Public selection. Public selection: concepts, rules and procedures. One of the representatives of the theory of public selection

Politician reminds me of a man who killed his father and mother, and then when he is sentenced, asks him to spare on the grounds that he is an orphan

(Abraham Lincoln).

Society cannot effectively function and develop without coordination of subjects. Action harmonization can be based on a market mechanism and a public selection mechanism. The mechanism of public selection is triggered when the market mechanism does not work effectively.

At the sources of the theory of public selection stood Swedish economist Knut Vixel (1851-1926). The origins of theory can be found in the studies of D. Blake (r. 1908), the works of mathematicians of the XVIII-XIX centuries, who were interested in voting problems, - J. A. N. Kondorse, T. S. Laplas, Ch. Dodjon (Lewis Carolla). A separate direction formed American economist Buchanan (Buchanan) James-Mak-Jil (born in 1919). He published a lot of work on this topic, in particular: "Formula of consent" (1962), "Demand and supply of public benefits" (1968), "Theory of public selection" (1972), "Freedom, Market and State" (1986) and DR. In 1986, Buchenen received the Nobel Prize for the "Study of the Constitutional and Contract Principles of the Theory of Economic Decision". Together with the city of Tallock, he organized in the Polytechnic Institute of Virginia "The Committee for the Study of Non-Individual Decisions", which was subsequently transformed into a "General Sewage Center". In the US, a special magazine "Public Choice" ("Public Choice") is published. Outstanding representatives were also Gordon Tallock, Kenneth Arrow, Mansur Olson, Friedrich Hayek

The theory of public choices is based on three main backgrounds:

1) individualism: People act in the political sphere, pursuing their personal interests and there is no face between business and politics;

2) The concept of "Economic Man". All - from voters to the president - guided in their activities the economic principle: compare the limit benefits and limit costs. Condition: MB\u003e MS, where MB - MARGINAL BENEFIT, MS - MARGINAL COST.

3) Policy interpretation as a exchange process.In politics pay taxes in exchange for public benefits. This exchange is not very rational. Typically taxpayers are alone, and the benefits receive others at the expense of taxes.

Public selection - This is a combination of non-market coordination of individual actions through a system of political institutions. Unlike a private public selection, it is carried out at certain intervals of the time, the range of applicants is limited, each of which offers its program. Voters are more limited in choosing than buyers of goods on the market, primarily from the point of view of information they have.

Public selection represents treaty of processes online decision-making through the system of political institutions.This is how decisions are made that determine the development of the public sector. Public selection There are collective development solutions regarding public goods and redistribution. Collective decisions are accepted not only through state structures. Such decisions are the conditions for any voluntary joint activity.

Each consumer, guided by its own preferences and focusing on market prices, determines the most suitable set of goods. Each person has their own preferences, so in the whole population of people they may not coincide. When we are talking about public benefits, it is important to mean collective selection characterproduction and consumption parameters. Since all participants in choosing have to be consumed by the same set of public goods, it is necessary to coordinate individual preferences. In practice, such coordination is most often achieved by political institutions of democracy.These institutions allow you to make decisions regarding redistribution, so that they meet the interests of many individuals, and not just a separate person. From the point of view of economic theory, the meaning of the Democratic Device of the State is precisely in ensuring the accounting of a variety of individual preferences in the formation of a program for the production of public goods and redistribution.

The competitive market ensures the achievement of pass-effective states. In relation to the collective choice, the procedure is characterized by a similar property. unanimous decision-making . Only such a procedure guarantees that some selection participants will not receive one-sided advantages at the expense of others. The decision taken unanimously can be implemented without the use of coercion. But the achievement of a unanimous solution is associated with costs, in particular with a time loss in order to find a compromise between all voting. Is there a procedure for filing and taking into account votes that would avoid these costs? If right decision making delegated to a group of its separate member In obviously, it will not be necessary to spend time and effort to develop a consistent position. However, in this case, there is a danger that solely the decisive individual will choose the option that its most suggests personally and damages other members of the group. As a result, at least some members of the group will incur losses; Their position will be the worst compared with the on-based unanimous decision. These losses can also be considered as costs caused by a specific decision procedure.

In practice, the most common procedure for making collective solutions implies the application of the rule simple majority . According to this rule, an alternative is defeated, in support of which more than half of the participants in the choice (voting) are expressed.

More than 200 years ago, French philosopher and mathematician J.A.N. Condorse showed that when using a simple majority rule may occur cyclic vote . Imagine that three individuals or three homogeneous groups of voters are involved in the adoption of a collective decision, each of which has the same number of votes. The subject of discussion is the spending of funds received to the state budget over the initially planned amount. It is assumed that these funds can be spent on additional financing of one of three industries: sciences (s), education (ABOUT)or culture (TO). A set of preferences of all voting participants in relation to all allowable alternatives is called profile preferences . Let a pairwise comparison of alternative solutions occur based on the basis of the rule of the simple majority. If you start with a comparison of options N. and ABOUT,then the voices of the first and third subjects of choice conquer the option N.Next, when comparing N and K, thanks to the voices of the second and third subjects. It turns out that the outcome of the collective choice is the increase in the provision of culture. However, comparable to the winning option To S.overnay already in the first step alternative ABOUT.With this comparison, the advantage gets ABOUT Due to the votes of the first two subjects participating in the vote. If after that compare ABOUT from N., win again won N. etc. The process of pairwise comparison alternatives can be continued to infinity, receiving a new result at each step and cyclically repeated the alternation of the outcomes. Wrapped around this process, we can get any of the outcomes depending on which step was stopped. The result of collective selection is thus arbitrary .

