The position of people at the front and in the rear. Describe the situation of people at the front and in the rear during the First World War. Positional warfare on the Western Front

Chapter 9. On two fronts On a smoky April morning, Kopdratenko gave an emku to the entrance of the small house where I was quartered. Despite the patches, it sparkled festively in the sun. It was felt that, getting ready for the trip, my chauffeur thoroughly washed and polished her black

On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War on June 20, 1941, Grigory Panteleevich successfully completed courses at the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army and was enrolled as a student of the Academy. He learned about the beginning of the war early in the morning of June 22, while at his dacha in Serebryany Bor. On the same day, G. P. Kravchenko was

The above fully applies to the First World War. At first, the rear (of all participants in the future universal battle) was in a state of pre-war euphoria, absolutely confident in the imminent victory of "their guys" - in France, soldiers were waiting with victory by Christmas, and then after the first defeats and funerals, the rear fell into despondency. Meanwhile, the situation required the mobilization of all forces. And much here already depended on the government, its ability to organize and lead society.

Not a single pre-war plan provided for such losses, or that the war would acquire a positional and long-term character by the end of 1914. Real life completely overturned the calculations of the then experts regarding the types, and most importantly, the amount of weapons and ammunition needed to win. Hunger for rifles and shells during this period was not a "Russian phenomenon", as they used to think in Russia, but was universal. The "mountains of armaments accumulated by the militarists," about which the pacifists wrote before the war, were instantly consumed by the adversaries, and the economy of none of the belligerent countries was transferred in advance and in full to a war footing, so that no one could properly replenish the necessary reserves for quite a long time from the participants in the war.

Russia planned to have an annual stock of 76-mm shells per gun of 1000 pieces, but it turned out that this was only enough for 16 days of fighting. The Russians ran out of stock of rifles in three months, and the ammunition (cartridges and shells) ran out by December 1914. France in the Battle of the Marne spent 240 thousand shells daily at an estimated rate of 13 thousand. The French had enough shells for 75-mm guns until September, and stocks of rifles until November 1914. By February 1915, France was short of 700,000 rifles. At the beginning of 1915, the British had from 4 to 10 shells per gun per day, that is, seven times less than the preliminary design norms. The situation was not much better for the enemy. The Germans and Austrians in late 1914 and early 1915 often sent their reinforcements to the front unarmed. It became common practice that weapons were taken from the rear units, and in return they were given captured French or Russian weapons.

The trouble was that if Germany, England and France could relatively quickly establish the necessary production of weapons and ammunition, the Russian industry, due to its weakness, could not do this. At the same time, Russia's requests for help from its allies remained virtually unanswered. The foreign order of the Russians in 1915 was fulfilled by 8% for rifles and cartridges, by 13% for shells and even less for guns. The French and British, themselves pretty hungry in 1914, were in no hurry to replenish the Russian ammunition, but preferred to accumulate weapons in their warehouses.

Years later, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, admitting mistakes, bitterly complained about this inappropriate greed of the Allies and said that if they had not been stingy, but had armed the Russians, then they themselves would have suffered much smaller losses, and the war would have ended earlier, and the revolutions would have in Russia did not happen.

He's probably right. The clumsy Russian economy was able to fully mobilize only by the end of the war, and therefore, unlike the allies or the Germans, the Russian soldier fought from hand to mouth during the First World War, that is, constantly experiencing a shortage of weapons and ammunition. This fact should be constantly kept in mind when analyzing the successes and failures of the Russian army in that war.

To understand the conditions under which the Russians fought in 1915, I will give you one example. During the famous Gorlitsky breakthrough of the Germans against only one of the Russian corps of the 3rd Russian army, the German command concentrated more than 200 heavy guns, not counting light ones. We, however, in this entire 3rd army had only 4 heavy guns.

Of course, the rear problems of Russia in the First World War were not limited to the topic of guns and shells. For example, it was said about a weak railway network even before the war, but during the war the problem of transport became (especially since 1916, when a lot of steam locomotives and wagons went out of order) simply catastrophic. And if there is no transport, there is no way to provide high-quality supplies not only to the front, but also to the rear. Hungry times with surplus-rich Siberia were commonplace. Here is what Rodzianko, chairman of the Duma, wrote at that time: “The food supply became very bad, the cities were starving, in the villages they were sitting without boots, and at the same time everyone felt that there was plenty of everything in Russia, but that nothing could be obtained due to the complete collapse of the rear. Moscow and Petrograd were sitting without meat, and at the same time in the newspapers they wrote that broken carcasses were lying at the stations in Siberia and that this entire supply of half a million poods would rot at the first thaw.

