoulder harness.

A. Pershakov “Portrait of P.S. Vannovsky "(visible harness)

For the troops of the southern districts, the ceremonial headdress was considered too heavy and was replaced by an ordinary cap, to which a small metal coat of arms is attached.

The most significant changes followed only in the army cavalry. A modest uniform without buttons at the beginning of the reign of Nicholas II was replaced by a more beautiful double-breasted, sewn at the waist and with a colored edging along the side of the uniform. A shako was introduced for the Guards regiments.

In each cavalry division, the regiments are given the same colors: the first is red, the second is blue, the third is white. The former colors remained only in those regiments for which some historical memory was associated with their color.

Ceremonial cap of the era of Nicholas II

The caps were also changed: not the bands, but the crowns, were made colored so that the color of the regiment could be seen at a great distance, and visors were given to all lower ranks.

In 1907, following the results of the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian army introduced as a summer uniform a single-breasted khaki tunic with a stand-up collar on hooks, with a five-button fastener, with pockets on the chest and on the sides (the so-called "American" cut) . The white tunic of the former sample has fallen into disuse.

Tunic of the Russian army of the era of Nicholas II

In aviation, on the eve of the war, a blue tunic was adopted as working clothes.

Part (Volume) 2

Chapter VII. Holy Alliance and Military Settlements

Army of Emperor Nikolai Pavlovich

Emperor Nikolai Pavlovich was a soldier in the full sense of the word. Until the age of 20, he was not intended to reign and received a purely military, drill, education. Military business was his favorite thing, his vocation. He loved him not as an amateur, but as a connoisseur. He considered the army to be his family. “There is no phrase-mongering here, no lies that you see everywhere,” he often said. “That’s why I feel so good between these people and that’s why my military rank will always be held in high esteem.” The Sovereign had a special affection for the engineering troops (34). The sappers paid the Sovereign the same and preserved the cult of his memory. For a long time after his death, already in the 70s, officers of the engineering troops continued to wear short mustaches and sideburns. Nicholas I was especially favored by the Life Guards Sapper Battalion, the first to rush to him on December 14. Handing this battalion in 1828 under the walls of Varna the St. George banner. The emperor wept. Loving the soldier, when he was the Grand Duke and commander of the Izmailovsky regiment, he tried not to show this feeling (Alexander I did not tolerate "popular bosses"), which is why at first he was not understood by the troops, which, as you know, took advantage of the Decembrists. Subsequently, already the King, he walked in the winter cold behind the coffin of a simple Private...

All his reign was a retribution for the mistakes of the previous one. The young Emperor received a heavy inheritance from his brother. The guard was seized with ferment, which was not slow to turn into open rebellion. The settled army murmured muffledly. Society sharply condemned the existing order. The peasantry was worried. A paper ruble was worth 25 kopecks in silver...

Under such conditions, the Decembrist uprising broke out. It had the most sad consequences for Russia and had the same influence on the policy of Nicholas I that the Pugachevshchina had on the policy of Catherine and that Karakozov's shot would subsequently have on the policy of Alexander II. It is difficult to say what would have happened to Russia if this uprising had succeeded. Headless, she would have plunged into chaos, before which the horrors of Pugachevism would have paled. Having caused a storm, the conspirators, of course, would no longer be able to cope with it. A wave of twenty-five million rebellious serf slaves and a million disobedient soldiers would have swept away everyone and everything, and the Decembrists of 1825 would very soon have suffered the fate prepared for the “Februaryists” of 1917. The buckshot on Senate Square alienated these horrors from Russia for almost a century.

