The battle with the Tatar Mongols. Mongolian conquests of Russia. Tatar-Mongol yoke. Russian and Tatar names are difficult to distinguish

50 famous mysteries of the Middle Ages Zgurskaya Maria Pavlovna

So was there a Tatar-Mongol yoke in Russia?

A passing Tatar. Hell will truly envelop them.

(She passes.)

From the parody theatrical play by Ivan Maslov "Elder Paphnutius", 1867

The traditional version of the Tatar-Mongol invasion of Russia, the "Tatar-Mongol yoke", and the liberation from it is known to the reader from school. In the presentation of most historians, the events looked something like this. At the beginning of the 13th century, in the steppes of the Far East, the energetic and brave tribal leader Genghis Khan gathered a huge army of nomads, welded together by iron discipline, and rushed to conquer the world - "to the last sea." Having conquered the closest neighbors, and then China, the mighty Tatar-Mongol horde rolled westward. Having traveled about 5 thousand kilometers, the Mongols defeated Khorezm, then Georgia and in 1223 reached the southern outskirts of Russia, where they defeated the army of Russian princes in the battle on the Kalka River. In the winter of 1237, the Tatar-Mongols invaded Russia with all their countless army, burned and ravaged many Russian cities, and in 1241 they tried to conquer Western Europe by invading Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, reached the shores of the Adriatic Sea, but turned back, therefore that they were afraid to leave in their rear the ruined, but still dangerous for them Russia. The Tatar-Mongol yoke began.

The great poet A. Pushkin left heartfelt lines: “Russia was assigned a high mission ... its boundless plains absorbed the power of the Mongols and stopped their invasion at the very edge of Europe; the barbarians did not dare to leave enslaved Russia in their rear and returned to the steppes of their East. The resulting enlightenment was saved by a torn apart and dying Russia ... "

The huge Mongol power, stretching from China to the Volga, hung over Russia like an ominous shadow. The Mongol khans issued labels to the Russian princes for reigning, attacked Russia many times in order to plunder and plunder, and repeatedly killed Russian princes in their Golden Horde.

Having strengthened over time, Russia began to resist. In 1380, the Grand Duke of Moscow Dmitry Donskoy defeated the Horde Khan Mamai, and a century later, the troops of the Grand Duke Ivan III and the Horde Khan Akhmat met in the so-called "standing on the Ugra". The opponents camped for a long time on different sides of the Ugra River, after which Khan Akhmat, finally realizing that the Russians had become strong and he had little chance of winning the battle, gave the order to retreat and took his horde to the Volga. These events are considered “the end of the Tatar-Mongol yoke”.

But in recent decades, this classic version has been called into question. Geographer, ethnographer and historian Lev Gumilyov convincingly showed that relations between Russia and the Mongols were much more complicated than the usual confrontation between cruel conquerors and their unfortunate victims. Deep knowledge in the field of history and ethnography allowed the scientist to conclude that there was a kind of "complementarity" between the Mongols and the Russians, that is, compatibility, the ability to symbiosis and mutual support at the cultural and ethnic level. The writer and publicist Alexander Bushkov went even further, "twisting" Gumilyov's theory to its logical conclusion and expressing a completely original version: what is commonly called the Tatar-Mongol invasion was in fact the struggle of the descendants of Prince Vsevolod the Big Nest (son of Yaroslav and grandson of Alexander Nevsky ) with their rival princes for the sole power over Russia. Khans Mamai and Akhmat were not alien raiders, but noble nobles who, according to the dynastic ties of the Russian-Tatar families, had legally justified rights to the great reign. Thus, the Battle of Kulikovo and the "standing on the Ugra" are not episodes of the struggle against foreign aggressors, but pages of the civil war in Russia. Moreover, this author promulgated a very "revolutionary" idea: under the names "Genghis Khan" and "Batu" in history ... Russian princes Yaroslav and Alexander Nevsky, and Dmitry Donskoy - this is Khan Mamai himself (!).

Of course, the conclusions of the publicist are full of irony and border on postmodern "banter", but it should be noted that many facts of the history of the Tatar-Mongol invasion and the "yoke" really look too mysterious and need closer attention and unbiased research. Let's try to consider some of these mysteries.

Let's start with a general comment. Western Europe in the 13th century presented a disappointing picture. Christendom was experiencing a certain depression. The activity of Europeans shifted to the borders of their area. German feudal lords began to seize the border Slavic lands and turn their population into powerless serfs. The Western Slavs who lived along the Elbe resisted German pressure with all their might, but the forces were unequal.

Who were the Mongols who approached the borders of the Christian world from the east? How did the powerful Mongolian state come about? Let's make an excursion into its history.