The main mistake in the logistical work of Russia, as many former tsarist generals and experts rightly concluded after the war, was the lack of a unified leadership and a common work plan for the then government. As Nikolai Golovin writes: “It was possible to carry out the proper organization of the rear only if the Law on General Industrial Obligation was issued. A state that considers itself entitled to demand sacrifices from its citizens with blood and life, of course, has an even greater right to demand from its citizens, who remained in the rear, victims of personal labor and property. " However, this was not done. The Council of Ministers rejected three times a bill on the militarization of defense factories. On the one hand, after 1905, the authorities were very afraid of discontent among the workers. On the other hand, the military-industrial lobby was influencing, and the government did not want to quarrel with industrialists who profited from military orders.

As for society, it came to the aid of the state only in June 1915, when the IX Congress of representatives of industry and trade was held in Petrograd. There, the Central Military-Industrial Committee was formed, which over the next two months formed local branches in 73 cities. Simultaneously with the mobilization of large-scale industry, it was the public who took up the mobilization of medium and small-scale industry. The All-Russian Union of Zemstvos and Cities helped the committee as much as he could.

On the whole, the movement was undoubtedly useful, however, as historians correctly note, the government has been treating this most important public initiative for too long, if not negatively, then certainly indifferently. However, the accusations against the Military-Industrial Committee itself were also fair. And here the greed of individual industrialists who tried to cash in on military orders caught the eye of many.

Meanwhile, while the committee was settling its relations with the authorities, while figuring out the real needs of the army, while purchasing new machines, while debugging production, until, finally, this production reached the required indicators in terms of quantity and quality, a considerable time passed. And all this time the army experienced a catastrophic shortage of weapons and ammunition.

Of course, one should not forget the difficult staffing problem. A competent system of retaining skilled workers in production did not appear during the war. Industrialists constantly complained that as soon as they had time to recruit and train new personnel, they were immediately taken into the army. The protests of the Main Artillery Directorate, which was responsible for the supply of ammunition and guns to the front, were not taken into account by the government. That is, the authorities were more concerned with the supply of "cannon fodder" to the front than with guns and shells for them.

However, what can we say about skilled workers, when the personnel of the tsarist government itself (the secret of Punchinelle), with rare exceptions, was very weak and absolutely did not meet the requirements of the moment. The remark of the French minister Tom during his visit to Russia is characteristic. When the Chairman of the State Duma asked him to frankly point out the main weaknesses in the organization of supplying the army, he replied: “Russia must be extremely wealthy and very confident in its strength in order to allow itself the luxury of having a government like yours, where the prime minister is a disaster, and the Minister of War - a disaster. " Unfortunately, the assessment was fair.

In other words, when the Russian industry finally mobilized by 1916, the losses (human, territorial, domestic) were already so serious that the very existence of the Russian Empire was in jeopardy.

The setbacks at the front in 1915 undoubtedly affected the morale in the army, but were much more reflected in the mood in the rear. The strategic decision to take the army deep into the country, which was absolutely correct in those conditions, caused a real panic in the Council of Ministers, and first of all it was spread by the Minister of War Polivanov, although, it seems, it was he who had to understand the real situation at the front better than others. The army, immensely tired by that time and very angry at the top, where rumors of treason in the Tsar's inner circle had already begun to circulate, at that time, nevertheless, still believed in a final victory and was not going to surrender. The soldiers retreated, died, but did not flee.

And in the rear - in the government - panic has already settled, the result of which was the fateful decision of Nicholas II to become the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, dismissing Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich from this post. The Grand Duke, of course, was not an outstanding commander, but he was a good professional. In addition, he was popular among the mass of soldiers. Yes, and the retreat, given the difficult circumstances, Nikolai Nikolayevich carried out, according to experts, quite competently.

But the new supreme was neither a professional nor a popular politician. In military terms, the situation was partly saved by the appointment of the experienced General Alekseev as Chief of the General Staff, but in terms of politics, these changes were deeply erroneous. Being aloof from the direct leadership of the troops, Nicholas II remained in fact the last fulcrum of the already shaken autocracy: the lightning of indignation did not fall on him. Having made (as a result of panic) the decision to lead the army personally, the tsar took upon himself the thankless role of a lightning rod. Now he was personally responsible for all the failures at the front. That knocked out the last support from the autocracy.