Strictly condemning the Decembrists, who played with fire, we must, however, always keep in mind the conditions that gave rise to this revolt. Among the Decembrists there were scoundrels like the fanatical doctrinaire Pestel{35} who hid his soldiers "to teach them to hate their superiors"; scoundrels came across, like Prince Trubetskoy, who organized the uprising, framed his comrades for buckshot, and himself hid in the house of his son-in-law, the Austrian ambassador. However, among them were also the most honest people, like Ryleev, the last chicks of Petrov's nest, the last politically educated (though most of them went the wrong way) officers. They were convicted without trial, without observing any procedural and legal norms - at the complete arbitrariness of the members of the investigating commission, who sometimes pursued selfish goals (the scandal with the Chernyshevsky majorat). The well-connected prisoners were told in advance what they would be asked and what they had to answer. 32-year-old General Lopukhin{36} he was released “for youth”, and a 16-year-old junker boy, who was tried in the same category, was sent to the Siberian battalions. The excessively zealous advisers of the young Emperor made a terrible, irreparable mistake, creating an aura of martyrdom for the Decembrists. The entire political outlook of the Russian intelligentsia was based on the cult of the five hanged and hundreds of those exiled to the mines.

As a result of this event, the guard changed part of its officer corps. The rebellious troops (parts of the regiments of the Life Guards of the Moscow, Grenadier and Guards Crew) were sent to the Caucasus as part of the Consolidated Guards Regiment to atone for their guilt in the war with the Persians. In relation to the Sovereign to Muscovites and grenadiers, a chill was felt in his reign, as well as then under Alexander II . Only Mountain Dubnyak made the memory of Senate Square disappear forever. In the South, the unrest was, as we already know, especially strong among the commanders of the 2nd Army (VI and VII Corps) and in the III Corps of the 1st Army, where the Chernigov Infantry Regiment rebelled. All these troops, together with the guards, were soon sent to the Balkans and there they finally rehabilitated themselves in the eyes of the Sovereign.

* * *

The Polish campaign of 1831 showed the poor combat training of the settled troops (especially the cavalry). The “cholera riot” that accompanied it revealed the enormous demoralizing effect of military settlements on military spirit and discipline. Therefore, proceeding to the transformation of his army. Emperor Nicholas I decided to start with the removal of this ulcer.

Military reforms could be started only after the end of the important events of 1825-1831. At the end of 1831, all Polish national troops were abolished, and in 1832 military settlements were reorganized and renamed into arable soldier districts.

In 1833, a general transformation of the army was carried out. All 42 Chasseurs and 5 Carabinieri regiments were disbanded and 3 brigades of infantry divisions were abolished. Also abolished were 26 infantry regiments and all 3 naval ones. Instead of 33 infantry divisions with 194 regiments, 30 with 110 regiments (10 guards, 16 grenadiers, 84 army infantry), 27 divisions - in 4 regiments and a separate Caucasian Grenadier Brigade were left. 3 divisions (22nd, 23rd and 24th) consisted of line battalions. Formed 3rd guards division of 2 guards (Warsaw) and 2 grenadier (Kexholm and St. Petersburg) regiments. Instead of these latter, the Lithuanian Grenadier Brigade was transferred to the Grenadier Corps. Infantry divisions were in 2 brigades. They then invariably remained in the same regiments until the catastrophe of 1917 and the death of the old army. The divisions from the 1st to the 18th made up, in numerical order, 6 infantry corps of the 3rd division. The 19th, 20th and 21st formed the Caucasian Corps. The outlying divisions - the 22nd in Finland, the 23rd on the Orenburg line and the 24th in Siberia - were not included in the corps.

Large formations - regiments and brigades - were reduced by a third. The number of battalions, however, did not decrease: the battalions of the disbanded regiments were attached to the remaining ones, which had the effect of bringing these latter into 5- and 6-battalions. The states of the 6-battalion regiment are defined as 5359 people in peacetime and 6588 people in wartime. In order to preserve the name and traditions of the abolished chasseurs, it was ordered in the guards to keep the fourth regiments of divisions in the chasseur position, and in the army divisions the regiments of the second brigades were called "chasseurs", while preserving, however, their names. For example, Kamchatka Jaeger. Podolsky, Zhytomyr, Mingrelian Jaeger regiments and so on. In the Life Guards regiments of Finland and Volyn, the "jäger step" remained forever.