At the beginning of the XIII century, in 1202-1203, the Mongols first defeated the Merkits, and then the Kerait. The fact is that the Kerait were divided into supporters of Genghis Khan and his opponents. The opponents of Genghis Khan were led by the son of Wang Khan, the legitimate heir to the throne - Nilha. He had reason to hate Genghis Khan: even at the time when Wang Khan was an ally of Genghis, he (the leader of the Kerait), seeing the indisputable talents of the latter, wanted to transfer the Kerait throne to him, bypassing his own son. Thus, the collision of a part of the Kerait with the Mongols occurred during the life of Wang Khan. And although the Kerait were outnumbered, the Mongols defeated them, as they showed exceptional mobility and took the enemy by surprise.

In the collision with the Kerait, the character of Genghis Khan was fully manifested. When Wang Khan and his son Nilha fled from the battlefield, one of their noyons (military leaders) with a small detachment detained the Mongols, saving their leaders from captivity. This noyon was seized, brought before the eyes of Chinggis, and he asked: “Why, noyon, seeing the position of your troops, didn’t leave yourself? You had both the time and the opportunity. " He replied: "I served my khan and gave him the opportunity to escape, and my head is for you, about the victor." Genghis Khan said: “Everyone should imitate this man.

Look how brave, loyal, valiant he is. I cannot kill you, noyon, I offer you a place in my army. " Noyon became a thousand-man and, of course, faithfully served Genghis Khan, because the Kerait horde disintegrated. Wang Khan himself died while trying to escape to the Naimans. Their guards at the border, seeing the Kerait, killed him, and the severed head of the old man presented to their khan.

In 1204, the Mongols of Genghis Khan and the powerful Naiman Khanate clashed. And again the Mongols won the victory. The defeated were included in the Chinggis horde. In the eastern steppe, there were no more tribes capable of actively resisting the new order, and in 1206, at the great kurultai, Chinggis was re-elected as khan, but already throughout Mongolia. This is how the all-Mongolian state was born. The only hostile tribe to him remained the old enemies of the Borjigins - the Merkits, but even those by 1208 were forced out into the valley of the Irgiz River.

The growing power of Genghis Khan allowed his horde to quite easily assimilate different tribes and peoples. Because, in accordance with Mongolian stereotypes of behavior, the khan could and should have required obedience, obedience to orders, performance of duties, but forcing a person to abandon his faith or customs was considered immoral - the individual had the right to his own choice. This state of affairs was attractive to many. In 1209, the Uighur state sent ambassadors to Genghis Khan with a request to accept them into his ulus. The request, of course, was granted, and Genghis Khan gave the Uyghurs huge trade privileges. A caravan route passed through the Uyguria, and the Uyghurs, being part of the Mongol state, became rich due to the fact that they sold water, fruits, meat and "pleasure" to starving caravan men at high prices. The voluntary union of the Uyguria with Mongolia turned out to be useful for the Mongols as well. With the annexation of the Uyguria, the Mongols went beyond the boundaries of their ethnic area and came into contact with other peoples of the oikumene.

In 1216, on the Irgiz River, the Mongols were attacked by the Khorezmians. Khorezm by that time was the most powerful of the states that arose after the weakening of the power of the Seljuk Turks. The rulers of Khorezm from the governors of the ruler of Urgench turned into independent sovereigns and took the title of “Khorezmshahs”. They turned out to be energetic, adventurous and belligerent. This allowed them to conquer most of Central Asia and southern Afghanistan. The Khorezmshahs created a huge state in which the main military force was made up of the Turks from the adjacent steppes.

But the state turned out to be fragile, despite wealth, brave warriors and experienced diplomats. The regime of the military dictatorship relied on tribes alien to the local population, which had a different language, different customs and customs. The mercenaries' cruelty caused discontent among the residents of Samarkand, Bukhara, Merv and other Central Asian cities. The uprising in Samarkand led to the destruction of the Turkic garrison. Naturally, this was followed by a punitive operation by the Khorezmians, who cruelly dealt with the population of Samarkand. Other large and wealthy cities of Central Asia also suffered.

In this situation, Khorezmshah Muhammad decided to confirm his title "ghazi" - "winner of the infidels" - and become famous for another victory over them. The opportunity presented itself to him in the same year 1216, when the Mongols, fighting with the Merkits, reached Irgiz. Upon learning of the arrival of the Mongols, Muhammad sent an army against them on the grounds that the steppe dwellers must be converted to Islam.