It is not excluded, however, that someone interested in the victory of one of the alternatives controls the agenda, i.e. it has the authority to determine the sequence of comparing options or stop voting on one or another step. With the distribution of preferences, such a person is able to purposefully ensure the most arrangement of its voice result. The latter turns out to be manipulated . We have described paradox of voting (Paradox Condorce , which encourages to conclude a simple majority rules. It turned out that this rule does not guarantee transitivitycollective selection . Transitivity assumes that from xRY and yrz.follow xrz.where R. means "preferable". In our case, from preference N. towards ABOUT and preferences TOtowards N.does not follow preference TOtowards ABOUT.

The theory of the median voter

There are three factors determining the attitude of individuals to public benefits :

• Firstly, some individuals can simply prefer public benefits to other benefits.. For example, some can get great pleasure to public parks, while others never use them.
• Secondly, individual income differences. The poor will be less located than wealthy people, abandon the ruble (dollar) for private benefits in favor of obtaining an additional unit of public good. In this regard, at any level of costs for public goods, the limiting norm of substitution (the amount characterizing how many units of private benefits of individuals are ready to sacrifice for the sake of increasing the unit of public goods) the less than the poorer the individual. As a result, with the same taxation, wealthy people will prefer a higher level of public benefits.
• Third, it has great importance tax system naturewhich determines for an individual the share of additional costs caused by an increase in public benefits. With the same amount of the tax that each should pay the poor will prefer a lower level of spending on public goods, since the limit costs expressed in the expected utility from private benefits from which the individual should refuse, above. But if less secured must pay taxes less than wealthy people, then poor may prefer a higher level of public utilities. Obviously, an individual who should not pay taxes at all receives only a gain from increasing government spending on social benefits.

This leads us to the introduction of the concept "Median voter" . Median voter - This is a voter for whom the number of individuals preferring a higher level of expenses (having a higher income) is exactly equal to the number of individuals preferring a lower level of expenses (having a lower income). In other words, the median voter has a person who occupies an intermediate position in the elections; Voting at the party of the center.

The median voter may have an income higher or below average. We calculate the average income by dividing the total income to the number of individuals. If income in the country is distributed unevenly, which corresponds to the situation in most countries of the world, the median voter has an income below average.

Errow theorem about the impossibility

The variety of procedures suitable for collective decisions, encourages to think about whether there are those who ideally correspond to a fairly complete set of natural requirements (axioms). The answer to the question discussed gives theorem on the impossibility , proven Kennet Errow In 1951, the theorem argues that there are no rules for a collective choice that satisfies simultaneously by the following six requirements:

1. Fullness . The rule should provide a choice between any two alternatives, preferring one of them or recognizing both equal.
2. Universality . The rule provides an effective choice for any combination of individual preferences.
3. Transitivity . For any set of three alternatives H., w. and z., if a xRY and yrz.T. xrz.
4. Unanimity . If a xRI U executed for any i., i.e., all participants in collective choices prefer the first of two alternatives, xRYIn other words, the collective choice is committed in favor of the first alternative (this is nothing more than the fulfillment of the requirement of pass-optimization).
5. Independence from extraneous alternatives . The collective choice between any two alternatives x and y depends on how the individuals estimate these two alternatives relative to each other, but does not depend on the relationship of individuals to any expense of the alternative Z (for example, will be recognized xRYmay depend, in particular, from whether it is true that Xriy, but not from whether it is true that xRIZ. or what xrjZrjy.).
6. No "dictator" . Among the participants of the collective choice there is no such individual, any preference for which xRJY.would you like xRY Regardless of the preferences of all other individuals.

"Rational ignorance"

So, the public sector development line is formed in the process of constant interaction between voters, politicians and officials who are inherent in different directions. That is why the processes occurring in the public sector, in reality, do not always correspond to regulatory views. How to explain the willingness of a typical voter to be content with comparatively scarce information about public benefits and redistribution programs, delegating politicians the right to make a choice on their own behalf? The issue is natural, since in the field of private benefits the buyer seeks to collect as much information about the goods offered as possible and rarely brings his choice to unauthorized persons. Information about public good, herself is often a public blessing.. If its delivery does not provide a state, rational for an individual may be a refusal of searches for such information, even if for the group in which it enters, the costs of obtaining this information are capable of pumping. This phenomenon is called called rational ignorance .

This phenomenon has two sides. First, the collective nature of the solution means that with a large number of participants, the position of a separate individual does not matter. Suppose that someone already has information about the less expensive version of the public benefit. However, the decision takes everything together, and to disseminate the information about which are subject to significant costs. In general, the collective decision suggests that the influence of the individual on the outcome of the choice is small, and this, with other things being equal, reduces the interest in developing and demonstrating a reasonable point of view. So, the role of an individual in making a decision is limited. Secondly, it accounts for only a small part of the benefits and costs.which are formed in the process of implementing the solution. It also limits individual interest. In order to make a significant contribution to the public selection. The numerous group that makes the decision, the brighter the described phenomenon is manifested. In other words, the non-appearance of the voter to the elections is explained by rational ignorance as follows: the voter does not see this personal gain..