The most intelligent tsarist officials, having soberly assessed the situation, resigned, but even this could not stop the sovereign. Although among the retired were the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Trade and Industry and others. As stated in their collective letter: "Sovereign, we dare to tell you once again that your adoption of such a decision threatens, in our extreme understanding, Russia, you and your dynasty with grave consequences."

Further events, as we already know, confirmed their correctness. The authorities were unable to prevent the universal massacre, or prepare for it, or correct their pre-war mistakes during the war. So it was not the Russian army that lost the First World War, it was lost by the power and the rear, which this power could neither organize nor control properly.

Soviet rear during the war

Soviet rear during the war. In the fight against the German invaders, not only military units, but also all home front workers took an active part. They provided the front with everything necessary: ​​weapons, military equipment, ammunition, fuel, as well as food, footwear, clothing, etc. Despite the difficulties, the Soviet people managed to create a powerful economic base that ensured victory. In a short time, the national economy of the USSR was reoriented to meet the needs of the front.

The occupation of the most important economic regions of the USSR put the country's economy in extremely difficult conditions. Before the war, 40% of the country's population lived in the occupied territory, 33% of the gross output of the entire industry was produced, 38% of grain was grown, about 60% of pigs and 38% of cattle were kept.

In order to urgently transfer the national economy to a war footing, compulsory labor service, military norms for the issuance of industrial goods and foodstuffs to the population were introduced in the country. Everywhere an emergency procedure was established for government agencies, industrial and commercial organizations. Overtime has become common practice.

On June 30, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a national economic plan for the third quarter of 1941, which provided for the mobilization of the country's material and labor resources to meet the needs of defense in the shortest possible time. The plan provided for the urgent evacuation of the population, institutions, industrial enterprises and property from the areas threatened by the German occupation.

Through the efforts of the Soviet people, the Urals, Western Siberia and Central Asia were transformed into a powerful military-industrial base. Most of the factories and factories evacuated here by the beginning of 1942 established the production of defense products.

The destruction of the war, the loss of a significant part of the economic potential led to a critical decline in production in the USSR in the second half of 1941. The transfer of the Soviet economy to martial law, which was completed only in mid-1942, had a positive effect on the increase in output and the expansion of the range of military products.

Compared to 1940, the gross industrial output in the Volga region increased 3.1 times, in Western Siberia - 2.4 times, in Eastern Siberia - 1.4 times, in Central Asia and Kazakhstan - 1.2 times. In the all-Union production of oil, coal, pig iron and steel, the share of the eastern regions of the USSR (including the Volga region) ranged from 50 to 100%.

The growth of military production with a reduction in the number of workers and employees was achieved through the intensification of labor, an increase in the duration of the working day, overtime work, and the strengthening of labor discipline. In February 1942, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued the Order "On the mobilization of the able-bodied urban population to work in production and construction during wartime." Men from 16 to 55 years old and women from 16 to 45 years old were mobilized from among those not employed in state institutions and enterprises. The labor resources of the USSR amounted to 23 million people in 1944, half of them were women. Despite this, in 1944 the Soviet Union produced 5,800 tanks and 13,500 aircraft monthly, while Germany produced 2,300 and 3,000, respectively.

The measures taken found support and understanding among the population. During the war, the citizens of the country forgot about sleep and rest, many of them exceeded labor standards by 10 or more times. Slogan: "Everything for the front, everything for the victory over the enemy!" became essentially nationwide. The desire to contribute to the victory over the enemy manifested itself in various forms of labor competition. It became an important moral stimulus for the growth of labor productivity in the Soviet rear.

The achievements of the Soviet economy during the Great Patriotic War would have been impossible without the labor heroism of the Soviet people. Working in incredibly difficult conditions, sparing no effort, health and time, they showed steadfastness and perseverance in completing tasks.

Socialist competition for the production of products above the plan has acquired unprecedented proportions. A heroic deed can be called the heroic labor of youth and women who did everything necessary to defeat the enemy. In 1943, a movement of youth brigades began to improve production, fulfill and overfulfil the plan, and achieve high results with fewer workers. Thanks to this, the production of military equipment, weapons and ammunition has significantly increased. There was a continuous improvement of tanks, guns, aircraft.