The Khorezm army attacked the Mongols, but they themselves went on the offensive in the rearguard battle and badly wounded the Khorezmians. Only the attack of the left wing, commanded by the son of the Khorezmshah, the talented commander Jalal-ad-Din, straightened the situation. After that, the Khorezmians withdrew, and the Mongols returned home: they were not going to fight Khorezm, on the contrary, Genghis Khan wanted to establish ties with the Khorezmshah. After all, the Great Caravan Route went through Central Asia and all the owners of the lands along which it ran got rich at the expense of the duties paid by merchants. Merchants willingly paid duties, because they passed their expenses on to consumers, while losing nothing. Wishing to preserve all the advantages associated with the existence of caravan routes, the Mongols strove for peace and tranquility on their borders. The difference of faith, in their opinion, did not give a pretext for war and could not justify the bloodshed. Probably, the Khorezmshah himself understood the episodic nature of the clash on Irshze. In 1218, Muhammad sent a trade caravan to Mongolia. Peace was restored, especially since the Mongols had no time for Khorezm: shortly before that, the Naiman prince Kuchluk began a new war with the Mongols.

Once again, Mongol-Khorezm relations were violated by the Khorezmshah himself and his officials. In 1219, a rich caravan from the lands of Genghis Khan approached the Khorezm city of Otrar. The merchants went to the city to replenish food supplies and bathe in the bathhouse. There the merchants met two acquaintances, one of whom informed the governor of the city that these merchants were spies. He immediately realized that there was a great reason to rob the travelers. The merchants were killed, their property was confiscated. The ruler of Otrar sent half of the loot to Khorezm, and Muhammad accepted the loot, which means he shared responsibility for what he had done.

Genghis Khan sent ambassadors to find out what caused the incident. Muhammad was angry when he saw the infidels, and ordered some of the ambassadors to kill, and some, stripping naked, drive them out to certain death in the steppe. Two or three Mongols finally got home and told them what had happened. Genghis Khan's anger had no limits. From the Mongolian point of view, there were two most terrible crimes: deceiving those who confided in and killing guests. According to custom, Genghis Khan could not leave unavenged neither the merchants who were killed in Otrar, nor the ambassadors whom the Khorezmshah insulted and killed. The khan had to fight, otherwise his fellow tribesmen would simply refuse to trust him.

In Central Asia, the Khorezmshah had at their disposal a regular army of four hundred thousand. And the Mongols, as the famous Russian orientalist V.V.Bartold believed, had no more than 200 thousand. Genghis Khan demanded military assistance from all allies. Warriors came from the Turks and Kara-Kitays, the Uighurs sent a detachment of 5 thousand people, only the Tangut ambassador boldly replied: "If you do not have enough troops, do not fight." Genghis Khan considered the answer an insult and said: "Only dead could I bear such an insult."

Genghis Khan threw the assembled Mongol, Uyghur, Turkic and Kara-Chinese troops on Khorezm. Khorezmshah, having quarreled with his mother Turkan-Khatun, did not trust the military leaders who were related to her. He was afraid to gather them into a fist in order to repel the onslaught of the Mongols, and scattered the army across the garrisons. The best generals of the shah were his own unloved son Jalal-ad-Din and the commandant of the Khujand fortress Timur-Melik. The Mongols took the fortresses one after another, but in Khojent, even taking the fortress, they could not capture the garrison. Timur-Melik put his soldiers on rafts and escaped pursuit along the wide Syrdarya. Scattered garrisons could not hold back the advance of Genghis Khan's troops. Soon all the major cities of the Sultanate - Samarkand, Bukhara, Merv, Herat - were captured by the Mongols.

Regarding the capture of Central Asian cities by the Mongols, there is a well-established version: "Wild nomads destroyed the cultural oases of agricultural peoples." Is it so? This version, as LN Gumilev showed, is based on the legends of the court Muslim historians. For example, the fall of Herat was reported by Islamic historians as a disaster, in which the entire population was exterminated in the city, except for a few men who managed to escape in the mosque. They hid there, afraid to take to the streets littered with corpses. Only wild beasts roamed the city and tormented the dead. After sitting out for some time and coming to their senses, these "heroes" went to distant lands to rob caravans in order to regain their lost wealth.

But is it possible? If the entire population of a large city was exterminated and lay in the streets, then inside the city, in particular in the mosque, the air would be full of cadaveric miasma, and those who were hiding there would simply die. No predators, except jackals, live near the city, and they very rarely enter the city. It was simply impossible for exhausted people to move to rob caravans several hundred kilometers from Herat, because they would have to walk, carrying heavy loads - water and provisions. Such a "robber", having met a caravan, could no longer rob it ...