The Guards and Grenadier Corps (both in 3 divisions) were subordinate to one commander in chief. This position was held until his death in 1849 by Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich, then by General Ridiger{37} . I - IV Corps were called "active" and made up the 1st Army of General Paskevich (headquarters in Warsaw). V and VI are called "separate" - they reinforced, if necessary, the troops operating in the Caucasus and generally played the role of an all-army reserve. The 2nd Army was abolished.

In artillery, companies are called batteries. All in 12 guns. Each infantry division was assigned an artillery brigade of the same number. Artillery consisted of 28 foot brigades - 3 guards, 4 grenadiers (from the Caucasus), 21 field and 6 mounted. brigades - a total of 125 batteries with 1500 guns, not counting the Cossack artillery, siege parks and fortress artillery companies. The artillery divisions, one per corps, were retained. Guards artillery brigades were 3-battery (2 battery and 1 light battery), Grenadier and field - 4-battery (2 battery and 2 light), horse - in 2 batteries. In the guards infantry division there were 36 guns for 16 battalions, in the army division for 24 battalions 48 guns, that is, 2 guns per 1000 bayonets, which was very little. Cavalry artillery brigades were usually assigned one per corps. The Guards and the 2nd Cavalry Artillery Brigade were in double strength. The 22nd, 23rd and 24th Infantry Divisions did not have artillery brigades.

The cavalry underwent the same reform as the infantry. Of the 75 regular regiments, 55 were left. The squadrons of the disbanded regiments were attached to the remaining ones. Horsemen have been completely abolished.

From 4 lancers and 3 hussar divisions, 7 light cavalry divisions were formed, each with 2 lancers and 2 hussar regiments. All light regiments are assigned to 8 active and 2 reserve squadrons.

Guards cavalry consisted of 2 divisions - Cuirassier (former 1st) and Light. Two other cuirassier divisions remained settled in Little Russia. The cuirassier regiments were composed of 6 active and 1 reserve squadron.

The reorganization of most of the dragoon regiments into lungs, begun under Alexander I, continued in the first years of the new reign. In 1826, 8 dragoon regiments were converted into lancers and hussars, and only 2 out of 4 dragoon divisions were left. Of the 37 dragoon regiments that were in 1812, only 9 were left, counting Nizhny Novgorod in the Caucasus, which was not part of the divisions. During the transformation of the army in 1833, these 2 divisions made up the 11th reserve cavalry corps, which was given a special device and purpose. Emperor Nicholas decided to take advantage of the ability of the dragoons to dismount to organize a "dragoon corps" capable of operating both on horseback and on foot. All 8 regiments of the corps were part of 10 squadrons. 2 pikemen did not dismount, and 8 dragoons each formed a rifle platoon on foot. The division formed a company (in 2 platoons), and the entire dismounted regiment was equal to a battalion. A dismounted division formed a regiment, and the entire corps formed a brigade. The corps was a mass of 10,000 pikes and checkers on horseback, and 6,500 bayonets with 48 guns on foot. Pikemen were assigned to guard horsemen and cover the flanks.

This organization of dragoons existed throughout the reign of Nicholas I, but was not tested either in the Hungarian campaign or in the Eastern War, where the "dragoon corps" did not participate.

In 1856, during the reorganization of the cavalry, it was abolished: the presence of a mass of 10,000 horses in the immediate vicinity of the dismounted dragoon battalions and the line of fire was considered risky.

The entire regular cavalry thus amounted to 13 divisions and 1 separate Guards brigade (Warsaw), consolidated into 4 corps (Guards and I - III cavalry). A total of 10 guards, 8 cuirassiers, 9 dragoons, 14 lancers and 14 hussars. The Cossack regiments were brought into the composition of 6 hundreds (instead of 5, and the Don regiments, which until then were named after colonels, received numbers).