During the war, aircraft designers A.S. Yakovlev, S.A.Lavochkin, A.I. Mikoyan, M.I. Gurevich, S.V. Ilyushin, V.M.Petlyakov, A.N. Tupolev created new types of aircraft, superior to the German. New types of tanks were being developed. The best tank of the Second World War, the T-34, was designed by M.I.Koshkin.

The workers of the Soviet home front felt that they were participants in the great battle for the independence of the Fatherland. For the majority of workers and employees, appeals have become the law of life: "Everything for the front, everything for victory over the enemy!", "Work not only for yourself, but also for a comrade who went to the front!" ... Thanks to the dedication of the workers of the Soviet home front, in a short time, the country's economy was transferred to martial law in order to provide the Red Army with everything necessary to achieve victory.

Partisan movement.

The partisan movement in the rear of the fascist troops in the temporarily occupied territory began literally from the first days of the war. It was an integral part of the armed struggle of the Soviet people against the fascist invaders and was an important factor in achieving victory over Nazi Germany and its allies.

The partisan movement had a high degree of organization. In accordance with the Directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated June 29, 1941 and the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated July 18, 1941 "On organizing the struggle in the rear of the German troops", the Central Headquarters of the Partisan movement (TsSHPD) headed by the 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus P.K. Ponomarenko, and on the periphery - the regional and republican headquarters of the partisan movement and their representations at the fronts (Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement, Leningrad, Bryansk, etc.) ...

In these documents, instructions were given on the preparation of the party underground, on the organization, recruitment and armament of partisan detachments, and the tasks of the partisan movement were determined.

Already in 1941, 18 underground regional committees, over 260 district committees, city committees, district committees and other bodies, a large number of primary party organizations and groups, in which there were 65.5 thousand communists, were operating in the occupied territories.

The struggle of Soviet patriots was led by 565 secretaries of regional, city and district party committees, 204 chairmen of regional, city and district executive committees of workers' deputies, 104 secretaries of regional, city and district Komsomol committees, as well as hundreds of other leaders. In the fall of 1943, 24 regional committees, over 370 okrug committees, city committees, rayon committees and other party bodies operated behind enemy lines. As a result of the organizational work of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the combat effectiveness of the partisan detachments increased, their zones of action expanded and the effectiveness of the struggle was increased, in which the broad masses of the population were involved, and close interaction with the Soviet troops was established.

By the end of 1941, over 2 thousand partisan detachments were operating in the occupied territory, in which up to 90 thousand people fought. In total, during the war, there were more than 6 thousand partisan detachments in the rear of the enemy, in which they fought over 1 million 150 thousand partisans.

In 1941 - 1944. in the ranks of Soviet partisans in the occupied territory of the USSR fought: RSFSR (occupied regions) - 250 thousand people. Lithuanian SSR -10 thousand people. Ukrainian SSR - 501,750 people. Byelorussian SSR - 373,942 people. Latvian SSR - 12,000 people. Estonian SSR - 2000 people. Moldavian SSR - 3500 people. Karelo - Finnish SSR - 5500 people.

By the beginning of 1944, there were: workers - 30.1%, peasants - 40.5%, office workers - 29.4%. 90.7% of the partisans were men, 9.3% were women. In many detachments, the communists accounted for up to 20%, about 30% of all partisans were Komsomol members. Representatives of most of the nationalities of the USSR fought in the ranks of the Soviet partisans.

The partisans destroyed, wounded and captured over a million fascists and their accomplices, destroyed more than 4,000 tanks and armored vehicles, 65,000 vehicles, 1,100 aircraft, destroyed and damaged 1,600 railway bridges, derailed over 20,000 railway trains.

Partisan detachments or groups were organized not only in the occupied territory. Their formation in the unoccupied territory was combined with the training of personnel in special partisan schools. The detachments that underwent training and preparation either remained in the designated areas before their occupation, or were transferred to the rear of the enemy. In a number of cases, the formations were created from military personnel. During the war, it was practiced to send organizational groups to the rear of the enemy, on the basis of which partisan detachments and even formations were created. Such groups played an especially important role in the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, in the Baltic States, where, due to the rapid advance of the German fascist troops, many regional and district party committees did not manage to organize work on the deployment of the partisan movement. For the eastern regions of Ukraine and Belarus, for the western regions of the RSFSR, early preparation for a partisan war was characteristic. In the Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Orel, Moscow and Tula regions, in the Crimea, fighter battalions, which consisted of about 25,500 fighters, became the base of formation. Areas for the basing of partisan detachments and warehouses of material resources were created in advance. A characteristic feature of the partisan movement in the Smolensk, Oryol regions and in the Crimea was the participation in it of a significant number of Red Army soldiers who were surrounded or escaped from captivity, which significantly increased the combat effectiveness of the partisan forces.