Even more surprising is the information reported by historians about Merv. The Mongols took it in 1219 and also supposedly exterminated all the inhabitants there. But already in 1229 Merv revolted, and the Mongols had to take the city again. And finally, two years later, Merv sent a detachment of 10 thousand people to fight the Mongols.

We see that the fruits of fantasy and religious hatred gave rise to the legends of Mongol atrocities. If we take into account the degree of reliability of the sources and ask simple but inevitable questions, it is easy to separate the historical truth from literary fiction.

The Mongols occupied Persia almost without a fight, driving out the son of the Khorezmshah Jelal ad-Din to northern India. Muhammad II Gazi himself, broken by struggle and constant defeats, died in a leper colony on an island in the Caspian Sea (1221). The Mongols made peace with the Shiite population of Iran, which was constantly offended by the Sunnis in power, in particular the Baghdad Caliph and Jalal ad-Din himself. As a result, the Shiite population of Persia suffered significantly less than the Sunnis of Central Asia. Be that as it may, in 1221 the state of the Khorezmshahs was finished. Under one ruler - Muhammad II Gazi - this state reached its highest power and perished. As a result, Khorezm, Northern Iran, and Khorasan were annexed to the Mongol empire.

In 1226, the hour of the Tangut state struck, which at the decisive moment of the war with Khorezm refused to help Genghis Khan. The Mongols rightly viewed this move as a betrayal, which, according to Yasa, required revenge. The capital of Tangut was the city of Zhongxing. It was besieged by Genghis Khan in 1227, defeating the Tangut troops in the previous battles.

During the siege of Zhongsin, Genghis Khan died, but the Mongol noyons, on the orders of their leader, concealed his death. The fortress was taken, and the population of the "evil" city, on which the collective guilt for betrayal fell, was subjected to execution. The Tangut state disappeared, leaving behind only written evidence of the past culture, but the city survived and lived until 1405, when it was destroyed by the Chinese of the Ming dynasty.

From the capital of the Tanguts, the Mongols took the body of their great ruler to their native steppes. The funeral rite was as follows: the remains of Genghis Khan were lowered into the dug grave, along with many valuable things, and all the slaves who performed the funeral work were killed. According to custom, exactly one year later, it was required to celebrate the commemoration. In order to find the burial place later, the Mongols did the following. At the grave they sacrificed a little camel just taken from the mother. And a year later, the camel herself found in the boundless steppe a place where her cub was killed. Having killed this camel, the Mongols performed the prescribed ceremony of commemoration and then left the grave forever. Since then, no one knows where Genghis Khan is buried.

In the last years of his life, he was extremely concerned about the fate of his state. The khan had four sons from his beloved wife Borte and many children from other wives, who, although they were considered legitimate children, did not have the right to the father's throne. Sons from Borte differed in inclinations and character. The eldest son, Jochi, was born shortly after the Merkit captivity of Borte, and therefore not only evil tongues, but also the younger brother Chagatai called him a “Merkit geek”. Although Borte invariably defended Jochi, and Genghis Khan himself always recognized him as his son, the shadow of his mother's merkit captivity fell on Jochi with the burden of suspicion of illegitimacy. Once, in the presence of his father, Chagatai openly called Jochi illegitimate, and the case almost ended in a fight between the brothers.

It is curious, but according to the testimony of contemporaries, there were some persistent stereotypes in Jochi's behavior that greatly distinguished him from Chinggis. If for Genghis Khan there was no concept of “mercy” in relation to enemies (he left life only to young children, who were adopted by his mother Hoelun, and to the valiant Bagatur who passed on to the Mongol service), then Jochi was distinguished by his humanity and kindness. So, during the siege of Gurganj, the Khorezmians, completely exhausted by the war, asked to accept the surrender, that is, in other words, to spare them. Jochi spoke in favor of showing mercy, but Genghis Khan categorically rejected the request for mercy, and as a result, the garrison of Gurganj was partially cut, and the city itself was flooded by the waters of the Amu Darya. The misunderstanding between the father and the eldest son, constantly fueled by the intrigues and slander of relatives, deepened over time and turned into the sovereign's distrust of his heir. Genghis Khan suspected that Jochi wanted to gain popularity among the conquered peoples and secede from Mongolia. It is unlikely that this was so, but the fact remains: at the beginning of 1227, Jochi, hunting in the steppe, was found dead - his spine was broken. The details of the incident were kept secret, but, without a doubt, Genghis Khan was a man interested in the death of Jochi and quite capable of ending his son's life.