In general, the reform of 1833 is characterized by an increase in the combat composition of infantry and cavalry regiments by reducing their number. At the same time, the same picture was repeated as in the 80s of the 18th century, with the increased formation of grenadiers and chasseurs by Potemkin, and in 1810, when third brigades were converted to chasseurs, namely: a number of old, well-deserved regiments suffered. When the horsemen were disbanded, for example, the Chernigov regiment, founded under Tsar Alexei, and the first cavalier of St. George (with the Pavlograd hussar) in the Russian cavalry were abolished. With the abolition of the rangers, a number of old, distinguished regiments worthy of being its decoration disappeared from the infantry (such as the 13th, 14th, 42nd regiments). Peter's veterans were not spared - Perm, Vyatka, Vyborg, the hero Ishmael, glorified by Burtsev in the Caucasus, the Kherson grenadier was not spared ... The old regiments were still valued as little in our country as in the reign of Catherine. Since the end of the 30s, in this regard, however, a turning point has been outlined - and since 1838, the regiments, which have 100 years of existence, began to complain about the "jubilee" St. Andrew's ribbons on the banners. Banners with St. Andrew's (blue) anniversary ribbons complained only to the regiments of the guard. Army regiments received the scarlet ribbons of Alexander Nevsky. In 1842, the highest decree restored the seniority of the Erivan Carabinieri Regiment from 1642 (the Elected Butyrsky Regiment). However, it was not until the reign of Alexander II and especially Alexander III that the cult of the old regiments was given its proper place.

* * *

In the 1930s, instead of rangers, a new type of light infantry was introduced - riflemen. Back in 1829, the Finnish Rifle Battalion was formed, and in 1837, 2 rifle battalions were formed, and this laid the foundation for glorious battalions, then regiments with crimson piping. By the mid-40s, each corps had already formed a battalion of riflemen.

Particular attention was paid to the formation of line battalions - the main type of infantry on the outskirts. In 1829, all the garrison troops of the Caucasian Corps, the 23rd and 24th divisions of the Orenburg and Siberian Corps, and in 1835 the 22nd Infantry Division in Finland were converted to line battalions. At the end of the 1940s, there were 96 line battalions, reduced by 5 to 8 into brigades. 47 battalions in the Caucasus (18 Georgian, 16 Black Sea, 13 Caucasian), 22 Finnish, 16 Siberian (12 West Siberian and 4 East Siberian) and 11 Orenburg. In the Black Sea army before the Turkish war, a foot battalion was formed from horseless Cossacks - scouts. By the beginning of the Eastern War, there were already 6 plastun battalions.

In 1827, the Border Guard was established, initially consisting of 6 brigades (3600 ranks). By the end of the reign, its composition was brought up to 11 brigades with 11,000 ranks. The guard was subordinated to and at the disposal of the Ministry of Finance, and for a long time the highest command was given to civilian ranks. The chiefs of the customs districts enjoyed the rights of the chiefs of divisions, and the director of customs fees had the rights of a corps commander. This inconvenience was eliminated only in 1893 by the creation of the Border Guard Corps.

By the recruitment charter of 1831, the Russian Empire was divided into two bands - Eastern and Western. Sets were made alternately: a year later in each. Less than 7 recruits per 1000 revision souls were taken into “ordinary” sets, from 7 to 10 into “reinforced” sets, over 10 into “extraordinary” sets. With a human reservoir of 6.5 million conscripts, this amounted to an “ordinary” set less than 45,000 people, in "reinforced" from 45,000 to 65,000 people.

The term of service in 1834 was reduced from 25 years to 20 (in the guard from 22 to 20), after which the soldiers were dismissed for 5 years on indefinite leave, from where they could be called up if necessary (that is, they were transferred to the reserve). Since 1839 they served only 19 years.

In 1842, all infantry regiments were ordered to be brought into a 4-battalion structure (with the exception of the regiments of the 19th, 20th and 21st divisions of the Caucasian Corps, which were part of 5 operating battalions). The 5th and 6th battalions were named "reserve" and were kept in an extremely weak cadre (1 officer, 23 lower).