The main tactical unit of the partisan movement was a detachment - at the beginning of the war, usually several dozen people, later - up to 200 or more fighters. In the course of the war, many detachments were united in formations (brigades) of from several hundred to several thousand people. The armament was dominated by light weapons (machine guns, light machine guns, rifles, carbines, grenades), but many detachments and formations had mortars and heavy machine guns, and some even artillery. People who joined the partisan formations took the partisan oath. In the detachments, firm military discipline was established.

Depending on the specific conditions, small and large formations, regional (local) and non-regional, were organized. Regional detachments and formations were permanently based in one area and were responsible for protecting its population and fighting the occupiers in the area. Non-regional formations and detachments carried out missions in various areas, making long raids, by maneuvering which, the leading organs of the partisan movement concentrated their efforts on the main directions to deliver powerful strikes against the enemy's rear.

The forms of organization of the partisan forces and the methods of their action were influenced by the physical and geographical conditions. Vast forests, swamps, mountains were the main basing areas for partisan forces. Here, partisan territories and zones arose, where various methods of struggle could be widely used, including open battles with punitive enemy expeditions. In the steppe regions, however, large formations operated successfully only during partisan raids. The small detachments and groups that were constantly located here usually avoided open clashes with the enemy and caused damage to him mainly by sabotage.

In a number of regions of the Baltic, Moldavia, the southern part of Western Ukraine, which became part of the USSR only in 1939-40, the Nazis managed to extend their influence to certain segments of the population through bourgeois nationalists. The small partisan detachments and underground organizations that existed in these areas were mainly engaged in sabotage and reconnaissance operations and political work.

The general strategy, the leadership of the partisan movement was carried out by the Supreme Command Headquarters. Directly strategic leadership was carried out by the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TsSHPD) at the Headquarters, created on May 30, 1942. Operationally, he was subordinate to the republican and regional headquarters of the partisan movement (SHPD), which were headed by secretaries or members of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the republics, regional and regional committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (since 1943, the Ukrainian ShPD was directly subordinate to the Supreme Command Headquarters). The broadband access was also subordinate to the Military Councils of the respective fronts.

In those cases when several fronts operated on the territory of a republic or region, under their Military Councils, representative offices or operational groups of republican and regional broadband access were created, which, while supervising the combat activities of partisans in the zone of this front, were subordinate to the corresponding broadband and the Military Council of the front.

Strengthening the leadership of the partisan movement proceeded along the line of improving the communication of the partisans with the mainland, improving the forms of operational and strategic leadership, and improving the planning of combat activities. If in the summer of 1942 only about 30% of the partisan detachments registered with broadband access had radio communication with the mainland, then in November 1943, almost 94% of the detachments maintained radio communication with the leadership of the partisan movement through the radios of partisan brigades.

A large role in the development of partisan warfare behind enemy lines was played by the meeting of the leading workers of the NKO, the Central School of Defense with representatives of underground party bodies, commanders and commissars of large partisan formations of Ukraine, Belarus, the Oryol and Smolensk regions, held by the Central Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) at the end of August. early September 1942. The results of the conference and the most important issues of the struggle behind enemy lines were formulated in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin of September 5, 1942 "On the tasks of the partisan movement."

Much attention was paid to the uninterrupted supply of the partisans with weapons, ammunition, mine-blasting equipment, medicines, and the evacuation of the seriously wounded and sick by air to the mainland. During its existence, the TSSHPD sent 59,960 rifles and carbines, 34,320 automatic rifles, 4,210 light machine guns, 2,556 anti-tank rifles, 2,184 mortars of caliber 50 mm and 82 mm, 539,570 hand anti-personnel and anti-tank grenades to the headquarters of the partisan movement. In 1943, only ADD and Civil Air Fleet planes made over 12 thousand sorties to the rear of the enemy (half of them - with landing on partisan airfields and sites).