Rational ignorance to a large extent affects public selection. This is exactly where the disinterest of most voters in carrying out frequent referendums on which they could express their points of view on the most important political issues, as well as the willingness to be content with the vague promises of candidates for elective posts. Moreover, even the minimum interest in such promises and the participation in elections in the presence of a large number of voters is irrational from the point of view of a completely egoistic voter, and the theory of public selection is forced to explain the political activity of ordinary citizens by the presence of altruistic motives, the desire for self-expression, etc. Rational ignorance is manifested in behavior not only voters, but also members of the collective bodies of the state and local self-government: parliaments, various kinds of committees, commissions, etc. Of course, in such cases, it is already inconsistently smaller in such cases than the entire population, the number of participants in public selection This phenomenon makes itself felt much weaker. However, on the one hand, the inability of the individual to fully predetermine the decision, and on the other, the division of political responsibility between all participants weakens the interest in the deep elaboration of their own position.

Groups of Special Interests (Lobby) and Lobbying

The participation of an individual in political life is usually mediated by various kinds of associations: parties, professional unions, organizations of entrepreneurs, other formal and informal structures. What prompts to create such structures, on what basis they function, which determines their successes and failures, what are the trends in their influence on the state of affairs in the economy? Calling such questions, we appeal to issues special Interest Groups (Lobby) .

According to the most common understanding of a group of special interests, it represents a set of individuals for which the same activities cause unidirectional utility increments (positive or negative). From this point of view, each person belongs to many groups, often without conscious. But in order for a group of interests to manifest itself in the process of public selection as a real subject, it must be capable of targeted collective action . Collective action ensures the creation of a public good. Public blessing for members of the Group is the implementation of its overall interest, for example, obtaining the right to tax break, subsidy or other advantages.

The advantage taken by the individual from the political success of his group is often consigned to expand access to private benefits. Thus, tax benefits is, in fact, a background increase in income, which is capable of fluidizing freely. The income of the individual cannot be considered as a public good. However, tax benefits - this is still not a sum of money as such, but rightseparate a relatively smaller tax provided affiliated with this group. For those who are included in the group, such a right has non-continuity and non-exclusiveness. Accordingly, the advantage is acquired by those who do not belong to the group. If the collection of individuals having some common interest is able to provide its members with selective incentives for collective action to influence the legislative or executive power, it usually creates organizationwhich is engaged lobbying . The lobbyists clarify the position of a group of special interests, seeking to present it in the most advantageous light, arrange propaganda campaigns and other means attracting politicians and influential officials. Special interest groups exist three basic mechanism for implementation His power:

• Replenishment of information failure (receiving information from friends, acquaintances, etc.);
• Obtaining information policy policies;
• Direct and indirect bribery.

It should be borne in mind that members of representative bodies, as well as voters, are in some extent, rational ignorance. The electorate of the parliamentarian elected from one of the numerous districts receives only part of the benefits and carries only a part of the costs associated with the political solutions of a nationwide scale. In addition, the influence of a separate parliamentarian on making a solution is usually not very large. If the parliamentarian presents, for example, a rural district, then it makes no sense to deal with independently in detail in policies in relation to individual industries. In this regard, ignorance can manifest itself, with other things being equal to the enhancing influence of lobbyists.

Introduction

The theory of public selection is one of the most striking areas of neo-institutionalism associated with the application of economic analysis methods for studying political processes. This direction is at the junction of economic and political theories, and therefore, its study is very important in modern conditions when crisis phenomena occurs in the global economy and international politics. The study of the theory of public choices makes it possible to look increasing the processes occurring in the state.

Criticizing state regulation, representatives of the theory of public selection made an object of analysis not the impact of credit and financial measures to the economy, and the process of making government decisions.

The object of study of the work is the theory of public selection in the context of modern economic problems.

Research Subject is the main concepts and prerequisites of the theory of public selection. Problems of state regulation.

The purpose of the work: to consider the theory of public selection in the history of economic thought and analyze modern economic and political problems.

Examine the concept of Buchenen

Justify what the inconsistency of the public sector is.

Consider the problems of state regulation.

1. Theory of public selection in the history of economic thought

.1 Basic views of Buchen

Buchenane wrote: "Public selection is a look at a policy that arises due to the dissemination of the use of tools and methods of economist for collective or non-market solutions." According to J. Buchenane's ideas, this new discipline is built on two main methodological postulates. The first is that the individual pursues its own interests; The second is the interpretation of a political process, with the help of which individuals implement their interests as a variety of exchange.

However, the postulate of individualism is given the main place. The first and most important assumption that provides the basis for any true theory of democracy, is that the sources of value are placed exclusively in the individuals themselves. Political and other institutions are assessed in accordance with how well they allow individuals to pursue their own interests. Individualism chosen by the bouquenne as the analysis prerequisite, just allows to comprehend the political process as a mutually beneficial exchange. The ideal is to establish such public institutions, which, like a competitive market, will allow persecuting individual interests to simultaneously provide public interests.

The second postulate is an approach to politics as a mutually beneficial exchange. Buchanan compares the political market and the market for private goods. The important property of the private goods market is that the market is the more effective, the higher the level of competition, that is, the larger the number of its participants. Unlike the markets of private goods, the political market, where solutions are taken collectively, it becomes less and less effective with increasing the number of participants. So, a political decision may be passive-effective if no one will object against him. After all, the transactions in the private goods market there is always a purely voluntary act carried out by the "unanimity" of the parties. This means that the political decision, if it claims a pass-effective outcome, must be taken unanimously. If the number of participants in the transactions in the political market increases, the probability of unanimity is reduced almost to zero, as well as the possibility of establishing a pass-effective state. Also, Buchanan emphasizes that in the political market, people pay less attention to the "quality" of choice. This is due to the fact that when buying a product in a private market, a person gets it certainly, and when voting for a candidate promising, admissible, the construction of a school is not guaranteed even in the event of the victory of this candidate for elections. In the private benefit, a person can choose between numerous varieties of one good, buy different benefits in a wide variety of variations at the same time. Political choice is carried out from a small set of mutually exclusive alternatives. The listed advantages of the private goods market and the shortcomings of the political market and determine the tendency of Buchenane to give preference to the private market before the state wherever possible.