The codification of all the laws of the Russian Empire undertaken in 1832 to 1840 led to the publication in 1839 of the Code of Military Regulations - a collection of all laws and orders relating to the Russian armed forces. This Code (as well as the subsequent 1859) consisted of 5 parts:

I. On the formation of military institutions (Ministry of War, departments of troops, military educational institutions);

II. About service and awards;

III. Order to the troops (charters);

IV. On the preparation of supplies;

V. Charter military criminal.

In 1846, a new Regulation on the field command of the troops was drawn up (in the spirit of the previous Regulation of 1812).

Emperor Nikolai Pavlovich was an opponent of cruel corporal punishment{38} . In 1839, he abolished the fuchteli and limited the use of gauntlets to a number of unspoken orders, reducing the number of blows by a factor of three. It is strictly forbidden to carry out executions without a doctor. This latter had the right to prohibit the execution of the weak or stop it at any time. The former draconian provisions, however, continued to remain in the text for warning.

The transformations of the early 30s were reflected in the appearance of the army. In 1833, a new form of uniform was introduced, which, like the former, pursued only a ceremonial effect. The troops received single-breasted dark green uniforms, somewhat longer than the previous double-breasted ones with a colored chest, and blue-gray pantaloons (white left in the summer). In the cavalry - leggings of the same color. The hateful boots have been abolished, and high boots have been introduced into the infantry. Heavy and uncomfortable shakos with sultans were replaced by pointed helmets on the Prussian model. Helmets lasted in our army for 30 years - in them she did the Hungarian campaign and the beginning of the Eastern War. They were beautiful, but very uncomfortable on the campaign, and the troops, where they could, replaced them with caps, and in the Caucasus with hats adopted from the highlanders. Having adopted the helmet from the Prussians, we forgot to adopt their helmet cover{39} . The skin was shrinking from the heat, and the helmet was kept on the top of the head. The scaly belt always fell apart.

Since 1832, military ranks were allowed to wear mustaches and sideburns, until then prohibited in the infantry, with the obligation, however, for the lower ranks to be sure to make them black (in 1855, Alexander II ordered this to be done only when guarding and at parades, and in 1859 this last vestige of Gatchina cosmetics was abolished).

The sanitary condition of the troops was very poor. The equipment, which weighed 77 pounds, was heavy and uncomfortable; clothes are designed only for the parade and poorly protected from the weather; the drill was harsh and exhausting, and the quartering conditions of the troops - unsanitary - the barracks had a little more than a third, the majority, especially the cavalry, huddled up in the dirtiest places and villages of the Western Territory. Emperor Nicholas I sought at the beginning of his reign to build barracks for the entire army. However, the committee established by him found that a billion rubles was needed for this. The construction of the barracks had to be postponed for several decades. This work was completed only in the 90s under Alexander III. Morbidity and mortality were twice those of Western European armies and three times the corresponding ages of the civilian population. From 1841 to 1850, for example, the average annual morbidity was up to 70 percent of the staff, and mortality was up to 4 percent. A recruit who entered for 20 years thus had an 80 out of 100 chance of dying in the service, even without a war. Military infirmaries could accommodate only a third of the patients.

By the beginning of the Eastern War, the regular army reached an impressive figure on paper: 27,745 officers and 1,123,583 lower ranks. Emperor Nicholas, to whom only one pleasant report was reported for 30 years, sincerely believed in the perfection of the military system he had instituted. “I have a million bayonets,” he said, “I will order my minister - and there will be two, I will ask my people - there will be three.” Alas, on paper, a million actually gave barely half a million fighters ... The shortage in general against the states reached 20 percent, and the “millionth” figure included disabled people, cantonists, internal guard troops, a motley mosaic of local, garrison, guard teams ... In the field the fifth part of the troops were all kinds of non-combatants. The army could not be mobilized, the insignificant cadres of reserve units could not cope with the training of the called-up recruit mass. The militia, in no case, could be considered combat-ready. The chagrin of the Sovereign, who had been striving all his life for only one goal - the good of Russia, was immeasurable. He saw that all the enormous labors turned out to be useless, all thirty years of work was fruitless - and these torments broke his iron nature.