The expansion of the partisan movement was facilitated by the enormous political work of partisans and underground fighters among the population of the occupied regions. The population provided the partisans with food, clothing and footwear, sheltered them and warned them of danger, sabotaged all enemy measures. Failure of the fascist plans to use the human and material resources of the occupied regions is one of the most important achievements of the partisans.

Much attention in party political work among the partisans was paid to the education and combat training of personnel. During the war, the central and republican schools of the partisan movement trained and sent about 30 thousand different specialists to the enemy's rear, among them were demolition men, organizers of the underground and partisan movement, radio operators, scouts, etc. Thousands of specialists were trained behind enemy lines at "forest courses".

Communications, especially railways, became the main object of partisan combat activities, which in its scope acquired strategic importance.

For the first time in the history of wars, partisans carried out a number of large operations according to a single plan to disable enemy railway communications over a large territory, which were closely related in time and facilities to the actions of the Red Army and reduced the throughput of railways by 35-40%.

In the winter of 1942-1943, when the Red Army smashed Hitler's troops on the Volga, the Caucasus, the Middle and Upper Don, they unleashed their attacks on the railways, along which the enemy was throwing reserves to the front. In February 1943, on the Bryansk - Karachev, Bryansk - Gomel sections, they blew up several railway bridges, including the bridge across the Desna, along which from 25 to 40 echelons passed daily to the front and the same number of trains back - with broken military units, equipment and looted property.

In Belarus, only from November 1, 1942 to April 1, 1943, 65 railway bridges were blown up. Ukrainian partisans blew up a railway bridge across the Teterev River on the Kiev-Korosten section and several bridges in other areas. Such large railway junctions as Smolensk were under the blows of the partisans almost all the time. Orsha, Bryansk, Gomel, Sarny, Kovel, Shepetovka. From November 1942 to April 1943 alone, in the midst of the Stalingrad counteroffensive and the general offensive, they derailed about 1,500 enemy echelons.

Strong blows to enemy communications were dealt during the summer-autumn campaign. This made it difficult for the enemy to regroup, transport reserves and military equipment, which was a huge help to the Red Army.

The partisan operation that went down in history under the name "Rail War" was grandiose in its scale, the number of forces involved and the results achieved. It was planned by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement and prepared for a long time and comprehensively. The main goal of the operation was to paralyze the transport of the Nazis by rail by simultaneously massively blowing up the rails. Partisans from Leningrad and Kalinin were involved in this operation. Smolensk, Oryol regions. Belarus and partly Ukraine.

Operation "Rail War" began on the night of August 3, 1943. On the very first night, over 42 thousand rails were blown up. Massive explosions continued throughout August and the first half of September. By the end of August, more than 171 thousand rails were out of order, which is 1 thousand km of a single-track railway track. By mid-September, the number of rails blown up reached almost 215 thousand. "In just one month, the number of explosions has increased thirtyfold," the command of the guard corps of Army Group Center reported in its August 31 report.

On September 19, a new such operation began, which received the code name "Concert". This time, the rail war engulfed other areas as well. The partisans of Karelia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Crimea joined it. More powerful blows followed. Thus, while 170 partisan brigades, detachments and groups numbering about 100 thousand people took part in Operation Rail War, 193 brigades and detachments numbering more than 120 thousand people took part in Operation Concert.

The attacks on the railways were combined with attacks on individual garrisons and enemy units, with ambushes on highways and dirt roads, and also with disruption of the river transport of the Nazis. During 1943, about 11 thousand enemy trains were blown up, 6 thousand steam locomotives, about 40 thousand cars and platforms were disabled and damaged, more than 22 thousand cars were destroyed, about 5,500 bridges on highways and dirt roads were destroyed or burned and over 900 railway bridges.

The powerful blows of the partisans behind the entire Soviet-German front shocked the enemy. Soviet patriots not only inflicted great damage on the enemy, disorganized and paralyzed railway traffic, but also demoralized the occupation apparatus.

The enemy was forced to divert large forces to the protection of railway communications, the length of which in the occupied territory of the USSR was 37 thousand kilometers. As the experience of the war showed, for the organization of even weak protection of the railway, 1 battalion is needed for every 100 km, for a strong guard - 1 regiment, and sometimes, for example, in the summer of 1943 in the Leningrad region, the Nazis were forced, due to the active actions of the partisans, to allocate up to 2 regiments.