However, how to be where the private market does not work or is working extremely inefficient and collective solutions are required? Buchanan offered his vision to solve this problem, which later received the name of the "constitutional economy". Constitution of the economic thought of Buchenane will consider in more detail.

1.2 Methodological individualism

Economists in their research rarely go beyond the usual models. In economic science, a person is an individual who determines the value of the benefit that makes a choice and participating in any activity. Therefore, the starting point of analysis is always the choice or decision to elect one of the existing alternatives. The focus of the economist is the process of individual choice, independent of the complex institutional mechanism for its implementation. It is assumed that individuals as buyers and sellers of goods and services make a choice in accordance with their diverse preferences. But the economist is not necessary to delve into the essence of these preferences. The value of the goods determines the person himself, and the task of the scientist is to give a scientific explanation of the process of implementing individual preferences. Buchenane wrote: "Economic theory is essentially individualist, therefore, there is no point in bringing into it the concept of social goals. If we recognize that the desire to maximize wealth is a scientific explanation of the behavior of the individual who makes a choice, and not the purpose of the economic system, it will be easy to analyze the influence of various institutions on the economic behavior of people and predict its results. Individual, which today makes a choice between apples and oranges, tomorrow will choose in the cabin to vote one of two politicians, for example, "Candidate A" or "Candidate B" .. Social institutions undoubtedly affect the behavior of the voter, and this relationship It is the main object of the theory of public selection.

1.3 Concept of "Economic Man" (Homo Economicus)

When studying the behavior of a person who makes a choice under the influence of tax and government restrictions, it is necessary to assume that the individual identifies its preferences with the goods. Then it will be possible to significantly expand the circle of hypotheses: for example, that two products are apples and oranges - have the same subjective value for the individual. And if apples are cheaper oranges, then individuals will buy more apples. Ensure that income has a subjective value of both the "product", and the rates of income from the activities of A higher than the rates of income from the activities of B. Then most people will prefer to engage B. If the housing rental fee also has a subjective value. And the rent will begin to establish a state, then people who receive income from renting housing will be more investing in construction, hoping to affect state decisions. Buchene believed: "It is important to note that identifying individual needs with goods allows to abstract from motives determining human behavior. To create a practically applicable theory of the voter behavior in politics or in the market, it is not necessary to assume at all that the dominant motive of people's activities is the desire to maximize wealth or net income. "

Applying the model of market behavior of the individual to the analysis of policies, it is necessary to take into account the difference between the needs of the individual and the motives of its behavior. Many critics of the "economic theory of politics" are questioned one of its basic provisions, according to which the most important motive of the behavior of the political figure is the desire for personal enrichment, which is not always confirmed in practice. But few people question the thesis on identifying other economic interests with the goods representing subjective value for the individual. This thesis refutes the idea of \u200b\u200bdominance of economic benefits over all other interests and at the same time does not mean that politicians initially drive unkind or criminal motifs.

The scientific explanation of the motivation of both political and market selection in relation to the theory under consideration is still "in diapers". But the reason for the difference in the results of the functioning of market and political systems lies in their unequal structure, and not in different motifs of people employed in these areas.

1.4 policy as an exchange

A choice person identifies its economic interests with goods that have a subjective value for him. This behavior is characteristic not only for the market, but also for politics. Markets are the Institutes of Exchange: People go to the market to exchange one thing to another, but not in order to get some public results in addition to trading or satisfying personal interests. Motivation of behavior does not affect the functioning of the market, since individuals do not realize that the process of individual choice leads to social consequences: the placement or redistribution of public resources. Applying the concept of exchange for policy analysis refutes the well-known philosophical error that people participate in political activities moving by the general desire to find good, justice and beauty, and these ideals do not depend on the moral values \u200b\u200bof the participants themselves and are not always characteristic of their own behavior. In the light of idealistic philosophy, politics is just a tool to achieve these great goals.

Buchenane wrote: "Politics is a complex exchange system between individuals, in which the last collectively strive to achieve their private goals, as they cannot realize them by conventional market exchange. There are no other interests here, except individual. In the market, people change apples on oranges, and in politics - agree to pay taxes in exchange for benefits necessary to all and everyone: from the local fire department to court. "

And this ultimately voluntarily chosen base for political consent allows you to disprove a view of politics common in many modern research solely as power. Elements of violence characteristic of state activities seem to be difficult to combine with the concept of free exchange between people. However, you can ask a question: for what is this violence? Why are people forced to endure coercion that has become an integral part of collective action? The answer is simple. Individuals agree to obey coercion by the state, only if the final results of the political "exchange" correspond to their interests.

But in the absence of any model of free exchange, any methods of state violence will conflict with the individualistic values \u200b\u200bon which the liberal social system is founded.

1.5 Constitution of Economic Policy

public selection of economic

Buchanan wrote: "The interpretation of politics as an exchange is of great importance for the development of the applied theory of economic policy. The degree of improvement of the work of political institutions should be measured not in units of approaching to a certain abstract ideal, ignoring a person, but on the contrary, - in units of people with all the necessary benefits of them. ".. The need for benefits may be common to many individuals. But the distinction between the market and political exchange is that the participants in the political process seek to various purposes. The unanimity of the participants of the political process, the possible only ideally, does not reject individualistic values \u200b\u200bat all. This unanimity in itself is the result of the choice made by individuals (though, theoretically). The public contract in the philosophical sense means consent coming from the interaction of individuals themselves, and not universal approval of a certain abstract ideal.