* * *

The largest organizational event of this reign was the transformation of "His Majesty's Retinue for the Quartermaster" into General base. Already in 1826, it was forbidden to let young officers into the suite directly from the corps. At the end of the Turkish War, a commission was appointed under the chairmanship of General Jomini to develop the staff of the General Staff and establish a higher military scientific institution. The work of this commission led to the development in 1832 of the staff of the General Staff (17 generals, 80 staff and 200 chief officers) and the establishment of the Imperial Military Academy, the first head of which was Jomini.

The Swiss military thinker reaped the fruits of the long-term and systematic work of Prince P. M. Volkonsky. The father of the Russian General Staff was Volkonsky - Jomini was only a "Swiss tutor", and one cannot say that he was a particularly successful tutor. He thought of the General Staff as a hermetically closed corporation, tightly isolated from the army. Army, troops - on their own. The General Staff is on its own. The columnists of Volkonsky knew and understood the troops - the academicians of Jomini turned into some kind of military institutes, completely unfamiliar with military capabilities and combatant life. Since that time, the separation of the General Staff from the troops began - the most severe blunder of the Russian military organization, which has never been corrected ... The transition from the General Staff to other departments and into operation was impossible - for a long time even teaching in military educational institutions was considered inappropriate establishments. In other words, the General Staff began to exist only for the General Staff...

The Academy was a temple of abstract military science, and with the departure of Jomini it became a temple of military scholasticism. When Jomini retired in 1834, General Sukhozanet 1st was appointed head of the academy, who had been in this position throughout the reign of Nicholas I. Having a poor understanding of military science, he paid attention only to the combat unit, external improvement. General Schubert, the chief of the General Staff, who at the same time was the director of the military topographic depot, became in charge of the educational department and reduced all teaching to a one-sided passion for mathematical disciplines with almost complete disregard for strategy and tactics. The Academy began to produce excellent draftsmen, not bad astronomers, dashing riders, but very mediocre quartermasters.

The service of an officer of the General Staff was ungrateful. Production was only for vacancies opening in the "corporation" itself, and those were very rare. It was much more difficult to get the rank of general than in the ranks, especially since the officers of the General Staff of the regiments were not given. By promotion to major general, they could get a brigade, but this happened extremely rarely. In 1843, the officers of the General Staff were allowed to return to duty, but only for vacancies in the part where they had previously served. The usual end of a career here was the rank of colonel. All this resulted in a reduction in the number of candidates for the General Staff. The source of its replenishment began to dry up quickly - and in 1851, out of the entire millionth Russian army, only 7 officers expressed a desire to enter the academy!

This circumstance greatly alarmed the Sovereign, who showed a number of favors to the academy: the officers of the General Staff were given increased maintenance, movement in the service was ensured, and the right to return to duty without any restrictions was granted. A number of senior commanders were determined to be students of the academy, and its prestige immediately increased: from 1852 to 1856, despite the war, 35-40 people entered each year.

* * *

The most important military leader of the reign of Emperor Nicholas I was Field Marshal Paskevich, Count of Erivan, His Serene Highness Prince of Warsaw.

Paskevich enjoyed the unlimited confidence of the Emperor. For a quarter of a century - from the Polish campaign to the Eastern War inclusive - he was the complete master of the Russian armed forces.

An unconditionally gifted, intelligent, ambitious and supremely domineering man, Paskevich had the good fortune from his very youth to attract the attention of all the major military leaders of the great century and build himself a brilliant career. He covered himself with glory near Smolensk at the head of the 26th division, and after the war he received the 1st Guards Division, where he had subordinates of the Grand Dukes - Nikolai Pavlovich, commander of the 2nd brigade, and Mikhail Pavlovich, commander of the Petrovsky brigade. Emperor Nicholas called him his "father-commander" all his life - and the opinion of "Ivan Fedorovich" in his eyes was infallible.