In contrast to Jochi, the second son of Genghis Khan, Chaga-tai, was a strict, executive and even cruel man. Therefore, he was promoted to the "keeper of the Yasa" (something like the attorney general or the supreme judge). Chagatai strictly observed the law and treated its violators without mercy.

The third son of the great khan, Ogedei, like Jochi, was distinguished by kindness and tolerance towards people. The character of Ogedei is best illustrated by the following incident: once, on a joint trip, the brothers saw a Muslim washing himself by the water. According to Muslim custom, every believer is obliged to perform namaz and ritual ablution several times a day. Mongolian tradition, on the other hand, forbade a person to bathe during the entire summer. The Mongols believed that washing in a river or lake causes a thunderstorm, and a thunderstorm in the steppe is very dangerous for travelers, and therefore "calling a thunderstorm" was considered an attempt on people's lives. Nukers-vigilantes of the ruthless adherent of the law Chagatai seized a Muslim. Anticipating a bloody denouement - the unfortunate man was threatened with cutting off his head - Ogedei sent his man to tell the Muslim to answer that he had dropped the gold into the water and was just looking for it there. The Muslim said so to Chagatay. He ordered to look for a coin, and during this time Ogedei's vigilante threw the gold into the water. The found coin was returned to the "rightful owner". At parting, Ogedei, taking out a handful of coins from his pocket, handed them to the rescued person and said: "The next time you drop a gold coin into the water, don't go after it, don't break the law."

The youngest of the sons of Chinggis, Tului, was born in 1193. Since then Genghis Khan was in captivity, this time Borte's infidelity was quite obvious, but Genghis Khan and Tuluya recognized as his legitimate son, although outwardly he did not resemble his father.

Of the four sons of Genghis Khan, the youngest had the greatest talents and showed the greatest moral dignity. A good commander and an outstanding administrator, Tului was also a loving husband and distinguished for his nobility. He married the daughter of the deceased head of the Kerait, Wang Khan, who was a devout Christian. Tului himself had no right to accept the Christian faith: like Chinggisid, he had to profess the Bon religion (paganism). But the son of the khan allowed his wife not only to perform all Christian rituals in a luxurious "church" yurt, but also to have priests with them and receive monks. The death of Tului can be called heroic without any exaggeration. When Ogedei fell ill, Tului voluntarily took a strong shamanic potion, trying to "attract" the disease to himself, and died saving his brother.

All four sons had the right to inherit Genghis Khan. After the elimination of Jochi, three heirs remained, and when Chinggis was gone, and the new khan had not yet been elected, Tului ruled the ulus. But at the kurultai of 1229, the gentle and tolerant Ogedei was chosen as the great khan, in accordance with the will of Chinggis. Ogedei, as we have already mentioned, had a kind soul, but the kindness of the sovereign is often not good for the state and subjects. Under him, the management of the ulus was mainly due to the strictness of Chagatai and the diplomatic and administrative skills of Tului. The great khan himself preferred nomadic wanderings with hunts and feasts in Western Mongolia to state concerns.

Genghis Khan's grandchildren were allocated various areas of the ulus or high positions. The eldest son of Jochi, Orda-Ichen, received the White Horde, located between the Irtysh and the Tarbagatai ridge (the area of ​​present-day Semipalatinsk). The second son, Batu, began to own the Golden (big) Horde on the Volga. The third son, Sheibani, went to the Blue Horde, roaming from Tyumen to the Aral Sea. At the same time, the three brothers - the rulers of the uluses - were allocated only one to two thousand Mongolian soldiers each, while the total number of the Mongol army reached 130 thousand people.

The children of Chagatai also received a thousand warriors, and the descendants of Tului, being at the court, owned all of their grandfather's and father's ulus. So the Mongols established a system of inheritance, called a minorat, in which the youngest son inherited all the rights of his father, and the older brothers - only a share in the common inheritance.

The great khan Ogedei also had a son - Guyuk, who claimed the inheritance. The increase in the clan during the lifetime of Chinggis's children caused the division of the inheritance and enormous difficulties in managing the ulus, stretching from the Black to the Yellow Sea. These difficulties and family accounts concealed the seeds of future strife that destroyed the state created by Genghis Khan and his associates.

How many Tatar-Mongols came to Russia? Let's try to deal with this issue.

Russian pre-revolutionary historians mention the "half-million Mongolian army." V. Yan, author of the famous trilogy "Genghis Khan", "Batu" and "To the Last Sea", calls the number four hundred thousand. However, it is known that a warrior of a nomadic tribe sets out on a campaign with three horses (at least two). One carries luggage ("dry rations", horseshoes, spare harness, arrows, armor), and the third one needs to change from time to time so that one horse can rest if he suddenly has to engage in battle.