Direct criteria for assessing political activity does not exist, but an indirect estimate may be the measurement of the degree of efficiency of the implementation of individual preferences using political mechanisms. It is not necessary to evaluate the goals and results of policies, but tools for their achievement. The improvement of the work of political institutions, therefore, means the need for reforms, that is, changes in the political system, which will lead to the fact that political decisions will more comply with the interests of people. It is not necessary to reform a policy as such as such as the constitution of politics.

The theory of consumer choice extremely rarely takes into account the Constitution

the economic system in which people make a choice. We simply assume that the individual is able to fulfill its preferences: if he wants to buy an orange, we believe that he can do it, because in this theory there are no social barriers to the satisfaction of human needs. The question of the imperfection of the market mechanism is not related to the costs of implementing individual preferences, but with the imperfection of the exchange relationship, when some participants choose alternatives that are not suitable selection made by others. The effectiveness of market operations means that all participants have the opportunity to choose the same behavior strategy.

There is no such decentralized exchange in politics, which would allow its effectiveness from the standpoint of ethics - the criterion characteristic of the assessment of market operations. Individuals in the political process cannot be guided by conventional trade rules, since the consumer of public goods is not a separate individual, but society as a whole. Nevertheless, there is still an analogue of free trade in politics. This consent between people inherent in any type of exchange. The unanimity achieved by the participants of the collective choice in politics, similar to the voluntary exchange of individual goods on the market. Thus, it seems possible to evaluate the political system itself, regardless of the results of its functioning. To do this, it is necessary to determine to what extent the rules for the implementation of state decisions comply with the unique rule of unity that guarantees the effectiveness of political exchange. If you recognize that the desired evaluation criterion is effective, this means that the degree of improvement in the political system is due to the fact that the principle of unity is incarnated.

Real policies are still far from the ideal collective cooperative exchange based on the action of the unanimity rule. Cost of state activities pushing people to find a perfect model of an effective policy, which often goes beyond the limits of reasonable, unlike searching for an efficient market model. But the obstacles on the way of implementing the ideal do not mean that society can not get closer to it. On the contrary, these obstacles should be considered when building a civil consent model.

Vixel wrote: "Do public benefits bring great advantages to citizens spending their funds," no one has the right to judge about it, except for the citizens themselves. "Wixel tried to participate in reforming legislative authorities. He made a proposal, according to which decisions on government expenditures should be made only jointly with decisions on the methods of funding budget, and also proposed to make a special rule "false-unanimity", meaning the approval by the parliamentary majority of government spending not provided for in the approved budget. Thus, K. Vixel has expanded its analysis to the level of constitutional choice, that is, the choice of rules regulating the activities of the state.

Individual is able to consciously choose a rule that in some cases can even lead to an undesirable consequences for it, when the criterion of unanimity becomes the basis for the Constitutional Treaty, within which there will be ordinary political activities. The individual will be accepted if it is known in advance that the satisfaction of his interests will end ultimately from the basic law acting for a long time, and not from certain short-term state measures recommended by K. Vixel. The criterion of Vixel, designed for a short period of time, is nevertheless an important measure of the effectiveness of individual state decisions. Time makes its own adjustments to this principle, but it does not lose its importance, since it complies with the constitutional rule of unity.

As noted, the Constitution, based on the principle of unanimity, not only will contribute to the achievement of consent, but moreover, the likely conflicts between personal and public interest can eliminate. Individual understands that the effect of constitutional rules is designed for several historical periods, during which one of which will make its choice. Therefore, it is impossible to determine the consequences of the influence of any rules for the interests of a particular person. Consequently, the basis for the choice of the Constitution should be universal principles of justice, the use of which is much more efficient way to consent, rather than the realization of the personal interests of each person separately.

Objectively, there are no such legal norms that would give a serious reason for criticism. However, the political economist may foresee future changes and suggest reforming political procedures and rules in such a way that they contribute to the achievement of general consent. But these recommendations need to be made, only aware of their responsibility for political reality, and taking into account the fact that any similar changes are possible only in the long run. The reforms of the existing system make sense only when they contribute to the implementation of policies, understandable to ordinary men and women and not designed for the perfect - conscious and generous - the people. Buchenane wrote: "The choice of political rules should not go beyond reality, and, in addition, it should be recognized that the interests of people in power can become an obstacle to possible transformations."

1.6 Constitutional approach and contract theory

The model of the bouquenne regarding the choice of the rules or the constitution and, taking into account the uncertainty factor is close to the famous philosophical model of J. Rullza, who, applying moral criteria for analysis of the problem

uncertainty in politics, created new principles of social justice, outgoing from the concept of achieving universal consent on the basis of contracts, which should precede the stages of choosing the political constitution.

According to Buchanan: "Only under the influence of uncertainty (or ignorance), the parliamentary majority can approve the state aid to the poor, calculated only for a short period of time, up to the following elections. These programs should be created only in accordance with the Constitution, since it does not depend on anyone's momentary interests and is a criterion of public consent. The purpose of the theory of contracts is the creation of a scientific base for evaluating decision-made decisions "..

The experience of financing the budget deficit in modern Western states shows very bright examples, pushing to discussion on constitutional policy. So, it seems an unlikely achievement of general consent, when representatives of different generations will unanimously allow the majority expressing the interests of only one generation, to finance today's social consumption at the expense of the state budget, since paying public debt and bear forced losses will have tomorrow's taxpayers. A similar situation is also characteristic of the issuance of debt obligations, which are included in many programs designed for several generations of taxpayers.