For all his merits, Paskevich had very big shortcomings. His lust for power and despotic manner of dealing with subordinates made him a very unpleasant boss, especially since, always attributing all successes only to himself, he blamed all failures on his subordinates (a quality that was then repeated in another major military leader - Brusilov). Paskevich's military talents are indisputable, but overestimated by his contemporaries, who in their flattery to the all-powerful field marshal reached the most unworthy obsequiousness. In 1847, during the life of Nicholas I and at the peak of Paskevich's power, N. Ustryalov undertook a panegyric description of the reign. Describing the invasion of Transcaucasia by Abbas Mirza in 1826, Ustryalov did not hesitate to write: “Under the walls of Elisavetpol, he was met by the one whom fate destined to be a threat to Russia’s enemies in Asia and Europe in our time, a leader worthy of the Russian army, Paskevich met him there” .

Since the time of Potemkin, not a single military leader has been showered with the monarch's generosity to such an extent: he received the rank of Field Marshal, the Order of St. Persian indemnity). As a commander, he proved himself excellently in the Erivan campaign against the Persians and especially in the Erzerum campaign against the Turks, both times having incomparable Caucasian troops and dashing Caucasian commanders. He arrived in Poland already “ready-made” after Dibich. The Hungarian campaign was carried out by him very mediocrely, and in the Eastern War, on the Danube, his generalship turned out to be completely untenable. As a young general, he was perfectly aware of the disorders of our military system, but when he became a field marshal, having received full power, he did nothing to correct these disorders. Paskevich did not give anything to the army, not a single positive organizational event is associated with his name. He by no means created a school of generals, and his influence on his subordinates was ultimately negative, thanks to his system of depersonalization.

Above Paskevich, another knight of St. George of the 1st degree should be placed - Count Zabalkansky. He did a lot of work on the creation of the General Staff and was mainly engaged in organizational and staff work (whereas Paskevich was a combat commander). Dibich{40} conducted only one campaign in its entirety - his Trans-Balkan campaign, but this campaign is brilliant in terms of the synthesis of the idea, the simplicity of the plan (sacrifice of the secondary to the main) and the decisiveness of the execution.

It should be noted the winner of Gergey - General Ridiger, whom contemporaries considered the best combat general of the entire army, and the hero of Transylvania, General Leaders{41} who discovered a bright military leadership talent. Both of these remarkable military leaders, however, did not take part in the Eastern War (a victim of the pride of the "father-commander") - and the fate of the army in the Crimea was entrusted to third-rate figures - Menshikov and Gorchakov.

Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich, Commander-in-Chief of the Guards and Grenadiers, was a strict and extremely demanding boss in military service, having inherited his father's "Gatchina spirit" with particular force (the Sovereign had to restrain him all the time). At the same time, having a kind and sensitive heart, he met the needs of each of his subordinates, who constantly turned to him in difficult times. The Grand Duke showed special activity in the position of chief head of military educational institutions that he combined. In total, 14 cadet corps were opened during the reign of Nicholas I. Nicholas I was very fond of the cadets, who for their part adored him. When he visited the buildings, the cadets tore their gloves, scarves of the Sovereign as a keepsake, even tore off the buttons of his uniform, and kept these relics all their lives.

* * *

Gatchina traditions continued to be respected in full force. The Sovereign himself and both of his brothers were ardent supporters of the "front" and the Prussian drill. In 1843, the army was re-equipped with 6-line piston guns.{42} (instead of the previous 7-line flint sample of 1811) excellent ballistic qualities for a smoothbore gun (they hit at 600 steps). In addition, rifled fittings were introduced in the infantry, however, in very limited quantities. Rifle battalions and selected riflemen in the infantry, 6 people per company, were armed with these fittings, which hit 1200 steps, which made up a regimental fitting team of 96 people (a complete analogy with the teams of Catherine's skirmishers - rangers). In general, for 40,000 smoothbore guns in the ranks of the corps, there were about 2,000 fittings, and this proportion (one fitting for 20 smoothbore guns) was preserved until the end of the Eastern War.