Simple calculations show that for an army of half a million or four hundred thousand fighters, at least one and a half million horses are needed. Such a herd is unlikely to be able to effectively advance a long distance, since the leading horses will instantly destroy the grass over a huge area, and the hind horses will die from lack of food.

All the main invasions of the Tatar-Mongols into Russia took place in winter, when the remaining grass is hidden under the snow, and you cannot take a lot of forage with you ... The Mongolian horse really knows how to get food from under the snow, but ancient sources do not mention the Mongolian horses that were "In service" of the horde. Horse breeding experts prove that the Tatar-Mongol horde rode the Turkmens, and this is a completely different breed, and looks different, and is not capable of feeding in winter without human help ...

In addition, the difference between a horse allowed to roam in winter without any work, and a horse forced to make long journeys under a rider, and also to participate in battles, is not taken into account. But they, in addition to the riders, had to carry also heavy prey! Convoys followed the troops. The cattle that drags the carts must also be fed ... The picture of a huge mass of people moving in the rearguard of a half-million army with carts, wives and children seems rather fantastic.

The temptation for the historian to explain the campaigns of the Mongols of the 13th century by "migrations" is great. But modern researchers show that the Mongol campaigns were not directly related to the displacement of huge masses of the population. Victories were won not by hordes of nomads, but by small, well-organized mobile detachments, returning to their native steppes after campaigns. And the khans of the Jochi branch - Batu, Horde and Sheibani - received, according to the will of Chinggis, only 4 thousand horsemen, that is, about 12 thousand people who settled in the territory from the Carpathians to Altai.

In the end, historians settled on thirty thousand warriors. But even here unanswered questions arise. And the first among them will be this: is it not enough? Despite the disunity of the Russian principalities, thirty thousand horsemen is too small a figure to arrange “fire and ruin” all over Russia! After all, they (even the supporters of the "classical" version admit it) did not move in a compact mass. Several detachments scattered in different directions, and this reduces the number of "innumerable Tatar hordes" to the limit, beyond which begins an elementary distrust: could such a number of aggressors conquer Russia?

It turns out to be a vicious circle: for purely physical reasons, a huge Tatar-Mongol army would hardly have been able to maintain combat effectiveness in order to move quickly and deliver the notorious "indestructible blows." A small army would hardly have been able to establish control over most of the territory of Russia. To get out of this vicious circle, one has to admit: the invasion of the Tatar-Mongols was actually just an episode of the bloody civil war going on in Russia. The forces of the opponents were relatively small, they relied on their own stocks of fodder accumulated in the cities. And the Tatar-Mongols became an additional external factor used in the internal struggle in the same way as the troops of the Pechenegs and Polovtsians were previously used.

The chronicles that have come down to us about the military campaigns of 1237-1238 paint the classically Russian style of these battles - battles take place in winter, and the Mongols - steppe people - operate with amazing skill in the forests (for example, the encirclement and subsequent complete destruction of the Russian detachment on the City River under the command of the great Prince Vladimirsky Yuri Vsevolodovich).

Having cast a general look at the history of the creation of a huge Mongolian state, we must return to Russia. Let us take a closer look at the situation with the battle of the Kalka River, not fully understood by historians.

At the turn of the 11th-12th centuries, it was not the steppe inhabitants that represented the main danger for Kievan Rus. Our ancestors were friends with the Polovtsian khans, married the "red Polovtsian girls", accepted the baptized Polovtsians into their midst, and the descendants of the latter became Zaporozhye and suburban Cossacks, not without reason in their nicknames the traditional Slavic suffix of belonging "ov" (Ivanov) was replaced by a Turkic one - " Enko ”(Ivanenko).

At this time, a more formidable phenomenon emerged - a fall in morals, a rejection of traditional Russian ethics and morality. In 1097, a princely congress took place in Lyubech, which marked the beginning of a new political form of the country's existence. There it was decided that "let everyone keep his fatherland." Russia began to turn into a confederation of independent states. The princes vowed to keep the proclaimed indestructiblely and in that they kissed the cross. But after the death of Mstislav, the Kiev state began to quickly disintegrate. Polotsk was the first to postpone. Then the Novgorod "republic" stopped sending money to Kiev.

A striking example of the loss of moral values ​​and patriotic feelings was the act of Prince Andrei Bogolyubsky. In 1169, having captured Kiev, Andrew gave the city to his warriors for a three-day plunder. Until that moment, it was customary in Russia to do this only with foreign cities. Under no civil strife, this practice has never spread to Russian cities.