If political decisions are not dependent on the rules that limit state activities, then all the contracts of contracts will be useless. If the changes in the constitutional system do not give the expected results, the constitutional political economy will become unnecessary. Conversely, the increase in the role of the Constitution puts specific tasks to political economy. Its theoretical function is to analyze the effectiveness of legal norms regulating political activity. Similar to the theory of games, this analysis is a search for the best way to win in the framework of the established rules of the game. The practical task of constitutional political economy is to assist voters controlling ultimately their social system, in their constant search for such principles of a political game that would maximize their diverse interests.

2. The modern economic and political problems in the theory of public selection

.1 Problems of state regulation of the economy

State regulation of the economy is one of the main forms of state participation in the economy, consisting in its impact on the allocation of resources and income, the level and pace of economic development and the welfare of the country's population. For the modern market economy, the diversity of methods, forms and institutions of state regulation is characterized. Administrative, legal, direct and indirect forms and methods of state regulation differ. The administrative methods include, in particular, issuing licenses that resolve any activity, the establishment of quotas for export and import, quotas for young people when creating new jobs, control over prices, product quality, income, etc. State legal regulation is carried out on the basis of civil and economic legislation through the system of norms and rules established by them. Direct economic regulation is implemented in the form of irrevocable targeted financing of sectors, industries, territories and individual enterprises.

It includes subventions and subsidies, which include various types of subsidies, surrenders from special budget and extrabudgetary funds of various levels (nationwide, regional, local). This also includes preferential loans and tax breaks. To indirect forms of economic regulation include regulation of the amount of money supply, determining the conditions for the provision of centralized loans and interest rates, taxes, currency courses, customs duties, etc.

As the official representative of the entire society, a specially organized sustainable social institution, the state should: reasonably formulate the economic, social, spiritual and other needs of society, taking into account the interests of future generations; reflect these needs in relevant economic and political programs; carry out these needs with cash and promising resources of their satisfaction; Finally, develop mechanisms and create conditions for the development of institutions that contribute to the satisfaction of these needs.

The state may occupy various positions in relation to the market: "State of the Market", "the state next to the market", "the state within the market". A comprehensive approach to the system "State - Market" system in order to search for effective interaction in the modern stage of economic development and is necessary for the prospect.

All developed countries, despite their "market market", enjoyed and use all the methods of regulation to implement strategic goals.

Economic and administrative methods are interrelated. Economic methods of impact on market processes include credit, tax, as well as transfers, that is, the redistribution of funds in order to socially support the low-income groups of the population. Applying these methods, the state manages the most important processes both in the formation of the market and in the stage of its self-regulation. Administrative methods are actively used in the spheres of consumer protection, environmental protection. Thus, any economic regulator carries administration elements, because it is controlled by this or that public service. In turn, in each administrative regulator there is something economic, in the sense that it indirectly affects the behavior of the subjects of the economic system. At the same time, economic and administrative methods are opposite. Economic methods do not narrow the freedom of election of subjects, which retain the right to free adoption of market conditions. On the contrary, administrative techniques significantly limit the freedom of economic selection, and sometimes reduce it to zero. This happens where administration comes out for the economically reasonable boundaries, acquires the traits of totality. At the same time, administrative measures, suppressing individual economic freedom, are fully justified if they are used in cases where the maximum freedom of some subjects turns into severe losses for other subjects and market economy as a whole. There are areas where the application of administrative methods is effective and does not contradict the market mechanism. For example, monopoly market control, the development of economic standards and their control, determination and maintenance of the minimum permissible parameters of the well-being of the population and others.

Many objective difficulties in the economy of Belarus are associated with subjective reasons, including a prominent place occupy the mistakes in the field of state regulation of the economy. The state should, first of all, take care of maintaining market competition, preventing monopolization. The optimal degree of state intervention in the market economy in Belarusian conditions cannot be determined approximately, it can be found only in an experimental way.

Of all the above, we can conclude: the problem of state regulation may be associated with the adoption of incorrect economic decisions related to the incomprehension of economic laws. It should also be noted that state regulation of the economy creates the basis for making such decisions that are more beneficial to the state than, for example, private entrepreneurs. The state determines the rules of the game for which plays society.

Increases the well-being of society Production of goods, the cumulative benefit of which exceeds the total costs. It should be borne in mind that decision making with the help of voting often leads to the fact that the voting results are economically ineffective. Even if the cumulative benefits from the production of public goods exceed the total costs, voting participants can vote against this production.

Imagine that society consists of only 3 people. Suppose that cumulative costs for the production of public goods (ensuring national defense) are 1200 rubles. Each of the 3 people pays tax - 400 rubles. But the 1st is ready to pay 800 rubles. , 2nd -350 rub. , 3rd 300 rub.

Provided that the decision on the production of this product (for or against) is accepted by a majority vote, the 2nd and 3rd, most likely, would voting "against". And although, many factors affect the choice, and not just their own economic interests, in this case the costs of each of them are 400 rubles, and the benefits of only 350 and 300 rubles. respectively. Despite the fact that the cumulative benefit is 1450 rubles. (800 rub. + 350 rub. + 300 rub.) Exceeds the total cost of 1200 rubles. (400 rub. + 400rub. + 400rub.), In this case, the majority will vote "against". In this product it would be necessary to invest more resources, but this did not happen. Similarly, you can illustrate the situation when you vote for the goods whose production is unprofitable.