An important role was played by the intelligence activities of partisans and underground fighters who kept a vast territory under observation. From April to December 1943 alone, they established areas of concentration of 165 divisions, 177 regiments and 135 det. enemy battalions, while in 66 cases they disclosed their organization, staff size, the names of the commanding staff. On the eve of the Byelorussian operation of 1944, the partisans reported the location of 33 headquarters, 30 airfields, 70 large depots, the composition of 900 enemy garrisons and about 240 units, the direction of movement and the nature of the transported goods of 1,642 enemy echelons, etc.

During the defensive battles of 1941, the interaction of the partisans with the troops of the Red Army was carried out mainly in a tactical and operational-tactical framework and was expressed mainly in conducting reconnaissance in the interests of Soviet troops and conducting minor sabotage behind enemy lines.

During the winter offensive of the Red Army 1941-42. the interaction of the partisans with the troops has expanded. The partisans struck at communications, headquarters and warehouses, participated in the liberation of settlements, directed Soviet aviation to enemy targets, and assisted airborne assault forces.

In the summer campaign of 1942, in the interests of the defensive operations of the Red Army, partisans solved the following tasks: hindering the regrouping of enemy troops, destroying enemy manpower and military equipment and disrupting enemy supplies, diverting forces to guard the rear, reconnaissance, guiding Soviet aircraft to targets, freeing prisoners of war ...

The actions of the partisans distracted 24 enemy divisions, including 15-16 ones that were constantly used to guard communications. In August 1942, 148 train wrecks were made, in September - 152, in October - 210, in November - 238. However, in general, the interaction of the partisans with the Red Army was still episodic.

From the spring of 1943, plans for the operational use of partisan forces were systematically developed. During the winter offensive of 1942-43, during the Battle of Kursk in 1943, the Battle of the Dnieper and in the operations to liberate the eastern regions of Belarus, the partisans intensified their actions in the interests of the advancing Soviet troops. The offensive of the Red Army in 1944 was carried out in close cooperation with the partisans, who actively participated in almost all strategic operations.

The importance of tactical interaction increased, since the offensive of the Soviet troops passed through areas where geographical conditions contributed to the creation of a solid defense by the enemy (wooded and swampy areas of the Leningrad and Kalinin regions, Belarus, the Baltic states, north-western regions of Ukraine). It was here that large groupings of partisans operated, which significantly helped the troops to overcome the enemy's resistance. With the beginning of the offensive of the Red Army, they disrupted enemy transfers of troops, disrupted their organized withdrawal and control of them, etc. As the Soviet troops approached, the partisans struck the enemy from the rear and helped to break through his defenses, repel his counterattacks, and encircle the German fascist groups. The partisans assisted the Soviet troops in capturing settlements, provided the open flanks of the advancing troops. The partisans, assisting the offensive of the Red Army, in addition to disrupting enemy communications, seized river crossings, liberated individual settlements, road junctions and held them until the advance units approached. So, in Ukraine, during the Soviet offensive towards the Dnieper, they captured 3 crossings across the Desna, 10 - across the Pripyat and 12 - across the Dnieper.

The most striking example of such effective interaction is the Belarusian operation of 1944, in which a powerful group of Belarusian partisans represented, in essence, the fifth front, coordinating its operations with four advancing fronts.

In 1944, partisan detachments and formations carried out raids outside Soviet territory to assist the fraternal peoples in the struggle against the German-fascist occupiers. In the occupied territory of Poland, there were 7 formations and 26 divisions. large detachments of Soviet partisans, in Czechoslovakia - more than 40 formations and detachments, of which about 20 came out here by raids, the rest were formed on the basis of parachuted organizing groups.

The struggle of the Soviet people behind enemy lines was a vivid manifestation of Soviet patriotism. The significance of the partisan movement in the war was determined by the great assistance it provided to the Soviet troops to achieve victory over the enemy.

In this war, the notion of "partisan movement" as spontaneous and independent actions of individual detachments and groups disappeared. The leadership of the partisan movement was centralized to a strategic scale.

Unified management of the combat activities of partisans with a stable connection between broadband access and partisan formations, interaction of partisans with the Red Army on a tactical, operational and strategic scale, conducting large-scale operations by partisan groups, widespread use of modern mine-blasting equipment, systematic training of partisan personnel, supplying partisans from the rear of the country, the evacuation of the sick and wounded from the enemy rear to the mainland, the actions of Soviet partisans outside the USSR - these and other features of the partisan movement in the Great Patriotic War significantly enriched the theory and practice of partisan warfare as a form of armed struggle.