Only 6 rounds per year per person were still issued for shooting. In other regiments, even these ill-fated six cartridges were not shot from the commendable economy of gunpowder. The meaning of the army was seen not in war, but in parades, and the gun was looked at not as a weapon for shooting and thrusting, but primarily as a tool for grasping tricks. The ideal of the true "trunk" was to bring the part to such a degree of perfection that the bayonets of the guns taken "on the shoulder" stick out without hesitation, and the guns rang when performing tricks. To achieve this effect (which greatly touched the authorities), many commanders did not stop before damaging the weapon, ordering the screws to be loosened.

The basis of the training of the troops was the so-called "linear doctrine", which brought incalculable harm to the Russian army. The purpose of this exercise was to accustom the troops to harmonious movements in mass. This was thought to be achieved by commanding the troops “along the lines” (hence the name of the entire system) exclusively by one team. During corps exercises, for example, the corps commander personally gave all the commands. The linear doctrine, having assumed the external forms of perpendicular tactics, however, poured into these forms the soul of the linear “Friedrichian” tactics, to which the grandchildren of the Kunersdorf winners had a completely irresistible, strange (explained, however, by Gatchina) attraction, despite the final bankruptcy of this tactic. in 1806 near Jena-Auerstedt.

The combat training of troops during maneuvers was reduced to a spectacular offensive in long, deployed lines of several battalions marching in step, and all the concerns of commanders - from platoon to corps - were reduced to one, the most important thing: maintaining alignment. These marching lines were usually not covered by rifle chains (the loose formation, as we saw, was not asked at reviews). Even the troops could not stand the field service exercises. Usually the regiment deployed only half a company of riflemen in loose formation, and the arrows stood in pairs in the chain so that one gun always remained loaded.

All battle formations were a combination of two lines and a reserve. It was assumed that the deployed battalions of the 1st line attacked one by one, through the battalion, and stopped for firing, preparing with fire the success of the attack of the 2nd line, which followed non-stop in battalion columns (12 lines). The change of front, the change of lines - all this was based on the correct and orderly movement of those who were replacing and being replaced. These latter were supposed to be undisturbed (although then, it would seem, why should they be replaced?). The whole system was characterized by extreme rigidity of forms, their "template", ignoring fire (deep, massive constructions) and a great commitment to accurate digital data. The introduction of troops into battle piecemeal, in "packs", is legitimized by linear exercises and firmly instilled in all senior command instances.

Thus, on the parade grounds of the end of the Alexander and Nicholas eras, some kind of special “peaceful military” tactics was created, which had nothing in common with actual combat requirements. This system completely killed in the troops, and especially in the commanders, any sense of reality. Everything was built on fiction, starting with the “show attacks” of divisional and corps exercises and ending with the “show” of loading and the “show” of a single training shot. The methods that led the Prussian army to the catastrophe of 1806 were implanted many years later in the Russian army with a tenacity worthy of a better application. And only thanks to the incomparable qualities of a Russian officer and a Russian soldier, instead of the shame of Jena, we received the mournful glory of Sevastopol.

One by one, figures of the Napoleonic wars left the stage. Modestly went out "outright", having served their own, officers and soldiers - veterans of Borodin and Leipzig. Their places were taken by new people - the same Russian officers and soldiers, but who did not have the combat experience and combat dexterity of their predecessors and did not think about the war at all as the ultimate goal, did not prepare for it, did not consider the war with anyone at all possible after how we defeated the whole of Europe, led by Napoleon himself.

Only the Caucasian regiments preserved the real military spirit, the immortal Russian military traditions in full splendor. The rest of the army, little by little, forgot how to fight ...