In the absence of the necessary market mechanisms, to increase the economic efficiency of the production of public goods due to a number of conditions may be the state. But as can be seen from the above example, the state, due to inefficient voting, does not always cope with the provision of some public goods, the production of which is economically justified. But at the same time can provide public goods, the production of which is not economically justified.

Thus, since the decision-making mechanism by a majority of votes is not able to take into account the entire set of preferences of a separate voter, such a process may lead to economically inefficient results.

2.3 Paradox Condorce

Paradox Condorce ? - the paradox of the theory of public selection, first described by Marquis Condorce in 1785.

First of all, it is necessary to define transitivity. Transitivity (from lat. Transitivus - transition), one of the properties of the logical ratio of values. The ratio A * B is called transitive, if from A * B and B * C implies that a * c. For example, the ratio of equality (A \u003d B) is transitively, since from A \u003d B and B \u003d C flows a \u003d s ..

The Condorse Paradox is that a simple rule of majority is not able to provide transitality of preference among the options selected if there are more than two alternatives and more than two voters. Due to non-transitivity, the result may depend on the voting order, which makes it possible to manipulate the choice of the majority.

There are situations where someone possessing the authority to determine the sequence of comparing options or stop voting on a particular step, and interested in the victory of a certain alternative can thus control the agenda.

According to the principle of Condorce, in order to determine the true will of the majority, it is necessary that each voting express all candidates in order of their preference. After that, for the chosen pair of candidates, it is determined how many voting prefers one candidate to another. Similarly, you can compare any candidates.

However, it is worth noting that any rules provide an opportunity due to completely legal manipulations built with the exact calculation of voting portfolios, get the necessary result.

2.4 Errow theorem on the impossibility

Kenneth George Errow Professor Standford, Harvard and a number of other universities, the laureate of the Nobel Prize in the economy (1972) for pioneering works in the field of the theory of general economic equilibrium, laid the foundations of the current theory of choice, and its work still defines the development of this theory.

In 1951 Kenneth Arrow, summarizing the Paradox of Condorce, proved the theorem of the impossibility, the essence of which is that there are no rules for collective selection capable of simultaneously satisfy the following six requirements:

.Fullness. The rule should provide a choice between any two alternatives, preferring one of them or recognizing both equal.

.Universality. The rule provides an effective choice for any combination of individual preferences.

.Transitivity. For any set of three alternatives x, y and z, if Xry and Yrz, then xrz.

.Unanimous. If XRI Y is performed for any i, i.e. All participants in collective choices prefer the first of two alternatives, Xry, in other words, a collective choice is committed in favor of the first alternative (this is nothing more than the fulfillment of the requirement of pass-optimization).

.Independence from foreign alternatives. The collective choice between any two alternatives X and Y depends on the individuals as evidenced by these two alternatives relative to each other, but do not depend on the relationship of individuals to any extraneous alternative Z, (for example, XRY will be recognized, may depend on, in particular, from whether it is true that Xriy, but not from whether Xriz or that XrjZrjy).

.No dictator. Among the participants of the collective choice there is no such individual, any preference of which Xrjy would entail XRY regardless of the preferences of all other individuals ..

The decisive coalition is a collection of individuals who are included in the total number of participants in collective selection and with unanimity within this coalition the position of its members becomes the result of a collective choice. The decisive coalition can only be for a particular pair of alternative options (and against B). In its theorem, Arrow proved that if the six conditions listed above are performed, then there is a decisive coalition for an arbitrary pair of alternatives, consisting of one member. He also proved that if the coalition consisting of their one member is decisive for some pair X and y, then it is decisive for any couple alternatives a and c. .

The fundamental importance of the Errow Theorem is, it determines the key prerequisites for the feasibility or the impracticalness of a rational democratic choice. The conditions of the theorem allow a choice between all sorts of pass-optimal states with various preference profiles, which entails the improvement of the position of one individuals at the expense of others, creates irreconcilable conflicts and provokes the formation of unstable coalitions.

The history of democratic institutions clearly suggests that their decisions are far from always better than private solutions. Guided by the decision of the Areopague, the Athenians condemned the death of Socrates and almost executed Aristotle. Solutions of the NATO collective governing body were unanimously on the beginning of the operation in Yugoslavia and the USSR Politburo on the introduction of a limited contingent in Afghanistan. At the same time, the consequences of these decisions and are currently not clear to the end.

Trying to answer the question of how the public selection rule itself acts, Herrow, introducing obvious and easy rules, came to a striking conclusion - only the dictatorial regulations are satisfied with all listed requirements.

Non-existence of a rational public selection rule, approved by this theorem, means that a rational social choice cannot be achieved as a result of a compromise - so you can interpret the result of Errow.

2.5 Lobbism and political rent

The fact that the government belongs to the dominant role, when the market turns out to be insolvent, means that it should provide public goods and services, regulate the side gains and costs, mitigate income inequality, etc. In the perfect version, the decisions that the government takes should contribute to the overall well-being, or, as a last resort, to protect the interests of most citizens. In practice, the government often supports the goals of small groups, haunting special interests, often to the detriment of society as a whole.

The theory of political rent focuses on the circumstance that the purpose of the participation of economic entities in political activities may be obtaining specific advantages providing them with rental (ie exceeding the competitive level) revenues on their disposal factors of production. These revenues were called "Political rent, and activities aimed at obtaining their acquisition -" Exquisition of political rent ".. The most indicative case of activities aimed at finding political rent is the struggle of economic entities for obtaining monopoly rights, restriction of competition in the market or legislative record favorable for product level manufacturers. If you take the difference between the monopoly price and the equilibrium price and multiply it to the issue at a monopoly price, we will get a political rente that officials receive to maintain this monopoly. That is, political rent spraying Among the officials, with the result that society is poor.