Igor Svyatoslavich, a descendant of Prince Oleg, the hero of The Lay of Igor's Regiment, who became Prince of Chernigov in 1198, set himself the goal of cracking down on Kiev, a city where rivals of his dynasty were constantly strengthening. He agreed with the Smolensk prince Rurik Rostislavich and called for the help of the Polovtsi. In defense of Kiev - "the mother of Russian cities" - the prince Roman Volynsky, who relied on the allied troops of the Torks, spoke out.

The plan of the Chernigov prince was implemented after his death (1202). Rurik, prince of Smolensk, and the Olgovichi with the Polovtsy in January 1203, in a battle that went mainly between the Polovtsy and the torques of Roman Volynsky, prevailed. Having captured Kiev, Rurik Rostislavich subjected the city to a terrible defeat. The Church of the Tithes and the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra were destroyed, and the city itself was burned. “They did a great evil, which was not from baptism in the Russian land,” the chronicler left a message.

After the fateful year 1203, Kiev has not recovered.

According to L. N. Gumilyov, by this time the ancient Russians had lost their passionarity, that is, their cultural and energetic "charge". In such conditions, a clash with a strong adversary could not but become tragic for the country.

Meanwhile, the Mongol regiments were approaching the Russian borders. At that time, the main enemy of the Mongols in the west was the Polovtsy. Their enmity began in 1216, when the Polovtsians accepted Chinggis's blood enemies - the Merkits. The Polovtsians actively pursued the anti-Mongol policy, constantly supporting the Finno-Ugric tribes hostile to the Mongols. At the same time, the steppe-Polovtsians were as mobile as the Mongols themselves. Seeing the futility of cavalry clashes with the Polovtsy, the Mongols sent an expeditionary corps to the rear of the enemy.

The talented commanders Subatei and Jebe led a corps of three tumens across the Caucasus. The Georgian king George Lasha tried to attack them, but was destroyed along with the army. The Mongols managed to capture the guides who showed the way through the Darial Gorge. So they went to the upper reaches of the Kuban, to the rear of the Polovtsy. Those, finding the enemy in their rear, retreated to the Russian border and asked for help from the Russian princes.

It should be noted that the relationship between Russia and the Polovtsy does not fit into the scheme of irreconcilable confrontation "sedentary - nomads". In 1223, the Russian princes acted as allies of the Polovtsians. The three strongest princes of Russia - Mstislav Udaloy from Galich, Mstislav of Kiev and Mstislav of Chernigov, gathered troops and tried to protect them.

The collision on Kalka in 1223 is described in some detail in the annals; in addition, there is another source - "The Tale of the Battle of Kalka, and about the Russian princes, and about seventy heroes." However, the abundance of information does not always clarify ...

Historical science has not denied for a long time the fact that the events on Kalka were not the aggression of evil aliens, but an attack from the Russians. The Mongols themselves did not strive for a war with Russia. The ambassadors who arrived at the Russian princes quite friendly asked the Russians not to interfere in their relations with the Polovtsy. But, true to allied commitments, the Russian princes rejected the peace proposals. In doing so, they made a fatal mistake that had bitter consequences. All the ambassadors were killed (according to some sources, they were not even simply killed, but "tortured"). At all times, the murder of an ambassador, a parliamentarian was considered a grave crime; according to the Mongolian law, the deception of the trusting person was an unforgivable crime.

Following this, the Russian army sets out on a long campaign. Having left the borders of Russia, it was the first to attack the Tatar camp, take prey, steal cattle, after which it moves out of its territory for another eight days. A decisive battle takes place on the Kalka River: the eighty thousandth Russian-Polovtsian army fell on the twenty thousandth (!) Detachment of the Mongols. This battle was lost by the Allies due to the inability to coordinate actions. The Polovtsi left the battlefield in panic. Mstislav Udaloy and his "younger" Prince Daniel fled across the Dnieper; they were the first to reach the shore and managed to jump into the boats. At the same time, the prince chopped up the rest of the boats, fearing that the Tatars would be able to cross after them, “and, fearful, he reached Galich”. Thus, he doomed to death his comrades-in-arms, whose horses were worse than the prince's. The enemies killed everyone they overtook.

The other princes are left alone with the enemy, they beat off his attacks for three days, after which, believing the assurances of the Tatars, they surrender. Another mystery lurks here. It turns out that the princes surrendered after a certain Russian named Ploskinya, who was in the enemy's battle formations, solemnly kissed the pectoral cross that the Russians would be spared and not shed their blood. The Mongols, according to their custom, kept their word: having tied the captives, they laid them on the ground, covered them with a deck of planks and sat down to feast on the bodies. Not a drop of blood was really spilled! And the latter, according to Mongolian views, was considered extremely important. (By the way, the fact that the captive princes were put under the boards is only reported by “The Tale of the Battle on Kalka.” Other sources write that the princes were simply killed without mockery, and still others - that they were “taken prisoner.” So the story with a feast on bodies is just one of the versions.)