To fight against the Soviet population, which put up fierce resistance to the Nazis, the occupiers threw a total of 50 divisions, which amounted to 20% of all German troops on the Soviet-German front, despite the fact that until the summer of 1944 on all other fronts (against the allies) , taken together, was only 6% of the troops of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht.

The German general Guderian wrote that "guerrilla warfare has become a real scourge, strongly affecting the morale of front-line soldiers."

The partisan movement and the Bolshevik underground behind enemy lines bore a truly broad national - patriotic character. They fully met the requirements that were presented to them in the speech of I.V. Stalin on July 3, 1941: "In the occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step, disrupting all their activities."

By the beginning of 1915, it had become obvious that in reality the war was noticeably different from what it was seen by the staff of the general staff of the great powers in the pre-war period. Due to the fact that the war had become protracted, it was important for its protagonists to enlist the support of new allies in order to break the existing balance of forces in this way. In 1915, the sphere of hostilities expanded due to the entry into the war of two new countries - Bulgaria on the side of Germany and Italy on the side of the Entente. But the fate of the war was still being decided on the Eastern and Western Fronts.

In 1915, the Russian army began to experience difficulties caused by the fact that the military industry could not provide it with the proper amount of ammunition, weapons and ammunition. Germany decided in 1915 to deliver the main blow on the Eastern Front. In the winter and spring of this year, fighting unfolded along the entire length of this front. In Galicia, things were going well for the Russian troops. The Austrian troops suffered defeat after defeat, and the threat of complete defeat hung over them. In May, the Germans came to the aid of their ally, whose unexpected blow between Gorlice and Tarnov led to a breakthrough of the front and the forced withdrawal of Russian troops from Galicia, Poland and Lithuania. All summer our troops had to conduct heavy defensive battles, and only in the fall did they manage to stop the German offensive.

In 1916, hostilities intensified on the Western Front. In February 1916, the German command launched its largest-scale operation, trying to capture the strategically important French fortress of Verdun. However, despite colossal efforts and huge losses, German troops were never able to take it.

To weaken the German onslaught on Verdun, the Anglo-French army, in turn, tried to break through the German line of defense at the Somme River. In this battle, which lasted from July to the end of November 1916, the British and French used tanks for the first time. Nevertheless, the Battle of the Somme did not bring tangible operational results.

The situation on the Eastern Front was more successful for the Entente. In the midst of the fighting at Verdun, the French command again turned to Russia for help. The call for support came from the Italian army, which was defeated by the Austro-Hungarian troops. In the summer of 1916, the Russian command undertook a number of offensive operations. The army under the leadership of General A. Brusilov broke through the Austrian front on the Lutsk - Chernivtsi line. Russian troops again occupied most of Galicia and Bukovina, putting Austria-Hungary on the brink of military defeat. The Brusilov breakthrough suspended the activity of the Austrians on the Italian front and in many respects eased the position of the Anglo-French troops at Verdun and on the Somme. The dispersal of combat forces in many directions weakened Germany.

The huge scale of hostilities led to the depletion of material and food resources in all the belligerent powers. Military weariness was felt in all the belligerent countries, and anti-war protests grew. The situation was especially difficult in the countries of the German bloc. In Germany, the number of workers on strike grew steadily. On May 1, 1916, at the initiative of K. Liebknecht, a left-wing Social Democrat from the Spartak group, a mass demonstration took place in Berlin streets under the slogans “Down with the war!”, “Down with the government!”.

In Austria-Hungary, the anti-war sentiments of the working masses were closely intertwined with the national liberation movement.

A deep economic crisis has begun in Turkey. Discontent grew in Bulgaria. Even in Britain and France, where the crisis was not so deep, there were major strikes and demonstrations.

However, the most acute situation was in tsarist Russia. The futility of 30 months of almost continuous battles, the death of millions of soldiers, the collapse of the national economy, devastation, hunger, and the decay of the government apparatus — all this revived broad strata of the population against tsarism. The autocracy in Russia was going through a deep crisis. As a result, in February 1917, a revolution took place in the country, which led to the overthrow of the tsarist regime.