Lobbism - pressure on parliamentaria by personal or written appeal either in another way (organization of mass petty, flow of letters, publications) by any groups or individuals in order to achieve or deviate bills. Lobbying is a form of finding political rent.

2.6 Explicit benefits and hidden costs

There is an opinion that, seeking to attract voters, the political figures will not, guided by the requirements of economic rationality, objectively weigh all the benefits and costs from various programs, making a decision which of them to reject, and what to support.

A four-year political cycle dictates people who are in power and needing periodic support for voters, promote programs that will bring immediately tangible benefits. On the other hand, such programs are struggling to be determined, unclear or deferred costs. At the same time, with a much smaller enthusiasm, political figures will be treated for programs, the costs of which are determined easily and immediately, and the future benefits are very foggy and vague.

Such preferences in the field of public selection can lead politicians to reject economically acquitted programs, and the adoption of programs irrational from an economic point of view. For example, the offer to build and expand the transport system for transit traffic in the zone of large cities can be considered economically rational (with an objective analysis of costs and benefits).

Consider this question taking into account the following provisions: 1) the program financing should be started immediately, and it is quite obvious that this will happen by increasing taxes; 2) Benefits will appear only 10 years after the program is completed.

Under such conditions, the political actor interested in supporting voters is more profitable to vote against the program.

But if costs are hidden or postponed, thanks to deficient financing, this may lead to the fact that very minor benefits from this program can be significantly exaggerated. In turn, such inflaming benefits will most likely lead to the fact that such a program will be adopted.

Thus, politicians are interested in decisions that provide obvious and immediate benefits and require hidden, difficult-determined costs. Such decisions contribute to the growth of politicians' popularity, but, as a rule, they are economically ineffective.

2.7 bureaucracy and inefficiency

The state management form is much less effective than private, mainly due to the fact that the market system creates incentives to improve the efficiency of activities, which is absent in the public sector. In other words, an employee of a private enterprise has a powerful personal stimulus to increase efficiency - an increase in income. Reduced costs, thanks to effective management, regardless of whether a private enterprise operates in conditions of monopoly or competition, in any case contributes to increasing profits. The situation in the public sector is directly opposite: an official who improves efficiency in his department does not have the ability to receive personal benefits, that is, part of the profit.

In the public sector, there are fewer incentives in order to take care of the reduction of costs. In a broader sense, a clear criterion for the effectiveness of a private firm is laid in a market system - profit and losses. Effective profitable firm, so it succeeds and develops. Ineffective enterprise is not cost-effective and does not succeed, it degrades, after a while suffers bankruptcy and ceases to exist. But there is no similar test, with the help of which it is possible to estimate the effectiveness or inefficiency of the state department.

Ineffectiveness and material losses in the private sector lead to the cessation of the production of certain types of goods and services. The state, as a rule, rarely refuses the activity in which failed, and, on the contrary, increases states and financing to improve efficiency.

According to the generally accepted definition, the bureaucracy is the domination of the office, a specific form of social organizations in society (political, economic, ideological, etc.). The essence of the bureaucracy is, firstly, in the separation of executive centers from the will and solutions of the majority of members of this organization, secondly, in the primacy of the form on the content of the activities of this organization, thirdly, in subordinate the rules and objectives of the functioning of the organization of the goals of its conservation and Strengthening. The bureaucracy is inherent in society built on social inequality and exploitation, when the government focuses in the hands of a narrow ruling group. The essential sign of the bureaucracy is the existence and growth of the bureaucrats layer - a bureaucratic-administrative caste, privileged and torn away from the people.

From the concept of political rents considered above, it is necessary that state programs contribute to an increase in the number of bureaucrats, and those who benefit from these programs. As a result of the political activities of bureaucrats, such programs continue to expand and develop even in cases where they have proven their inconsistency and have not fulfilled their destination or vice versa has long reached their goals.

Many government officials are typical of creating detailed, expensive, and sometimes ridiculous instructions and techniques that not only increase the costs within the state institution and for subjects, but also significantly increase the term for making a decision, making a decision that clearly slows down the work of the department.

It is also necessary to remember that in addition to the ineffective spending of funds, time and strength, the bureaucracy is one of the reasons that generate corruption.

Thus, the inconsistency of the public sector can be explained by the pursuit of the rent, short-sightedness of political figures, shadow lobbying and inefficient work of officials.

Conclusion

An increasingly active participation of the state in business and economic regulation raises the question of making decision-making. The essence of the problem is how to achieve that the adoption of laws, the establishment of taxes, the distribution of budget funds, other solutions of power structures really answered the needs of society, not individuals or groups of the population?

The approach of Bucken and other representatives of the Virginian school is to consider political decisions by analogy with decisions in the field of economic activity. Political decisions are the choice of alternatives. Politicians act as well as entrepreneurs. They are guided by their private interests, such as the desire to obtain a maximum of votes, ensure maximum power and influence.

Thus, on the basis of the studied theory, it is possible to conclude that in the conditions of Belarusian reality it will take a lot of time to optimize the relationship between the population and power structures, improve the political mechanism.

It is necessary to limit the manipulation of public consciousness with the help of exhaust technologies; To accustom people to chipping the pseudo-information, which the political market is constantly producing and implements and implements. It is important that Belarusians have a kind of immunity to manipulate politicians and media.

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