Different peoples have different perceptions of the rule of law and the concept of honesty. The Rusichi believed that the Mongols, having killed the captives, had broken their oath. But from the point of view of the Mongols, they kept the oath, and execution was the highest justice, because the princes committed the terrible sin of murdering the one who trusted. Therefore, the matter is not in treachery (history gives a lot of evidence of how the Russian princes themselves violated the kiss of the cross), but in the personality of Ploskini himself - a Russian Christian, who somehow mysteriously found himself among the soldiers of the “unknown people”.

Why did the Russian princes surrender after listening to the persuasions of Ploskini? "The Tale of the Battle of Kalka" writes: "There were also the wanderers with the Tatars, and Ploskinya was their commander." Brodniks are Russian free warriors who lived in those places, the predecessors of the Cossacks. However, the establishment of Ploskini's social position only confuses the matter. It turns out that the roaming people in a short time managed to come to an agreement with the "unknown peoples" and became so close to them that they jointly struck at their brothers in blood and faith? One thing can be stated with certainty: part of the army with which the Russian princes fought on Kalka was Slavic, Christian.

Russian princes in this whole story do not look the best. But back to our riddles. The Tale of the Battle of Kalka, which we have mentioned, for some reason is not able to definitely name the enemy of the Russians! Here is a quote: “... Because of our sins, unknown nations came, godless Moabites [symbolic name from the Bible], about whom no one knows exactly who they are and where they came from, and what their language is, and what kind of tribe they are, and what faith. And they call them Tatars, and some say - Taurmen, and others - Pechenegs. "

Amazing lines! They were written much later than the events described, when it seemed like it was supposed to know exactly with whom the Russian princes fought on Kalka. After all, part of the army (albeit a small one) nevertheless returned from Kalka. Moreover, the victors, in pursuit of the defeated Russian regiments, chased them to Novgorod-Svyatopolch (on the Dnieper), where they attacked the civilian population, so that among the townspeople there should have been witnesses who had seen the enemy with their own eyes. And yet he remains "unknown"! This statement further confuses the matter. After all, the Cumans by the described time in Russia knew perfectly well - for many years they lived side by side, they fought, then became related ... The Taurmen, a nomadic Turkic tribe that lived in the Northern Black Sea region, were again well known to the Russians. It is curious that in the "Lay of Igor's Regiment" some "Tartars" are mentioned among the nomadic Türks who served the Chernigov prince.

One gets the impression that the chronicler is hiding something. For some reason unknown to us, he does not want to directly name the enemy of the Russians in that battle. Perhaps the battle on Kalka was not a clash with unknown peoples at all, but one of the episodes of the internecine war waged between Russian Christians, Polovtsian Christians and the Tatars who got involved in the cause?

After the battle on Kalka, part of the Mongols turned their horses to the east, trying to report on the fulfillment of the assigned task - on the victory over the Polovtsians. But on the banks of the Volga, the army was ambushed by the Volga Bulgars. Muslims, who hated the Mongols as pagans, unexpectedly attacked them during the crossing. Here the victors at Kalka were defeated and many people lost. Those who managed to cross the Volga left the steppes to the east and united with the main forces of Genghis Khan. Thus ended the first meeting of the Mongols and the Russians.

LN Gumilev has collected a huge amount of material that clearly shows that the relationship between Russia and the Horde CAN be designated by the word "symbiosis". After Gumilyov, they write especially a lot and often about how Russian princes and "Mongol khans" became brothers-in-arms, relatives, sons-in-law and father-in-law, how they went on joint military campaigns, how (let's call things by their proper names) they were friends. Relations of this kind are unique in their own way - in no other country they conquered did the Tatars behave like that. This symbiosis, brotherhood in arms leads to such an interweaving of names and events that sometimes it is even difficult to understand where the Russians end and the Tatars begin ...

Therefore, the question of whether there was a Tatar-Mongol yoke in Russia (in the classical sense of this term) remains open. This topic is waiting for its researchers.

7.4. The fourth period: the Tatar-Mongol yoke from the battle of the City (1238) to the "standing on the Ugra" (1481) - the official end of the Tatar-Mongol yoke in Russia KHAN BATY since 1238 YAROSLAV VSEVOLODOVICH, 1238-1248, ruled for 10 years, the capital is Vladimir . Came from Novgorod, s. 70. According to